Cruz vs. Catapang

A co-owner cannot validly authorize a third person to build a house on co-owned land without the consent of all co-owners; such unilateral consent does not divest the entry of its character as one effected through strategy or stealth, and an aggrieved co-owner may maintain an action for forcible entry provided the complaint is filed within one year from the time the other co-owners learned of the intrusion.

Leonor B. Cruz, Luz Cruz, and Norma Maligaya co-owned a 1,435-square-meter parcel of land in Taal, Batangas. In 1992, respondent Teofila M. Catapang, a sister of Norma Maligaya, erected a house on an adjacent lot with Norma Maligaya’s sole consent; the structure extended onto a portion of the co-owned property. Petitioner visited the property in the first week of September 1995 and discovered the encroachment. After her demands to vacate were refused, petitioner filed a forcible entry case.

• Co-ownership and the Property: Petitioner Leonor B. Cruz, Luz Cruz, and Norma Maligaya were co-owners of a 1,435-square-meter parcel of land situated in Barangay Mahabang Ludlod, Taal, Batangas.
• Construction of the House: Sometime in 1992, respondent Teofila M. Catapang, sister of co-owner Norma Maligaya, built a house on an adjacent lot with the consent solely of Norma Maligaya. The house, however, intruded onto a portion of the co-owned property.
• Discovery and Demands: In the first week of September 1995, petitioner visited the property and discovered the encroachment. She made several demands upon respondent to demolish the intruding structure and vacate; respondent refused and disregarded all demands.
• The Forcible Entry Complaint: On January 25, 1996, petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent before the MCTC, alleging that respondent’s entry into the property was effected through strategy or stealth.
• MCTC and RTC Findings: The MCTC found that the consent of only one co-owner was insufficient to justify respondent’s possession and construction, and ordered respondent to vacate, deliver possession, and pay P10,000.00 attorney’s fees plus costs. The RTC affirmed the MCTC ruling in toto, rejecting respondent’s defense that Norma Maligaya’s consent rendered the entry lawful.
• CA Reversal: The Court of Appeals held that because respondent entered with the consent of co-owner Norma Maligaya, the entry could not be characterized as having been made through strategy or stealth, and thus no cause of action for forcible entry existed. It declared that petitioner’s proper remedy was an action other than ejectment.

• Insufficiency of Unilateral Consent: Petitioner maintained that the consent given by only one co-owner could not defeat the forcible entry action, as no co-owner may claim exclusive title to any definite portion of commonly owned property before partition; allowing a single co-owner to authorize a third party to build would effectively devote the property to her exclusive use, to the prejudice of the co-ownership.
• Strategy or Stealth: Petitioner argued that respondent’s entry, accomplished without the knowledge of the other co-owners and in connivance with Norma Maligaya, constituted strategy or stealth within the meaning of the rules on forcible entry.

• Lack of Strategy or Stealth: Respondent countered that the forcible entry complaint could not prosper because her entry into the property was not effected through strategy or stealth, given the express consent of co-owner Norma Maligaya.
• Possession de Jure: Respondent further argued that because co-owner Norma Maligaya resided in the constructed house, the dispute involved rights of co-owners to enjoy the property, thus raising a question of possession de jure that could not be resolved in a summary action for forcible entry.

• Validity of Consent by a Co-owner: Whether the consent given by one co-owner to a third person to construct a house on co-owned property bars a forcible entry action brought by another co-owner.
• Character of Entry as Strategy or Stealth: Whether respondent’s entry into the co-owned property may be categorized as having been effected through strategy or stealth.
• Prescriptive Period: Whether the complaint for forcible entry was filed within the one-year reglementary period under the Rules of Court.

• Validity of Consent by a Co-owner: The consent of only one co-owner did not defeat the action for forcible entry. A co-owner cannot devote common property to her exclusive use to the detriment of the co-ownership. Authorizing a third party to build a house on common land is an act of dominion amounting to an alteration under Article 491 of the Civil Code, which requires unanimous consent. Articles 486 and 491 collectively preclude a single co-owner from unilaterally permitting an intrusion that injures the interest of the co-ownership and prevents other co-owners from using the property according to their rights. Consequently, respondent acquired no right to enter or construct by virtue of Norma Maligaya’s consent alone.
• Character of Entry as Strategy or Stealth: The entry was effected through strategy or stealth. Respondent’s act of securing consent only from her sister Norma Maligaya and building the house without the knowledge of the other co-owners constituted a clandestine act amounting to possession by stealth. The concealment of the construction, together with the arrangement allowing the consenting co-owner to reside in the house, demonstrated a stratagem to secure unauthorized entry. Thus, forcible entry lay.
• Prescriptive Period: The complaint was timely. When possession is acquired by stealth, the one-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the date the plaintiff learned of the intrusion. Petitioner discovered the encroachment only in the first week of September 1995. She made demands, and after their rejection, filed the complaint on January 25, 1996, well within one year from discovery.

• Co-owner’s Power to Consent to Third-Party Building on Common Property — A co-owner cannot validly authorize a third person to construct a house on property owned in common without the unanimous consent of all co-owners. The construction of a house is an act of dominion and an alteration under Article 491 of the Civil Code that requires the consent of every co-owner. Unilateral consent by one co-owner does not create any legal right in the third party and cannot defeat a forcible entry action by another co-owner.
• Forcible Entry through Stealth with Partial Co-owner Consent — Entry into co-owned land effected clandestinely, without the knowledge of all co-owners and with the connivance of only one of them, constitutes entry through strategy or stealth. The secret character of the entry, even if premised on a co-owner’s consent, remains sufficient to sustain an action for forcible entry.
• Prescriptive Period in Stealth Cases — When possession is acquired by stealth, the one-year period to bring a forcible entry action is counted not from the date of actual entry but from the time the aggrieved party learned of the stealthy encroachment.

• “a co-owner cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership. In our view, a co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to build a house on the co-owned property, which is an act tantamount to devoting the property to his or her exclusive use.”
• “The construction of a house on the co-owned property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it is an alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code. There being no consent from all co-owners, respondent had no right to construct her house on the co-owned property.”
• “Entry into the land effected clandestinely without the knowledge of the other co-owners could be categorized as possession by stealth.”
• “when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time the petitioner learned about it.”

• De Guia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120864, October 8, 2003, 413 SCRA 114, 127 — Cited as controlling authority for the principle that a co-owner may not devote common property to his exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership.
• Gala v. Rodriguez, 70 Phil. 124 (1940) — Relied upon for the rule that alterations under Article 491 include any act of strict dominion, such as an encumbrance or disposition, and that building a house on common land is an alteration requiring unanimous consent.
• Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142276, August 14, 2001, 362 SCRA 755, 768 — Used to support the classification of clandestine entry accomplished without the knowledge of other co-owners as possession by stealth.
• Bongato v. Malvar, G.R. No. 141614, August 14, 2002, 387 SCRA 327, 338, and Elaine v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80638, April 26, 1989, 172 SCRA 822 — Cited for the settled rule that in forcible entry by stealth, the one-year prescriptive period runs from discovery of the intrusion.

• Article 486, Civil Code — Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common provided it is in accordance with its purpose and does not injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent other co-owners from using it according to their rights. Giving consent to a third person to construct a house on common property was held to injure the co-ownership and prevent other co-owners from exercising their rights.
• Article 491, Civil Code — None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common. The construction of a house constituted an act of alteration that required unanimous consent; because only one co-owner consented, respondent’s construction was unauthorized.

Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Conchita Carpio Morales, Dante O. Tinga, and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. concurred.