Dator vs. Carpio-Morales

The condonation doctrine does not apply to administrative cases instituted after the Supreme Court's abandonment of the doctrine in Carpio Morales vs. CA and Binay, Jr., and a local chief executive who hires a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity to perform the functions of a municipal administrator through a job order—without complying with the statutory requirements of appointment, confirmation, and qualification under the Local Government Code and CSC rules—is liable for simple misconduct, the penalty for which may be reduced to the minimum where mitigating circumstances such as good faith are present.

Celso Olivier T. Dator was the incumbent Mayor of Lucban, Quezon. His sister, Maria Lyncelle D. Macandile, was hired as Chief Administrative Officer through a Job Order and designated as Municipal Administrator through Special Order No. 2, Series of 2014, dated March 1, 2014. The Local Government Code governs the appointment of municipal administrators, requiring specific qualifications under Section 480 and confirmation by the Sangguniang Bayan under Section 443(d). The condonation doctrine—previously recognizing that re-election of an elective official extinguishes administrative liability for misconduct committed in a prior term—was abandoned by the Supreme Court in Carpio Morales vs. CA and Binay, Jr. in November 2015, with the abandonment applied prospectively. CSC Resolution No. 020790 prohibits the hiring of persons covered by nepotism rules under contracts of service and job orders.

On May 2, 2016, complainant Moises B. Villasenor—a former mayor of Lucban, Quezon—filed an administrative complaint against the incumbent Mayor Celso Olivier T. Dator and his sister, Maria Lyncelle D. Macandile, for grave misconduct, grave abuse of authority, and nepotism. The complaint alleged that during Dator's immediately preceding term, he hired Macandile as Chief Administrative Officer through a Job Order and designated her as Municipal Administrator through Special Order No. 2, Series of 2014, dated March 1, 2014. No appointment paper was submitted to the Sangguniang Bayan for the confirmation required under Section 443(d) of the Local Government Code. The complaint further alleged that Macandile lacked the qualifications for the position of Municipal Administrator and that her Job Order contained a false attestation that she was not related within the fourth degree of consanguinity to the hiring authority, when she was in fact Dator's sister.

In their Joint Counter-Affidavit, Dator and Macandile denied the charges. They maintained that Macandile was merely granted authority to perform the duties and functions of an administrator in the exigency and best interest of public service, and that her credentials demonstrated competence, she having worked as a Head Nurse at Ginebra San Miguel, Inc. from 1994 to 2005. They argued that the position of Municipal Administrator did not exist in the municipality's plantilla of personnel, which was why no appointment paper was submitted to the Sangguniang Bayan for confirmation. They characterized the position as primarily confidential, non-career, and coterminous with the appointing authority, and stated that the Job Order was executed for payroll purposes only. They also pointed out that complainant Villasenor, as former mayor, had engaged in the same practice during his own administration, submitting copies of Job Order forms issued from 2007 to 2010 designating Dr. Palermo C. Salvacion as Chief Administrative Officer.

The Ombudsman rendered a Decision on March 20, 2017, dismissing the charges against Macandile but finding Dator administratively liable for simple misconduct. The Ombudsman found that Dator's act of hiring his sister without observing the regular process of appointment, and merely issuing a Job Order, was irregular. It noted that since the position of Municipal Administrator was not in the plantilla, Dator should have requested the Sangguniang Bayan to create the position through an ordinance. The Ombudsman further ruled that although the position was coterminous and highly confidential, the appointee was still required to meet the qualifications under Section 480 of the LGC, and that the position did not fall within the confidential/personal staff contemplated under Section 1(e), Rule X of CSC MC No. 40, s. 1998, which would dispense with eligibility and experience requirements. The Ombudsman also found reprehensible Dator's act of signing the Job Order containing the false attestation regarding consanguinity. The decision, as approved by Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales on October 11, 2017, contained a footnote prescribing a shorter penalty of one month and one day suspension, creating an apparent conflict with the body's imposition of six months.

