Cuizon vs. Ramolete

A probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to belong to outside parties, and cannot divest third persons of their possession and ownership of property covered by a Torrens title merely because the property was included in the inventory of the estate. The probate court may only make a prima facie determination of whether property should be included in or excluded from the inventory, and where a property is covered by a Torrens Title, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, with the holder considered the owner until the title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action.

The petitioners were the vendees of salt beds from Irene Cuizon, who died in 1978. The property had been sold to them in 1971 through a Deed of Sale with Reservation of Usufruct, and was subsequently titled in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12665. After Irene's death, an intestate proceeding was filed before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and the respondent administrator included the property in the inventory of the estate despite the petitioners' Torrens title over it.

Marciano Cuizon applied for the registration of several parcels of land located at Opao, Mandaue City, then covered by certificates of Tax Declaration, in Land Registration Case No. N-179, as far back as 1961. In 1970, he distributed his property between his two children, Rufina and Irene. Part of the property given to Irene consisted largely of salt beds which eventually became the subject of the controversy.

On December 29, 1971, Irene Cuizon executed a Deed of Sale with Reservation of Usufruct involving the salt beds in favor of the petitioners Francisco, Rosita, and Purificacion, all surnamed Cuizon. At that time, Francisco and Rosita were minors and assisted by their mother, Rufina, the only sister of Irene. The sale was not registered because the petitioners felt it was unnecessary due to the lifetime usufructuary rights of Irene.

Although the decision in L.R. Case No. N-179 was rendered in 1962, the decree of registration No. N-161246 and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. 0171 was issued only in 1976 in the name of Marciano Cuizon. In that same year, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10477 covering the property in question was issued by the Register of Deeds to Irene Cuizon. Irene died in 1978. In the extrajudicial settlement of the estate, her alleged half sister and sole heir Rufina adjudicated to herself all the property of the decedent including the property in question. After the notice of the extrajudicial settlement was duly published in a newspaper of general circulation, Rufina executed a deed of Confirmation of Sale wherein she confirmed and ratified the deed of sale of December 29, 1971 executed by the late Irene and renounced and waived whatever rights, interest, and participation she may have in the property in question in favor of the petitioners. The deed was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds and annotated at the back of TCT No. 10477. Subsequently, TCT No. 12665 was issued in favor of the petitioners.

On September 28, 1978, a petition for letters of administration was filed before the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 3864-R) by respondent Domingo Antigua, allegedly selected by the heirs of Irene numbering seventeen in all to act as administrator of the estate of the decedent. The petition was granted. Respondent Antigua as administrator filed an inventory of the estate of Irene and included in the inventory the property in question, which was being administered by Juan Arche, one of the petitioners. On June 27, 1979, respondent Antigua filed a motion asking the court for authority to sell the salt from the property and praying that petitioner Arche be ordered to deliver the salt to the administrator. The motion was granted, and the respondent court ordered that the administrator be authorized to sell the salt in the custody of Juan Arche, that Arche deliver the salt to the administrator, and that he likewise deliver such other products of the land to the administrator.

Subsequently, on three different occasions, respondent Segundo Zambo with the aid of several men sought to enforce the order of the respondent court, compelling the petitioners to come to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The petitioners argued that the respondent court, as a court handling only the intestate proceedings, had neither the authority to adjudicate controverted rights nor to divest them of their possession and ownership of the property in question and hand over the same to the administrator. The respondent administrator, on the other hand, argued that the petitioners failed to first apply for relief in the court of origin before filing the present petition, and that the deed of sale of December 29, 1971 lost its efficacy upon the rendition of judgment and issuance of the decree in favor of Irene Cuizon.

• Lack of Probate Court Jurisdiction: Petitioners argued that the respondent court, as a court handling only the intestate proceedings, had neither the authority to adjudicate controverted rights nor to divest them of their possession and ownership of the property in question and hand over the same to the administrator.
• Proper Remedy: Petitioners contended that the proper remedy of the respondent administrator is to file a separate civil action to recover the property.

• Failure to Exhaust Remedies: The respondent administrator argued that the petitioners' failure to first apply for relief in the court of origin before filing the present petition was a fatal defect.
• Inefficacy of the Deed of Sale: The administrator stated that the deed of sale of December 29, 1971 lost its efficacy upon the rendition of judgment and issuance of the decree in favor of Irene Cuizon.

