Damayo vs. Lagura-Yap

A judge may not be held administratively liable for errors committed in the performance of judicial functions, no matter how erroneous, in the absence of a showing of fraud, dishonesty, corruption, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice; the proper remedy is to seek correction through judicial review, not through an administrative complaint.

Catherine Damayo was convicted of estafa in Criminal Case No. DU-14740 by the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, then presided over by Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap. After her appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for availing of the wrong mode of review, Damayo, through her mother, filed an administrative complaint against the now Associate Justice Lagura-Yap, alleging that the conviction was fraudulent and that the judgment was not properly promulgated.

• The Criminal Case and Conviction: On October 2, 2006, an Information for Estafa was filed against Catherine Damayo before the RTC of Mandaue City, Branch 28, then presided by Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap. Damayo was arraigned on November 23, 2006 and pleaded “not guilty.” Trial on the merits followed. On November 3, 2011, the trial court rendered a judgment finding Damayo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa, sentencing her to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, and ordering her to pay civil liability of ₱17,274.35 with 12% interest per annum from the date of demand.

• The Erroneous Statement in the Decision: The opening statement of the written decision dated November 3, 2011 stated that “Catherine Damayo pleaded ‘guilty’ when she was arraigned on November 23, 2006 on the aforequoted charge.” The records, including the Order dated November 23, 2006, unequivocally showed that Damayo pleaded “not guilty.” The body of the decision discussed the evidence of both prosecution and defense, indicating that the case was decided on the merits, not on a plea of guilt.

• Promulgation in Absentia: Notice for the promulgation scheduled on November 24, 2011 was sent to Damayo. She failed to appear despite notice. The trial court proceeded with the promulgation by recording the dispositive portion in the criminal docket, as authorized by Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, and served a copy to her at her last known address or through counsel.

• The Lost Appeal: Damayo, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal. The entire records were transmitted to the Court of Appeals. Instead of filing an appellant’s brief, Damayo submitted a petition for review under Rule 42. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on January 18, 2013 for being the wrong mode of review: the RTC decision was rendered in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, making a petition for review under Rule 42 — applicable only to decisions rendered in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction — improper. A motion for reconsideration was denied on November 21, 2014 for lack of merit.

• The Administrative Complaint: Damayo filed the instant complaint, alleging that her conviction was fraudulent. She argued that: (a) the judgment falsely stated she pleaded “guilty”; (b) respondent deliberately included a detailed narration to sustain the false plea; and (c) the judgment was spurious and never duly promulgated; they only learned of it upon inquiring about the case status. She sought to hold respondent administratively liable for rendering a false decision and judicial fraud.

• Defense of Respondent: Respondent Justice Lagura-Yap denied the charges. She admitted the erroneous reference to “guilty” but explained it was due to mere inadvertence — the omission of the word “not” — and that no fraudulent intent existed because the conviction was based on the evidence, not on any alleged plea of guilt. She maintained she personally prepared and signed the judgment, negating the claim of spuriousness. She invoked Section 6, Rule 120, as the basis for valid promulgation in absentia. She surmised the administrative complaint was a substitute for a lost appeal caused by Damayo’s own procedural misstep.

• Inadvertent Error Without Fraudulent Intent: Respondent argued that the statement that complainant pleaded “guilty” was caused by mere inadvertence, as the records — particularly the Order dated November 23, 2006 — clearly showed a plea of “not guilty.” She insisted the error was not deliberate or malicious, and it could not have affected the evidence proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt; the decision was rendered on the merits.

• Regular Performance of Judicial Functions: Respondent maintained that she personally prepared and signed the judgment, and the detailed narration was a faithful discussion of the evidence presented, not an attempt to sustain an erroneous plea. She emphasized that the conviction rested on the quantum of proof, not on the plea.

• Valid Promulgation in Absentia: Respondent invoked Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, pointing out that since complainant failed to appear at the scheduled promulgation despite notice, the promulgation was properly effected by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving a copy upon her.

• Procedural Default of Complainant: Respondent submitted that the administrative complaint was a substitute for a lost appeal, the dismissal of which was entirely attributable to complainant’s own fault in pursuing the wrong mode of review.

• Fraud or Bad Faith: Whether respondent Associate Justice committed fraud or acted in bad faith in rendering the judgment against complainant, thereby warranting administrative liability.

• Validity of Promulgation: Whether the judgment was validly promulgated in absentia in accordance with the Rules of Court.

