Cuenca vs. Court of Appeals

A motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence may be entertained by the Supreme Court even after the petition for review has been denied, where the newly discovered evidence — such as a declaration against interest — casts doubt on the culpability of the accused and the prosecution does not object. The earlier rule barring such motions in the Supreme Court has been relaxed in subsequent jurisprudence.

Edilberto M. Cuenca was the President and Chief Executive Officer of Ultra International Trading Corporation, a wholly-owned service corporation organized by Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to supply the needs of CDCP and its subsidiaries. Ultra's directors were nominees of CDCP and received instructions directly from Rodolfo Cuenca, Edilberto's brother, who was CDCP's President and CEO and controlled an effective majority of CDCP's voting shares. Ultra obtained credit facilities from China Bank, including trust receipts for the purchase of steel materials for CDCP, on the basis of guarantees and informal assurances from CDCP that Ultra's transactions were undertaken for and on behalf of CDCP. When payment on the trust receipts was not made, Edilberto was charged with and convicted of violation of the Trust Receipts Law (P.D. No. 115).

Edilberto M. Cuenca served as President and Chief Executive Officer of Ultra International Trading Corporation from its inception. Ultra was organized sometime in 1974 upon the initiative of Rodolfo Cuenca — Edilberto's brother — who was then President and CEO of Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) and controlled an effective majority of CDCP's voting shares. Ultra's purpose was to serve and supply the needs of CDCP and its subsidiaries with lower-value goods, using Ultra's own financial resources. Ultra's directors were nominees of CDCP and received instructions directly from Rodolfo Cuenca or from Mr. Pedro Valdez, Chairman of CDCP.

In March 1979, Rodolfo Cuenca instructed Ultra, through Edilberto, to purchase various steel materials for CDCP. These materials were received by CDCP and were covered by trust receipts that became the subject of the criminal case. CDCP provided the guarantees needed to persuade China Bank to issue the trust receipts, along with informal assurances that Ultra's transactions were undertaken for and on behalf of CDCP and CDCP Mining Corporation. On the basis of these guarantees, Ultra was able to obtain credit facilities including the trust receipts in question.

In 1980, CDCP suffered cashflow problems and consciously omitted payment to Ultra for the delivery of the steel materials. Edilberto had no power to cause payment of the trust receipts because the common Treasurer and controller of both CDCP and Ultra, Ms. Nora Vinluan, acted under Rodolfo Cuenca's control, and Rodolfo did not allow her to make the appropriate payments. CDCP never paid Ultra the amounts corresponding to the materials covered by the trust receipts. By the time final demand to pay was served in 1984, Edilberto was no longer president of Ultra Corporation and could not have caused Ultra to pay.

Edilberto was charged with and convicted of violation of the Trust Receipts Law (P.D. No. 115). The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, and the Supreme Court denied his petition for review on February 9, 1994. Thereafter, Edilberto sought to file a motion for new trial grounded on newly discovered evidence and excusable negligence, supported by affidavits from an officer of the private complainant corporation who would exculpate him, an admission against interest by a former officer of CDCP, and his own affidavit asserting innocence. The key piece of newly discovered evidence was the affidavit of Rodolfo Cuenca, who accepted personal responsibility for the trust receipts and undertook to pay the civil obligations arising therefrom, stating that Edilberto had merely acted as agent for CDCP and had no power to cause payment.

• Newly Discovered Evidence: Petitioner maintained that he was entitled to a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence and excusable negligence, supported by affidavits from an officer of the private complainant corporation, an admission against interest by a former officer of CDCP (Rodolfo Cuenca), and his own affidavit asserting innocence for the first time.
• Exculpation Through Declaration Against Interest: Petitioner argued that Rodolfo Cuenca's sworn statement constituted an admission against interest that cast doubt on his culpability, as it established that Edilberto had merely acted as agent for CDCP and had no power to cause payment of the trust receipts.

• Entitlement to New Trial: The Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines, recommended that petitioner be entitled to a new trial, agreeing that Rodolfo Cuenca's sworn statement was a declaration against interest under Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court that cast doubt on Edilberto's culpability.
• Duty of Prosecution to See Justice Done: The Solicitor General argued that under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is done, and that the suppression of facts or concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible. The People was inclined to allow petitioner to establish the genuineness and due execution of his brother's affidavit in the interest of justice and fair play.

• Admissibility of Motion for New Trial: Whether the Supreme Court may entertain a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence after the petition for review has already been denied.
• Sufficiency of Newly Discovered Evidence: Whether Rodolfo Cuenca's affidavit constitutes newly discovered evidence sufficient to justify a new trial.

• Admissibility of Motion for New Trial: Yes. The earlier rule in Goduco vs. CA barring the Supreme Court from entertaining motions for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence has been relaxed, if not abandoned, in subsequent cases such as Helmuth, Jr. vs. People and People vs. Amparado.
• Sufficiency of Newly Discovered Evidence: Yes. Rodolfo Cuenca's affidavit is a declaration against interest under Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court that casts doubt on petitioner's culpability, and the prosecution does not object to a new trial.

