Custodio vs. Court of Appeals

Damage resulting from the lawful exercise of an owner's right to enclose and fence property, when no easement or servitude exists at the time of the act, is damnum absque injuria and does not give rise to a cause of action for damages, even if another party suffers actual loss such as unrealized rentals.

Pacifico Mabasa owned a parcel of land with a two-door apartment situated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila, which he acquired in September 1981 through a contract of sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos and Teodora Quintero. His property was surrounded by the lots of defendants Cristino and Brigida Custodio, Lito and Maria Cristina Santos, and Rosalina Morato. Two passageways connected Mabasa's property to P. Burgos Street: the first, approximately one meter wide and twenty meters long, ran between the row of houses belonging to the Custodios, the Santoses, and Mabasa; the second, about three meters wide and twenty-six meters long, required traversing a narrow path beside a septic tank. Mabasa's property had tenants occupying the apartment at the time of purchase.

Pacifico Mabasa acquired a parcel of land with a two-door apartment at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila, through a contract of sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos and Teodora Quintero in September 1981. The property was surrounded by the lots of Cristino and Brigida Custodio, Lito and Maria Cristina Santos, and Rosalina Morato. Taking P. Burgos Street as the point of reference, the row of houses on the left side leading to Mabasa's property consisted of the Custodios' residence, then the Santoses', and then Mabasa's. On the right side was Morato's property, followed by a septic tank. Two passageways provided access from Mabasa's property to P. Burgos Street: the first was approximately one meter wide and about twenty meters long, running between the row of houses; the second was about three meters wide and twenty-six meters long, but required traversing a path less than a meter wide beside the septic tank for five to six meters. At the time of purchase, tenants occupied the apartment premises and were acknowledged by Mabasa as tenants.

Sometime in February 1982, one of the tenants vacated the apartment. When Mabasa inspected the premises, he found that an adobe fence had been constructed along the first passageway, making it narrower. The fence was first built by the Santoses along their property, which adjoined the passageway. Morato subsequently constructed her own adobe fence and extended it such that the entire passageway was enclosed. Maria Cristina Santos testified that she built the fence because her daughter had been dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the tenants along the passageway, and she cited other inconveniences such as tenants banging doors and windows while drunk and the loss of footwear. After the passageway was enclosed, the remaining tenants vacated the apartment.

Mabasa filed Civil Case No. 47466 for the grant of an easement of right of way before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 22, on August 26, 1982. Mabasa died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by his surviving spouse Ofelia Mabasa and his children. On February 27, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment ordering the Custodios and Santoses to give Mabasa permanent access for ingress and egress to the public street, and ordering Mabasa to pay the Custodios and Santoses P8,000 as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. Mabasa's heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals solely on the issue of whether the trial court erred in not awarding damages. On November 10, 1993, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision with modification, awarding P65,000 as actual damages, P30,000 as moral damages, and P10,000 as exemplary damages, based on the finding that Mabasa incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when tenants vacated due to the closure of the passageway. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration on July 8, 1994.

• Propriety of the Grant of Right of Way: Petitioners raised the issue of whether the grant of the right of way to private respondents was proper.
• Award of Damages: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages in favor of private respondents, contending that the award had no substantial legal basis.

• Entitlement to Damages: Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the sole issue of whether the trial court erred in not awarding damages in their favor, asserting that they suffered losses in the form of unrealized rentals when tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the passageway.

• Propriety of Right of Way: Whether the grant of the right of way to private respondents is proper.
• Award of Damages: Whether the award of damages by the Court of Appeals is in order.

• Propriety of Right of Way: Petitioners are barred from raising this issue. Having failed to appeal the trial court's decision granting the right of way, that judgment became final as against them and can no longer be reviewed or reversed.
• Award of Damages: No. The award of damages was reversed for lack of legal basis, the petitioners' act of fencing their property being a lawful exercise of ownership rights, rendering any resulting loss damnum absque injuria.

• Propriety of Right of Way: Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of the lower court. An appellee can only advance arguments to defeat the appellant's claim or uphold the disputed decision, and may assign errors solely to maintain the appealed decision on other grounds — not to reverse or modify the judgment in the appellee's favor. Because the trial court's decision became final as against petitioners, the issue of the propriety of the grant of the right of way was laid to rest.

