Custodio vs. Sandiganbayan

A new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence will not be granted unless the movant demonstrates that the evidence was discovered after trial, that it could not have been discovered and produced at trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence, that it is material and not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and that it is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. The evidence proffered by petitioners — an independent forensic review of existing physical and testimonial evidence and a corroborative eyewitness — failed to meet these standards, as it was not timely discovered and would not alter the Sandiganbayan’s findings.

On August 21, 1983, Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. was fatally shot while descending the service stairway of a China Airlines aircraft at the Manila International Airport. Rolando Galman was also killed on the tarmac. Petitioners, members of the military assigned as Senator Aquino’s security detail, were charged with double murder. The first trial before the Sandiganbayan ended in an acquittal that the Supreme Court later nullified as a sham, ordering a retrial. In the retrial, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioners as principals by conspiracy and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua for each count. The conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1991 and became final. In 2004, petitioners sought to re-open the cases, invoking newly discovered evidence and violations of due process.

• The Crime and Conviction: On August 21, 1983, Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. was killed by a single gunshot to the head while descending the service stairway from a China Airlines aircraft at the Manila International Airport. Rolando Galman was also shot dead on the tarmac. Petitioners, who comprised the military security detail escorting Senator Aquino, were charged with double murder. After a nullified first trial declared a sham, a second trial before the Sandiganbayan resulted in the conviction of petitioners as principals by conspiracy, with C1C Rogelio Moreno identified as the one who fired the fatal shot at Senator Aquino on the stairway. The Sandiganbayan relied on the autopsy finding of a “forward, downward and medially” bullet trajectory, the presence of an ovaloid wound of entrance with a contusion collar widest superiorly indicating a downward shot from a higher elevation, and eyewitness accounts that the soldier behind the Senator on the stairs fired the gun. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding no reversible error in the Sandiganbayan’s factual analysis, and the judgment became final in 1991.
• Motion to Re-open: In August 2004, petitioners sought to re-open the case and secure a third trial. They submitted a forensic review report prepared by the Independent Forensic Group of the University of the Philippines (Prof. Jerome B. Bailen, Atty. Erwin P. Erfe, M.D., Benito E. Molino, M.D., and Anastacio N. Rosete, Jr., D.M.D.). Using the same physical and testimonial evidence presented at trial—photographs, autopsy reports, guns, slugs, court records, and re-enactments—the forensic group concluded that Senator Aquino was shot while walking on the tarmac toward the AVSECOM van, not on the service stairway, and suggested that the physical evidence may have been misinterpreted and manipulated. Petitioners also offered the testimony of SPO4 Ruben M. Cantimbuhan, the AVSECOM van driver, who stated in an affidavit that he saw a man in a blue uniform (later identified as Galman) suddenly fire at Senator Aquino as the latter was about to board the van.
• Additional Allegations: Petitioners further claimed a grave violation of due process during the second trial, citing insufficient legal assistance of counsel, deprivation of counsel of choice, testimony of defense witnesses allegedly given under duress, willful suppression of evidence, and the use of false forensic evidence that led to their conviction.

• Newly Discovered Evidence: Petitioners argued that the independent forensic report and the eyewitness testimony of SPO4 Cantimbuhan constituted newly discovered evidence that was not available during the second trial and that, if presented, would have altered the Sandiganbayan’s judgment by disproving the prosecution’s theory that the soldier on the stairway fired the fatal shot.
• Grave Violation of Due Process: Petitioners maintained that their constitutional right to due process was violated by insufficient legal assistance, deprivation of counsel of choice, testimony given under duress, willful suppression of evidence, and the prosecution’s use of false forensic evidence that misled the court.
• Serious Misapprehension of Facts: Petitioners asserted that the Sandiganbayan’s decision rested on a serious misapprehension of facts occasioned by false forensic evidence, which entitled them to a re-trial.

N/A (The resolution does not contain a separate response from the respondents; the motion was resolved directly by the Court.)

• Newly Discovered Evidence: Whether the independent forensic review report and the testimony of SPO4 Cantimbuhan qualify as newly discovered evidence under Rule 121 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, such that a third trial should be ordered.
• Due Process Violations: Whether petitioners were denied due process of law by reason of allegedly inadequate legal assistance, deprivation of counsel of choice, duress upon defense witnesses, suppression of evidence, or the use of false forensic evidence.
• Misapprehension of Facts: Whether the Sandiganbayan’s alleged misapprehension of facts based on false forensic evidence warrants the re-opening of the case.

