Culanag vs. Director of Prisons

A parolee who violates parole conditions may be re-arrested and made to serve the remaining unexpired portion of his original sentence under Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code, notwithstanding his separate prosecution, conviction, and service of sentence for violation of conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code.

On November 6, 1961, Andres Culanag was accused of falsification of a public document in an information filed in the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte (Crim. Case No. 671). The information alleged that on or about June 19, 1960, in Iligan City, he subscribed and swore to a petition for commission as notary public for and in the City and Province of Cotabato, falsely claiming to be one Ross V. Pangilinan, a graduate of the College of Law of the University of the Visayas, to have passed the bar examinations, and to have been admitted to the practice of law. After trial, he was found guilty on December 16, 1961 and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from four months and one day of arresto mayor to two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of P1,000.00. The judgment became final, and he was committed to the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa, Rizal.

On July 9, 1962, Culanag was discharged from the penitentiary on parole. Among the conditions of his release were that he reside at Iligan City, not change his residence without the consent of the Board of Pardons and Parole, not commit any crime, and that should he violate any of these conditions, the remaining unexpired portion of his maximum sentence would again be in full force and effect.

Subsequently, on March 31, 1964, another information for falsification of a public document was filed against him in the Municipal Court of Mamburao, Mindoro Occidental (Crim. Case No. 790). This time the charge was that on June 1, 1963, he again claimed to be Ross V. Pangilinan and filed with the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro a sworn petition for commission as notary public for and in the Province of Occidental Mindoro, falsely stating that he was a law graduate of the University of the Visayas, had passed the bar examinations, and been admitted to the practice of law. On April 3, 1964, a separate information was filed in the same court charging him with violation of conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code (Crim. Case No. 789).

On May 18, 1964, the Board of Pardons and Parole ordered Culanag arrested for violation of the conditions of his parole and delivered to the custody of the Director of Prisons to serve the remaining portion of his prison term imposed in Crim. Case No. 671. After unsuccessfully moving to quash in Crim. Cases Nos. 789 and 790 — pleading double jeopardy by contending that the falsification act charged anew was the same as that involved in Crim. Case No. 671 — Culanag pleaded guilty on December 4, 1964 in both new criminal cases. He was sentenced in Crim. Case No. 790 to an indeterminate penalty of from four months and one day of arresto mayor to two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, plus a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment, and in Crim. Case No. 789 to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor.

Culanag began serving these new sentences. He had previously filed a habeas corpus petition on December 22, 1964 in the CFI Rizal (Sp. Proc. No. 5099), contending that the second falsification case involved the same act as the first and thus constituted double jeopardy; that petition was dismissed, and the Supreme Court affirmed on June 21, 1966, finding the two falsifications to be different acts done at different times and in different places. On December 13, 1966, alleging that the prison sentences under Crim. Cases Nos. 789 and 790 had already been fully served, Culanag filed a second habeas corpus petition in the CFI Rizal (Sp. Proc. No. 2004-P), raising the issue of whether he still had to serve, in addition to the sentences in Crim. Cases Nos. 789 and 790, the remaining unexpired portion of his sentence in Crim. Case No. 671. The CFI Rizal dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and Culanag appealed.

• Parole Re-incarceration Barred by Conviction for Conditional Pardon Violation: Petitioner argued that a person released on parole cannot be re-arrested and made to serve the remaining unexpired portion of his sentence under Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code if the State prosecutes and has him convicted for violation of conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Full Service of Conditional Pardon Sentence Precludes Re-service of Original Sentence: Since he had been convicted and had served sentence for violation of conditional pardon under Article 159 (Crim. Case No. 789), petitioner maintained that he could no longer be made to serve the rest of his sentence in Crim. Case No. 671 from which he was paroled.

• Parole Re-incarceration vs. Conviction for Conditional Pardon Violation: Whether a parolee who has been prosecuted, convicted, and has served sentence for violation of conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code may still be re-arrested and made to serve the remaining unexpired portion of his original sentence under Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code.