• Propriety of Administrative Complaint: Whether the administrative complaint should be dismissed and complainant appropriately sanctioned for filing an unsubstantiated charge.

• Fraud or Bad Faith: The allegation of fraud was found unsubstantiated. The burden of proof in administrative proceedings rests on the complainant, and mere allegation of fraud is insufficient; clear and convincing extrinsic evidence of bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose is required. The erroneous statement that complainant pleaded “guilty” was caused by inadvertence — the omission of the word “not” — as shown by the record of arraignment and the body of the decision itself, which discussed the defensive arguments and evidence, indicating the case was decided on the merits. No showing of bad faith, malice, or corrupt motives was made. Absent fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, a judge’s judicial acts, even if erroneous, are not subject to administrative discipline; the remedy is to seek correction through appellate review, not to file an administrative complaint.

• Validity of Promulgation: The promulgation was valid. Complainant was duly notified of the November 24, 2011 scheduled promulgation but failed to appear. Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, the trial court correctly promulgated the judgment by recording the dispositive portion in the criminal docket and serving a copy on the accused. The rule on promulgation in absentia is intended to prevent an accused from frustrating the judicial process by absconding.

• Propriety of Administrative Complaint: The complaint was dismissed for failure to substantiate the charges. The Court declared it would not hesitate to protect judges and court personnel from groundless accusations that trifle with judicial processes. Complainant was sternly warned against filing unsubstantiated complaints against judges and justices that serve only to harass them.

• Administrative Liability of Judges — Requisites for Disciplinary Action — The acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, corruption, or a deliberate intent to do injustice. Even palpable error, without extrinsic evidence of bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, is not a ground for administrative sanction. The proper remedy of an aggrieved party is to elevate the error to a higher court for review, not to file an administrative complaint.

• Burden of Proof in Administrative Proceedings Against Judges — The complainant bears the burden of proving the charges by clear and convincing evidence. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to any error that may be inferred from the decision or order itself. Bare allegations of fraud are insufficient.

• Promulgation of Judgment in Absentia — Under Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, if the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving a copy upon the accused at his last known address or through counsel. The rule is intended to prevent subversion of the judicial process by an accused who absconds to frustrate promulgation.

• Protection of Judges from Unsubstantiated Suits — The Court will not hesitate to dismiss unfounded administrative complaints and to shield judges and judicial personnel from suits that trifle with judicial processes, disrupting rather than promoting the orderly administration of justice.

• “It should be emphasized that as a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. He cannot be subjected to liability — civil, criminal or administrative — for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. In such a case, the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file an administrative complaint against the judge but to elevate the error to the higher court for review and correction.” — This passage encapsulates the controlling doctrine on judicial immunity from administrative suits and the distinction between judicial error and disciplinary infraction.

• “This Court will not hesitate to protect Judges or court personnel against any groundless accusation that trifles with judicial processes when an administrative charge against them has no basis whatsoever in fact or in law. This Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon all employees of the judiciary, but neither will it hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.” — Highlights the Court’s balancing duty to discipline while protecting judicial officers from harassment.

• Rivera v. Judge Mendoza, 529 Phil. 600 (2006) — Cited for the rule that in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof rests on the complainant, and clear and convincing evidence is required to support charges against judges.

• Salvador v. Judge Limsiaco, Jr., 519 Phil. 683 (2006), citing Balsamo v. Suan, 458 Phil. 11 (2003) — Applied for the principle that a judge cannot be held administratively liable for errors in judicial acts absent a showing of bad faith or deliberate intent to do injustice; good faith and absence of malice are sufficient defenses.

• People v. Chiok, 534 Phil. 538 (2006) — Referenced to explain the rationale of promulgation in absentia under Section 6, Rule 120: the rule prevents an accused from subverting the judicial process by absconding.

• Tan Tiac Chiong v. Cosico, 434 Phil. 753 (2002) — Cited in support of the Court’s declaration that it will shield judicial officers from unfounded suits that disrupt the orderly administration of justice.

• Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court — Governs the promulgation of judgment in criminal cases. Applied to validate the promulgation in absentia after complainant failed to appear despite notice. The provision authorizes recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving a copy to the accused, preventing the frustration of promulgation by deliberate non-appearance.

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno and Associate Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Portugal Perez, Jose Catral Mendoza, Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, and Marvic M.V.F. Leonen concurred. Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Arturo D. Brion, Bienvenido L. Reyes, and Francis H. Jardeleza were on leave.

No dissenting opinions were recorded; the decision was unanimous among the participating justices.