Dabu vs. Kapunan

Falsification of official documents and dishonesty by court personnel constitute grave offenses warranting dismissal from service upon the first offense, and a party disavowing the authenticity of their signature on a public document bears the burden of presenting evidence to that effect, as mere disclaimer is insufficient.

Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Vivian T. Dabu was assigned to Branches 50, 51, and 52 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guagua, Pampanga, in October 1999. Upon her assignment, she noticed that she was not being called upon to intervene or investigate annulment cases in Branches 51 and 52, both presided by Judge Kapunan, despite cases being raffled equally. Suspecting irregularities based on prior information that annulment cases were being "fixed," Dabu retrieved the dockets and discovered that court records were falsified to make it appear that prosecutors appeared during hearings when they had not. Concurrently, a newspaper article reported that an RTC branch in Guagua was improperly disposing of annulment cases through a syndicated effort involving court personnel, prompting then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. to order an inventory of annulment cases in the area.

• Discovery of Anomalies: Prosecutor Dabu discovered that court records in Branches 51 and 52 were falsified to simulate the appearance of prosecutors and counsel in annulment cases, despite prosecutors being on leave or reassigned and counsel denying participation.
• Fabricated Hearings and Records: In multiple cases (e.g., Vitug v. Sangan, Vitug v. Faeldon, Layug v. Arteta), minutes and transcripts were prepared by Cortez showing hearings where prosecutors appeared and cases were submitted for decision. The alleged prosecutors and counsel (Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo) testified they never appeared in these cases. In one instance, an Order stated a prosecutor submitted a report, but no such report was attached to the records.
• Falsified LRC Cases: In LRC Cases Nos. G-73 and G-74, hearings were allegedly conducted and transcripts prepared by Cortez, but Atty. Lobo denied appearing or representing the petitioners.
• Premature and Spurious Decisions: In Samia v. Lorenzo-Samia, a decision was rendered citing a Psychological Evaluation Report that was not on record, and no hearing was conducted between the last scheduled date and the date of decision. In Enal v. Enal, an Order and Decision were dated earlier than the alleged hearing date, and Judge Kapunan claimed his signatures on these were forgeries.
• "Processing" Fees: Litigant Tomas Tamayo testified that Cortez facilitated the filing of his annulment case, promising a grant within three months without a hearing. He paid Php 15,000.00, which was returned upon withdrawal of the case. Galo collected Php 4,000.00 from Tamayo for a "psychologist fee," which was not returned.
• Roles of Respondents: Galo, though a stenographer, acted as Judge Kapunan's secretary, receiving communications and payments. Cortez admitted preparing the questioned orders, decisions, and transcripts, claiming she acted on Galo's instructions. Judge Kapunan presided over both branches and signed the falsified records.

• Falsification of Court Records: Complainant alleged that respondents falsified court records to make it appear that hearings were conducted, prosecutors appeared, and counsel offered evidence in annulment cases, when in truth no such proceedings occurred.
• Conspiracy and "Fixing": Complainant contended that respondents acted in concert to "process" annulment cases, as evidenced by Galo's collection of "psychologist fees" and admissions that she processed cases with Judge Kapunan's go signal.

• Judge Kapunan's Defense of Forgery: Judge Kapunan averred that his signatures on the decisions in Enal and Vitug were forgeries and that he was a victim of falsification by Galo, claiming he conducted a discreet investigation upon learning of her activities but stopped when the complaint was filed.
• Cortez's Defense of Compliance: Cortez admitted preparing the questioned documents but claimed she merely acted upon the instructions of Galo.
• Galo's Default: Galo neither appeared in the proceedings nor filed any comment or pleading.
• Tiongco's Exoneration: Tiongco was included only upon the initiative of the Office of the Court Administrator for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as complainant had no evidence linking her to the falsification.

• Falsification and Dishonesty: Whether respondents Cortez and Galo are guilty of falsification of official documents and dishonesty warranting dismissal.
• Judge's Liability: Whether Judge Kapunan's defense of forgery and lack of conspiracy absolves him of administrative liability.
• Effect of Death: Whether the administrative case against Judge Kapunan is rendered moot and academic by his death prior to the resolution of the case.

