Dacanay vs. People

A person who holds the victim’s arms from behind, rendering him defenseless and making the fatal stabbing possible, is a principal by indispensable cooperation, not a mere accomplice, even if there was no anterior conspiracy, when the circumstances show unity of criminal purpose immediately before the stabbing.

Rodrigo Dacanay and Victor Buduan were cousins. Dacanay owned the house in San Manuel, Isabela where the events took place, and Abraham Cortez alias Luis Cortez Jr. was among those present there.

On the night of June 3, 1967, Abraham Cortez alias Luis Cortez Jr. was playing cards in Rodrigo Dacanay’s house in San Manuel, Isabela, together with Dacanay, Dacanay’s cousin Victor Buduan, Cresencio Doctor, Fermin Esteban, and Esmeraldo Pagatpatan. During the game, Buduan accused the deceased, who was acting as banker, of cheating. A fight ensued between the deceased and Buduan.

According to the prosecution, Buduan stabbed the deceased with a scythe (“lilit”) while Dacanay held the deceased from behind. On June 6, 1967, the day before he was charged before the Municipal Court of San Manuel, Dacanay gave a statement before the Chief of Police of San Manuel saying that during the card game Buduan accused the deceased of cheating; that a fight ensued between the deceased and Buduan; that to separate the two, Dacanay held the shoulders of the deceased with his two hands; and that while he was doing so, Buduan stabbed the deceased with a scythe. On June 7, 1967, after he was charged before the Municipal Court, Dacanay gave another statement before the Municipal Judge reiterating what he had told the Chief of Police the day before.

At trial, Dacanay changed his story. He claimed that during the card game Buduan and the deceased left his house together to get chicken for “arroz caldo”; that at about 8:00 o’clock that night a neighbor informed him that Buduan had stabbed the deceased between the houses of Daniel Peralta and Esmeraldo Pagatpatan; that he was not present during the stabbing; that he did not bother to go outside to see the deceased; and that Buduan did not return to his house after the stabbing.

The evidence established that the deceased was stabbed in Dacanay’s house in the course of the card game, as confirmed by Dacanay’s own statements, and not outside the house as he claimed at trial. It was also established that Buduan stabbed the deceased while Dacanay held the deceased’s arms from behind, making the fatal stabbing possible. Cresencio Doctor and Fermin Esteban, who were participants in the card game, testified to this; Doctor demonstrated that Dacanay held both arms of Cortez Jr. about the elbows from behind, and the testimony showed that Buduan was able to reach the victim when he stabbed him and that Dacanay held Cortez Jr. from behind.

The original criminal complaint for the death of the deceased was filed against Victor Buduan and Dacanay before the Municipal Court of San Manuel, Isabela, on June 7, 1967. Because Buduan could not be arrested and remained at large, only Dacanay was tried under the Information filed before the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which alleged that Dacanay, together with Buduan, conspiring and confederating and helping one another, and with intent to kill, caused Buduan to stab the deceased with a scythe while Dacanay held him on his right shoulder.

• No Conspiracy or Criminal Design: Petitioner contended that he had no previous agreement with Victor Buduan and did not join Buduan’s criminal design; the act imputed to him was innocent or guiltless.
• Co-Principal or Accomplice Liability: Petitioner argued that under applicable jurisprudence he should not be held liable as a co-principal, or even as a mere accomplice, because there was no proof that he concurred in Buduan’s homicidal intent.

• Accomplice Liability: Respondent, through the Solicitor General, argued that Dacanay was not a principal by direct participation because there was no proof of a previous agreement or conspiracy with Buduan, but that he was liable as an accomplice because he did not release his hold on the victim even as he saw Buduan stabbing him, thereby becoming aware of and concurring in the criminal intent.

• Co-Principalship vs. Accomplice Liability: Whether Dacanay was a co-principal or merely an accomplice in the homicide.
• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the killing.

• Co-Principalship vs. Accomplice Liability: Yes. Dacanay was a co-principal by indispensable cooperation, not a mere accomplice. His act of holding the victim’s arms from behind immobilized the victim and made the stabbing possible, showing unity of criminal purpose immediately before the attack even without anterior conspiracy.
• Treachery: No. Treachery was not appreciated because the attack was preceded by a quarrel and heated discussion that placed the victim on guard, and Dacanay’s act was impulsively done on the spur of the moment, not consciously deliberately adopted.

