Cusi vs. Philippine National Railways

A railroad company that maintains manually operated warning devices at a crossing is negligent when it permits a train to traverse that crossing while the devices are inoperative due to the absence of a guard, without taking compensating precautions such as blowing a whistle, and a motorist who relies on the inoperative signals and slows down rather than making a full stop is not contributorily negligent where no hazard is apparent under the excepting clause of Section 56(a) of the Motor Vehicle Law.

The spouses Victorino Cusi and Pilar Pobre were the plaintiffs below. Victorino Cusi was a businessman — Special Assistant to the Dolor Lopez Enterprises, managing partner of Cusi and Rivera Partnership, manager of his own ricemill, and an investor in other enterprises — while Pilar Cusi was a skilled music and piano teacher. The defendant, Philippine National Railways (formerly Manila Railroad Company), operated the railroad crossing in the United Housing Subdivision in Parañaque, Rizal, where the collision occurred. The warning devices at the crossing were manually operated, with only two shifts of guards provided — from 7:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M. and from 3:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M. The action was predicated on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.

On the night of October 5, 1963, the spouses Victorino Cusi and Pilar Pobre attended a birthday party inside the United Housing Subdivision in Parañaque, Rizal. The party broke up at about 11:00 o'clock that evening, and the spouses proceeded home in their Vauxhall car with Victorino Cusi at the wheel. Upon reaching the railroad tracks, Cusi found the level crossing bar raised, saw no flashing red light, and heard no whistle from any oncoming train. He merely slackened his speed and proceeded to cross the tracks. At the same time, a train bound for Lucena traversed the crossing, resulting in a collision. The impact threw the spouses out of their car, which was smashed. Benjamin Franco, who had come from the same party and was driving behind them, rushed to their aid and brought them to San Juan de Dios Hospital for emergency treatment. They were later transferred to the Philippine General Hospital.

Mrs. Cusi suffered multiple severe injuries: an open fracture of the middle third of the right humerus, a fracture of the right paramedian mandible, a fracture of the left distal fibula, cerebral concussion, multiple abrasions, lacerations, and contusions with hematoma. She underwent four surgical operations over a period of two years. Dr. Manuel Rivera, head of the Orthopedic and Fracture Service of the Philippine General Hospital, performed a second operation and continued treating her as an out-patient until the end of February 1964, by which time the fractured bones had not yet healed. Dr. Francisco Aguilar, Director of the National Orthopedic Hospital, operated on her in May 1964 and again in August 1965. After another operation from the chest to the abdomen, she was placed in a cast for about three months with her right arm immobilized. As a result of the fracture on her right arm, there was a shortening of about one centimeter, and she lost the flexibility of her wrist, elbow, and shoulder. Up to the time she testified in August 1966, she still had an intermedullary nail in the bone of her right arm. Victorino Cusi suffered brain injuries affecting his speech, memory, sense of hearing, and neck movement, and felt pain all over his body for a long period.

Prior to the accident, Victorino Cusi was a successful businessman — the Special Assistant to the Dolor Lopez Enterprises, the managing partner of Cusi and Rivera Partnership, the manager of his ricemill, and an investor in other enterprises — with a monthly average income of ₱5,000.00. As a result of his injuries, he was unable to properly attend to his various business undertakings. Pilar Cusi was a skilled music and piano teacher averaging ₱600.00 monthly income, but after the accident she lost the dexterity of her fingers and was forced to quit her profession. She also bore ugly scars on several parts of her body and, being five months pregnant at the time of the accident, suffered anxiety of a possible miscarriage.

The warning devices at the railroad crossing were manually operated, with only two shifts of guards — from 7:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M. and from 3:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M. On the night of the accident, the train for Lucena was on an unscheduled trip after 11:00 P.M., during which precise hour the warning devices were not operating because no one attended to them. The locomotive driver did not blow his whistle and simply sped on without taking the extra precaution of blowing his whistle from a distance of 50 to 10 meters from the crossing. The train was running at full speed, as attested by the fact that notwithstanding the application of emergency brakes, it did not stop until it reached a distance of about 100 meters. The trial court found the gross negligence of the defendant-appellant to be the proximate cause of the collision and awarded damages accordingly.

• Negligence of Railroad Company: Whether the defendant-appellant Philippine National Railways was negligent and whether such negligence was the proximate cause of the collision.
• Contributory Negligence of Motorist: Whether Victorino Cusi was contributorily negligent for failing to make a full stop before traversing the railroad crossing, as required by Section 56(a) of the Motor Vehicle Law.
• Reasonableness of Damages: Whether the amounts awarded by the lower court as actual, compensatory, and moral damages, as well as attorney's fees, were reasonable.

• Negligence of Railroad Company: Yes. The gross negligence of the defendant-appellant was the proximate cause of the collision, the warning devices being inoperative due to the absence of a guard and the locomotive driver having failed to blow his whistle.
• Contributory Negligence of Motorist: No. Victorino Cusi was not contributorily negligent, the excepting clause of Section 56(a) of the Motor Vehicle Law permitting a driver to slow down instead of coming to a full stop when it is apparent that no hazard exists.
• Reasonableness of Damages: Yes. The awards of actual, compensatory, and moral damages, as well as attorney's fees, were all found reasonable, with the modification that the total amount of damages shall bear 6% legal interest from March 26, 1968.

• Negligence of Railroad Company: The finding of negligence by the trial court commands great respect, the trial judge having the advantage of hearing the parties testify and observing their demeanor, and appellate courts accord lower court judgments the presumption of correctness absent substantial error or abuse of judicial scrutiny. Even independently of that presumption, the circumstances fully establish gross negligence. The warning devices were manually operated with only two shifts of guards ending at 11:00 P.M.; the train was on an unscheduled trip after that hour, when the crossing was left unattended and the signal devices inoperative. The railroad company allowed its locomotive to traverse the unattended crossing without sending any employee to operate the signal devices. The locomotive driver did not blow his whistle and sped on at full speed, the train not stopping until about 100 meters despite emergency brakes. Jurisprudence recognizes that the travelling public has the right to rely on warning devices to put them on guard, and the failure of such devices to operate is evidence of negligence. The inoperation of the warning devices created a situation misunderstood by the riding public to mean safe passage, making it a menace. The circumstances are similar to those in Lilius vs. Manila Railroad Company, where negligence was found for the absence of a semaphore, the failure of the flagman to remain at his post, and the engineer's failure to take precautions.

• Contributory Negligence of Motorist: The defense relied on Section 56(a) of the Motor Vehicle Law requiring a full stop before traversing railroad crossings, but omitted the excepting clause providing that the driver of a passenger automobile may, instead of coming to a full stop, slow down to not more than ten kilometers per hour whenever it is apparent that no hazard exists. Victorino Cusi had exercised all necessary precautions. The spouses had previously stopped at the guardhouse to ask for directions before proceeding to the party and had safely traversed the crossing earlier that evening when the level bar was raised, no warning lights were flashing, no bells ringing, and no whistle heard. On their return, the situation at the crossing did not change except for the absence of the guard or flagman. Rely on his faculties of sight and hearing, Cusi had no reason to anticipate impending danger and merely slackened his speed, driving at the proper rate for going over railroad crossings. Had the railroad company established that its driver blew his whistle and that Cusi proceeded with reckless speed, the result might have differed. But the contrary was established, and Cusi had not through his own negligence contributed to the accident.

• Reasonableness of Damages: The actual expenses and losses were fully substantiated: hospital bills of ₱13,550.05 and ₱3,001.90, doctor's fees of ₱1,500.00, loss of a wrist watch valued at ₱250.00, loss of a diamond earring valued at ₱2,750.00, and car repair costs of ₱2,894.77, totaling ₱23,946.72. The award of ₱21,600.00 to Mrs. Cusi for loss of income over three years and ₱14,000.00 for impairment of earning capacity was reasonable, she having earned ₱600.00 monthly as a piano teacher and having lost the dexterity of her fingers. The award of ₱40,000.00 to Mr. Cusi for loss of income during eight months of disability and impairment of earning capacity was likewise reasonable, his businesses having previously netted ₱5,000.00 monthly. The award of ₱20,000.00 for unrealized profits from a real estate transaction with Dolor Lopez Enterprises was affirmed, the defendant having failed to present any evidence to overcome the certainty of the transaction. The moral damages of ₱70,000.00 to Mrs. Cusi and ₱50,000.00 to Mr. Cusi were not excessive, both having been successful in their fields and now bearing lifelong physical deformities affecting their social lives, financial undertakings, and mental attitudes. The ₱10,000.00 in attorney's fees and litigation expenses was not unreasonable. Legal interest at 6% was imposed from the date of judgment, March 26, 1968.

