Cumigad vs. AAA

Under Section 8(g) of RA 9262, the phrase "income or salary" is disjunctive, and "income" is broader than "salary," encompassing allowances, bonuses, emoluments, honoraria, pensions, and retirement pay; accordingly, a protection order may direct the offender's employer to deduct an appropriate percentage from the offender's total income — not merely basic salary — as support for the woman and her child.

Spouses Edward Cumigad and AAA were married in 2006 in Taguig City and had one child, BBB. Edward was employed as a branch manager at Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, earning a basic monthly salary of P80,000.00 plus bonuses and allowances, while AAA earned a monthly salary of P31,500.00. The dispute arose under Republic Act No. 9262, the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, which penalizes economic abuse — including the deprivation or denial of sufficient financial support — and authorizes courts to issue protection orders with broad reliefs, including direct employer withholding of support.

Spouses Edward Cumigad and AAA were married in 2006 in Taguig City. A couple of years into the marriage, AAA gave birth to their only child, BBB. Their relationship deteriorated in the last quarter of 2008, when AAA accidentally discovered Edward's extramarital affair with his former girlfriend. Upon discovery, Edward abandoned AAA and their newborn child without explanation, taking their commonly owned Toyota Revo with him and later selling it. He never returned and instead cohabited with his paramour, with whom he had two children born in 2010 and 2011.

Despite the abandonment, Edward continued to provide monthly financial support for BBB — initially P8,500.00, which increased to P10,500.00 in 2009. In 2010, Edward won a Toyota Vios in a raffle draw and sold it a year later. Around this time, AAA had been asking Edward for BBB's educational support, but Edward ignored the request. On March 29, 2012, the spouses met to discuss BBB's education; Edward refused to have his name written in the school's information sheet, saying he would not attend school gatherings anyway. In April 2012, AAA asked Edward for P61,350.00 to pay for BBB's tuition, but Edward refused, insisting the amount was excessive and unreasonable.

AAA's monthly salary of P31,500.00, combined with Edward's support, was insufficient to meet the needs of their growing son. She had to seek help from her parents and siblings to maintain her and her child's living conditions. On May 7, 2012, AAA formally demanded an increase in financial support, noting that Edward, as a Metrobank branch manager earning a basic monthly salary of P80,000.00 excluding bonuses and allowances, could afford more. Edward rejected the demand as unreasonable, maintaining that P10,500.00 per month was more than enough. For several years, Edward saw BBB on only two occasions and neither greeted his child nor sent gifts on Christmas or birthdays. AAA also discovered that Edward and his paramour had publicized their relationship on social media, causing her emotional distress so severe that she sought professional help and was diagnosed with dysthymia.

On December 18, 2012, AAA filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for Issuance of Permanent Protection Order under RA 9262, praying that Edward be directed to provide sufficient support and account for the sale of the cars. Edward denied the accusations, alleging that their relationship fell apart due to AAA's immaturity and extreme attachment to her parents, describing her as temperamental and paranoid with an "obsessive pursuit for material security." He claimed he never neglected his obligations, regularly sent financial support, procured a medical card and educational plan for BBB, and that AAA had forbidden him from seeing their son. As to the sale of the family car, Edward claimed AAA consented and received her share of the proceeds.

The Regional Trial Court, in its May 15, 2014 Order, granted the petition and found Edward guilty of psychological and economic abuse, noting that he failed to rebut the allegation of marital infidelity and deprived his wife and son of benefits that should accrue to the absolute community. The Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that Edward earned a monthly gross income of P102,000.00 while AAA earned P31,500.00, and that BBB's average monthly expenses amounted to P60,702.00, making the one-third deduction proper.

• Scope of Deduction: Petitioner argued that Section 8(g) of RA 9262 only requires an appropriate percentage of his income or salary to be withheld, and that only his basic salary should be subject to deduction. Meal, representation, and transportation allowances should be excluded because they are necessary expenses given by the company to enable him to carry out his job as bank manager, and do not form part of his earnings or income.
• Insufficiency of Net Income: Petitioner claimed his net monthly income was insufficient for his personal expenses and existing financial obligations.
• Shared Support Obligation: Petitioner emphasized that respondent, as BBB's mother, was jointly bound to support their son and should share in the expenses.
• Excessiveness of Child's Expenses: Petitioner contended that BBB's alleged monthly expenses of P60,702.00 were excessive, citing 2012 Philippine Statistics Authority figures showing a family of five's average monthly expenses at P36,833.33. He maintained that P10,500.00 per month was sufficient for a six-year-old boy.
• Estoppel on Vehicle Sale: Petitioner alleged that respondent was estopped from questioning the sale of the family car because more than four years had passed since the sale, and that she had consented to the sale and received her share of the proceeds.

