Daoang vs. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas

The disqualification under Article 335(1) of the Civil Code applies only to persons who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction; it does not extend to persons who have legitimate grandchildren, the word "children" being clear and unambiguous and not inclusive of grandchildren.

Respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy had a legitimate daughter, Estrella Agonoy, who was the mother of the petitioners Roderick and Rommel Daoang. Estrella died on 1 March 1971. The spouses thereafter sought to adopt two unrelated minors, Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos, before the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. The petitioners, as surviving grandchildren of the spouses through Estrella, opposed the adoption on the theory that the spouses' having had a legitimate child—and consequently legitimate grandchildren—disqualified them under Article 335(1) of the Civil Code. The governing statute, Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, was patterned after Article 174 of the Spanish Civil Code, which had previously been in force in the Philippines and which disqualified persons with legitimate or legitimated "descendants" from adopting; the Philippine codifiers, however, substituted the word "children" for "descendants."

On 23 March 1971, respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking to adopt the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. The case was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 37. The petition was set for hearing on 24 April 1971, and notices were served upon the Office of the Solicitor General and ordered published in the Ilocos Times, a weekly newspaper of general circulation in Ilocos Norte with editorial offices in Laoag City.

On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, Romeo Daoang, filed an opposition to the adoption petition. They claimed that the spouses Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, the oppositors' mother, who had died on 1 March 1971, and that the spouses were therefore disqualified from adopting under Article 335 of the Civil Code. The petitioners further contended, citing In re Adoption of Millendez, that the proposed adoption would introduce a foreign element into the family unit and reduce the legitimes of the petitioners, producing an indirect, permanent, and irrevocable disinheritance contrary to the law's policy on reconciliation between offender and offended party.

After the required publication of notice was accomplished and evidence was presented, the Municipal Court of San Nicolas rendered its decision on 30 June 1971, granting the petition for adoption. The dispositive portion declared Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos children by adoption of the spouses Agonoy, freed them from legal obedience and maintenance by their respective parents, changed their surnames to "Agonoy," and directed that the decision be entered into the records of the Local Civil Registry of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. The respondent judge overruled the opposition by applying the legal maxim that what is expressly included excludes what is not included, holding that "children" in Article 335 does not encompass grandchildren.

• Disqualification under Article 335: Petitioners argued that the respondent spouses had a legitimate daughter, Estrella Agonoy, the petitioners' mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and that the spouses were consequently disqualified from adopting under Article 335 of the Civil Code.
• Reduction of Legitimes and Indirect Disinheritance: Citing In re Adoption of Millendez, petitioners contended that the adoption would introduce a foreign element into the family unit, reduce their legitimes, and produce an indirect, permanent, and irrevocable disinheritance contrary to the policy of law that subsequent reconciliation between offender and offended deprives the latter of the right to disinherit.

• Statutory Construction — Expressio Unius: Respondent judge reasoned that to include grandchildren in Article 335, where none is expressly mentioned, would violate the legal maxim that what is expressly included naturally excludes what is not included.

• Scope of Disqualification: Whether the respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1), Article 335 of the Civil Code by virtue of their having legitimate grandchildren through their deceased legitimate daughter.

• Scope of Disqualification: No. The word "children" in Article 335(1) of the Civil Code is clear and unambiguous and does not include grandchildren; the disqualification applies only to those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction.

• Scope of Disqualification: The Court found the language of Article 335(1) clear and unambiguous, applying the well-settled rule that a statute clear on its face need not be interpreted; only statutes with ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction. The word "children" has a clearly defined meaning in law and, as the respondent judge correctly observed, does not include grandchildren. The Court reinforced this conclusion through a comparative-legislative analysis: Article 174 of the Spanish Civil Code, which had once been in force in the Philippines and served as the pattern for the Philippine Civil Code, disqualified persons with legitimate or legitimated "descendants" from adopting—language that would have barred the spouses Agonoy. When the Philippine Civil Code was enacted, however, the legislature deliberately changed "descendants" to "children" in paragraph (1) of Article 335, demonstrating a clear intent to narrow the disqualification. The Court further noted that adoption was traditionally for the benefit of the adoptor, affording childless persons the consolation of having a child through legal fiction, but that the modern tendency is geared toward the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life, with every intendment sustained to promote that objective. Under the law then in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction was no longer even a ground for disqualification to adopt, further supporting a construction that did not extend the disqualification to grandchildren.

• Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius — The legal maxim that what is expressly included excludes what is not included. The Court applied this principle to hold that because Article 335(1) of the Civil Code enumerates only "legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction," and does not mention grandchildren, the disqualification cannot be extended to persons who have grandchildren.
• Plain Meaning Rule (Verba Legis) — A statute that is clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; only statutes with ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction. The Court invoked this rule to decline petitioners' invitation to expand the scope of "children" in Article 335(1) to include grandchildren.
• Modern Policy of Adoption — Child Welfare Orientation — The modern tendency in adoption law is geared toward the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every intendment is sustained to promote that objective. The Court cited this principle as supporting a construction favoring the grant of adoption.

• "The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include grandchildren." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the plain meaning of "children" in Article 335(1) excludes grandchildren, and thus the disqualification does not apply.
• "But, when the Civil Code of the Philippines was adopted, the word 'descendants' was changed to 'children', in paragraph (1) of Article 335." — This passage establishes the comparative-legislative basis for the holding, demonstrating that the legislature deliberately narrowed the disqualification from the broader "descendants" in the Spanish Civil Code to "children" in the Philippine Civil Code.
• "The present tendency, however, is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every intendment is sustained to promote that objective." — This passage articulates the modern policy orientation of adoption law toward child welfare, which the Court invoked as supporting a liberal construction favoring the adoption.

• In re Adoption of Millendez, G.R. No. L-28195, June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA 499 — Cited by petitioners for the proposition that adoption would introduce a foreign element into the family unit and reduce legitimes; the Court did not follow this argument in resolving the statutory issue.
• In re Adoption of Resaba, 95 Phil. 244 — Cited for the historical proposition that adoption was traditionally for the benefit of the adoptor, affording childless persons the consolation of having a child through legal fiction.
• Santos vs. Aranzanso, 123 Phil. 160 — Cited for the modern tendency in adoption law toward promotion of the welfare of the child.

• Article 335(1), Civil Code of the Philippines — Disqualifies from adopting "those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction." The Court held that the word "children" is clear and unambiguous and does not include grandchildren, so the respondent spouses, who had only grandchildren through their deceased daughter, were not disqualified.
• Article 174, Civil Code of Spain — Disqualified persons with legitimate or legitimated "descendants" from adopting. The Court contrasted this provision with Article 335(1) of the Philippine Civil Code, noting that the Philippine codifiers deliberately substituted "children" for "descendants," thereby narrowing the disqualification.
• Article 28, Child and Welfare Code — Cited for the proposition that, under the law then in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction was no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt.

Yap, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Sarmiento, JJ., concurred.