Dano vs. Commission on Elections

The one-year residency requirement for local elective officials under Section 39 of the Local Government Code does not require continuous, uninterrupted, or substantial actual bodily presence in the locality; what is required is the establishment of domicile, which is a matter of intent supported by acts confirming that intent. A candidate who has reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and has established domicile in the locality where she seeks election satisfies the residency requirement even if she is temporarily absent therefrom, provided the absence is justified and does not indicate abandonment of the domicile.

Juliet B. Dano was a natural-born Filipino citizen from the Municipality of Sevilla, Province of Bohol, who worked as a nurse in the United States and later acquired American citizenship. She sought to reacquire her Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, which allows former natural-born Filipino citizens who were subsequently naturalized in a foreign country to reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic. Section 39 of the Local Government Code requires that an elective local official be a resident of the locality where she intends to be elected for at least one year immediately preceding the day of the election. The case arose in the context of the May 13, 2013 local elections, where Dano sought to run for mayor of Sevilla, Bohol.

Juliet B. Dano was a natural-born Filipino who hailed from the Municipality of Sevilla, Province of Bohol. She worked as a nurse in the United States and thereafter acquired American citizenship. On February 2, 2012, she obtained a Community Tax Certificate from the municipal treasurer of Sevilla. On March 30, 2012, she took her Oath of Allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles, California, reacquiring her Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225. On May 2, 2012, Dano went to Sevilla to apply for voter's registration. Eight days later, she went back to the United States and stayed there until September 28, 2012, claiming that she went there to wind up her affairs, particularly to sell her house in Stockton, California, as well as her shares of stock in various companies. Upon returning to the Philippines, Dano executed a Sworn Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship on September 30, 2012. On October 4, 2012, she filed her Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of Sevilla, representing herself as having been a resident of Sevilla for 1 year and 11 days prior to the elections of May 13, 2013, or from May 2, 2012.

On October 10, 2012, private respondent Marie Karen Joy Digal, the daughter of Ernesita Digal whom Dano would later defeat for the mayoralty position in the 2013 elections by a margin of 668 votes, filed a petition with COMELEC for the cancellation of Dano's Certificate of Candidacy. Private respondent alleged that Dano had made material misrepresentations of fact in her Certificate of Candidacy and failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. In support of her allegation, private respondent presented a Certification of the Office of the Municipal Assessor that Dano had no real property declared under her name in Sevilla as of October 30, 2012; a Certification of the COMELEC Election Officer that Dano had no voting record available as of October 30, 2012; and an Affidavit executed by Ceferino Digal, husband of Ernesita Digal, Dano's rival for the mayoralty position.

Dano, for her part, presented the following evidence to establish the fact of her residence in Sevilla: a Certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Sevilla issued upon her request on January 30, 2012; a Community Tax Certificate issued on February 2, 2012; her Application for Registration as voter dated May 2, 2012; her Philippine passport issued on April 27, 2012; a Deed of Absolute Sale of parcels of land in her favor executed on May 18, 2012; an Affidavit executed by Tristan Cabagnot, the incumbent punong barangay of Poblacion, Sevilla; and an Affidavit executed by Praxides Mosqueda, a retired public school teacher and member of the Parish Pastoral Council of Sevilla. In her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc, Dano further argued that the following acts showed that she had reestablished her domicile in Sevilla: she purchased parcels of land and a residential house as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on May 18, 2012; she made public her intention to run for mayor of Sevilla as early as January 2012; and she started to settle permanently in her ancestral home in Barangay Poblacion, Sevilla, starting January 2012. She later filed a Supplement to Petition for Review attaching copies of documents evidencing the sale of her properties in the United States, including a California Residential Purchase Agreement, Buyer's Inspection Advisory, Short Sale Addendum, Disclosure Regarding Real Estate Agency Relationship, and Trade Confirmation of Sale of Shares of Stocks.