• Reasonableness of Support Award: Respondent argued that the amount of support awarded by the trial court was just and reasonable under the circumstances, and that her monthly salary of P31,500.00 was insufficient to cover BBB's present and future needs.
• Petitioner's Financial Capacity: Respondent pointed out that a deduction of one-third from petitioner's earnings would not destroy his way of life given that he earned a monthly gross income of P102,000.00, and as a bank manager he was entitled to annual salary increases and numerous bonuses allowing him to live comfortably.
• Accounting for Vehicle Sales: Respondent alleged that petitioner sold the family car and the car he won in a raffle without her consent and without dividing the proceeds. She maintained that the proceeds formed part of their absolute community property and the sale should be subject to accounting.

• Scope of Support Deduction: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering petitioner and his employer to withhold and deduct one-third of everything that he receives, including allowances, and to automatically remit the amount to respondent.
• Accounting for Vehicle Sale: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering petitioner to account for the sale of the vehicles.

• Scope of Support Deduction: No. Section 8(g) of RA 9262 uses "income or salary" disjunctively; "income" is broader than "salary" and includes allowances, bonuses, emoluments, honoraria, pensions, and retirement pay, so the deduction of one-third of everything petitioner receives — including allowances — was proper.
• Accounting for Vehicle Sale: No. Section 8(k) of RA 9262 grants courts discretion to provide other forms of relief deemed necessary to protect the petitioner; the vehicles are household property whose sale must redound to the benefit of respondent and her child.

• Scope of Support Deduction: Section 8(g) of RA 9262 directs the offender's employer to deduct "an appropriate percentage of the income or salary" of the respondent. The word "or" is a disjunctive conjunction indicating alternative or choice, and there was no reason to give it a non-disjunctive meaning in this context. The statute thus allows the court to choose between the offender's salary and income as the source of support. "Salary" or "wages" refers to recompense for services rendered and excludes allowances and benefits, which are granted apart from and in addition to salary. "Income," however, covers not just salary but also emoluments, honoraria, bonuses, allowances, pensions, retirement pay, and the like. Salary is but a component of income. Because RA 9262 provides that support may be obtained from income or salary, the deduction properly included petitioner's allowances. Moreover, the amount of P10,500.00 was clearly insufficient for BBB's needs, as respondent proved through actual receipts that BBB's average monthly expenses amounted to P60,702.00 covering food, medical attendance, housing, clothing, transportation, and education. Petitioner failed to refute this evidence, relying merely on a general statistic that did not account for BBB's specific needs. The award of support must be based on sufficient evidence of the giver's financial capacity and the recipient's needs, both of which were established here. The amount of support is never fixed but always variable, depending on the changing needs of the recipient and the resources of the giver. Respondent was left to shoulder the bulk of expenses despite her modest income, and even with the increased support, she would still assume a portion of their son's expenses, with each parent's share being reasonable and proportionate to their respective means. Furthermore, petitioner's employer, though not impleaded, was bound to comply with the deduction order, consistent with the rulings in Republic vs. Yahon and Mabugay-Otamias vs. Republic, which held that Section 8(g) of RA 9262 is an exception to the general rule exempting retirement benefits from execution and that employers are bound by protection orders even if not made parties to the case.

• Accounting for Vehicle Sale: Section 8(k) of RA 9262 grants courts the discretion to provide other forms of relief as they deem necessary to protect and provide for the safety of the petitioner. The vehicle is a household property, and its subsequent sale must redound to the benefit of respondent and her child. The order of accounting was therefore a proper exercise of the court's authority under the protection order framework.

• Economic Abuse under RA 9262 — Economic abuse refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent, including withdrawal of financial support, deprivation of financial resources and conjugal/community property, destroying household property, and controlling the victim's money or properties. It is not limited to the absolute refusal to provide financial support but also includes deliberately providing insufficient financial support. The deprivation or denial of sufficient financial support is an act of violence penalized under RA 9262 and is deemed a continuing offense. In this case, Edward's abandonment of his family, refusal to provide adequate support, and deprivation of community property constituted economic abuse.

• Variable Nature of Support — The amount of support is never fixed but always variable, depending on the changing needs of the recipient and the resources of the person obliged to furnish support. Under Article 202 of the Family Code, support shall be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources of the giver. The award must be based on sufficient evidence of the giver's financial capacity and the recipient's expenses.

• Statutory Construction of "Income or Salary" in Section 8(g) of RA 9262 — The word "or" in "income or salary" is a disjunctive conjunction indicating alternative; the court may choose between the offender's salary and income. "Salary" means recompense for services rendered and excludes allowances and benefits. "Income" is broader, covering salary, emoluments, honoraria, bonuses, allowances, pensions, retirement pay, and the like. Salary is but a component of income. Because RA 9262 provides that support can be obtained from income or salary, the deduction may include allowances.

• Employer's Duty to Comply with Protection Orders — An employer is bound to comply with an order requiring deduction of support from the offender's earnings even if the employer was not impleaded in the case. Section 8(g) of RA 9262, being a later law, is an exception to the general rule exempting retirement benefits from execution.

