Daco vs. Cabajar

The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples has jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples when the parties belong to the same indigenous cultural community and the dispute involves ancestral domain, and native title — being ownership since time immemorial — prevails over mere tax declarations unsupported by other evidence.

Arnolfo A. Daco is a Tagbanua and a native of Busuanga, Palawan, while Ruben E. Cabajar is a member of the Tagbanua indigenous cultural community of Barangay Panlaitan, Busuanga, Palawan, and president of the Panlaitan San Isidro Cultural Minorities Development Association. The Tagbanuas represented by Cabajar applied for a Certificate of Ancestral Domain under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8371, or the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997, covering areas in Barangay Panlaitan and San Isidro, including Black Island or Isla Malajem. During the pendency of the application, former National Commission on Indigenous Peoples Chairperson Eugenio Insigne issued an "Assumption Over Ancestral Domain" in favor of the Tagbanuas, and Municipal Resolution No. 39, series of 1996, recognized that the Tagbanuas occupy and own Isla Malajem. The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act created the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples as the primary government agency responsible for promoting and protecting the rights and well-being of indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples, and for recognizing their ancestral domains.

Ruben E. Cabajar is a member of the Tagbanua indigenous cultural community of Barangay Panlaitan, Busuanga, Palawan, and the president of the Panlaitan San Isidro Cultural Minorities Development Association, a local organization of indigenous peoples in Busuanga, Palawan. He was authorized by the Council of Elders of the Tagbanua indigenous cultural community of Barangay Panlaitan and San Isidro to file a complaint before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples for violation of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8371, or the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997, against Arnolfo A. Daco, also a Tagbanua and a native of Busuanga, Palawan, specifically for unauthorized and unlawful intrusion, with prayer for temporary restraining order, permanent injunction, and damages.

Cabajar alleged that the Tagbanuas he represents applied for a Certificate of Ancestral Domain under Section 11 of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act, covering areas in Barangay Panlaitan and San Isidro, which includes Black Island or Isla Malajem. During the pendency of their application, former National Commission on Indigenous Peoples Chairperson Eugenio Insigne issued an "Assumption Over Ancestral Domain" in favor of the Tagbanuas represented by Cabajar. Cabajar also cited Municipal Resolution No. 39, series of 1996, which allegedly recognizes that his fellow Tagbanuas occupy and own Isla Malajem.

On October 12, 2012, Cabajar alleged that Daco, accompanied by several barangay tanods of Barangay Panlaitan, forcibly took over Isla Malajem. Two members of the Council of Elders who were guarding Isla Malajem on that day claimed that they saw Daco and the barangay tanods bring construction materials to the area. One of the tanods approached Cabajar and informed him that Punong Barangay Jerry Del Valle told them to escort Daco. Daco then proceeded to construct a nipa hut despite the elders' protest. Daco argued that he paid the municipal government for the ownership of Isla Malajem and had documents, particularly tax declarations, to prove it. The elders refuted this claim, saying that they have native title over the area and that their crops, plants, caves, and three nipa huts could prove their possession of the island since time immemorial. Unfazed, Daco and the barangay tanods continued with the construction. Cabajar and the other members of the Council of Elders went to Isla Malajem to settle but Daco and the tanods refused to talk to them. Subsequently, Daco barred Cabajar and the other Tagbanuas from returning to Isla Malajem. Cabajar alleged that because of this, their livelihood suffered since Isla Malajem was their primary source of Balinsasayaw nest or edible bird nest.

Upon learning of the complaint, Daco argued that the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples Regional Hearing Office IV had no jurisdiction over the complaint. Officials from the Regional Hearing Office conducted an ocular inspection in the disputed land, but Daco did not appear; instead, his sister was present but did not participate. The Regional Hearing Office found that Isla Malajem was a seashore and a cave traditionally used by the indigenous peoples to gather bird's nest, or in Tagbanua dialect, "balinsasayaw," since time immemorial, and thus could not be privately owned by one individual. It also found that the same finding had already been established in its previous ruling in PASICMIDA vs. PCSD, and that while the Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title had not yet been issued, the Tagbanuas had established a claim over their ancestral domain since time immemorial, which already constituted native title.