• Jurisdiction of Probate Court: Whether a probate court has jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title issued in favor of owners who are not parties to the intestate proceedings, if the said parcels have been included in the inventory of properties of the estate prepared by the administrator.

• Jurisdiction of Probate Court: No. A probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and equally claimed to belong to outside parties. The respondent court was clearly without jurisdiction to issue the order of June 27, 1979, and it was unnecessary for the petitioners to first apply for relief with the intestate court.

• Jurisdiction of Probate Court: The Court applied the well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. The Court cited Mallari vs. Mallari and Baquial vs. Amihan in support of this rule.

The Court also cited Valero Vda. de Rodriguez vs. CA, where it was held that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate petition regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties.

In the instant case, the property involved was not only claimed by outside parties but was sold seven years before the death of the decedent and was duly titled in the name of the vendees who were not parties to the proceedings. The Court found the case of Bolisay vs. Alcid to be similar, where the Court held that the mere inclusion in the inventory submitted by the administrator of the estate of a deceased person of a given property does not of itself deprive the probate court of authority to inquire into the propriety of such inclusion in case an heir or a third party claims adverse title thereto. The correct rule is that the probate court should resolve the issue before it provisionally, as basis for its inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory.

The Court further held that if a property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly when, as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of the property.

Even assuming the truth of the private respondents' allegations that the sale of December 29, 1971 was effected under suspicious circumstances and tainted with fraud and that the right of Rufina as alleged half-sister and sole heir of Irene remains open to question, these issues may only be threshed out in a separate civil action filed by the respondent administrator against the petitioners and not in the intestate proceedings.

• Jurisdiction of Probate Courts over Properties Claimed by Third Parties — A probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute, the parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it ordered the delivery of property titled in the petitioners' names to the administrator.

• Prima Facie Determination of Ownership in Probate Proceedings — For the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate petition regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties. The probate court should resolve the issue before it provisionally, as basis for its inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory.

• Conclusiveness of Torrens Title in Probate Proceedings — If a property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly when possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. The mere inclusion in the inventory submitted by the administrator of the estate of a deceased person of a given property does not of itself deprive the probate court of authority to inquire into the propriety of such inclusion in case an heir or a third party claims adverse title thereto.

• "It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally (claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator." — This passage states the fundamental limitation on probate court jurisdiction over properties claimed by third parties, which is the ratio decidendi of the case.

• "the mere inclusion in the inventory submitted by the administrator of the estate of a deceased person of a given property does not of itself deprive the probate court of authority to inquire into the property of such inclusion in case an heir or a third party claims adverse title thereto. To hold otherwise would render inutile the power of that court to make a prima facie determination of the issue of ownership recognized in the above quoted precedents. The correct rule is that the probate court should resolve the issue before it provisionally, as basis for its inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory." — This passage clarifies the scope of the probate court's authority regarding inventory inclusion and establishes the prima facie determination rule.

• "if a property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title." — This passage establishes the standard for weighing Torrens titles in probate proceedings and is the controlling principle for the disposition of the case.

• Mallari vs. Mallari, 92 Phil. 694 — Cited as controlling precedent for the rule that a probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed by outside parties, and that the parties must resort to an ordinary action for final determination of conflicting claims of title.
• Baquial vs. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501 — Cited as controlling precedent for the same rule regarding the limits of probate court jurisdiction over properties claimed by third parties.
• Valero Vda. de Rodriguez vs. CA, 91 SCRA 540 — Cited for the rule that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate petition regarding ownership.
• Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262 — Cited in support of the rule that the probate court's determination of title for inventory purposes is not conclusive and is subject to a separate action regarding ownership.
• Bolisay vs. Alcid, 85 SCRA 213 — Followed as a similar case where the Court held that the mere inclusion of a property in the inventory does not deprive the probate court of authority to inquire into the propriety of such inclusion, and that the presumptive conclusiveness of a Torrens title should be given due weight.
• Siy Chong Keng vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 60 Phil. 494 — Cited for the proposition that it is not necessary that the inventory and appraisal be approved by the Court.

• Rules of Court, provisions on special proceedings — The Court relied on the rules governing testate and intestate proceedings, as discussed in Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, to determine the extent of the probate court's authority over properties included in the inventory of the estate.

Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, and De la Fuente, JJ., concurred.