• Award of Damages: The award of damages by the Court of Appeals had no substantial legal basis. The award was based solely on the fact that Mabasa incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when tenants vacated the premises due to the closure of the passageway. However, the mere fact that a plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant recovery, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action. There is a material distinction between damages and injury: injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense awarded for the damage suffered. There can be damage without injury where the loss was not the result of a violation of a legal duty — situations known as damnum absque injuria. In this case, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. The petitioners' construction of a fence within their lot was a valid exercise of their right as owners under Article 430 of the Civil Code, which provides that every owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon. At the time of construction, the lot was not subject to any servitude; no easement of way existed in favor of respondents, either by law or by contract. This was confirmed by the very decision of the trial court, which granted a compulsory right of way only after payment of just compensation — it was that decision which first gave respondents the right to use the passageway and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere. Prior to that decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property. The requisites of abuse of right under Article 21 of the Civil Code were not satisfied: the act of fencing was not contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, but was a lawful exercise of ownership. The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong, even if it results in damage to another. The inconvenience arising from such use is a mere consequence of community life, and the resulting damage is damnum absque injuria.

• Damnum Absque Injuria — There is damage without injury in those instances where loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. Damage resulting from the lawful exercise of one's property rights, when no legal duty has been breached and no legal right invaded, is damnum absque injuria and affords no cause of action. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that petitioners' fencing of their property, being a lawful exercise of ownership, caused damage to respondents but no legal injury.

• Abuse of Right (Article 21, Civil Code) — For the principle of abuse of right to apply, three requisites must concur: (1) the defendant acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy; (2) the acts were willful; and (3) there was damage or injury to the plaintiff. The Court found that the first requisite was absent because the fencing was a valid exercise of ownership, not contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.

• Finality of Judgment as to Non-Appealing Party — An appellee who has not appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of the lower court. Assigned errors by an appellee may be considered only to maintain the appealed decision on other grounds, not to reverse or modify the judgment in the appellee's favor.

• Owner's Right to Enclose Property (Article 430, Civil Code) — Every owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon. The Court held that this right may be lawfully exercised when no servitude exists on the property at the time.

• "Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong." — This passage articulates the foundational principle distinguishing actionable legal injury from mere loss, central to the Court's reversal of the damages award.

• "In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right." — This statement applies the damnum absque injuria doctrine to the facts and rejects the respondents' Article 21 argument, forming the core of the ratio decidendi.

• "The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie, although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded." — This formulation encapsulates the principle that lawful exercise of property rights, even if causing incidental damage, does not create liability — a proposition frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on abuse of rights.

• Lumibao vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 64677, September 13, 1990, 189 SCRA 469 — Cited in support of the rule that an appellee who has not appealed may not obtain affirmative relief beyond what the lower court granted.
• Jovellanos, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 100728, June 18, 1992, 210 SCRA 126 — Cited for the proposition that the law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of property without other limitations than those established by law.
• Escano, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-47207, September 25, 1980, 100 SCRA 197 — Cited as supporting authority for the application of damnum absque injuria where damage results from the rightful use of land by its owner.
• Ilocos Norte Electric Co. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 53401, November 6, 1989, 179 SCRA 5 — Cited alongside Escano for the same proposition on damnum absque injuria.
• Albenson Enterprises Corporation, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 88694, January 11, 1993, 217 SCRA 16 — Cited alongside Escano and Ilocos Norte Electric Co. for the damnum absque injuria principle.
• The Board of Liquidators vs. Kalaw, et al., L-18805, August 14, 1967, 20 SCRA 987 — Cited for the requirement that injuries must result from a breach of duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff to maintain an action.

• Article 21, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides the principle of abuse of right, requiring that the defendant acted contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, that the act was willful, and that damage resulted. The Court found the first requisite absent because the fencing was a valid exercise of ownership.
• Article 430, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that every owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon. The Court applied this provision to hold that petitioners' fencing was lawful because no servitude existed on the property at the time of construction.

Romero, J., and Puno, J., concurred. Mendoza, J., took no part.