• Procedural Infirmities: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing his appeal based on procedural infirmities without considering the merits of the case.
• Ownership and Possession: Petitioner claimed that Isla Malajem was owned by his father, Ciricao Daco, who is also a Tagbanua, and who introduced improvements over the property during his lifetime; however, the improvements were allegedly destroyed by Cabajar and the other Tagbanuas when they attempted to grab the property using the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act as their basis.
• Tax Declaration: Petitioner added that Isla Malajem is declared for tax purposes under his name.
• Absence of CADT: Petitioner claimed that the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples has yet to issue a title declaring Isla Malajem as ancestral land or ancestral domain in favor of the Tagbanuas represented by Cabajar.
• Lack of Jurisdiction: Petitioner claimed that the Commission had no jurisdiction over the case because the complaint is criminal in nature.

• Procedural Infirmities: Respondent asserted that the Court of Appeals is correct in dismissing petitioner's petition for its numerous procedural flaws, and that the negligence of petitioner's counsel signifies their intent to further delay the resolution of the case.
• Jurisdiction: Respondent added that petitioner's claim that the Regional Hearing Office has no jurisdiction has no basis since the complaint he filed against petitioner is not criminal in nature, but a civil case with a violation of Tagbanua customary law.
• Tax Declaration: Respondent asserted that the tax declaration presented by petitioner appears spurious and that it was not enough to support the claim of occupation or possession of the area.

• Procedural Grounds: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition outright due to procedural grounds.
• Jurisdiction: Whether the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples has jurisdiction over the complaint for violation of Section 10 of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act.
• Ownership and Possession: Whether petitioner Arnolfo A. Daco has a legitimate claim of ownership or possession over Isla Malajem.

• Procedural Grounds: Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal solely on technicalities, as the procedural lapses warranted relaxation of the rules under the liberal construction doctrine, but the petition nonetheless fails on the merits.
• Jurisdiction: Yes. The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples has jurisdiction over the complaint, both parties being members of the same indigenous cultural community and the dispute involving ancestral domain.
• Ownership and Possession: No. Petitioner's tax declarations and unsubstantiated claims of possession cannot defeat the Tagbanua's native title over Isla Malajem.

• Procedural Grounds: The Court held that while the number of procedural defects in petitioner's appeal to the Court of Appeals admittedly indicated negligence on their part, rules of procedure should not be so absolute as to subvert the true objective of all rules and laws that justice be attained. Citing Barnes vs. Padilla, which in turn cited Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, the Court enumerated instances that would merit the relaxation of procedural rules: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor, or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. The Court found that a strict application of Rule 43, Sections 5 and 6 of the Rules of Civil Procedure was not called for as the case involves matters of property that affect both parties' livelihood, and the liberal interpretation of the remedial requirements would not prejudice the other party. On the contrary, resolving the case on the merits rather than on pure technicalities would have promoted judicial economy. The Court also cited Kabalikat para sa Maunlad na Buhay, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, where it remanded the case to the Court of Tax Appeals, holding that to abruptly put an end to litigation solely based on technicalities amounts to serious injustice to the parties, and Alcantara vs. The Philippine Commercial and International Bank, where it held that in appropriate cases, the courts may liberally construe procedural rules in order to meet and advance the cause of substantial justice. The Court noted that petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration curing all the defects found in his Appeal, and none of the procedural lapses committed were prejudicial to respondent. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals should have decided the appeal not solely on the technicalities, but on the merits of the case. This notwithstanding, the Petition still fails on the merits.