• Admissibility of Motion for New Trial: The Court acknowledged that in Goduco vs. CA (14 SCRA 282 [1965]), it had ruled that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, since the judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts and only questions of law are involved in an appeal by certiorari. However, the Court found that this rule "now appears to have been relaxed, if not abandoned" in subsequent cases, specifically Helmuth, Jr. vs. People (112 SCRA 573 [1982]) and People vs. Amparado (156 SCRA 712 [1987]). In both cases, the Court brushed aside technicalities and, despite opposition from the Solicitor General, granted new trial to convicted accused on the basis of proposed testimonies or affidavits considered newly discovered and probably sufficient to reverse the judgment of conviction. Being similarly circumstanced, petitioner was entitled to the same benefit, all the more so because the People raised no objection to a new trial.

• Sufficiency of Newly Discovered Evidence: The Court agreed with the Solicitor General's assessment that Rodolfo Cuenca's affidavit constituted a declaration against interest under Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. The affidavit contained admissions that Rodolfo personally directed Ultra's transactions, controlled its finances through the common treasurer, and consciously prevented payment on the trust receipts — all of which exculpated Edilberto, who merely acted as agent for CDCP and had no power to cause payment. The Court noted that the affidavit was executed by Rodolfo to accept personal responsibility and exculpate his brother, and that the People was inclined to allow petitioner to establish the genuineness and due execution of the affidavit. The Solicitor General was commended for his impartiality in recommending the new trial, consistent with the duty of public prosecutors under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the instruction in Berger vs. United States that the prosecution's interest is not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be done.

• Relaxation of the Rule Against Motions for New Trial in the Supreme Court — The earlier doctrine in Goduco vs. CA held that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, because the Court of Appeals' findings of fact are conclusive and only questions of law are reviewed on certiorari. This doctrine has been relaxed, if not abandoned, in Helmuth, Jr. vs. People and People vs. Amparado, where the Court granted new trial despite technicalities where proposed testimonies or affidavits constituted newly discovered evidence probably sufficient to reverse a conviction. The Court applied this relaxed rule to grant petitioner's motion, noting that he was similarly circumstanced and that the prosecution did not object.

• Declaration Against Interest (Section 38, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court) — A declaration against interest is an exception to the hearsay rule, admitting statements made by a person who is unavailable as a witness, where the statement is against the declarant's pecuniary, proprietary, or penal interest at the time it was made. Rodolfo Cuenca's affidavit was treated as such a declaration, as it accepted personal responsibility for the trust receipts and undertook to pay the civil obligations arising therefrom, thereby casting doubt on Edilberto's culpability.

• Duty of the Public Prosecutor — Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is done; the suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and cause for disciplinary action. This duty is grounded on the principle, articulated in Berger vs. United States, that the prosecution's interest in a criminal case is not that it shall win but that justice shall be done.

• "the rule now appears to have been relaxed, if not abandoned, in subsequent cases like 'Helmuth, Jr. v. People' and 'People v. Amparado'." — This passage marks the Court's explicit departure from the Goduco doctrine, establishing that the Supreme Court may entertain motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence even after denial of the petition.

• "Being similarly circumstanced, there is no nagging reason why herein petitioner should be denied the same benefit." — The Court applied the relaxed rule by analogy to Helmuth and Amparado, emphasizing that the accused was entitled to the same treatment where newly discovered evidence cast doubt on his guilt.

• "The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is done." — This quotation of Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility underscores the ethical foundation for the Solicitor General's recommendation and the Court's commendation of the prosecution's stance.

• Goduco vs. CA, 14 SCRA 282 (1965) — The earlier controlling case holding that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence in an appeal by certiorari, since only questions of law are involved. The Court in the present case found this rule to have been relaxed, if not abandoned.

• Helmuth, Jr. vs. People, 112 SCRA 573 (1982) — A subsequent case in which the Court, brushing aside technicalities and despite opposition from the Solicitor General, granted new trial to a convicted accused on the basis of newly discovered evidence. Cited as authority for relaxing the Goduco rule.

• People vs. Amparado, 156 SCRA 712 (1987) — Another case where the Court granted new trial on the basis of proposed testimonies or affidavits considered newly discovered and probably sufficient to reverse the conviction. Cited alongside Helmuth as authority for the relaxed rule.

• Berger vs. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) — U.S. Supreme Court decision cited by the Solicitor General for the principle that the prosecution's interest in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be done. Used to support the ethical duty of public prosecutors under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

• Section 38, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court — Governs the admissibility of declarations against interest as an exception to the hearsay rule. The Court, adopting the Solicitor General's recommendation, treated Rodolfo Cuenca's affidavit as a declaration against interest that cast doubt on petitioner's culpability.

• Rule 6.01, Canon 6, Code of Professional Responsibility — Provides that the primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is done, and that suppression of facts or concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible. The Court relied on this provision to commend the Solicitor General's recommendation for a new trial.

• Presidential Decree No. 115 (Trust Receipts Law) — The statute under which petitioner was convicted. The trust receipts subject of the case covered steel materials purchased by Ultra for CDCP.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concurred.