• "Economic abuse is not only the absolute refusal to provide financial support, but also the act of 'deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support[.]' Thus, the financial support must be sufficient to meet the needs of the woman and her child, considering the resources and means of the one obliged to provide." — This passage defines the scope of economic abuse under RA 9262, establishing that insufficiency — not just total absence — of support constitutes a penalized act.

• "Salary is but a component of income. And because Republic Act No. 9262 provides that the support can be obtained from income or salary, we affirm the amount of financial support indicated in the protection order, which includes the petitioner's allowances." — This is the ratio decidendi on the first issue, establishing that "income" in Section 8(g) is broader than "salary" and encompasses allowances.

• "There is no reason to give the word 'or' in Section 8(g) of Republic Act No. 9262 a non-disjunctive meaning. The use of 'or' signifies that the court may choose between the offender's salary and income from which spousal or child support should be deducted." — This passage articulates the Court's statutory construction of the disjunctive "or" in Section 8(g), a key interpretive ruling for support enforcement under RA 9262.

• "The accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality." — Quoted from Garcia vs. Drilon via Justice McIntyre, this passage frames the constitutional rationale for the gender-based classification in RA 9262, justifying the law's focus on violence against women.

• Garcia vs. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44 (2013) — Controlling precedent explaining the constitutional basis for RA 9262's classification; the unequal power relationship between women and men and widespread gender bias justify the law's classification. Cited for the proposition that the scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to safeguard victims and ensure financial support.

• Del Socorro vs. Van Wilsem, 749 Phil. 823 (2014) — Followed; held that the obligation to provide child support should be imposed in the Philippines even when the foreign national's own law did not impose such obligation, to avoid injustice to the child.

• Melgar vs. People, 826 Phil. 177 (2018) — Followed; affirmed conviction for economic abuse under Section 5(e) where the offender failed to support his child and former partner and sold property despite a compromise agreement, demonstrating intent to evade the support obligation.

• Reyes vs. People, G.R. No. 232678, July 3, 2019 — Followed; found petitioner guilty of economic abuse for deliberately refusing to provide financial support to his wife and children despite being gainfully employed.

• Songco vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 262 Phil. 667 (1990) — Cited for the definition of "salary" or "wages" as recompense or consideration for services rendered, synonymous with "wages," and distinct from allowances and benefits.

• Equitable Banking Corporation vs. Sadac, 523 Phil. 781 (2006) — Cited for the distinction between salary increases and allowances/benefits; allowances are granted apart from and in addition to wage or salary.

• Republic vs. Yahon, 736 Phil. 397 (2014) — Followed; held that Section 8(g) of RA 9262, being a later law, is an exception to the general rule exempting retirement benefits from execution, and that an employer (the AFP) was bound by a protection order even though not impleaded.

• Mabugay-Otamias vs. Republic, 786 Phil. 517 (2016) — Followed; held that the exemption from execution of pension benefits may be waived to comply with a husband's duty to provide support, and that the employer was bound by the trial court's order despite not being a party to the case.

• Estacio vs. Estacio, G.R. No. 211851, September 16, 2020 — Cited for the principle that it is a misguided view to always characterize women as victims, as this reinforces their disadvantaged position and perpetuates gender inequality.

• Section 8(g), Republic Act No. 9262 — Directs the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if entitled to legal support; notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an appropriate percentage of the income or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by the respondent's employer and automatically remitted to the woman. Applied as the basis for the deduction of one-third of petitioner's total earnings, including allowances, as the word "or" is disjunctive and "income" is broader than "salary."

• Section 8(k), Republic Act No. 9262 — Provides for such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary to protect and provide for the safety of the petitioner and any designated family or household member. Applied as the statutory basis for the order requiring petitioner to account for the sale of the vehicles.

• Section 3(d), Republic Act No. 9262 — Defines economic abuse as acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent, including withdrawal of financial support, deprivation of financial resources and conjugal/community property, destroying household property, and controlling the victim's money or properties. Applied to characterize petitioner's conduct as economic abuse.

• Section 5(e)(2), Republic Act No. 9262 — Penalizes depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support. Applied to establish that insufficiency of support — not just total refusal — constitutes economic abuse.

• Article 194, Family Code — Defines support as everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education, and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Applied to determine the scope and sufficiency of the support obligation.

• Article 201, Family Code — Provides that the amount of support shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. Applied in determining the proportionate share of each parent.

• Article 202, Family Code — Provides that support shall be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources of the giver. Applied to support the principle that support is variable and adjustable.

• Article 95, Family Code — Referenced in the RTC order regarding the administration and disposition of absolute community property. Applied in ordering petitioner to account for the sale of community-property vehicles.

Lazaro-Javier, M. Lopez, J. Lopez, and Marquez, JJ., concurred. Justice Marquez was designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2868.