Cristobal vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc. & Tan

A motion for reconsideration directed against a decision that substantially reverses or modifies a prior determination is not a prohibited second motion for reconsideration; it is a new motion against an entirely new decision that supersedes the original. The prohibition against a second motion for reconsideration contemplates the same party assailing the same judgment, not a party seeking reconsideration of a discrete, superseding decision.

Angelito L. Cristobal became a pilot for Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) on October 16, 1971. In May 1998, pursuant to a PAL downsizing program, Cristobal applied for and was granted leave without pay to enter into a four-year contract with EVA Air; he was advised that his seniority would continue to accrue and that he could opt to retire during the leave. By letter dated March 10, 1999, Cristobal informed PAL of his intention to retire. PAL responded that he was deemed to have lost his employment status as of June 9, 1998. Cristobal then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and retirement benefits with the National Labor Relations Commission.

• Employment and Leave: Angelito L. Cristobal joined Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) as a pilot on October 16, 1971. In May 1998, in line with PAL’s downsizing program, he applied for and was granted leave without pay to work for EVA Air under a four-year contract. PAL informed him that his seniority would continue to accrue and that he could retire during the leave period.
• Retirement Communication and Response: On March 10, 1999, Cristobal wrote to PAL expressing his intent to retire. PAL responded that he was considered to have lost his employment status as of June 9, 1998, effectively treating the employment relationship as severed before his retirement indication.
• Labor Arbiter Decision: Cristobal filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and retirement benefits. The Labor Arbiter, in a Decision dated December 1, 1999, found the dismissal illegal. On retirement benefits, the Arbiter rejected PAL’s position that Cristobal was entitled only to ₱5,000.00 per year under the 1967 PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan, and instead awarded retirement pay of ₱1,575,964.30 computed under Article 287 of the Labor Code, along with ₱500,000.00 moral damages, ₱500,000.00 exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees of 10% of the total award.
• First NLRC Decision: On September 30, 2010, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s findings but reduced moral and exemplary damages to ₱100,000.00 each. It upheld the retirement pay computation under Article 287.
• Motions for Reconsideration and Second NLRC Decision: Cristobal sought partial reconsideration to reinstate the full damages and impose legal interest, while PAL sought reconsideration of the illegal dismissal finding and the retirement benefits computation. The NLRC, in a Decision dated May 31, 2011, deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages, and substantially reduced Cristobal’s retirement benefits to ₱140,000.00, applying the 1967 PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan (₱5,000.00 per year of service). It relied on Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines and reasoned that Cristobal had not reached age 60 when he retired, and that the PAL Pilots Retirement Benefit Plan amounts he had already received were separate.
• Cristobal’s June 24, 2011 Motion: Cristobal filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 24, 2011, specifically assailing the reduction of retirement benefits. He argued that the PAL Pilots Retirement Benefit Plan was a misnamed investment plan funded by pilot contributions and should not have been considered in reducing his PAL-ALPAP retirement benefits. This was his first motion directed at the new ruling on retirement benefits.
• NLRC’s Dismissal as Second Motion: The NLRC, in a Resolution dated August 24, 2011, treated the motion as a prohibited second motion for reconsideration and dismissed it. The Commission did not rule on the merits of the retirement benefits argument.
• Court of Appeals Action: Cristobal’s subsequent Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals was dismissed via the assailed resolutions for being filed out of time—the CA adopting the view that the June 24, 2011 motion was a second motion that did not toll the period—and for lacking certain supporting documents.

• Nature of the Motion for Reconsideration: Petitioner argued that his November 12, 2010 Partial Motion for Reconsideration had assailed only the reduction of moral and exemplary damages, while his June 24, 2011 Motion for Reconsideration assailed the NLRC’s new ruling that reduced his retirement benefits. Thus, the latter was not a second motion for reconsideration but a first motion directed at a substantially altered decision.
• Condition Sine Qua Non for Certiorari: Petitioner maintained that filing a motion for reconsideration to allow the NLRC to correct itself on the retirement benefits issue was a condition sine qua non before resorting to a petition for certiorari.
• Liberal Application of Rules: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals should have adopted a liberal stance and ordered the submission of missing records instead of dismissing the petition outright.