The COMELEC First Division, in its Resolution dated May 8, 2013, cancelled Dano's Certificate of Candidacy, highlighting that even if she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship, registered as a voter in Sevilla, and executed her sworn renunciation, her prolonged absence resulted in her failure to reestablish her domicile in her hometown. The First Division ruled that a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin, and upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225, must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, with the period of residency counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice and not retroacting to the time of his birth. The First Division found that during the intervening six-month period between taking the oath of allegiance on March 30, 2012 and the sworn renunciation on September 30, 2012, no concrete acts had been done by Dano to clearly establish that she had categorically chosen Sevilla as her domicile of choice, and that her frequent absence in the Philippines after filing her application for registration could not be considered insignificant or as a mere temporary absence. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the First Division's ruling on November 20, 2013. Pending the resolution of her motion for reconsideration, Dano assumed office as mayor of Sevilla and began discharging the powers of the office upon her proclamation. Maria Emily D. Dagaang, Sevilla's then Vice-Mayor-Elect, filed a Petition-in-Intervention, claiming that under Section 44 of the Local Government Code, it was she who should be proclaimed as mayor of Sevilla in case Dano's Certificate of Candidacy were to be cancelled.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner argued that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling her Certificate of Candidacy, as it failed to fully appreciate her evidence establishing her reacquisition of domicile in Sevilla, including her purchase of parcels of land and a residential house, her public declaration of intent to run for mayor as early as January 2012, and her permanent settlement in her ancestral home starting January 2012.
• Residency Compliance: Petitioner maintained that she satisfied the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code, as she had reacquired her Philippine citizenship on March 30, 2012, applied for voter registration in Sevilla on May 2, 2012, and her four-month absence in the United States was justified by her need to wind up her affairs there, including selling her house and shares of stock.
• Absence Justification: Petitioner argued that her trip to the United States was necessary, unavoidable, and demanded by her clear decision to settle for good in Sevilla, Bohol, as she travelled there to dispose of her properties and settle her obligations in good faith.

• Failure to Reestablish Domicile: Respondent argued that Dano failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code, as she was a naturalized American citizen who had abandoned her domicile of origin in Sevilla, and her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship did not automatically reestablish her domicile there.
• Interruption of Residency: Respondent contended that Dano's trip to the United States before the approval of her application for voter registration interrupted her residency in Sevilla, and that her application for voter registration alone could not be considered sufficient to establish her domicile since she went back to the United States soon after.
• Lack of Concrete Acts: Respondent argued that during the intervening period between Dano's Oath of Allegiance on March 30, 2012 and her Sworn Renunciation on September 30, 2012, no concrete acts were done by Dano to clearly establish that she had categorically chosen Sevilla as her domicile of choice, and that physical presence and not mere intent is required to establish domicile.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner had failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.
• Succession: If the cancellation of petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy is upheld by this Court, whether she should be succeeded by the qualified candidate with the next highest number of votes or by the vice-mayor.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Yes. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling Dano's Certificate of Candidacy, as it failed to fully appreciate her evidence establishing her reacquisition of domicile in Sevilla and instead made a legal conclusion contrary to jurisprudence that a candidate physically absent from a locality for four out of twelve months preceding the elections can never fulfill the residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code.
• Succession: Moot. The second issue was dispensed with for being moot in view of the expiration of the term of office of the winners of the 2013 elections.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Court explained that in Mitra vs. Comelec, the appreciation and evaluation of evidence by COMELEC is not ordinarily reviewed in a petition for certiorari, but in exceptional cases when COMELEC's action oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged but constitutionally mandated to intervene. The Court found this case to be such an instance, as COMELEC abruptly concluded that Dano had failed to reestablish her domicile in Sevilla simply because she was admittedly absent from the municipality for four months, instead of evaluating the probative value of the evidence she presented. The Court reminded COMELEC that the summary nature of proceedings under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code only allows it to rule on patent material misrepresentations of facts, not to make conclusions of law that are even contrary to jurisprudence. The Court ruled that physical presence, along with animus manendi et revertendi, is an essential requirement for the acquisition of a domicile of choice, but the law does not require that physical presence be unbroken. Citing Japzon vs. Comelec and Sabili vs. Comelec, the Court reiterated that a candidate is not required to stay and never leave the place for a full one-year period prior to the date of the election, and that the law does not require a candidate to be at home 24 hours a day, 7 days a week to fulfill the residency requirement. The Court noted that COMELEC relied heavily on the affidavits executed by Ceferino and Marie Karen Joy Digal containing bare allegations that Dano had never been a resident of Sevilla since she became an American citizen, but Dano sufficiently established that she had already reacquired her Philippine citizenship when she started residing in Sevilla on May 2, 2012. The Court observed that the only controverted issue before COMELEC was whether Dano's absence from the locality for four months out of the 1 year and 11 days she had stated in her Certificate of Candidacy rendered her unable to fulfill the residence requirement, and COMELEC should not have disregarded the evidence showing specific acts performed by Dano one year before the elections which clearly demonstrated her animus manendi et revertendi: she made public her intention to run for the mayoralty position; she started to reside in her ancestral home and obtained a Community Tax Certificate during the first quarter of 2012; she applied for voter's registration in Sevilla; and she went back to the United States to dispose of her properties located there. The Court also found that COMELEC was wrong in dismissively disregarding the affidavits of the punong barangay and a long-time resident of Sevilla for not being "substantiated by proof," citing Sabili where the Court said that the certification of the punong barangay should be given due consideration. The Court held that COMELEC's grave abuse of discretion lay in its failure to fully appreciate Dano's evidence and fully explained absence from Sevilla, and in cancelling Dano's Certificate of Candidacy without any prior determination of whether or not she had intended to deceive or mislead the electorate. The Court emphasized that the denial of due course to, or the cancellation of, a Certificate of Candidacy must be anchored on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that was false, and in the sphere of election laws, a material misrepresentation pertains to a candidate's act done with the intention to gain an advantage by deceitfully claiming possession of all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications when, in fact, the contrary is true. Citing Mitra vs. Comelec, the Court noted that the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy was reversed because COMELEC failed to critically consider whether the candidate deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible, and absent such finding, the cancellation of Dano's Certificate of Candidacy could not be sustained.
• Succession: The Court dispensed with the second issue for being moot in view of the expiration of the term of office of the winners of the 2013 elections.