• Falsification and Dishonesty: Cortez and Galo were found guilty of falsification of official documents and dishonesty. Falsification of court records is a grave offense under the Administrative Code, equivalent to dishonesty, and warrants dismissal from service upon the first offense. Galo's collection of "psychologist fees" and Cortez's preparation of spurious records demonstrated a concerted effort to simulate judicial proceedings.
• Judge's Liability: Judge Kapunan's defense of forgery was rejected. Except for the Enal and Vitug cases, he failed to specifically deny under oath the genuineness of his signatures on the questioned records, resulting in a deemed admission under Section 8, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Even for the Enal and Vitug cases, he presented no evidence of forgery, relying on mere disclaimer, which is insufficient. His claim of conducting a discreet investigation was deemed specious, as he offered no plausible reason for failing to complete it and clear his name.
• Effect of Death: The case against Judge Kapunan was dismissed as moot and academic. The penalty of dismissal can no longer be imposed or carried out following his death, pursuant to established jurisprudence.

• Deemed Admission of Genuineness of Documents — Under Section 8, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, when an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, its genuineness and due execution are deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them and sets forth what they claim to be the facts. Failure to specifically deny under oath constitutes an admission. Judge Kapunan's failure to specifically deny his signatures in most questioned documents was deemed an admission of their authenticity.
• Burden of Proof in Forgery — Forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive, and convincing evidence, with the burden of proof lying on the party alleging it. A mere disclaimer is insufficient; the party must present corroborating witnesses or expert testimony to prove the forgery.
• Dismissal for Falsification and Dishonesty — Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Administrative Code of 1987, dishonesty and falsification are considered grave offenses warranting dismissal from service upon commission of the first offense. Court personnel are held to a high degree of professionalism and moral righteousness, and falsification of court records is an impious act that diminishes public trust in the judiciary.
• Mootness due to Death of Respondent Judge — An administrative case against a judge is dismissed as moot and academic if the judge dies during the pendency of the case, as the penalty of dismissal can no longer be imposed.

• "Falsification of an official document such as court records is considered a grave offense. It also amounts to dishonesty. Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Administrative Code of 1987, dishonesty (par. a) and falsification (par. f) are considered grave offenses warranting the penalty of dismissal from service upon commission of the first offense."
• "As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery."
• "Court employees, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, being public servants in an office dispensing justice, should always act with a high degree of professionalism and responsibility. Their conduct must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but must also be in accordance with the law and court regulations."

• Loyao, Jr. v. Caube, 450 Phil. 38 (2003) — Followed. The case established that administrative complaints against a judge are dismissed as moot and academic if the judge dies during the pendency of the case, as the penalty of dismissal can no longer be carried out.
• Apiag v. Cantero, 335 Phil. 511 (1997) — Followed. Cited in conjunction with Loyao to support the dismissal of the case against the deceased judge.
• Libres v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 176358, June 17, 2008 — Followed. Cited for the principle that he who disavows the authenticity of his signature on a public document bears the responsibility of presenting evidence to that effect; mere disclaimer is insufficient.
• Pan Pacific Industrial Sales Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125283, February 10, 2006 — Followed. Cited for the rule that the genuineness of handwriting may be proved by comparison or by corroborating witnesses, and at best, by an expert witness.
• Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 753 (1998) — Followed. Cited for the doctrine that forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive, and convincing evidence.
• Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan, 478 Phil. 823 (2004) — Followed. Cited for the principle that court employees must act with a high degree of professionalism and responsibility, as their conduct affects the people's respect and faith in the judiciary.

• Section 6, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Vesting the Supreme Court with administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof, serving as the basis for the Court's exercise of disciplinary authority over the respondents.
• Section 8, Rule 8, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Providing that the genuineness and due execution of a written instrument copied in or attached to a pleading are deemed admitted unless specifically denied under oath by the adverse party. Applied to deem Judge Kapunan's signatures on the questioned documents admitted due to his failure to specifically deny them under oath.
• Section 22, Rule 132, Rules of Court — Enumerating the methods by which the genuineness of handwriting may be proved (by witnesses who saw the person write, or by comparison with admitted genuine writings). Cited to show the proper evidentiary methods Judge Kapunan should have used to prove forgery.
• Section 23, Rule XIV, Administrative Code of 1987 — Classifying dishonesty and falsification as grave offenses warranting dismissal from service upon commission of the first offense. Applied to justify the dismissal of Cortez and Galo.
• Article 171, Revised Penal Code — Defining falsification of an official document as a criminal offense. Cited to emphasize the gravity of the respondents' actions in falsifying court records.

Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice), Antonio T. Carpio, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad, Jose Catral Mendoza, Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno.