Cuison vs. Court of Appeals

The promulgation of only the civil liability portion of a decision does not bar the subsequent promulgation of the criminal liability portion, because the first jeopardy has not yet attached where the criminal case has not been validly terminated, and a promulgation rendered incomplete by grave abuse of discretion is void and cannot serve as the basis for a double jeopardy defense.

Eduardo Cuison was charged with and convicted of double homicide for the shooting deaths of Rafael Sapigao and Rulo Castro. The case arose from events at the Tropical Hut in Bugallon, Pangasinan, on May 27, 1986, involving Cuison, his brothers and nephews, and two military sergeants. The dispute centers on the proper execution of an appellate decision affirming the conviction, specifically whether the trial court's partial promulgation of only the civil indemnity component constitutes a complete promulgation that bars subsequent promulgation of the criminal penalty under the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.

On February 7, 1989, the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, rendered a Joint Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. L-3553 and L-3554, finding Eduardo Cuison guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of double homicide for the shooting deaths of Rafael Sapigao and Rulo Castro. The trial court sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum for each offense, with the accessories provided by law, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of each victim in the amount of ₱30,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Cuison appealed to the Court of Appeals. On July 30, 1991, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision with the modification that the civil indemnity was increased to ₱50,000.00 for each victim's heirs, in accordance with the Supreme Court's new policy as articulated in People vs. Sison. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision stated that the joint decision was "MODIFIED by ordering accused Eduardo Cuison to indemnify the heirs of Rafael Sapigao the amount of P50,000.00 and the heirs of Rulo Castro also the amount of P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency." Cuison elevated the decision to the Supreme Court via petition for review docketed as G.R. Nos. 108985-86, but the petition was denied on December 1, 1993.

The case was remanded to the RTC for promulgation. On April 4, 1995, the trial court promulgated the CA decision only with respect to the modified civil liability of the accused — ordering payment of the increased indemnity — but did not commit the accused to jail to commence service of his sentence. Asst. City Prosecutor Abraham L. Ramos II reported the matter to the Solicitor General, who filed a Motion to Clarify Decision with the Court of Appeals on July 7, 1995. On August 17, 1995, the CA issued a Resolution clarifying that it had affirmed the trial court's decision with regard to the penalty of imprisonment, noting that the only modification made was the increase of the civil indemnity, and that it entertained no doubt as to the participation of the accused-appellant in the shooting of the two victims.

The trial court then set the promulgation of the decision anew. Cuison, however, filed a Motion to Set Aside Promulgation, arguing that the judgment had already been promulgated on April 4, 1995 and that proceeding with the scheduled promulgation would violate his constitutional right against double jeopardy. On April 12, 1996, the trial court granted the motion, reasoning that it had already promulgated the decision by reading the dispositive portion to the accused, that the accused had already complied by paying the damages awarded, and that the Court of Appeals lacked the rule-making authority to suspend the operation of procedural rules to clarify an ambiguity in a decision that had already become final and been promulgated. On June 28, 1996, the Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion in refusing to execute the penalty of imprisonment. The CA ruled in favor of the People, set aside the RTC resolution, and ordered the trial court to set anew the promulgation of the decision sentencing the accused to imprisonment.

• Certiorari Requisites Not Established: Petitioner argued that the Solicitor General failed to establish the requisites for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari, maintaining that the trial court's April 12, 1996 Resolution was issued after careful deliberation and was "valid and substantial," far from being whimsical, capricious, or malevolent.
• Mandamus Elements Absent: Petitioner contended that the Solicitor General failed to show the existence of the elements for the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
• Impossibility of Re-Promulgation: Petitioner argued that the promulgation of April 4, 1995 cannot be modified or set aside over the objection of the accused, as the judgment had already been promulgated and become final.
• Double Jeopardy: Petitioner maintained that the filing of the petition for certiorari and mandamus by the Solicitor General violated his constitutional right against double jeopardy, as the promulgation on April 4, 1995 had effectively terminated the criminal cases against him.
• Failure to File Motion for Reconsideration: Petitioner contended that the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals was improper because the People had not filed a motion for reconsideration of the assailed trial court order.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Respondent, through the Solicitor General, argued that the trial judge seriously erred and gravely abused his discretion in refusing to execute the penalty of imprisonment despite the CA Decision of July 30, 1991 and Resolution of August 17, 1995, and prayed that the trial court's April 12, 1996 Order be nullified and the penalty of imprisonment enforced.
• Affirmance of Conviction Evident: Respondent countered that the CA Decision affirmed the conviction, as borne out by the body of the decision which entertained no doubt as to the accused's participation in the shooting, and that it would be absurd to conclude that the CA increased the civil liability without finding the accused guilty.
• Clarification Not Amendment: Respondent argued that the CA's August 17, 1995 Resolution was not an amendment, modification, correction, or alteration of an already final decision, but merely a categorical restatement of what the CA obviously meant — that the conviction was affirmed with the modification that the civil liability was increased.

• Certiorari and Mandamus: Whether the writs of certiorari and mandamus were properly issued by the Court of Appeals.
• Double Jeopardy: Whether petitioner's constitutional right against double jeopardy was violated by the order requiring re-promulgation of the decision sentencing the accused to imprisonment.

• Certiorari and Mandamus: Yes. The writs were properly issued, the trial court having acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to promulgate the CA decision in its entirety, and mandamus was warranted to compel the trial court's ministerial duty of obedience to a superior court's order.
• Double Jeopardy: No. The constitutional right against double jeopardy was not violated, because the first jeopardy had not yet attached — the criminal cases had not been validly terminated, the promulgation of April 4, 1995 having been incomplete and void for grave abuse of discretion.

• Certiorari and Mandamus: The requisites for certiorari under Rule 65 were present: the writ was directed against a tribunal exercising judicial functions, the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and there was no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The trial court capriciously and arbitrarily refused to promulgate the CA's July 30, 1991 Decision in its entirety, despite the fact that the CA Decision affirmed the conviction — the dispositive portion never communicated that the penalty of imprisonment was deleted. The trial court had no discretion to refuse promulgation; its refusal was a glaring transgression of its jurisdiction. Moreover, the Supreme Court had already dismissed the petition questioning the CA's July 30, 1991 Decision, thereby affirming the conviction, making the trial court's refusal tantamount to overruling a judicial pronouncement of the highest Court. The trial court's claim that it had already promulgated the decision on April 4, 1995 was erroneous because it promulgated only the civil aspect, not the criminal. Mandamus was likewise proper because obedience to a superior court's order is a ministerial duty of lower courts, and the trial court unlawfully neglected that duty. Petitioner's contention that a motion for reconsideration was a prerequisite was rejected, as a motion for reconsideration need not precede a petition for certiorari where the questioned resolution was a patent nullity.

• Double Jeopardy: To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense. Legal jeopardy attaches only upon a valid indictment, before a competent court, after arraignment, upon a valid plea, and when the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. Petitioner contended that the promulgation on April 4, 1995 effectively terminated the criminal cases. This was rejected. A criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the recovery of indemnity, and a decision in such case disposes of both criminal and civil liabilities. Here, the trial court promulgated only the civil aspect, not the criminal. The promulgation was not merely incomplete; it was void, having been rendered in excess of jurisdiction through grave abuse of discretion. Since the criminal cases had not yet been validly terminated, the first jeopardy had not yet attached, and double jeopardy could not prosper. The CA's questioned Decision did not modify or amend its July 30, 1991 Decision; it merely ordered the promulgation of the judgment of conviction and the full execution of the penalty. The cases cited by petitioner — People vs. Hernando, Ramos vs. Hodges, and Republic vs. Court of Appeals — were distinguished as inapplicable because they referred either to lower court proceedings that were not void or to errors of judgment rather than lack or excess of jurisdiction.