• Jurisdiction: The Court held that jurisdiction is the power and authority of a tribunal to hear, try, and decide a case, conferred by law and cannot be dictated by any other authority, body, or party. Section 66 of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act defines the jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, providing that the NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, provided that no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws, and for this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP. Rule IX, Section 1 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997 reiterates the jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples over claims or conflicts involving rights of indigenous cultural communities over ancestral domains and lands. Citing Unduran vs. Aberasturi, the Court explained that a careful review of Section 66 shows that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. The qualifying provision requires two conditions before such disputes may be brought before the NCIP: (1) exhaustion of remedies under customary laws of the parties, and (2) compliance with condition precedent through the said certification by the Council of Elders/Leaders. In Unduran, the subject property involved was within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig tribe, but petitioners failed to prove that they were members of the indigenous cultural community involved and a dispute on ownership of the ancestral land was not raised; instead, the nature of the case was one of accion reivindicatoria or injunction, and consequently, jurisdiction over the case fell with the Regional Trial Court and not the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples. This is unlike the case before the Court, where both petitioner and respondent belong to the Tagbanua indigenous cultural community and the case revolves around the ownership and possession of Isla Malajem, which is being claimed to be located within the Tagbanua's ancestral domain. Accordingly, the first condition for the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples to acquire jurisdiction is present. However, there is no showing that respondent presented a certification issued by the Council of Elders that there was an exhaustion of remedies under customary law, the second condition necessary for the case to fall under the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples' jurisdiction. Nevertheless, upon the filing of the complaint before the Regional Hearing Office, Administrative Circular No. 1, Series of 2003, known as "The Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples," was still effective. Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the said Rules provide the certification requirements and its corollary exceptions, including where the relief sought for in the complaint or petition seeks to prevent any grave, imminent, and irreparable damage or injury that may result if not acted upon immediately. The allegations in the complaint state that petitioner, accompanied by barangay tanods, entered the subject parcel of land and started constructing a bahay kubo over the protests of respondent and the council of elders, and that the elders pleaded with petitioner to cease their construction, to no avail. Moreover, it was shown that respondent was authorized by the Council of Elders of the Tagbanua indigenous cultural community to file the complaint before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples. Furthermore, it was alleged that since petitioner entered Isla Malajem, respondent and the Tagbanuas have been deprived of possession and source of livelihood. From this narration, respondent's complaint falls under one of the exceptions from the certification requirement, as the complaint sought to prevent grave, imminent, and irreparable damage or injury to the Tagbanua indigenous cultural community. On petitioner's insistence that respondent's complaint is one of a criminal nature and should thus fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, the Court held that this argument must fail. The original complaint filed by respondent against petitioner was one for violation of Section 10 of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act, which states that unauthorized and unlawful intrusion upon, or use of any portion of the ancestral domain, or any violation of the rights therein enumerated, shall be punishable under the law. In connection, Section 72 states that any person who commits violation of any of the provisions of the Act, such as, but not limited to, unauthorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon any ancestral lands or domains as stated in Section 10, Chapter III, or shall commit any of the prohibited acts mentioned in Sections 21 and 24, Chapter V, Section 33, Chapter VI thereof, shall be punished in accordance with the customary laws of the ICCs/IPs concerned, provided that no such penalty shall be cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, and provided further that neither shall the death penalty or excessive fines be imposed, without prejudice to the right of any ICCs/IPs to avail of the protection of existing laws. Contrary to petitioner's claim, Section 10's penal nature is not one necessarily meted out by the trial courts. Section 72 clearly states that violations of the provisions of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act will primarily be tackled by the applicable customary laws of the indigenous cultural community involved, without prejudice to the right to avail of protection of other existing laws, including but not limited to laws under the jurisdiction of both the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples and the Regional Trial Courts. The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act does not limit the course of action one may take. Under Section 72, one may file an action before the regular courts or find redress under the customary laws which falls within the jurisdiction of the Commission, its only caveat being that the penalty imposed must not be cruel, degrading, or inhuman. Accordingly, while respondent had the option to file his complaint with the Regional Trial Court, he was well within his rights when he chose to file the case before the Commission's Regional Hearing Office. The Court emphasized that the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples was created primarily with the protection and promotion of the rights of indigenous peoples in mind. Citing Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, the Court acknowledged that the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act was promulgated in recognition of the indigenous peoples' individual and distinct consciousness separate from that of the other citizens of the country, and that the statute created an avenue where indigenous peoples are given the opportunity to resolve issues within their customary laws or within a mechanism that recognizes their rights vis-a-vis their community's cultural and traditional reality. Citing Lim vs. Gamosa, which cited Unduran, the Court stated that while the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples has primary jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of indigenous cultural communities, the same remains concurrent with ordinary courts when involving parties who do not belong to indigenous cultural communities. Here, both parties are members of the Tagbanua indigenous cultural community and the subject matter is a parcel of land claimed to be located within the Tagbanua's ancestral domain. Accordingly, the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, being the "primary government agency responsible ... to promote and protect the rights and well-being of the [indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples] and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as the rights thereto," is in the best position to decide the matter. Thus, the Regional Hearing Office correctly exercised its jurisdiction over the complaint filed by respondent.