• Co-Principalship vs. Accomplice Liability: The SC ruled that Dacanay’s act of holding the victim from behind while Buduan stabbed him was a positive act toward the realization of a common criminal intent, even if the intent was instantaneous. Had Dacanay not held both arms of the victim from behind, the victim could have parried the thrust or run away. By immobilizing the victim’s hands from behind, Dacanay and Buduan showed unity of criminal purpose and intent immediately before the actual stabbing, even though there was no anterior conspiracy. The SC noted that Dacanay and Buduan were playing cards with the victim and that Dacanay shared Buduan’s anger toward the victim who cheated them. If Dacanay intended to save the victim, he could have grabbed Buduan or the arm holding the scythe, or placed himself between the assailant and the victim, instead of grabbing the victim from behind and holding both arms by the elbows, rendering the victim defenseless. The method clearly prevented the victim from moving and defending himself, and without the act of holding the crime would not have been accomplished. This made Dacanay a principal by indispensable cooperation, not merely an accomplice. The SC cited People vs. Labis in support.
• Treachery: The SC ruled out the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery appreciated by the CA. The attack was preceded by a quarrel and a heated discussion and must have placed the victim on his guard. Dacanay’s act in holding the deceased was impulsively done on the spur of the moment and was not consciously a deliberately adopted means; it merely sprang from the turn of events. With treachery ruled out and no modifying circumstances, the penalty for homicide, reclusion temporal, was imposed in its medium period.

• Principal by indispensable cooperation — A person who cooperates in the commission of the crime by another act without which the crime would not have been accomplished is a principal by indispensable cooperation. In this case, Dacanay held the victim’s arms from behind, immobilizing him and making Buduan’s fatal stabbing possible; the SC held that without this act the crime would not have been accomplished, so Dacanay was a co-principal, not a mere accomplice.
• Unity of criminal purpose immediately before the act — Even without anterior conspiracy, the SC found that Dacanay and Buduan showed unity of criminal purpose and intent immediately before the stabbing when Dacanay immobilized the victim from behind while Buduan attacked. The common criminal intent may be instantaneous.
• Treachery — Treachery was not appreciated where the attack was preceded by a quarrel and heated discussion that placed the victim on guard, and where the accused’s act of holding the victim was impulsively done on the spur of the moment and not consciously deliberately adopted.
• Penalty for homicide absent modifying circumstances — The SC held that in the absence of modifying circumstances, the penalty for homicide, reclusion temporal, is imposed in its medium period.

• “There can be no question that appellant's act in holding the victim from behind when the latter was stabbed by his cousin, Victor Buduan, was a positive act towards the realization of a common criminal intent, although the intent can be classified as instantaneous.” — The SC treats Dacanay’s hold as a positive act showing common criminal intent, even if formed instantaneously.
• “By immobilizing the two hands of the victim from behind, and although there was no anterior conspiracy, the two cousins showed unity of criminal purpose and intent immediately before the actual stabbing.” — The SC finds unity of criminal purpose immediately before the stabbing despite the absence of prior conspiracy.
• “The method by which appellant seized the deceased by his elbows from behind clearly prevented the latter from moving and defending himself, and without said act of holding the crime would not have been accomplished. This makes him a principal by indispensable cooperation, and not merely an accomplice.” — The SC classifies Dacanay as a principal by indispensable cooperation, not a mere accomplice.
• “The attack was preceded by a quarrel and a heated discussion and must have placed the victim on his guard.” — The SC uses the quarrel and heated discussion to reject treachery.

• People vs. Labis, 21 SCRA 875, 885 (1967) — Cited by the SC in support of its holding that Dacanay was a principal by indispensable cooperation.
• People vs. Gonzales, 76 Phil. 473 (1946) — Cited in connection with the SC’s rejection of treachery.
• People vs. Lara, 54 Phil. 96 (1929) — Cited in connection with the SC’s rejection of treachery.
• People vs. Concha, 49 Phil. 212 (1926) — Cited in connection with the SC’s rejection of treachery.
• People vs. Templonuevo, 106 Phil. 1003 (1960) — Cited in connection with the SC’s rejection of treachery.
• People vs. Calinawan, 83 Phil. 647 (1949) — Cited in connection with the SC’s ruling that Dacanay’s act was impulsively done and not deliberately adopted.

• Justice De Castro (Dissenting) — Would acquit Dacanay or at most convict him only as an accomplice, finding no proof beyond reasonable doubt that he had a previous agreement with Buduan or knowingly joined the criminal design; the evidence was equally consistent with an attempt to pacify the protagonists, and the simultaneous holding and stabbing did not by itself show unity of purpose. He invoked People vs. Ibañez, 77 Phil. 664, where holding the victim’s neck from behind did not prove intent to kill.