Dator filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Supplement, reiterating that the prior administration had engaged in the same practice and arguing that the administrative case was extinguished by his re-election in 2016 under the condonation doctrine, which was only abandoned in 2015. He also filed a Motion for Clarification regarding the correct penalty. When the Ombudsman had not yet resolved these motions and the suspension was immediately executory, Dator filed a Petition for Injunction with the CA, praying that respondents be enjoined from implementing the March 20, 2017 Decision. The CA dismissed the petition outright, ruling that an original action for injunction was outside its jurisdiction and that the proper mode was a petition for review under Rule 43. Dator then filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court. The Ombudsman subsequently denied Dator's motion for reconsideration in a February 27, 2018 Order, clarifying that the penalty was six months suspension without pay. Dator also filed a separate Petition for Review under Rule 43 with the CA on June 19, 2018, assailing the same Ombudsman decision and order.

• Condonation Doctrine: Dator maintained that the condonation doctrine still applied to his case because his re-election in 2016 extinguished his administrative liability for misconduct committed during his prior term, the doctrine having been abandoned only in 2015 by the Supreme Court in Carpio Morales vs. CA and Binay, Jr.
• Conflicting Penalties: Dator argued that the disparity between the six months suspension in the body of the OMB decision and the one month and one day suspension in the footnote warranted the issuance of an injunctive writ, as the conflicting penalties made the decision impossible to implement and gave implementing officers arbitrary discretion to choose which penalty to enforce.
• Entitlement to Injunctive Relief: Dator insisted that he had a clear and unmistakable right to be informed of the correct penalty, that the OMB decision was immediately executory, that there was urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage, and that as a public officer he had a right to be protected in his office pending resolution.
• CA Procedural Dismissal: Dator contended that the CA erred in not giving due course to his petition, as the petition substantially questioned the OMB decision in its entirety and the extreme urgency of the situation justified direct recourse to the appellate court.

• Forum Shopping: The OSG argued that Dator committed forum shopping by filing both the instant petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court and a separate petition for review under Rule 43 before the CA, both assailing the same March 20, 2017 OMB Decision.
• No Entitlement to Injunctive Relief: The OSG maintained that the CA was correct in dismissing the petition for injunction and that Dator was not entitled to any injunctive relief, as decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are immediately executory pending appeal.
• Proper Mode of Appeal: The OSG supported the CA's ruling that the correct mode to impugn the Ombudsman's decision in administrative disciplinary cases is a petition for review under Rule 43, not an original action for injunction under Rule 58.

• Condonation Doctrine: Whether the condonation doctrine still applies to Dator's case.
• Injunctive Relief: Whether the conflicting penalties in the Ombudsman's decision warrant the issuance of an injunctive writ.
• Procedural Due Course: Whether the CA erred in not giving due course to Dator's petition for injunction.

• Condonation Doctrine: No. The condonation doctrine is inapplicable because the administrative case was instituted on May 2, 2016, after the Court's abandonment of the doctrine in Carpio Morales vs. CA and Binay, Jr. in November 2015.
• Injunctive Relief: No. Dator failed to demonstrate a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, as there is no vested right to public office, and the damage from suspension is quantifiable since salary and emoluments are recoverable if he prevails on appeal.
• Procedural Due Course: Yes. The CA erred in outrightly dismissing the petition on procedural grounds alone, as the petition substantially questioned the OMB decision and the urgency of the situation justified relaxation of the rules.

• Condonation Doctrine: The Court discussed the condonation doctrine's history and its abandonment in Carpio Morales vs. CA and Binay, Jr., where it was ruled that the doctrine is bereft of legal authority in Philippine jurisdiction, being inconsistent with the constitutional concept of public office as a public trust and the requirement of accountability at all times. The Court emphasized that election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense and that there is no constitutional or statutory basis supporting the notion that re-election absolves an official of administrative liability arising from offenses committed during a prior term. Crucially, the abandonment was explicitly declared prospective in application, meaning the doctrine remains applicable only to cases that transpired prior to the ruling. Since the complaint against Dator was filed on May 2, 2016—after the November 2015 ruling in Carpio Morales—the condonation doctrine could no longer be invoked.

• Injunctive Relief: The Court applied the four requisites for injunctive relief: (1) a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) the right is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4) urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage. Dator failed to satisfy the first and fourth requisites. There is no vested right to public office, and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are immediately executory pending appeal. Citing Belmonte vs. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, the Court reiterated that a respondent in an administrative case is considered preventively suspended while the case is on appeal, and if he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and emoluments he did not receive. The damage from suspension is therefore quantifiable and not irreparable, as irreparable damage requires the absence of any standard by which the amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy.