• Ownership and Possession: Section 3(a) and (b) and Section 56 of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act define ancestral domains and ancestral lands. Ancestral domains refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure, or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social, and cultural welfare. Ancestral lands refer to lands occupied, possessed, and utilized by individuals, families, and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure, or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms, and tree lots. Section 56 provides that property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon effectivity of the Act shall be recognized and respected. Citing Republic vs. Cosalan, which cited Cruz, the Court enunciated that ancestral lands are covered by the concept of native title and considered owned by the indigenous peoples since time immemorial. Consequently, ancestral lands are incapable of private ownership. Ancestral lands are covered by the concept of native title that refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands, and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest. Lands covered by the concept of native title are considered an exception to the Regalian Doctrine embodied in Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution which provides that all lands of the public domain belong to the State which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. Here, the Regional Hearing Office further found that respondent applied for the issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Domain before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples over the subject land by virtue of Section 11 of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act, which provides that the rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains by virtue of native title shall be recognized and respected, and formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title, which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated. While the Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title was yet to be released at the time of the dispute, the Regional Hearing Office found that an "Assumption Over Ancestral Domains" had been issued in favor of respondent. Moreover, that a certificate has yet to be released does not contradict the indigenous concept of ownership. This Court has held that the concept of ownership and title for indigenous people are not dependent on a piece of paper; instead, a paper title is merely seen as a formal recognition of native title. In Lamsis, et al. vs. Dong-e, the Court held that the application for issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title pending before the NCIP is akin to a registration proceeding, which seeks an official recognition of one's claim to a particular land and is also in rem. The titling of ancestral lands is for the purpose of officially establishing one's land as an ancestral land. Just like a registration proceeding, the titling of ancestral lands does not vest ownership upon the applicant but only recognizes ownership that has already vested in the applicant by virtue of his and his predecessor-in-interest's possession of the property since time immemorial. Ownership should not be confused with a certificate of title. Registering land under the Torrens system does not create or vest title because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. Moreover, Isla Malajem is a seashore and a cave traditionally used by indigenous peoples to gather bird's nest called balinsasayaw in Tagbanua's dialect. The same land was recognized by the Municipality of Busuanga, Palawan through Resolution No. 39, series of 1996 of the Office of the Sangguniang Bayan as part of the ancestral lands discovered by the forefathers of the cultural minorities since time immemorial and exclusively for cultural minorities of Barangay Panlaitan, San Isidro, which respondent is a member of. On the contrary, petitioner's lone proof to support his claims that he, along with his siblings, are the legitimate owners of the subject parcel of land were tax declarations in the name of their father. Unfortunately, these tax declarations, coupled with unsubstantiated claims of possession over the land, are not sufficient. This Court has time and again held that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership or the right to possess land when not supported by other evidence to substantiate the claim. While it may be considered as good indicia of ownership, it cannot defeat native title which has been described as ownership since time immemorial. In the present case, it has been established that the subject land, Isla Malajem, has been recognized as ancestral domain of the Tagbanua indigenous cultural community and has never been considered as part of the public domain. Accordingly, it could not be privately owned by an individual albeit his alleged extended possession.

