Cruz y Bartolome vs. People
The Supreme Court modified the conviction of the accused from attempted rape to acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court ruled that merely climbing on top of a naked female, embracing her, and touching her private parts without proof of the erectile penis being in a position to penetrate does not constitute attempted rape. The intent to lie with the female—demonstrated by direct overt acts showing the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia—is the defining element distinguishing attempted rape from acts of lasciviousness. Absent such showing, the acts constitute only acts of lasciviousness. The Court imposed an indeterminate sentence of three months of arresto mayor to two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, and ordered payment of P30,000.00 in moral damages and P20,000.00 in civil indemnity.
Primary Holding
Mere climbing on top of a naked female, embracing her, and touching her vagina and breasts without proof of the erectile penis being in a position to penetrate constitutes acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape; the intent to lie with the female, which must be demonstrated through direct overt acts showing the penis capable of penetration touching the external genitalia, is the essential element distinguishing attempted rape from acts of lasciviousness.
Background
Norberto Cruz y Bartolome and his wife Belinda employed AAA (15 years old) and BBB to assist in selling plastic and glass wares during the Bangar, La Union fiesta on December 20, 1993. After setting up tents near the municipal hall for the victims to sleep in, petitioner allegedly sexually assaulted AAA in the early morning hours of December 21, 1993, leading to criminal charges for attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness.
History
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Filed complaint in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 34, Balaoan, La Union (Criminal Case Nos. 2388 and 2389) charging petitioner with attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness.
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RTC rendered judgment on April 6, 2000 finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness.
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Court of Appeals promulgated decision on July 26, 2004 affirming the conviction for attempted rape but acquitting petitioner of acts of lasciviousness due to insufficiency of evidence.
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Supreme Court rendered decision on October 8, 2014 modifying the conviction from attempted rape to acts of lasciviousness.
Facts
- On December 20, 1993, petitioner Norberto Cruz y Bartolome and his wife Belinda employed AAA (15 years old) and BBB to help sell plastic and glass wares during the Bangar, La Union fiesta.
- The group traveled from Libsong East, Lingayen, Pangasinan to Bangar, La Union, and set up two tents in front of Maroon enterprises near the municipal hall for the victims to sleep in.
- At around 1:00 AM on December 21, 1993, AAA was awakened when she felt petitioner on top of her; he had removed her panty and underwear, leaving her naked.
- Petitioner mashed AAA's breasts, touched her vagina, and threatened to kill her if she screamed; AAA resisted, kicked him twice, and pleaded for pity until petitioner desisted.
- Petitioner offered AAA money and threatened her not to tell her mother; AAA then saw petitioner touching the private parts of BBB, who was awake but shaking.
- The victims reported the incident to the police on the evening of December 21, 1993, and executed sworn statements on January 10, 1994.
- Petitioner denied the charges, claiming it was impossible to commit the acts due to the tents' proximity to the road and municipal hall, and alleged the complaints were filed to extort money from him.
Arguments of the Petitioners
- Assailed the credibility of AAA, arguing that her continued employment with petitioner until December 30, 1994 belied the alleged attempted rape.
- Contended that it was physically impossible to undress AAA without rousing her, noting that her bra was locked at the back and she had only been asleep for an hour.
- Argued that AAA's testimony about the struggle lasting nearly an hour was inconceivable unless the act was consensual or fabricated.
- Pointed out that there was no evidence petitioner was naked or that his erectile penis was poised to penetrate AAA's vagina.
- Alleged that AAA and her mother demanded P80,000.00 as settlement under threat of filing the case.
- Asserted that glaring inconsistencies in AAA's testimony cast doubt on her veracity and the sufficiency of evidence.
- Claimed that the CA erred in giving credence to incredible testimony and in convicting despite failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Issues
- Procedural: Whether the Supreme Court may review questions of fact regarding the credibility of witnesses in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
- Substantive Issues:
- Whether the overt acts of climbing on top of the naked victim, removing her underwear, and touching her private parts constitute attempted rape or merely acts of lasciviousness.
- Whether the intent to lie with the female, required for attempted rape, may be inferred from the acts described in the absence of proof that the erectile penis was in a position to penetrate.
Ruling
- Procedural: The Court held that under Rule 45, it reviews only questions of law, not questions of fact. Consequently, the Court accorded the highest respect to the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals regarding the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies. The contentions of the petitioner regarding credibility raised questions of fact that were outside the scope of the appeal.