• Procedural Due Course: While the CA was technically correct that the proper mode of appeal from Ombudsman decisions in administrative disciplinary cases is a petition for review under Rule 43, a close scrutiny of Dator's petition for injunction revealed that it questioned the OMB decision in its entirety. Given the peculiar circumstances—the conflicting penalties in the decision, the immediately executory nature of the suspension, and the pending resolution of his motion for clarification—Dator was justified in seeking urgent relief. The Court held that the Rules of Procedure may be relaxed for persuasive and weighty reasons to relieve a litigant of injustice, particularly where the suspension of an elective official would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services of the person they voted into office. The subsequent petition for review filed by Dator before the CA under Rule 43 was dismissed for forum shopping, as both petitions assailed the same OMB decision and sought similar reliefs. However, the forum shopping was neither willful nor deliberate, as Dator was constrained to file due to the urgency of the conflicting penalties and did not conceal the pending petition before the Supreme Court. Accordingly, only the subsequent petition was dismissed.

• Condonation Doctrine (Abandonment) — The doctrine that re-election of an elective local official extinguishes administrative liability for misconduct committed during a prior term was abandoned in Carpio Morales vs. CA and Binay, Jr. for lack of legal basis under the 1987 Constitution and existing statutes. The abandonment is prospective in application, meaning the doctrine remains applicable only to cases that transpired prior to the November 2015 ruling. In this case, the doctrine was held inapplicable because the administrative complaint was filed on May 2, 2016, after the abandonment.

• Forum Shopping — Forum shopping is committed by filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It may be committed through litis pendentia, res judicata, or splitting of causes of action. The consequences depend on whether the act was willful and deliberate: if not, the subsequent case is dismissed without prejudice; if willful and deliberate, all actions are dismissed with prejudice. In this case, Dator's filing of both a petition for injunction and a Rule 43 petition before the CA constituted forum shopping, but it was neither willful nor deliberate given the urgency of the situation, so only the subsequent petition was dismissed.

• Requisites for Injunctive Relief — To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the applicant must show: (1) a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) the right is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4) there is urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage. Dator failed to satisfy the first and fourth requisites because there is no vested right to public office and the damage from suspension is quantifiable, as salary and emoluments are recoverable upon a successful appeal.

• Nepotism and Job Orders — Under CSC Resolution No. 020790, persons covered by the rules on nepotism are prohibited from being hired under contracts of service and job orders. Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the appointing authority, recommending authority, chief of the bureau or office, or person exercising immediate supervision. The hiring of a sister by a mayor through a job order to perform the functions of a municipal administrator falls squarely within this prohibition.

• Simple vs. Grave Misconduct — Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, particularly unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. Grave misconduct requires the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules; absent these elements, the misconduct is only simple. A person charged with grave misconduct may be held liable for simple misconduct if the qualifying elements are not proven. Simple misconduct is classified as a less grave offense under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, punishable by suspension of one month and one day to six months for the first offense.

• What Cannot Be Legally Done Directly Cannot Be Done Indirectly — The lack of a plantilla position for municipal administrator cannot justify appointing a person to assume the exact functions and duties of that position without fulfilling the requisites set out in law. Circumventing the statutory appointment process through a job order or special order is impermissible; if acts that cannot be legally done directly could be done indirectly, all laws would be illusory.

• "What cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. This rule is basic and, to a reasonable mind, does not need explanation. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory." — This passage articulates the fundamental principle prohibiting circumvention of statutory requirements through alternative hiring mechanisms such as job orders and special orders.

• "No vested right is violated by the application of Section 7 because the respondent in the administrative case is considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal and, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. It is important to note that there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office." — Quoted from Belmonte vs. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, this passage establishes that the immediate executory nature of Ombudsman decisions does not violate any vested right, which is central to the denial of injunctive relief.

• "Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is folly absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term." — Quoted from Carpio Morales vs. CA and Binay, Jr., this passage captures the ratio decidendi for the abandonment of the condonation doctrine, explaining why re-election cannot extinguish administrative liability.