• Liberal Construction of Procedural Rules — Remedial or procedural laws are statutes designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases, made to aid a tribunal or court in its reception and evaluation of evidence and aimed for an efficient and effective resolution of a case. Nevertheless, courts are discouraged from dismissing a case solely on reasons of technicality. The Court enumerated the instances that would merit the relaxation of procedural rules: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor, or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. In this case, the Court found that a strict application of Rule 43, Sections 5 and 6 was not called for as the case involves matters of property that affect both parties' livelihood, and the liberal interpretation would not prejudice the other party.

• Jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act — The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, provided that no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws, and for this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP. The Court, citing Unduran vs. Aberasturi, explained that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. The qualifying provision requires two conditions: (1) exhaustion of remedies under customary laws of the parties, and (2) compliance with condition precedent through the said certification by the Council of Elders/Leaders. When such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice instead of the NCIP.

• Concurrent Jurisdiction of the NCIP and Ordinary Courts — While the NCIP has primary jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of indigenous cultural communities, the same remains concurrent with ordinary courts when involving parties who do not belong to indigenous cultural communities. The creation of the NCIP does not per se grant it primary and/or exclusive and original jurisdiction, excluding the regular courts from taking cognizance and exercising jurisdiction over cases which may involve rights of ICCs/IPs.

• Exceptions to the Certification Requirement — Under Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of Administrative Circular No. 1, Series of 2003, the certification from the Council of Elders shall not be required in the following cases: (a) where one of the parties is a public or private corporation, partnership, association, or juridical person or a public officer or employee and the dispute is in connection with the performance of his official functions; (b) where one of the parties is non-IP/ICC or does not belong to the same IP/IC community, except when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the Council of Elders/Leaders; (c) where the relief sought for in the complaint or petition seeks to prevent any grave, imminent, and irreparable damage or injury that may result if not acted upon immediately; and (d) where the Council of Elders/Leaders refuse to issue the necessary certification without justifiable reasons.

• Nature of Actions under Section 10 of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act — Section 10's penal nature is not one necessarily meted out by the trial courts. Section 72 clearly states that violations of the provisions of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act will primarily be tackled by the applicable customary laws of the indigenous cultural community involved, without prejudice to the right to avail of protection of other existing laws, including but not limited to laws under the jurisdiction of both the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples and the Regional Trial Courts. The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act does not limit the course of action one may take. Under Section 72, one may file an action before the regular courts or find redress under the customary laws which falls within the jurisdiction of the Commission, its only caveat being that the penalty imposed must not be cruel, degrading, or inhuman.

• Native Title and Ancestral Lands — Ancestral lands are covered by the concept of native title that refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands, and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest. Lands covered by the concept of native title are considered an exception to the Regalian Doctrine embodied in Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution. Consequently, ancestral lands are incapable of private ownership.

• Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title as Mere Recognition — The concept of ownership and title for indigenous people are not dependent on a piece of paper; instead, a paper title is merely seen as a formal recognition of native title. The application for issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title pending before the NCIP is akin to a registration proceeding, which seeks an official recognition of one's claim to a particular land and is also in rem. The titling of ancestral lands does not vest ownership upon the applicant but only recognizes ownership that has already vested in the applicant by virtue of his and his predecessor-in-interest's possession of the property since time immemorial.

• Tax Declarations vs. Native Title — Tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership or the right to possess land when not supported by other evidence to substantiate the claim. While they may be considered as good indicia of ownership, they cannot defeat native title which has been described as ownership since time immemorial.

• "While ordinary courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples in some matters in the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act, the Commission is in the best position to decide disputes on ancestral domain between members of the same indigenous cultural community, being the 'primary government agency responsible ... to promote and protect the rights and well-being of the [indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples] and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto.'" — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the jurisdictional issue, articulating the principle that the NCIP is the primary agency for disputes between members of the same indigenous cultural community involving ancestral domain.

• "A careful review of Section 66 shows that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP." — This passage, quoted from Unduran vs. Aberasturi, states the controlling rule on the NCIP's jurisdiction, defining the condition under which the Commission may take cognizance of disputes involving rights of indigenous cultural communities.

• "Moreover, that a certificate has yet to be released does not contradict the indigenous concept of ownership. This Court has held that the concept of ownership and title for indigenous people are not dependent on a piece of paper, instead, a paper title is merely seen as a formal recognition of native title." — This passage defines the indigenous concept of ownership, clarifying that a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title is not a prerequisite to the recognition of native title.

• "While it may be considered as good indicia of ownership, it cannot defeat native title which has been described as ownership since time immemorial." — This passage states the rule on the weight of tax declarations vis-a-vis native title, resolving the ownership issue in favor of the respondent.

• Unduran vs. Aberasturi, 771 Phil. 536 (2015) — Controlling precedent on the jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples under Section 66 of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act. The Court cited this case for the rule that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP, and that when such claims arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice.

• Lim vs. Gamosa, 774 Phil. 31 (2015) — Cited for the rule that while the NCIP has primary jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of indigenous cultural communities, the same remains concurrent with ordinary courts when involving parties who do not belong to indigenous cultural communities.

• Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 400 Phil. 904 (2000) — Cited for the recognition that the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act was promulgated in recognition of the indigenous peoples' individual and distinct consciousness separate from that of the other citizens of the country, and that the statute created an avenue where indigenous peoples are given the opportunity to resolve issues within their customary laws or within a mechanism that recognizes their rights vis-a-vis their community's cultural and traditional reality. Also cited for the institutionalization of the concept of native title.

• Republic vs. Cosalan, 835 Phil. 649 (2018) — Cited for the rule that ancestral lands are covered by the concept of native title and considered owned by the indigenous peoples since time immemorial, and that lands covered by the concept of native title are considered an exception to the Regalian Doctrine.

• Lamsis, et al. vs. Dong-e, 648 Phil. 372 (2010) — Cited for the rule that the application for issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title pending before the NCIP is akin to a registration proceeding, and that the titling of ancestral lands does not vest ownership upon the applicant but only recognizes ownership that has already vested in the applicant by virtue of his and his predecessor-in-interest's possession of the property since time immemorial.

• Barnes vs. Padilla, 500 Phil. 303 (2005) — Cited for the enumeration of instances that would merit the relaxation of procedural rules, restating the range of reasons which may provide justification for a court to resist a strict adherence to procedure.

• Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, 452 Phil. 665 (2003) — Cited in Barnes vs. Padilla for the elements for an appeal to be given due course by a suspension of procedural rules.

• Kabalikat para sa Maunlad na Buhay, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 217530, February 10, 2020 — Cited for the rule that to abruptly put an end to litigation solely based on technicalities amounts to serious injustice to the parties, and that a liberal application of the rules will not unjustly prejudice either of them.

• Alcantara vs. The Philippine Commercial and International Bank, 648 Phil. 267 (2010) — Cited for the rule that in appropriate cases, the courts may liberally construe procedural rules in order to meet and advance the cause of substantial justice, and that the subsequent and substantial compliance of an appellant may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure.

• Republic vs. Manimtim, 661 Phil. 158 (2011) — Cited for the rule that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership or the right to possess land when not supported by other evidence to substantiate the claim.