• Residence synonymous with domicile — Under election laws, the term "residence" is synonymous with domicile and refers to the individual's permanent home or the place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return, depending on the attendant facts and circumstances confirming the individual's intent and actions to carry out this intent. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that Dano had re-established her domicile in Sevilla through her acts of reacquiring Philippine citizenship, applying for voter registration, purchasing real property, and manifesting her intent to settle permanently in her ancestral home.
• Animus manendi et revertendi — To effect a change of domicile or to acquire a domicile of choice, there must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) a bona fide intention to remain there; and (3) a bona fide intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must be animus manendi in the new residence, coupled with animus non revertendi with respect to the former residence. The Court applied this doctrine in ruling that Dano's acts demonstrated her intent to abandon her United States domicile and establish Sevilla as her new domicile of choice.
• Continuous physical presence not required — The law does not require that physical presence in the locality be unbroken to satisfy the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials. A candidate is not required to stay and never leave the place for a full one-year period prior to the date of the election, and the law does not require a candidate to be at home 24 hours a day, 7 days a week to fulfill the residency requirement. The Court applied this doctrine in ruling that Dano's four-month absence from Sevilla to wind up her affairs in the United States did not interrupt her re-established domicile.
• Grave abuse of discretion — Grave abuse of discretion means the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that COMELEC's failure to fully appreciate Dano's evidence and its legal conclusion contrary to jurisprudence constituted grave abuse of discretion.
• Material misrepresentation in Certificate of Candidacy — The denial of due course to, or the cancellation of, a Certificate of Candidacy must be anchored on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that was false. A material misrepresentation pertains to a candidate's act done with the intention to gain an advantage by deceitfully claiming possession of all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications when, in fact, the contrary is true. The Court applied this doctrine in ruling that COMELEC cancelled Dano's Certificate of Candidacy without any prior determination of whether she had intended to deceive or mislead the electorate.