• Newly Discovered Evidence: The proffered evidence did not meet the requisites for newly discovered evidence. The forensic report was based entirely on materials—court records, photographs, autopsy reports, the weapon, bullets, and transcripts—that were available to the defense at trial. Petitioners failed to show why an independent forensic analysis could not have been procured before the case was submitted and decided; the report was not newly discovered but merely recently sought. The testimony of SPO4 Cantimbuhan merely corroborated the accounts of other defense witnesses—Pelagia Hilario, Lydia Morata, Augusto Fred Floresca, and Jose Orias—that a man in blue shot Senator Aquino on the tarmac. Those accounts had been rejected by the Sandiganbayan in favor of prosecution eyewitnesses Rebecca Quijano and Jessie Barcelona, whose version was consistent with the physical evidence of a downward trajectory. The new testimony would not probably change the judgment and was cumulative and impeaching at best. Accordingly, the threshold requirements under Section 2(b), Rule 121 were not satisfied.
• Due Process Violations: The claim of inadequate legal assistance was unsubstantiated. The records demonstrated that Atty. Rodolfo U. Jimenez, an experienced criminal practitioner, vigorously defended petitioners throughout trial, presented voluminous evidence, and exhausted all available remedies before the Supreme Court. No specific facts were pleaded to show that his representation fell below the standard of competent counsel. Under the rule in People vs. Umali, a client is bound by the actions of counsel in the conduct of the case and cannot later complain that the result might have been different had counsel proceeded otherwise. The additional allegations of duress, suppression of evidence, and false forensic evidence were entirely speculative and unsupported by concrete factual allegations; they could not serve as a basis for granting a new trial.
• Misapprehension of Facts: This ground was subsumed within the newly discovered evidence argument. The Sandiganbayan had conducted an exhaustive analysis of the forensic evidence, including the trajectory of the fatal bullet, the nature of the wound, the probative value of the probe, and the alternative explanations for the fracture of the petrous bone. These factual findings were affirmed by the Supreme Court when it denied the petition for review. The claim that the forensic evidence was false and misapprehended thus lacked any factual foundation.

• Berry Rule on Newly Discovered Evidence — To justify a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the movant must establish: (1) the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) it could not have been discovered and produced at trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) it is material and not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) it is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. The burden of proof rests on the movant, and the motion is treated with great caution because of the danger of perjury and the injustice of allowing a party to defeat an adverse judgment through his own neglect. The Court applied the Berry rule to hold that evidence based on a re-analysis of trial materials and a newly found corroborating witness did not constitute newly discovered evidence, as they could have been procured earlier with reasonable diligence and would not change the result.

• Client Bound by Counsel’s Conduct — In criminal cases, a client is generally bound by the mistakes, omissions, or tactical decisions of counsel in the conduct of the case. The fact that new counsel could assert that prior counsel was insufficiently diligent, experienced, or learned does not furnish a ground for a new trial. Only a showing of gross negligence tantamount to a complete denial of due process will overcome the presumption of regular performance of duty. The Court invoked this doctrine to dismiss petitioners’ claim that Atty. Jimenez inadequately represented them, as no specific instances of negligence were alleged.

• “Courts are generally reluctant in granting motions for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence for it is presumed that the moving party has had ample opportunity to prepare his case carefully and to secure all the necessary evidence before the trial. Such motions are treated with great caution due to the danger of perjury and the manifest injustice of allowing a party to allege that which may be the consequence of his own neglect to defeat an adverse judgment.”

• “The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is whether the proferred evidence is in fact a ‘newly discovered evidence which could not have been discovered by due diligence.’ The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered. It is to the latter that the requirement of due diligence has relevance.”

• “In order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded as newly discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so much the time when the evidence offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came to the knowledge of the party now submitting it; what is essential is that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it.”

• “The report of the forensic group essentially reiterates the theory presented by the defense during the trial of the double murder case. Clearly, the report is not newly discovered, but rather recently sought, which is not allowed by the Rules.”

• Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986) — The Supreme Court nullified the original Sandiganbayan acquittal and ordered a retrial; the present motion was a subsequent effort to re-open that retrial’s final judgment.
• Jose vs. Court of Appeals, 70 SCRA 257 (1976) — Described the remedy of new trial as “a new invention to temper the severity of a judgment or prevent the failure of justice,” grounding the equitable nature of the rule.
• Berry vs. State of Georgia, 10 Ga. 511 (1851) — The origin of the four-part standard for newly discovered evidence; the Supreme Court traced the Berry rule and applied its requirements to deny the motion.
• People vs. Umali, 15 Phil. 33 (1910) — Established the principle that a client is bound by the actions of counsel and cannot obtain a new trial on the ground of counsel’s alleged mistakes or incompetence; applied to dismiss the claim of inadequate legal assistance.
• People vs. Li Ka Kim, G.R. No. 148586 (May 25, 2004); People vs. Datu, 397 SCRA 695 (2003); People vs. Remudo, 364 SCRA 61 (2001) — Cited for the prevailing formulation of the requisites for new trial on newly discovered evidence.

• Rule 121, Sections 1, 2, and 6, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure — The provisions governing motions for new trial before finality of judgment. Section 2(a) and (b) enumerate the grounds of errors of law or irregularities and newly discovered evidence; Section 6 details the effects of granting the motion. The Court treated petitioners’ motion, filed after finality, under the same standards and found that the requisites of Section 2(b) were not met: the evidence was not newly discovered within the meaning of the rule, and it would not probably change the judgment.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Carpio-Morales, J., on leave.

None.