• Kawayan Hills Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 203090, September 5, 2018 — Cited for the rule that tax declarations may be considered as good indicia of ownership.

• Section 66, Republic Act No. 8371 (Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997) — Defines the jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, providing that the NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, provided that no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws, and for this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP. The Court applied this provision in determining that the NCIP had jurisdiction over the complaint, both parties being members of the same ICC/IP.

• Section 10, Republic Act No. 8371 — Provides that unauthorized and unlawful intrusion upon, or use of any portion of the ancestral domain, or any violation of the rights therein enumerated, shall be punishable under the law, and that the Government shall take measures to prevent non-ICCs/IPs from taking advantage of the ICCs/IPs customs or lack of understanding of laws to secure ownership or possession of land belonging to said ICCs/IPs. This was the provision alleged to have been violated by petitioner.

• Section 72, Republic Act No. 8371 — Provides that any person who commits violation of any of the provisions of the Act, such as unauthorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon any ancestral lands or domains as stated in Section 10, Chapter III, or shall commit any of the prohibited acts mentioned in Sections 21 and 24, Chapter V, Section 33, Chapter VI thereof, shall be punished in accordance with the customary laws of the ICCs/IPs concerned, provided that no such penalty shall be cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment, and provided further that neither shall the death penalty or excessive fines be imposed, without prejudice to the right of any ICCs/IPs to avail of the protection of existing laws. The Court applied this provision in holding that violations of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act will primarily be tackled by the applicable customary laws of the indigenous cultural community involved, without prejudice to the right to avail of protection of other existing laws.

• Section 11, Republic Act No. 8371 — Provides that the rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains by virtue of native title shall be recognized and respected, and that formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title, which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated. The Court applied this provision in holding that a certificate has yet to be released does not contradict the indigenous concept of ownership.

• Section 3(a) and (b), Republic Act No. 8371 — Define ancestral domains and ancestral lands. Ancestral domains refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure, or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social, and cultural welfare. Ancestral lands refer to lands occupied, possessed, and utilized by individuals, families, and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure, or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations. The Court applied these definitions in determining that Isla Malajem is part of the Tagbanua ancestral domain.

• Section 56, Republic Act No. 8371 — Provides that property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon effectivity of the Act shall be recognized and respected. The Court cited this provision in its discussion of the definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands.

• Section 38, Republic Act No. 8371 — Cited for the description of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples as the "primary government agency responsible ... to promote and protect the rights and well-being of the [indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples] and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto."

• Rule IX, Section 1, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997 — Reiterates the jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples over claims or conflicts involving rights of indigenous cultural communities over ancestral domains and lands, providing that all conflicts related to ancestral domains and lands involving ICCs/IPs shall be resolved by the concerned parties through the application of customary laws in the area where the disputed ancestral domain or land is located, and that all conflicts related to ancestral domains or lands where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP or where the dispute could not be resolved through customary law shall be heard and adjudicated in accordance with the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedures Before the NCIP.

• Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14, Administrative Circular No. 1, Series of 2003 ("The Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples") — Section 13 provides for the certification to file action, and Section 14 provides the exceptions to the certification requirement, including where the relief sought for in the complaint or petition seeks to prevent any grave, imminent, and irreparable damage or injury that may result if not acted upon immediately. The Court applied this provision in holding that respondent's complaint falls under one of the exceptions from the certification requirement.

• Rule 43, Sections 5, 6, and 7, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Section 5 provides for how an appeal is taken, Section 6 provides for the contents of the petition, and Section 7 provides that the failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The Court applied these provisions in addressing the procedural issue.

• Article XII, Section 2, 1987 Constitution — Provides that all lands of the public domain belong to the State which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. The Court cited this provision in its discussion of the Regalian Doctrine, holding that lands covered by the concept of native title are considered an exception to it.

Carandang, Zalameda, Rosario, and Dimaampao, JJ., concur.