Cruz vs. Gingoyon

A pleading containing derogatory, offensive, or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge wherein proceedings are pending constitutes direct contempt of court, equivalent to "misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same" within the meaning of Rule 71, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense, as respect for the judicial office should always be observed and enforced.

The petitioner and Benjamin Mina, Jr. were neighbors in Pasay City, with the petitioner having filed a civil complaint for abatement of nuisance against Mina regarding a basketball goal permanently attached to the second floor of Mina's residence that protruded into a public alley. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-0401 in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, presided by Judge Henrick F. Gingoyon. The action was premised on Article 701 of the Civil Code concerning nuisances, though the trial court would later rule that the action should be commenced by the city or municipal mayor rather than a private individual.

Petitioner Ferdinand A. Cruz filed a Civil Complaint against his neighbor, Benjamin Mina, Jr., docketed as Civil Case No. 01-0401 in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, for abatement of nuisance. The complaint sought to declare as a nuisance a "basketball goal" permanently attached to the second floor of Mina's residence that protruded into an alley serving as the public's only right of way. Mina was declared in default, and petitioner presented his evidence ex-parte.

After trial, Judge Henrick F. Gingoyon, in a Decision dated October 21, 2005, declared the basketball goal a public nuisance but dismissed the case on the ground that petitioner lacked locus standi, citing Article 701 of the Civil Code, which requires that an action for abatement of nuisance be commenced by the city or municipal mayor rather than a private individual. In the same Decision, Judge Gingoyon included observations about the petitioner's neighborhood, describing the area as "bursting with people most of whom live in cramped tenements," where alleys serve as playgrounds, wash areas, and cooking areas, and where residents "live and let live" amidst the chaos. The judge advised that the plaintiffs "must learn to accept the sad reality of the kind of place they live in" and that unless they choose to live elsewhere, "their only remaining choice is for them to live in perpetual conflict with their neighbors all the days of their lives."

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Decision. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he took exception to the judge's advice, arguing that the descriptions were off-tangent and that the court was "making his own legislations." Most significantly, petitioner insinuated that Judge Gingoyon must have been communicating with the defendant off the record, reasoning that the judge could not have known the exact description of the alley and the activities therein except through such communication, given that the defendant was in default and the evidence presented ex-parte was not so exacting.

Petitioner requested that his motion for reconsideration be heard on November 18, 2005. In an Order dated November 11, 2005, Judge Gingoyon set the motion for hearing on that date and directed petitioner to substantiate his serious charge or show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. The judge denied the allegation of off-the-record communication, stating that he had "not seen the faintest of shadow of the defendant or heard even an echo of his voice up to the present."

On November 18, 2005, petitioner did not appear at the hearing. Judge Gingoyon motu proprio issued an Order in open court granting petitioner another 10 days to show cause. In his Compliance to the Show Cause Order, petitioner maintained that his remarks were based on the circumstances of the case and reiterated his insinuation, posing the query: "where then did this court gather an exact description of the alley and the myriad of activities that the inhabitants of interior Edang do in relation to the alley, when the defendant was held in default and absent plaintiff's evidence so exacting as the description made by this court in paragraphs 12 and 13 of his Decision dated October 21, 2005."

On November 25, 2005, Judge Gingoyon issued an Order finding petitioner guilty of direct contempt of court, sentencing him to two (2) days of imprisonment and a fine of ₱2,000.00. The judge explained that as State Prosecutor, he was detailed in Pasay City in 1991 and had been a judge there since 1997, and that the blight described was not unique to that particular place but replicated in many urban areas. The judge found that petitioner's open accusation without factual basis that the judge was communicating with the defendant brought the court into disrepute and constituted contempt. An Order of Arrest was issued against petitioner on the same date.

On December 1, 2005, at 10:00 A.M., petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Post Bond and Quash Warrant of Arrest with the respondent court, averring that he had already filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court. The respondent court denied the motion on the same day based on petitioner's failure to attach proof of the alleged filed petition. The records showed that the Petition for Certiorari was actually filed with the Supreme Court on December 1, 2005 at 1:06 P.M., after the Ex-Parte Motion had been filed and denied. Meanwhile, Judge Gingoyon was slain on December 31, 2005, and the Supreme Court directed the incumbent Judge of Branch 117, Judge Jesus B. Mupas, to submit a comment on the petition.

• Fair Observation Defense: Petitioner contended that the alleged contumacious remark was merely a fair observation or comment and a logical conclusion made based on the detailed description given by the respondent court of what had been happening in the alley subject of the civil case. He argued that no other conclusion could be had except that Judge Gingoyon was communicating with the defendant off the record, since the exact description of what was happening in the alley was not adduced in evidence during trial.

• Non-Contumacious Nature of Remarks: Petitioner contended that a fair and logical conclusion founded on circumstances of the case cannot be considered contemptuous.

• Abuse of Discretion in Denying Bond: Petitioner insisted that the respondent court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to fix bond, thereby violating his right to due process. He argued that the court should have granted the Ex-Parte Motion since he had already filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, and that fixing the bond only on December 5, 2005, or 10 days after the Orders of contempt and arrest were issued, violated due process.

