Dagadag vs. Tongnawa

A municipal mayor is a real party in interest to challenge the reversal of his suspension or dismissal orders against municipal employees, but if he ceases to hold office during the pendency of the action, he loses legal personality to prosecute the appeal unless his successor timely continues it under Section 17, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Petitioner Rhustom L. Dagadag was the municipal mayor of Tanudan, Kalinga, while respondents Michael C. Tongnawa and Antonio Gammod served as municipal engineer and municipal planning and development coordinator, respectively, in the same municipality. Under Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, the municipal mayor is the appointing authority for municipal officials and employees paid from municipal funds and possesses disciplinary jurisdiction over subordinate officials and employees. The Civil Service Commission is constitutionally mandated to preserve and safeguard the integrity of the civil service system.

Petitioner Rhustom L. Dagadag was the municipal mayor of Tanudan, Kalinga, while respondents Michael C. Tongnawa and Antonio Gammod were the municipal engineer and municipal planning and development coordinator, respectively, of the same municipality. On July 24, 1995, petitioner, then mayor, sent respondents a memorandum ordering them to explain within 72 hours why they should not be administratively sanctioned for acts unbecoming of public servants and failure to perform their duties. Respondents submitted their respective explanations.

On August 1, 1995, petitioner issued Executive Order No. 95-002 creating a Municipal Grievance Committee to investigate the charges against respondents. Guilbert Dangpason, then vice-mayor of Tanudan, was designated chairman. After investigation, the Committee found respondents liable for insubordination, non-performance of duties, and absences without official leaves (AWOL). On November 27, 1995, petitioner issued an order suspending respondents from their respective positions for two months, or from December 1, 1995 to February 28, 1996.

Respondents appealed to the Civil Service Commission, contending that their right to due process had been violated. On May 23, 1996, during the pendency of that appeal, petitioner issued an order dropping them from the roll of employees effective May 28, 1996 by reason of their unauthorized absences. Respondents again appealed to the CSC.

Before the CSC, the suspension order was affirmed on October 21, 1997 through Resolution No. 974229, and reconsideration was denied on May 31, 1999. The dropping order was likewise affirmed on June 29, 1999 through Resolution No. 991136, with reconsideration denied. Respondents then filed separate petitions for review with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54511 and CA-G.R. SP No. 57315.

Before the Court of Appeals, respondents ascribed irregularities in the Grievance Committee hearing and submitted affidavits of William Tumbali and former Vice-Mayor Guilbert Dangpason, the committee chairman. Dangpason attested that while a meeting was held, no investigation was actually conducted; respondents were not given an opportunity to explain their side and prove their defenses; and the minutes on which the suspension was based did not state the true proceedings. These declarations were not denied by petitioner. The Court of Appeals found these declarations clear and convincing, found that the presumption of regularity in the committee hearing had been rebutted, and found that the minutes could not solely be the basis for suspension. It also found that respondents’ unauthorized absences totaled 41 and 43 days, respectively, but were intermittent rather than continuous.

• Substantial Evidence: Petitioner alleged that his suspension and dismissal orders against respondents are supported by substantial evidence.
• Credibility of Affidavits: Petitioner alleged that the sworn declarations of William Tumbali and Guilbert Dangpason, the designated Chairman of the Municipal Grievance Committee, that there was actually no investigation conducted on petitioner’s charges, are devoid of credibility.

• Lack of Legal Personality: Respondents averred that petitioner has no legal personality to file the instant petition because he had ceased to be the municipal mayor of Tanudan, Kalinga.
• Proper Party: Respondents averred that the CSC, being the aggrieved party, is the proper party to file the petition.