• "Physical presence, along with animus manendi et revertendi, is an essential requirement for the acquisition of a domicile of choice. However, the law does not require that physical presence be unbroken." — This passage states the ratio decidendi of the case, establishing that the one-year residency requirement does not demand continuous physical presence in the locality.
• "COMELEC's grave abuse of discretion lay in its failure to fully appreciate petitioner's evidence and fully explained absence from Sevilla. Instead, it made a legal conclusion that a candidate who has been physically absent from a locality for four out of the twelve months preceding the elections can never fulfil the residence requirement under Section 39 of the LGC." — This passage identifies the specific act constituting grave abuse of discretion and the Court's basis for intervening in COMELEC's ruling.
• "It must be emphasized that the denial of due course to, or the cancellation of, a COC must be anchored on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that was false. In the sphere of election laws, a material misrepresentation pertains to a candidate's act done with the intention to gain an advantage by deceitfully claiming possession of all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications when, in fact, the contrary is true." — This passage defines the standard for cancellation of a Certificate of Candidacy and the requirement of intent to deceive.

• Mitra vs. Comelec, 636 Phil. 753 (2010) — Controlling precedent cited for the rule that the appreciation and evaluation of evidence by COMELEC is not ordinarily reviewed in a petition for certiorari, but in exceptional cases when COMELEC's action oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is constitutionally mandated to intervene. Also cited for the rule that the cancellation of a Certificate of Candidacy must be based on a finding of deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact.
• Japzon vs. Comelec, 596 Phil. 354 (2009) — Followed for the rule that to be considered a resident of a municipality, the candidate is not required to stay and never leave the place for a full one-year period prior to the date of the election.
• Sabili vs. Comelec, 686 Phil. 649 (2012) — Followed for the rule that the law does not require a candidate to be at home 24 hours a day, 7 days a week to fulfill the residency requirement, and that the certification of the punong barangay should be given due consideration.
• Limbona vs. Comelec, 578 Phil. 364 (2008) — Cited for the doctrine that to effect a change of domicile or to acquire a domicile of choice, there must concur residence or bodily presence in the new locality, a bona fide intention to remain there, and a bona fide intention to abandon the old domicile.
• Fermin vs. Comelec, 595 Phil. 449 (2008) — Cited for the rule that the denial of due course to, or the cancellation of, a Certificate of Candidacy must be anchored on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that was false.

• Section 39, Local Government Code — Provides that an elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province where he intends to be elected, a resident therein for at least one year immediately preceding the day of the election, and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. The Court applied this provision in determining whether Dano satisfied the one-year residency requirement.
• Section 78, Omnibus Election Code — Provides that a verified petition seeking to deny due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 is false. The Court applied this provision in ruling that COMELEC cancelled Dano's Certificate of Candidacy without any prior determination of whether she had intended to deceive or mislead the electorate.
• Section 5(2), Republic Act No. 9225 — Provides that those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under the Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights, and those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. The Court applied this provision in determining that Dano had complied with the requirements for reacquired Filipino citizens seeking elective office.
• Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Provides that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The Court applied this provision as the constitutional basis for its intervention in COMELEC's ruling.

• Brion, J. — Concurred through a separate opinion, emphasizing that Dano satisfied the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code in relation to Republic Act No. 9225. Justice Brion elaborated that Dano's four-month stay in the United States after re-establishing her domicile in Sevilla with the filing of her application for voter registration cannot be considered an interruption of the required one-year residency, as continued and uninterrupted actual bodily presence is not required under the law. He further opined that change of residence or domicile is essentially a matter of intent supported by acts confirming the existence of the intent, and that the presented evidence did not clearly show that Dano committed a deliberate false representation sufficient to cancel her Certificate of Candidacy. He also emphasized that given that the move to disqualify Dano was filed before the election and was a live issue before the electorate, all doubts should have been resolved in favor of Dano's qualification after the people of Sevilla themselves spoke in the May 13, 2013 elections.

N/A — No dissenting opinion was noted in the case text.