• Contemptuous Allegation: The respondent court found that petitioner's allegation that the judge had been communicating with the defendant off the record was a serious charge that was unsubstantiated and wholly based on suspicion. When ordered to substantiate the charge, petitioner failed to present proof of facts and instead "simply shot back with a query," adamantly standing pat on his accusation.

• Judicial Familiarity with the Area: The respondent court explained that the judge was familiar with the area, having been detailed in Pasay City since 1991 as State Prosecutor and as judge since 1997, and that the blight described was not a unique feature of that particular place but replicated in many urban areas.

• Denial of Ex-Parte Motion: The respondent court denied the Ex-Parte Motion to Post Bond and Quash Warrant of Arrest based on petitioner's failure to attach the alleged duly filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court, holding that unless petitioner showed proof of filing, he could not avail of the remedy provided in Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

• Direct Contempt: Whether the petitioner is guilty of direct contempt of court for his statements in the Motion for Reconsideration and Compliance accusing the judge of communicating with the defendant off the record.

• Factual Basis for Contempt: Whether the respondent court had enough factual basis for citing petitioner in contempt.

• Abuse of Discretion in Denying Bond: Whether the respondent court abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to fix bond.

• Direct Contempt: Yes. A pleading containing derogatory, offensive, or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge wherein proceedings are pending constitutes direct contempt under Rule 71, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner's unsubstantiated accusation that Judge Gingoyon communicated with the defendant off the record was derogatory, offensive, and malicious, tainting the credibility and dignity of the court.

• Factual Basis for Contempt: Yes. The respondent court had sufficient factual basis for citing petitioner in contempt. Petitioner was given the opportunity to substantiate his charge but failed to present any proof, instead repeatedly arguing that his accusation was a "fair observation or conclusion." The judge's description of the alley was a general description of what is normally seen in such places, and the judge's familiarity with the area was explained by his long service in Pasay City.

• Abuse of Discretion in Denying Bond: No. The respondent court properly denied petitioner's Ex-Parte Motion because at the time it was filed on December 1, 2005 at 10:00 A.M., the Petition for Certiorari had not yet been filed with the Supreme Court, which occurred only at 1:06 P.M. on the same day. The remedy under Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court requires that a petition for certiorari or prohibition be filed before the execution of the judgment can be suspended.

• Direct Contempt: The Court applied the principle that "[c]ontemptuous statements made in pleadings filed with the court constitute direct contempt." Citing Wicker vs. Hon. Arcangel, the Court noted that "a pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge in which the proceedings are pending has been held to be equivalent to 'misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same' within the meaning of Rule 71, § 1 of the Rules of Court." The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner contained a serious allegation that Judge Gingoyon had been communicating with the defendant off the record, which the Court characterized as a grave offense. This allegation was unsubstantiated and totally bereft of factual basis. When asked to adduce proof, petitioner was unable to give any but repeatedly argued that it was his "fair observation or conclusion." The Court found that petitioner openly accused Judge Gingoyon of wrongdoing without factual basis, a dangerous accusation that exposed the judge to severe reprimand and even removal from office. The Court further held that even assuming the conclusion was justified by the facts, it was still not a valid defense in contempt cases, citing Salcedo vs. Hernandez: "Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should always be observed and enforced."

• Factual Basis for Contempt: The Court examined the description provided by Judge Gingoyon in the Decision and found it to be "but a general description of what is normally seen and what normally happens in places such as Edang Street." The Court quoted the description, which included observations about crowded tenements, children playing in alleys, ambulant vendors, and clotheslines, and concluded that these were general observations not requiring off-the-record communication with the defendant. The Court noted that Judge Gingoyon had explained his familiarity with the area, having been detailed in Pasay City since 1991 as State Prosecutor and as judge since 1997. The Court found that petitioner's act of openly accusing the judge of communicating with the defendant off the record, without factual basis, brought the court into disrepute, tainted its credibility and dignity, and questioned its impartiality. Citing Malolos vs. Hon. Reyes, the Court held that the charge of partiality was uncalled for, and there being no scintilla of proof that the judge did the act complained of, petitioner's act amounted to direct contempt of court.

• Abuse of Discretion in Denying Bond: The Court found that the respondent court was well within the bounds of its authority when it denied petitioner's Ex-Parte Motion. Under Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person adjudged in direct contempt may not appeal but may avail of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition, with the execution of the judgment suspended pending resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court. The Court noted that the Ex-Parte Motion was filed with the respondent court on December 1, 2005 at 10:00 A.M., and therein petitioner stated that he already filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court. However, the records showed that the Petition for Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court on the same day but at 1:06 P.M. The Court concluded that when the motion was filed with the respondent court, it could not be accurately said that a petition for certiorari was already duly filed. The respondent court was furnished a copy of the Petition by registered mail, received only on December 5, 2005. Thus, at the time petitioner filed the Ex-Parte Motion, he had not yet availed of the remedy of certiorari, and the respondent court did not commit error or overstep its authority in denying the motion.