• Real Party in Interest: Whether the Civil Service Commission and the municipal mayor of Tanudan are real parties in interest to challenge the Court of Appeals’ joint Decision reversing the CSC resolutions.
• Legal Personality After Cessation from Office: Whether petitioner, having ceased to be mayor at the time he filed the instant petition, retained legal personality to interpose the petition, or whether his successor’s failure to continue the action requires dismissal under Section 17, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

• Real Party in Interest: Yes. The CSC and the mayor of Tanudan are real parties in interest and may contest the assailed joint Decision; the CSC is constitutionally mandated to preserve civil service integrity, while the mayor’s power to appoint carries the power to remove and municipal funds pay respondents’ salaries.
• Legal Personality After Cessation from Office: No. Petitioner lost legal personality to interpose the instant petition because he was no longer mayor when he filed it, and his successor did not continue or maintain the appeal as required by Section 17, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

• Real Party in Interest: Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines a real party in interest as the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. The interest contemplated is material interest in issue and affected by the judgment, not mere interest in the question involved or a mere incidental interest. The CSC is a party adversely affected by the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals because it has been mandated by the Constitution to preserve and safeguard the integrity of the civil service system; any transgression by respondents of CSC rules and regulations adversely affects that integrity, and the CSC did not challenge the assailed Decision. The mayor is also a real party in interest for two reasons. First, his power to appoint officials and employees of the municipality; both respondents were appointed by petitioner during his incumbency. In Francisco Abella, Jr. vs. Civil Service Commission, the Court En Banc held that the municipal mayor, being the appointing authority, is a real party in interest to challenge the CSC’s disapproval of the appointment of his appointee. Similarly, where a municipal mayor orders the suspension or dismissal of a municipal employee on grounds he believes to be proper, but his order is reversed or nullified by the CSC or the Court of Appeals, he has the right to contest such adverse ruling. His right to appeal flows from the fact that his power to appoint carries with it the power to remove; as chief executive of the municipality, he possesses disciplinary power over appointive municipal officials and employees. Whenever his order imposing administrative sanctions upon erring municipal personnel is challenged, he should be allowed to defend his action as the appointing authority. Second, the salaries of respondents, being municipal officials, are drawn from municipal funds; the mayor has a real and substantial interest in the outcome of the administrative cases against respondents.

• Legal Personality After Cessation from Office: Section 17, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that when a public officer is a party in an action in his official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained by or against his successor if, within thirty (30) days after the successor takes office or such time as may be granted by the court, it is satisfactorily shown to the court by any party that there is a substantial need for continuing or maintaining it and that the successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor. Before substitution is made, the party or officer affected, unless expressly assenting thereto, shall be given reasonable notice of the application and accorded an opportunity to be heard. Interpreting this rule, in Miranda vs. Carreon, Heirs of Mayor Nemencio Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, and Roque, et al. vs. Delgado, et al., the Court held that where the petitioner, a public officer, ceases to be mayor, the appeal and/or action he initiated may be continued and maintained by his successor if there is substantial need to do so; if the successor failed to pursue the appeal and/or action, the same should be dismissed. Records show that upon petitioner’s cessation from public office, his successor did not file any manifestation to the effect that he is continuing and maintaining this appeal. Thus, petitioner lost his legal personality to interpose the instant petition, and the petition was denied.

• Real Party in Interest — Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or is entitled to the avails of the suit. The interest must be a material or present substantial interest, not a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. The Court applied this to hold that the CSC, constitutionally mandated to preserve and safeguard the integrity of the civil service system, and the municipal mayor, as appointing authority with disciplinary power and because municipal funds pay respondents’ salaries, are real parties in interest to challenge the CA decision reversing the mayor’s suspension and dismissal orders.
• Appointing Authority’s Power to Remove — A municipal mayor’s power to appoint municipal officials and employees carries with it the power to remove; as chief executive, the mayor possesses disciplinary power over appointive municipal officials and employees. Thus, when the mayor’s order imposing administrative sanctions is reversed or nullified by the CSC or the Court of Appeals, he has the right to contest the adverse ruling and defend his action as appointing authority.
• Continuation of Action by Successor of a Public Officer — Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, when a public officer is a party in an action in his official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained by or against his successor if, within thirty (30) days after the successor takes office or such time as the court may grant, it is satisfactorily shown that there is substantial need for continuing or maintaining it and that the successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor. If the successor fails to pursue the appeal or action, the same should be dismissed. The Court applied this to dismiss the petition because petitioner had ceased to be mayor and his successor did not manifest any intention to continue the appeal.

