Cruz vs. Court of Appeals

An information that alleges every fact necessary to constitute the offense charged is sufficient and may not be dismissed before trial on the basis of the accused's evidence alone. Denial of a motion to dismiss on that ground is interlocutory, rests in sound discretion where substantial justice requires a full-blown trial, and is reviewable only on appeal from final judgment.

Petitioner Teodoro B. Cruz, Jr., a notary public, was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, together with Melania Guerrero and others, in four separate informations for estafa through falsification of public documents. It was alleged that petitioner, together with Guerrero, who produced a special power of attorney claimed to have been executed by the late Clemente Guerrero, had conspired with their co-accused in selling properties of the decedent to the widow's sister, Luz Andico, through fictitious deeds of sale notarized by petitioner sometime in November and December 1980.

Upon arraignment on June 1, 1984, petitioner and his co-accused entered pleas of not guilty. Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the four informations did not charge an offense. At the hearing on the motion, petitioner submitted testimonial and documentary evidence which was not refuted by the prosecution, while the prosecution submitted no evidence at the time but later moved to deny the motion. According to petitioner, his evidence showed that the documents subject of the charges were prepared and notarized by him prior to the months stated in the informations.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and later denied reconsideration. The prosecution's affidavit-complaint, as summarized in the proceedings, pointed to circumstances indicating falsification after death, including the vendee's lack of visible means, late payment of capital gains taxes only in December 1980, late presentation of the deeds for registration in November and December 1980, and petitioner's failure as late as March 1981 to submit his 1980 notarial report. Clemente Guerrero had died on June 24, 1980.

• Sanctioned Procedure: Petitioner argued that the court proceedings on his motion to dismiss, including presentation of testimonial and documentary evidence after arraignment, were clearly sanctioned by law and jurisprudence.
• Estoppel: Petitioner maintained that the prosecution was in estoppel to question said proceedings, having participated without objection and having failed to controvert the evidence adduced at the hearing.
• Failure to Charge an Offense: Petitioner argued that the informations do not charge an offense.
• Variance: Petitioner argued that there exists a variance between the allegations in the informations and the evidence presented on the motion to dismiss.
• Date of Notarization: Petitioner maintained that the documents were notarized on their stated dates, clearly prior to the death of Clemente Guerrero and not in November and December 1980 as alleged.
• Substantial Justice: Petitioner argued that substantial justice demands dismissal of the informations filed against him.

• Uncontroverted Circumstances of Falsification: Respondent, through the Solicitor General, countered that denial was proper because petitioner failed to controvert substantial circumstances alleged in the affidavit-complaint, namely (a) the vendee Luz Andico had no visible means to purchase the properties, (b) capital gains taxes were paid only in December 1980 instead of within 30 days from sale, (c) the deeds were presented for registration only in November and December 1980, and (d) antedating was made possible because petitioner had not submitted his 1980 notarial report as late as March 1981.
• Need for Full Trial: Respondent countered that the interest of substantial justice required that the prosecution be allowed to adduce evidence during trial and to avoid technicalities that may arise later.

• Sufficiency of Information: Whether the four informations sufficiently charge the offense of estafa thru falsification of public documents such that dismissal at a preliminary hearing was unwarranted.
• Timeliness of Motion After Arraignment: Whether a motion to dismiss on the ground that the information charges no offense may still be filed after arraignment.
• Estoppel Against the State: Whether the prosecution is estopped from questioning the dismissal proceedings by its participation without objection and failure to controvert petitioner's evidence.
• Reviewability of Denial Order: Whether an order denying a motion to quash may be assailed by certiorari instead of proceeding to trial and appealing from final judgment.

• Sufficiency of Information: No dismissal warranted. The informations sufficiently alleged the essential elements, and defenses such as the true date of notarization require a full-blown trial after the prosecution presents evidence in chief.
• Timeliness of Motion After Arraignment: Yes. Failure to move to quash before plea does not waive the grounds that the information charges no offense, lack of jurisdiction, extinction of liability, and double jeopardy, which may be invoked even after arraignment.
• Estoppel Against the State: No. Estoppel does not lie against the government by reason of mistaken acts or omissions of its agents, including erroneous application of law by public officers.
• Reviewability of Denial Order: No. An order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory, not appealable nor subject to certiorari, and is reviewable only on appeal from judgment after trial.

• Sufficiency of Information: The fundamental test is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, establish the essential elements of the offense as defined by law. A reading of the informations disclosed sufficient allegations, so resolving the charges at the outset without a full-blown trial would be improper and unfair to the prosecution. The contention that the transactions already existed before November and December 1980 is a matter of defense best examined at trial under the normal procedure in Rule 119, Section 3, after the prosecution presents its evidence. Save where the Rules expressly permit inquiry into facts, only facts alleged in the information and those admitted by the fiscal are considered, and matters of defense cannot be produced except for expressly permitted grounds such as extinction, prescription, and former jeopardy.
• Timeliness of Motion After Arraignment: Although Section 1 of Rule 117 requires a motion to quash before plea and waiver otherwise applies, Section 8 expressly excepts specified grounds from waiver. Thus, even after arraignment, dismissal may still be sought where the information charges no offense, the court lacks jurisdiction, liability has been extinguished, or double jeopardy has attached. The respondent court's view that the motion should have preceded arraignment was therefore not sustained as to this ground.
• Estoppel Against the State: Participation without objection and failure to present counter-evidence at the preliminary hearing did not bar subsequent correct application of the law. Erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not block later correct application, and the government is never estopped by mistake or error of its agents.
• Reviewability of Denial Order: Denial rested in sound discretion to allow the prosecution to adduce evidence and avoid later technicalities, with no grave abuse shown, consistent with authority permitting a judge to deny dismissal when not satisfied that the case should be dropped. The proper course after denial was to proceed to trial without prejudice to reiterating special defenses and, if convicted, appealing. Where an information is truly insufficient, the case must be dropped at once, but that situation was not present because the informations were sufficient on their face and the preliminary evidence did not justify pre-trial dismissal.