The Court also emphasized the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, noting that the petition should have been filed with the Court of Appeals rather than directly with the Supreme Court, as there was no allegation of any special or compelling reason to warrant direct recourse. However, to avoid further delay, the Court deemed it practical to resolve the controversy. The Court also noted petitioner's repeated failure to comply with Court directives, which resulted in fines of ₱1,000.00 and ₱3,000.00.

• Direct Contempt Through Pleadings — A pleading containing derogatory, offensive, or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge wherein proceedings are pending is equivalent to "misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same" within the meaning of Rule 71, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, and therefore constitutes direct contempt. The Court applied this doctrine to find that petitioner's unsubstantiated accusation against the judge constituted direct contempt.

• Justification Not a Defense to Contempt — Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense in contempt cases. Respect for the judicial office should always be observed and enforced. The Court applied this principle to reject petitioner's defense that his accusation was a "fair observation or conclusion" based on the circumstances.

• Hierarchy of Courts — A becoming regard for judicial hierarchy indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed with the RTC, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. The Court applied this doctrine in noting that the petition should have been filed with the CA, though it resolved the case on the merits to avoid further delay.

• Remedy from Direct Contempt — A person adjudged in direct contempt may not appeal therefrom but may avail of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him. The Court applied this doctrine in upholding the denial of petitioner's Ex-Parte Motion, as the petition for certiorari had not yet been filed when the motion was made.

• "A pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge wherein proceedings are pending is considered direct contempt." — This statement articulates the core doctrine applied in the case, establishing that contempt can be committed through pleadings filed with the court.

• "Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should always be observed and enforced." — This quotation from Salcedo vs. Hernandez states the rule that justification is not a defense in contempt cases, which the Court applied to reject petitioner's "fair observation" defense.

• "The act of petitioner in openly accusing Judge Gingoyon of communicating with the defendant off the record, without factual basis, brings the court into disrepute. The accusation in the Motion for Reconsideration and the Compliance submitted by the petitioner to the respondent court is derogatory, offensive and malicious. The accusation taints the credibility and the dignity of the court and questions its impartiality. It is a direct affront to the integrity and authority of the court, subjecting it to loss of public respect and confidence, which ultimately affects the administration of justice." — This passage explains the Court's reasoning for affirming the contempt citation, identifying the specific harm caused by petitioner's unsubstantiated accusation.

• "A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ('inferior') courts should be filed with the [RTC], and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals (CA). A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition." — This quotation from People vs. Cuaresma articulates the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, which the Court applied in noting that the petition should have been filed with the CA.

• Atty. Ante vs. Judge Pascua, 245 Phil. 745 (1988) — Cited as authority for the proposition that contemptuous statements made in pleadings filed with the court constitute direct contempt.

• Wicker vs. Hon. Arcangel, 322 Phil. 476 (1996) — Cited for the principle that a pleading containing derogatory, offensive, or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge in which proceedings are pending is equivalent to misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings, constituting direct contempt under Rule 71, Section 1.

• Ang vs. Judge Castro, 221 Phil. 149 (1985) — Cited in Wicker for the same proposition regarding direct contempt through pleadings.

• Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724 (1935) — Cited for the rule that where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense, and that respect for the judicial office should always be observed and enforced.

• Malolos vs. Hon. Reyes, 111 Phil. 1113 (1961) — Cited for the proposition that the charge of partiality against a judge is uncalled for where there is no scintilla of proof, and such charge constitutes direct contempt.

• People vs. Cuaresma, 254 Phil. 418 (1989) — Cited for the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, requiring that petitions for extraordinary writs against lower courts be filed with the appropriate higher court rather than directly with the Supreme Court.

• Ouano vs. PGTT International Investment Corp., 434 Phil. 28 (2002) — Cited for the proposition that the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs is concurrent with the CA and with the RTC in proper cases.

• Vergara, Sr. vs. Judge Suelto, 240 Phil. 719 (1987) — Cited for the rule that where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the CA or an RTC, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ's procurement must be presented.

• Rule 71, Section 1, Rules of Court — Direct contempt punished summarily. A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be the Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank. The Court applied this provision in affirming petitioner's direct contempt conviction.

• Rule 71, Section 2, Rules of Court — Remedy therefrom. The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him. The Court applied this provision in upholding the denial of petitioner's Ex-Parte Motion to Post Bond, as the petition for certiorari had not yet been filed when the motion was made.

• Article 701, Civil Code — Cited by the trial court in dismissing the civil case for lack of locus standi, ruling that the action for abatement of nuisance should be commenced by the city or municipal mayor and not by a private individual.

• Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Acting Chairperson
• Lucas P. Bersamin
• Jose Portugal Perez (in lieu of Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., per Special Order No. 1080 dated September 13, 2011)
• Jose Catral Mendoza (in lieu of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, per Special Order No. 1093 dated September 21, 2011)