• "The established rule is that a real party in interest is one who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or one entitled to the avails of the suit. The word "interest," as contemplated by the Rules, means material interest or an interest in issue and to be affected by the judgment, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved or a mere incidental interest." — Defines real party in interest and the nature of the required interest.
• "The CSC is the party adversely affected by the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals because it has been mandated by the Constitution to preserve and safeguard the integrity of our civil service system." — Explains why the CSC is a real party in interest despite not having filed the petition.
• "Similarly, where a municipal mayor orders the suspension or dismissal of a municipal employee on grounds he believes to be proper, but his order is reversed or nullified by the CSC or the Court of Appeals (as in this case), he has the right to contest such adverse ruling. His right to appeal flows from the fact that his power to appoint carries with it the power to remove." — States the mayor’s real party interest and the appointing authority’s power to remove.
• "Records show that upon petitioner’s cessation from public office, his successor did not file any manifestation to the effect that he is continuing and maintaining this appeal. We thus agree with the respondents that petitioner has lost his legal personality to interpose the instant petition." — Applies Section 17, Rule 3 and states the dispositive rationale.

• Francisco Abella, Jr. vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 152574, November 17, 2004 — The Court relied on this En Banc ruling to hold that the municipal mayor, as appointing authority, is a real party in interest to challenge the CSC’s disapproval of his appointee’s appointment; the principle was extended to the mayor’s challenge to the reversal of his suspension and dismissal orders.
• Miranda vs. Carreon, G.R. No. 143540, April 11, 2003 — Cited in interpreting Section 17, Rule 3; held that where a public officer-petitioner ceases to be mayor, the appeal or action may be continued by his successor if there is substantial need, and if the successor fails to pursue it, the action should be dismissed.
• Heirs of Mayor Nemencio Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119193, March 29, 1996, 255 SCRA 672 — Cited for the same rule on continuation of an action by the successor of a public officer who ceases to hold office.
• Roque, et al. vs. Delgado, et al., No. L-6770, August 31, 1954, 95 Phil. 723 — Cited for the same rule on continuation of an action by the successor of a public officer who ceases to hold office.
• Civil Service Commission vs. Dacoycoy, G.R. No. 135805, April 29, 1999, 306 SCRA 405 — Cited in support of the CSC’s constitutional mandate to preserve and safeguard the integrity of the civil service system, which made it a real party in interest.
• Central Bank vs. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744, April 10, 1989 — Cited in the Abella excerpt for the proposition that the appointing authority stands to be adversely affected when the CSC disapproves an appointment and may defend its appointment.

• Section 2, Rule 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Defines a real party in interest as the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or is entitled to the avails of the suit. The Court applied this to hold that both the CSC and the municipal mayor are real parties in interest.
• Section 17, Rule 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs the death or separation of a party who is a public officer. It allows the action to be continued by the successor if, within thirty (30) days after the successor takes office or such time as the court may grant, it is shown that there is substantial need and that the successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor. The Court applied this to deny the petition because petitioner’s successor did not continue the appeal.
• Section 444, paragraphs (a), (b)(1)(v), Article I, Chapter III, Title III, Book I, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Provides that the municipal mayor, as chief executive, shall appoint all officials and employees whose salaries and wages are wholly or mainly paid out of municipal funds and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in the Code. The Court cited this to support the mayor’s real party interest.
• Section 87, Title III, Book I, Republic Act No. 7160 — Provides that the local chief executive may impose the penalty of removal from service, demotion in rank, suspension for not more than one (1) year without pay, fine in an amount not exceeding six (6) months’ salary, or reprimand, and otherwise discipline subordinate officials and employees under his jurisdiction. The Court cited this to support the mayor’s disciplinary power and power to remove.
• Section 444, paragraphs (a), (b)(x), Article I, Chapter III, Title III, Book I, Republic Act No. 7160 — Provides that the mayor shall ensure that all executive officials and employees of the municipality faithfully discharge their duties and functions and cause administrative or judicial proceedings against any official or employee who may have committed an offense in the performance of official duties. The Court cited this in connection with the mayor’s disciplinary authority.
• Constitution (CSC mandate) — The Court stated that the CSC is mandated by the Constitution to preserve and safeguard the integrity of the civil service system; this constitutional mandate supported its status as a real party in interest.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.