• Presumption of Correctness of Trial Court Findings of Fact — The finding of negligence by a trial court, being a question of fact, commands great respect and weight because the trial judge has the advantage of hearing the parties testify and observing their demeanor. Appellate courts accord lower court judgments the presumption of correctness, and absent substantial error or abuse of judicial scrutiny, they are bound by those judgments.
• Negligence Defined (Cooley on Torts) — Negligence is "the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." There is no hard and fast rule for measuring the degree of care and vigilance; it depends on the circumstances, and the law requires only that a person use the care and diligence expected of reasonable men under similar circumstances.
• Reliance on Railroad Warning Devices — If warning devices are installed at railroad crossings, the travelling public has the right to rely on such devices to put them on their guard and take necessary precautions before crossing the tracks. A railroad company must use reasonable care to keep such devices in good condition and in working order, or to give notice that they are not operating. If a signal is misunderstood, it is a menace. The failure of a signalling device to operate is generally held to be evidence of negligence.
• Excepting Clause of Section 56(a), Motor Vehicle Law — While the general rule requires a full stop before traversing a railroad crossing, the excepting clause permits the driver of a passenger automobile or motorcycle to slow down to not more than ten kilometers per hour instead of coming to a full stop whenever it is apparent that no hazard exists. A motorist who relies on inoperative warning signals and slows down rather than stopping, with no apparent hazard, is not contributorily negligent.

• "Jurisprudence recognizes that if warning devices are installed in railroad crossings, the travelling public has the right to rely on such warning devices to put them on their guard and take the necessary precautions before crossing the tracks." — This passage articulates the doctrine that the public is entitled to rely on railroad warning devices, and that the failure of such devices to operate constitutes evidence of negligence on the part of the railroad company.

• "if such a signal is misunderstood it is a menace." — This compact formulation captures the rationale for holding railroad companies liable when inoperative warning devices create a false impression of safe passage, thereby endangering motorists who reasonably rely on them.

• "We find no need for him to have made a full stop; relying on his faculties of sight and hearing, Victorino Cusi had no reason to anticipate the impending danger." — This passage applies the excepting clause of Section 56(a) of the Motor Vehicle Law, establishing that a motorist who slows down at a railroad crossing when no hazard is apparent — based on inoperative signals and the absence of audible warnings — is not contributorily negligent.

• Lilius vs. Manila Railroad Company, 59 Phil. 758 (1934) — Followed. The Court found the circumstances of the present case very similar to those in Lilius, where negligence was upheld on the part of the railroad company for the absence of a semaphore at the crossing, the flagman's failure to remain at his post, the station master's failure to send the flagman on time, and the engineer's failure to take precautions by slackening speed and continuously ringing the bell and blowing the whistle.
• Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co., 33 Phil. 8 (1915) — Cited in support of the proposition that where the railroad company fails to establish that its driver blew his whistle and the motorist proceeded with reckless speed, the motorist is not negligent.
• Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Co., 27 SCRA 674 — Cited for the presumption of correctness accorded to trial court findings of fact, and in support of the contributory negligence analysis.

• Article 2176, New Civil Code — Provides that "whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done." This provision was the statutory basis for the quasi-delict action predicated on the negligence of the defendant-appellant.
• Section 56(a), Act 3992 (Motor Vehicle Law) — Requires all vehicles to come to a full stop before traversing any railroad crossing, but contains an excepting clause permitting the driver of a passenger automobile or motorcycle to slow down to not more than ten kilometers per hour whenever it is apparent that no hazard exists. The Court applied the excepting clause to hold that Victorino Cusi was not contributorily negligent.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concurred.