• Second Motion for Reconsideration: Respondents insisted that petitioner’s June 24, 2011 Motion for Reconsideration was a prohibited second motion for reconsideration because it repeated arguments already raised and rejected, and therefore did not toll the reglementary period to file a petition for certiorari.
• Defective Petition: Respondents called attention to the fact that the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals lacked copies of pertinent supporting documents.

• Prohibition Against Second Motion for Reconsideration: Whether the June 24, 2011 Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was a prohibited second motion for reconsideration under Rule VII, Section 15 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, given that the NLRC’s May 31, 2011 Decision substantially reversed its earlier September 30, 2010 Decision.

• Prohibition Against Second Motion for Reconsideration: The June 24, 2011 Motion for Reconsideration was not a prohibited second motion for reconsideration. The NLRC’s May 31, 2011 Decision substantially modified its September 30, 2010 Decision by deleting moral and exemplary damages and reducing retirement benefits to an amount computed under a different legal basis. This constituted an entirely new decision that superseded the original. The prohibition against a second motion for reconsideration contemplates the same party assailing the same judgment. Because petitioner assailed a new and substantially different decision, his motion was a first motion for reconsideration of that new decision and thus tolled the period to file a petition for certiorari. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition as filed out of time. The matter of retirement benefits was remanded to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition on the merits.

• Doctrine on Prohibited Second Motion for Reconsideration — The prohibition against a second motion for reconsideration applies only when the same party assails the same judgment. Where a subsequent decision substantially reverses, modifies, or supersedes a prior determination, that subsequent decision is an entirely new judgment. A motion for reconsideration directed against that new judgment is a first motion for reconsideration and is not barred. This doctrine ensures that a party is not deprived of the opportunity to seek reconsideration of rulings made for the first time in a superseding decision.

• “However, a decision substantially reversing a determination in a prior decision is a discrete decision from the earlier one.” — The Court articulated the core distinction that removes a subsequent motion from the ambit of the second-motion prohibition.
• “The Amended Decision is an entirely new decision which supersedes the original decision, for which a new motion for reconsideration may be filed again.” — Quoting Solidbank Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the Court adopted the rule that a superseding decision resets the motion-for-reconsideration cycle.
• “This contemplates a situation where a second motion for reconsideration is filed by the same party assailing the same judgment or final resolution.” — Citing Barba v. Liceo De Cagayan University, the Court underscored that identity of the judgment assailed is the controlling element.

• Poliand Industrial Ltd. v. National Development Co., 523 Phil. 368 (2006) — Cited to illustrate that a motion seeking review of a resolution that delved for the first time into a new issue (reckoning date of interest) is not a second motion for reconsideration.
• Solidbank Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166581 & 167187, December 7, 2015 — Followed for the proposition that an amended decision entirely supersedes the original, allowing a fresh motion for reconsideration.
• Barba v. Liceo De Cagayan University, 699 Phil. 622 (2012) — Applied for the rule that the prohibition against a second motion for reconsideration contemplates the same party assailing the same judgment, not a new or amended decision.
• Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines, 424 Phil. 356 (2002) — Cited in the NLRC’s May 31, 2011 Decision as basis for reducing retirement benefits, though not dispositive of the procedural issue before the Supreme Court.

• Rule VII, Section 15 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure — Provides that a motion for reconsideration shall not be entertained except when based on palpable or patent errors, and that “only one such motion from the same party shall be entertained.” The Court interpreted this prohibition as limited to motions assailing the same judgment.
• Section 2, Rule 52 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — States that no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained; applied by analogy and cited in Barba to reinforce the same-party-same-judgment requirement.

Bersamin (Acting Chairperson), Jardeleza, Martires, and Gesmundo, JJ., concurred.

None.