• Parole Re-incarceration vs. Conviction for Conditional Pardon Violation: Yes. The power of the Chief Executive under Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code to arrest and re-incarcerate a parole violator stands even in the face of prosecution, conviction, and service of sentence for violation of conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. There is no double jeopardy because the sentences refer to different offenses, and there is no deprivation of liberty without due process because the petitioner was found guilty and sentenced after due process in both cases.

• Parole Re-incarceration vs. Conviction for Conditional Pardon Violation: The Court applied the principle established in Sales vs. Director of Prisons, 87 Phil. 492, that the executive power under Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code to re-incarcerate a parole violator is independent of, and not displaced by, a criminal prosecution for violation of conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. The two mechanisms address distinct legal consequences: Section 64(i) authorizes the Chief Executive to revoke parole and require service of the unexpired portion of the original sentence, while Article 159 punishes the act of violating a conditional pardon as a separate offense. Because the sentences in Crim. Case No. 671 (falsification) and Crim. Case No. 789 (violation of conditional pardon) pertain to different offenses, there is no double jeopardy. Nor is there a deprivation of liberty without due process, as Culanag was found guilty and sentenced in both cases after due process of law. Relying on People vs. Tan, L-21805, Feb. 25, 1967, the Court noted that before full service of the sentences, the petitioner was not yet entitled to liberty. Accordingly, the remaining unexpired portion of the sentence in Crim. Case No. 671 remained enforceable notwithstanding the service of sentence for violation of conditional pardon.

• Independence of Parole Revocation from Prosecution for Violation of Conditional Pardon — The power of the Chief Executive under Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code to arrest and re-incarcerate a person who violates his parole conditions is not negated or extinguished by the State's separate prosecution, conviction, and service of sentence of the same person for violation of conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. The two are distinct legal mechanisms: parole revocation is an executive function that restores the unexpired portion of the original sentence, while prosecution under Article 159 is a criminal proceeding punishing a separate statutory offense. There is no double jeopardy because the offenses are different, and there is no denial of due process where the petitioner was convicted and sentenced after due process in each case.

• "The power of the Chief Executive under Section 64(i) of the Rev. Administrative Code to arrest and re-incarcerate any person who violates his parole condition, stands even in the face of prosecution, conviction and service of sentence for violation of conditional pardon under Art. 159, Rev. Penal Code." — This passage states the ratio decidendi, establishing that parole revocation and prosecution for violation of conditional pardon are independent remedies that may both be pursued without offending double jeopardy or due process.
• "There is no double jeopardy, because the sentences refer to different offenses; in this case, to falsification (Crim. Case 671) and to violation of conditional pardon (Crim. Case 789)." — This clarifies why the re-incarceration of the parolee does not constitute double jeopardy: the original sentence and the sentence for violation of conditional punishment arise from legally distinct offenses.
• "And before full service of said sentences, he is not yet entitled to liberty" — This principle, drawn from People vs. Tan, underscores that entitlement to release arises only upon complete service of all applicable sentences, not merely upon service of one.

• Sales vs. Director of Prisons, 87 Phil. 492 — Controlling precedent cited for the proposition that the Chief Executive's power under Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code to re-incarcerate a parole violator persists notwithstanding prosecution, conviction, and service of sentence for violation of conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code.
• People vs. Tan, L-21805, Feb. 25, 1967 — Cited for the principle that before full service of all applicable sentences, a prisoner is not yet entitled to liberty.
• Andres Culanag vs. Director of Prisons, L-25619, June 21, 1966 — Prior ruling in the same petitioner's first habeas corpus petition, affirming that the two falsification charges involved different acts done at different times and in different places, thus negating double jeopardy.

• Section 64(i), Revised Administrative Code — Empowers the Chief Executive to arrest and re-incarcerate any person who violates the conditions of his parole, causing the remaining unexpired portion of his maximum sentence to again be in full force and effect. The Court held that this power stands independently of a separate prosecution for violation of conditional pardon.
• Article 159, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the offense of violation of conditional pardon. The Court treated conviction and service of sentence under this article as distinct from the executive act of parole revocation under Section 64(i), such that the former does not preclude the latter.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concurred.