• Double Jeopardy — The constitutional proscription against double jeopardy requires proof of three elements: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy was validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy is for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt or frustration thereof. Legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. In this case, the first jeopardy had not yet attached because the criminal cases had not been validly terminated — the promulgation of April 4, 1995 was incomplete and void for grave abuse of discretion, having covered only the civil liability and omitted the criminal penalty.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. The trial court's refusal to promulgate the CA decision in its entirety constituted grave abuse of discretion, as the trial judge had no discretion to refuse obedience to a superior court's affirmance of conviction.

• Certiorari — A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper when: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration need not precede a petition for certiorari where the questioned resolution is a patent nullity.

• Mandamus — Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus is warranted when any tribunal, corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. Obedience to a superior court's order is a ministerial duty of lower courts, and refusal to perform that duty warrants the issuance of mandamus.

• Civil Action Included in Criminal Prosecution — As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the recovery of indemnity. A decision in such a case disposes of both the criminal and civil liabilities of an accused. Partial promulgation of only the civil aspect does not constitute a valid and complete promulgation of the judgment.

• "The constitutional proscription of double jeopardy is not violated by a Court of Appeals order requiring the trial court to promulgate a decision sentencing the accused to imprisonment even if, earlier, the same decision has been promulgated in regard only to the payment of the modified civil indemnity arising from the same criminal act." — This is the opening statement of the decision, articulating the core ratio decidendi that partial promulgation of civil liability does not bar subsequent promulgation of criminal liability.

• "Since the criminal cases have not yet been terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense." — This passage crystallizes the Court's conclusion on the double jeopardy issue, establishing that an incomplete and void promulgation does not terminate the first jeopardy.

• "In fact and in truth, the promulgation was not merely incomplete; it was also void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the trial judge rendered a substantially incomplete promulgation on April 4, 1995, and he repeated his mistake in his April 12, 1996 Order." — This passage establishes that a promulgation rendered incomplete through grave abuse of discretion is void, and thus cannot serve as the basis for a double jeopardy defense.

• "Obedience to a superior court's order is a ministerial duty of lower courts." — This succinctly states the doctrinal basis for the issuance of mandamus against a lower court that refuses to execute a superior court's decision.

• People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643 — Cited as the basis for the Court of Appeals' increase of civil indemnity from ₱30,000 to ₱50,000, reflecting the Supreme Court's new policy on civil indemnity in homicide cases.
• People vs. Colman, et al., 55 O.G. 2392 — Cited for the doctrine that conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence but may be proved by acts, conditions, and circumstances indicating cooperative action toward a common unlawful object.
• People vs. Hernando — Distinguished as inapplicable because the questioned proceedings in that case were not an absolute nullity, unlike the void promulgation in the present case.
• Ramos vs. Hodges — Distinguished as inapplicable because the trial judge's erroneous conclusion in that case constituted errors of fact or law, not errors of jurisdiction.
• Republic vs. Court of Appeals — Distinguished as inapplicable because the lower court committed merely an error of judgment, not an error of jurisdiction, with no showing of arbitrary or despotic exercise of power.
• Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 703 — Cited for the elements of double jeopardy and the requisites for legal jeopardy to attach.

• Rule 65, Rules of Court (Certiorari) — Section 1 provides the requisites for certiorari: the writ must be directed against a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, such tribunal must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and there must be no appeal or plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. Applied to hold that the trial court's refusal to promulgate constituted grave abuse of discretion.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court (Mandamus) — Section 3 provides that mandamus is warranted when any tribunal unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. Applied to compel the trial court to perform its ministerial duty of obeying a superior court's order.
• Rule 111, Rules of Court — Section 1 provides that a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the recovery of indemnity. Applied to establish that a decision in a criminal case disposes of both criminal and civil liabilities, and that promulgation of only the civil aspect is incomplete.
• Constitutional Right Against Double Jeopardy — The constitutional guarantee was invoked by petitioner but held inapplicable because the first jeopardy had not yet attached, the criminal cases not having been validly terminated due to the void and incomplete promulgation.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug, and Quisumbing, JJ., concurred.