Cuaresma vs. Daquis

A member of the bar who makes false allegations in pleadings filed before the Court is subject to disciplinary action, with the severity of the penalty calibrated according to the circumstances; candor in dealings with the Court is of the very essence of honorable membership in the profession.

Eugenio Cuaresma, Marcelo Daquis, and two others were purchasers of a lot subject to a conditional contract of sale with the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC). Because PHHC required that only one person enter into the contract, Daquis was chosen, and by agreement of all purchasers—acknowledged by PHHC—the monthly installment payments of Cuaresma and the two others were remitted to Daquis, who in turn remitted them to PHHC. Daquis later filed Civil Case No. Q-12176 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, apparently to secure possession of the lot. Atty. Macario O. Directo served as counsel for Cuaresma in connection with this dispute.

Eugenio Cuaresma, Marcelo Daquis, and two others were among four purchasers of a lot covered by a conditional contract of sale with the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC). Because PHHC required that only one person be named in the contract, Daquis was selected by the others to enter into it. The arrangement, acknowledged by PHHC, was that Cuaresma and the two other purchasers would remit their monthly installment payments to Daquis, who would then remit the aggregate to PHHC.

In June 1968, Daquis filed Civil Case No. Q-12176 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch. According to Atty. Macario O. Directo, who later represented Cuaresma, Daquis never informed Cuaresma of the existence of this case from its filing in June 1968 through the issuance of the decision in 1970. The decision having been issued, a writ of execution and subsequently a writ of demolition were sought.

On May 27, 1972, Atty. Directo filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court on behalf of Cuaresma. The petition contained categorical allegations that Cuaresma "has no knowledge of the existence of said case," that he "was not given a day in court to present his side of the case, in violation of law, and of the dictum of due process of the constitution," and that on May 26, 1972, the respondent Judge issued an order of demolition and the Sheriff gave Cuaresma three days to remove his house. After the respondents filed their comments, the Court's resolution of August 4, 1972, revealed a markedly different picture. It showed that on December 14, 1971, Atty. Directo himself had addressed a letter to Daquis indicating that both counsel and Cuaresma were aware of the existence of the civil case. It further appeared that Cuaresma, along with other occupants, had been given a thirty-day notice to vacate the premises—a period even extended for another thirty days—but had refused to leave. Most significantly, on May 3, 1972, Atty. Directo had filed a motion for intervention in Civil Case No. Q-12176, and on May 13, 1972, he had filed a motion to quash or recall the writ of execution and an opposition to the issuance of a writ of demolition. On May 22, 1972, respondent Judge Pacifico de Castro had issued an order denying the motion to intervene as well as the motion to quash.

Atty. Directo was then required to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for deliberately making false allegations in the petition. On August 16, 1972, he filed a pleading entitled "Compliance," explaining that what he "honestly meant" by the allegation that Cuaresma had no knowledge of the civil case was that Cuaresma had no knowledge from the time Daquis instituted the case in June 1968 up to and after the decision was issued in 1970. He acknowledged that Daquis had been chosen as the sole contracting party with PHHC and that monthly dues were remitted through him. He reiterated that his knowledge of the civil case came only after the decision was issued and pleaded that if any mistake had been committed, it was an honest one, with no deliberate attempt to mislead the Court.

• Explanation of the Allegation: Respondent Atty. Directo maintained that his statement that Cuaresma "has no knowledge of the existence of said case" was intended to refer only to the period from June 1968, when Daquis filed the case, up to and after the court issued its decision in 1970, during which time Daquis never informed Cuaresma of the proceedings.
• Good Faith: Respondent pleaded that if any mistake had been committed, it was an honest one, and that there was no deliberate attempt or intent to mislead the Court, asserting he was "honestly and totally unaware of any false allegation in the petition."

• Disciplinary Action for False Allegations: Whether respondent Atty. Macario O. Directo should be disciplined for deliberately making false allegations in a petition for certiorari filed before the Supreme Court.

• Disciplinary Action for False Allegations: Yes. Respondent was reprimanded, the Court finding that his explanation was suspect as a possible afterthought but imposing only a reprimand in light of his possible language deficiency and the presumption of good faith, while emphasizing that candor with the Court is essential to honorable membership in the bar.

• Disciplinary Action for False Allegations: The Court found that the allegations in the petition—that Cuaresma had no knowledge of the existence of Civil Case No. Q-12176 and was denied a day in court—were demonstrably false. Court records established that Atty. Directo himself had addressed a letter to Daquis on December 14, 1971, indicating awareness of the case; that Cuaresma had been given and even granted an extension of a thirty-day notice to vacate; and that Directo had filed a motion for intervention on May 3, 1972, and a motion to quash the writ of execution and an opposition to the writ of demolition on May 13, 1972—all before the petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1972. The Court characterized Directo's Compliance explanation as lending itself "to the suspicion that it was a mere afterthought," possibly devised as a way out after his attention was called to the misstatements. Nevertheless, the Court extended him the assumption of good faith and noted that the awkwardly worded petition and compliance were "quite indicative of either carelessness or lack of proficiency in the handling of the English language," making it not unreasonable to assume that his deficiency in expression contributed to the inaccuracy. While a mere disclaimer of intent could not exculpate him, the Court held that "in the spirit of charity and forbearance, a penalty of reprimand would suffice," serving to impress upon him the need for greater care in the preparation of pleadings so that no doubt as to his intellectual honesty could be entertained.

• Candor and Honesty in Pleadings — Every member of the bar must maintain candor in dealings with the Court, as this is "of the very essence of honorable membership in the profession." False allegations in pleadings, whether deliberate or born of carelessness, expose the attorney to disciplinary action. The penalty is calibrated according to the circumstances, including the attorney's proficiency, the presence or absence of deliberate intent to mislead, and the presumption of good faith. In this case, a reprimand was deemed sufficient where the attorney's language deficiency may have contributed to the inaccuracy and good faith was presumed, but the Court made clear that the penalty would impress upon him the need for greater care in future pleadings.

• "Every member of the bar should realize that candor in the dealings with the Court is of the very essence of honorable membership in the profession." — This is the ratio decidendi of the resolution, articulating the foundational ethical obligation that underlies the disciplinary action imposed.
• "The above explanation lends itself to the suspicion that it was a mere afterthought." — This passage captures the Court's assessment of respondent's Compliance, finding his explanation unconvincing while still declining to impose a harsher penalty.
• "While a mere disclaimer of intent certainly cannot exculpate him, still, in the spirit of charity and forbearance, a penalty of reprimand would suffice." — This states the Court's calibration of the penalty, balancing the gravity of false allegations against mitigating considerations of possible language deficiency and presumed good faith.

Barredo, Antonio, Fernandez, and Aquino, JJ., concurred.