- Substantive: The Court ruled that the petitioner's acts constituted acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape. The Court held that the intent to lie with the female is the defining distinction between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness. Such intent must be demonstrated by direct overt acts showing the erectile penis capable of consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female. Mere climbing on top of the victim, embracing her, and touching her vagina and breasts without such showing only manifests lewdness, not intent to rape. The conviction was modified from attempted rape to acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, and the indeterminate sentence of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one day of prision correccional, as maximum, was imposed. The Court also ordered the payment of P30,000.00 in moral damages and P20,000.00 in civil indemnity, plus 6% interest per annum from the finality of the decision until full payment.
Doctrines
- Intent to Lie with the Female — The fundamental distinction between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is the offender's intent to lie with the female. Attempted rape requires such intent, which must be demonstrated by direct overt acts; acts of lasciviousness does not require this element.
- Overt Acts in Attempted Crimes — For attempted rape, the overt acts must have a direct causal relation to the intended crime and must not be equivocal or susceptible of double interpretation. The acts must be such that without the intent to commit rape, they would be meaningless, and must show without doubt that they are aimed at the consummation of rape.
- Frustrated Rape as Physical Impossibility — Rape admits of no frustrated stage because from the moment of carnal knowledge, all essential elements are accomplished; thus, frustrated rape is a physical impossibility under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
- Touching in Rape — For consummated rape, there must be sufficient proof that the penis touched the labias (labia majora or minora), not merely the mons pubis or external surface; mere grazing of the surface constitutes attempted rape at most, if not acts of lasciviousness.
Key Excerpts
- "The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness. The felony of attempted rape requires such intent; the felony of acts of lasciviousness does not."
- "Only the direct overt acts of the offender establish the intent to lie with the female. However, merely climbing on top of a naked female does not constitute attempted rape without proof of his erectile penis being in a position to penetrate the female's vagina."
- "The gauge in determining whether the crime of attempted rape had been committed is the commencement of the act of sexual intercourse, i.e., penetration of the penis into the vagina, before the interruption."
- "Acts susceptible of double interpretation, that is, in favor as well as against the culprit, and which show an innocent as well as a punishable act, must not and cannot furnish grounds by themselves for attempted or frustrated crimes."
- "The relation existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the offense of which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the intention must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instance of injustice, that the mind be able to directly infer from them the intention of the perpetrator to cause a particular injury."
Precedents Cited
- People v. Lamahang — Cited for the definition of overt acts in attempted crimes; established that acts must not be equivocal and must show without doubt the intention to consummate a specific crime, and that acts susceptible of double interpretation cannot furnish grounds for attempted crimes.
- People v. Campuhan — Cited for the definition of "touching" in rape; clarified that touching must involve the labias (labia majora or minora), not merely the mons pubis or external surface, for rape to be consummated.
- People v. Orita — Cited for the clarification that frustrated rape is a physical impossibility and for the definition of carnal knowledge as the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman.
- People v. Lizada — Cited for the definition of overt acts and the requirement that they must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense, and that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime.
- People v. Dominguez, Jr. — Cited for the standard that the gauge for attempted rape is the commencement of sexual intercourse (penetration of the penis into the vagina) before interruption.
- People v. Bugarin — Cited as illustration where the accused was held liable only for acts of lasciviousness because intent to commit rape was not apparent from the acts of kissing and touching, and where the Court held that preparatory acts are not punishable.
- People v. Jalosjos — Cited for the definition of consummated rape (slightest penetration) and the requirement of touching for attempted rape.
- People v. Mendoza — Cited for the distinction between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness based on intent to lie with the female.
- People v. Dadulla — Cited for the principle that without showing of erectile penis touching external genitalia, only acts of lasciviousness is committed.
Provisions
- Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code — Defines attempted felony as when the offender commences the commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all acts of execution due to causes other than spontaneous desistance.
- Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 7659) — Defines rape and its elements; provides penalty for consummated rape (reclusion perpetua).
- Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code — Defines acts of lasciviousness and its elements; basis for the modified conviction.
- Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code — Provides penalty for attempted felonies (lower by two degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony).
- Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code — Defines simple seduction (cited as possible alternative felony that could result if deceit were used).
- Article 2217 and 2219(3) of the Civil Code — Basis for awarding moral damages in acts of lasciviousness.
- Article 2211 of the Civil Code — Vests courts with discretion to impose interest as part of damages.
- Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court — Limits Supreme Court review to questions of law in petitions for certiorari from Court of Appeals decisions.