• Sufficiency of complaint or information — A complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to constitute the offense charged; the fundamental test on a motion to quash for failure to charge an offense is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, establish the essential elements as defined by law. Applied here, the informations for estafa through falsification were found sufficient on their face, precluding dismissal at a preliminary hearing.
• Limitation on hearing a motion to quash — Save where the Rules expressly permit investigation of facts alleged in a motion to quash, only facts alleged in the information and those admitted by the fiscal are taken into account, and matters of defense cannot be produced except where expressly permitted, such as extinction of criminal liability, prescription, and former jeopardy. Applied here, petitioner's claim on the true date of notarization was deemed a defense for trial, not for the motion hearing.
• Time to move to quash and exceptions to waiver — A motion to quash is ordinarily made before plea, and failure to do so waives available objections, but failure to assert that the information charges no offense, lack of jurisdiction, extinction of offense or penalty, and double jeopardy does not operate as waiver and may be invoked even after arraignment. Applied here, petitioner's post-arraignment motion on failure to charge an offense was not barred by waiver, though it failed on the merits.
• Discretion on dismissal and need for trial — A judge may deny dismissal despite a motion therefor when not satisfied from the record or information furnished that the case should be dismissed, particularly in the interest of substantial justice to allow the prosecution to adduce evidence and avoid technicalities. Applied here, denial was sustained as a proper exercise of discretion.
• Estoppel against the government — Erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not block subsequent correct application, and the government is never estopped by mistake or error of its agents. Applied here, the prosecution's prior participation and omission to controvert evidence did not estop it from opposing dismissal.
• Interlocutory nature of denial of motion to quash — An order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory, hence not appealable nor subject to certiorari, and may be reviewed only in the ordinary course by appeal from judgment after trial, with the accused free to reiterate special defenses at trial. Applied here, certiorari was held unwarranted and the cases were ordered to proceed.
• Amendment as to date of commission — Each information may be amended as regards the date of commission without impairing the accused's rights where the amendment is a matter of form not affecting the nature and essence of the crime charged. Applied here, proof that documents were prepared prior to death rather than in November and December 1980 did not compel dismissal because date could be amended in form.

• "The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law." — States the controlling test for sufficiency of an information on a motion to quash for failure to charge an offense.
• "Save where the Rules expressly permit the investigation of facts alleged in a motion to quash, the general principle is that in the hearing of such motion only such facts as are alleged in the information, and those admitted by the fiscal, should be taken into account in the resolution thereof." — Defines the limited scope of a quash hearing and excludes matters of defense.
• "there is the long familiar rule that erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not block subsequent correct application of the statute and that the government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents." — States the canonical formulation rejecting estoppel against the State invoked by petitioner.
• "Moreover, when the motion to quash filed by Acharon to nullify the criminal cases filed against him was denied by the Municipal Court of General Santos his remedy was not to file a petition for certiorari but to go to trial without prejudice on his part to reiterate the special defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if, after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law." — States the proper remedy after denial of a motion to quash, foreclosing certiorari.

• People vs. Cadabis, 97 Phil. 829 — Followed as authority that motions to quash are resolved on the information and fiscal admissions, excluding matters of defense except where expressly permitted.
• U.S. vs. Barredo, 32 Phil. 444 — Followed as authority that dismissal on motion rests in sound discretion and may be denied when the judge is not satisfied the case should be dropped.
• Acharon vs. Purisima, 13 SCRA 309 — Followed as authority that denial of a motion to quash is remedied by proceeding to trial and appealing from final judgment, not by certiorari.
• People vs. Castañeda, 165 SCRA 327 — Followed as authority that the government is never estopped by mistake or error of its agents.
• U.S. vs. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245; People vs. De la Rosa, 98 SCRA 190 — Cited as authority for the test of sufficiency of an information on a motion to quash.
• People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478; Palanca vs. Querubin, 30 SCRA 738 — Cited for waiver of grounds of a motion to quash not raised before plea.
• People vs. Gerardo Rivera, et al., 33 SCRA 746 — Cited by the respondent court for the proposition that date of commission may be amended as a matter of form.

• Section 1, Rule 117, Rules of Court — Provides that the accused may move to quash the complaint or information at any time before entering his plea; applied to address timeliness, with the ruling recognizing post-arraignment exceptions.
• Section 8, Rule 117, Rules of Court — Provides that failure to assert specified grounds, including failure to charge an offense, lack of jurisdiction, extinction, and double jeopardy, does not operate as waiver; applied to hold petitioner's post-arraignment ground cognizable though unmeritorious.
• Section 3, Rule 119, Rules of Court — Prescribes the normal order of trial in which the defense presents evidence after the prosecution has presented its evidence; applied to require petitioner to present his defense at trial rather than at the preliminary dismissal hearing.

Narvasa, J., Gancayco, J., Griño-Aquino, J. and Medialdea, J., concur.