• "While the Rules of Procedure must be faithfully followed, the same Rules may be relaxed for persuasive and weighty reasons to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure." — This passage states the principle allowing relaxation of procedural rules in exceptional circumstances, which justified the Court's reversal of the CA's outright dismissal.

• Carpio Morales vs. CA and Binay, Jr., 772 Phil. 672 (2015) — The seminal case abandoning the condonation doctrine, ruling it bereft of legal authority in Philippine jurisdiction. Applied to determine that the doctrine was inapplicable to Dator because his case was filed after this ruling.

• Office of the Ombudsman vs. Mayor Julius Cesar Vergara, G.R. No. 216871, December 6, 2017 — Discussed the condonation doctrine's prospective application, confirming that the doctrine remains applicable only to cases that transpired prior to Carpio Morales. Distinguished from Dator's case, which was instituted after the abandonment.

• Yamson, et al. vs. Castro, et al., 790 Phil. 667 (2016) — Discussed the rule on forum shopping, including the three ways it may be committed and the consequences depending on whether the act was willful and deliberate. Applied to determine that Dator's forum shopping was neither willful nor deliberate.

• P/S Insp. Belmonte, et al. vs. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, 778 Phil. 221 (2016) — Instructive on the nature of appealable Ombudsman decisions as immediately executory pending appeal and the absence of a vested right to public office. Applied to deny injunctive relief.

• Gov. Garcia, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals 12th Division, et al., 604 Phil. 677 (2009) — Cited for the principle that suspension of an elective official undeservedly deprives the electorate of the services of the person they voted into office, supporting relaxation of procedural rules.

• Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative vs. La Trinidad Water District, 661 Phil. 390 (2011) — Cited for the principle that what cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly, applied to Dator's circumvention of the statutory appointment process.

• Civil Service Commission vs. Cortes, 734 Phil. 295 (2014) — Cited for the definition of nepotism, applied to establish that Macandile, being Dator's sister, fell within the prohibition.

• Section 480, Article X, Local Government Code — Prescribes the qualifications, terms, powers, and duties of a municipal administrator, including citizenship, residency, good moral character, a college degree, civil service eligibility, and experience in management and administration work of at least three years for a municipal administrator. Applied to determine that Macandile lacked the required qualifications and that the position, though coterminous and confidential, still required compliance with these standards.

• Section 443(d), Local Government Code — Provides that heads of departments and offices shall be appointed by the municipal mayor with the concurrence of the majority of all Sangguniang Bayan members, subject to civil service law, rules, and regulations. Applied to find that Dator failed to submit any appointment paper for confirmation, circumventing the statutory process.

• Section 1(e), Rule X, CSC MC No. 40, s. 1998 — Provides that appointees to confidential/personal staff need meet only educational requirements, dispensing with civil service eligibility, experience, training, and other requirements. Applied to rule that the position of Municipal Administrator does not fall within the confidential/personal staff exception.

• CSC Resolution No. 020790 (Policy Guidelines for Contract of Service) — Prohibits the hiring under contracts of service and job orders of persons covered by nepotism rules, those previously dismissed from service, those hired to perform functions pertaining to vacant regular plantilla positions, and those who have reached compulsory retirement age. Applied to find that Dator's hiring of his sister through a job order violated this resolution.

• Section 52(B)(2), Rule IV, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service — Classifies simple misconduct as a less grave offense punishable by suspension of one month and one day to six months for the first offense. Applied to determine the range of penalties available.

• Section 54, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service — Sets out the manner of imposition of penalty, providing that the minimum penalty shall be imposed where only mitigating and no aggravating circumstances are present. Applied to reduce the penalty to one month and one day suspension due to the mitigating circumstance of good faith.

• Section 7, Rule III, Administrative Order No. 07, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17 (Ombudsman Rules of Procedure) — Provides that decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. Applied to support the immediate executory nature of the OMB decision and the denial of injunctive relief.

• Section 5, Rule 58, Rules of Court — Provides that a TRO may be issued only if great or irreparable injury would be inflicted on the applicant before the writ of preliminary injunction could be heard. Applied to test Dator's entitlement to injunctive relief.

Leonardo-De Castro, C.J. (Chairperson), Del Castillo, and Jardeleza, JJ., concurred. Bersamin, J., was on official business.