Cristobal vs. People

An accused is liable as an accessory to theft under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code when, after learning that property was stolen, he disposes of it to profit, even if he did not participate in the theft; a prior dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does not bar a later prosecution in the proper court.

Jose Cristobal was a silversmith in the City of Manila. Carmen M. de Caro owned a diamond ring, and her son, Rolando Caro, was 20 years old.

Jose Cristobal was a silversmith in the City of Manila. In the early part of April 1945, Mrs. Carmen M. de Caro discovered that her diamond ring, which she had kept in a handbag under her matters, had been stolen. Suspicion fell on her 20-year-old son, Rolando Caro, who had disappeared from the house and, according to some friends, had tried to sell a diamond ring to a family. Questioned about the matter, Rolando confessed to the theft and further revealed that he had sold the ring to Cristobal for P800, a part of which he spent and the rest he lost.

Seen at his shop by Mrs. Caro and her lawyer, Cristobal admitted having bought the ring from Rolando for that sum and, upon Mrs. Caro’s supplication, agreed to let her redeem it for the same amount without any profit. Mrs. Caro was for some time unable to raise the necessary sum, and when at last she found someone willing to advance the money, Cristobal could not let her have the ring because, according to him, it had already been sold by his agent for P1,200. Neither Cristobal nor the agent could name the person to whom the ring was said to have been sold, and when Mrs. Caro asked for the agent’s address, Cristobal did not give her the right one. The ring was never recovered, so its owner complained to the authorities. Cristobal was prosecuted for theft as an accessory after the fact, together with Jose Martinez as principal; the case against Martinez was subsequently dismissed upon petition of the fiscal for lack of sufficient evidence, and Francisco Cueva was not included in the information.

Cristobal claimed he disposed of the ring without knowledge that it had been stolen, alleging that the owner did not inform him of that fact. The evidence was against him: the lawyer who accompanied Mrs. Caro testified that after Mrs. Caro identified the ring shown to her as her own, she immediately told Cristobal that the ring was of much value to her because it was a souvenir from her mother and that it was stolen from her son. That information made Cristobal aware of the illegal source of the ring, as confirmed by his immediate willingness to let Mrs. Caro get back the property for the same amount he had paid for it without any profit. Cristobal also testified that while he had agreed to allow Mrs. Caro to redeem the ring, it was with the understanding that she would have only one week to do so, after which the ring would be sold; Mrs. Caro and her lawyer denied this. The CA found that Cristobal disposed of the ring knowing it had been stolen.

The trial court appraised the stolen ring at P3,000, but the only support was the owner’s testimony that she had turned down an offer for that amount before the war. Cristobal’s uncontradicted declaration was that the diamond ring had only 1 ½ carats and that before the war a carat cost only about P120. Cristobal actually paid P800 for the ring and himself said that it was resold for P1,200. The CA valued the ring at P2,000, adding P800 to the P1,200 resale price to cover its sentimental value to the owner as a souvenir from her mother.

• Knowledge of Theft: Petitioner argued that the CA erred in finding he disposed of the ring knowing it had been stolen; he claimed he disposed of it without knowledge that it had been stolen and that the owner did not inform him of that fact.
• Accessory Liability: Petitioner argued that he was erroneously found guilty as an accessory, predicated on the assumption that he did not know the ring had been stolen when he disposed of it; he cited a case in Viada (Volume 1, pages 386-387) where a silversmith was acquitted because at the time he bought and paid for the jewels he did not know they had been stolen.
• Double Jeopardy: Petitioner insisted on his plea of double jeopardy because he had previously been prosecuted for the same offense in the Municipal Court of Manila, which dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction since the amount involved in the theft was in excess of P200.
• Dismissal and Non-inclusion: Petitioner complained that the dismissal of the case against Jose Martinez and the non-inclusion in the information of Francisco Cueva were prejudicial to him.
• Valuation of the Ring: Petitioner contended that the stolen ring was worth only P200.

• Finality of CA Factual Findings: Whether the SC may review and reverse the CA’s finding that petitioner disposed of the ring knowing it had been stolen.
• Accessory Liability: Whether petitioner is guilty as an accessory to theft under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code when he disposed of the ring after learning it had been stolen.
• Double Jeopardy: Whether the dismissal by the Municipal Court of Manila for lack of jurisdiction bars the subsequent prosecution in the proper court.
• Dismissal and Non-inclusion: Whether the dismissal of the case against Jose Martinez and the non-inclusion of Francisco Cueva in the information prejudiced petitioner.
• Penalty: Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is correct under Articles 309, 53, 61, and 71 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Indemnity and Valuation: Whether the indemnity should be reduced and how the value of the stolen ring should be determined under Article 106 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Finality of CA Factual Findings: No. The CA’s finding that petitioner disposed of the ring knowing it had been stolen is a finding of fact final and conclusive upon the SC, which is not empowered to review and reverse it.
• Accessory Liability: Yes. Under Article 19, an accessory is one who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime and without participating therein as principal or accomplice, takes part subsequent to its commission by profiting or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; petitioner profited by disposing of the stolen property at P1,200 after agreeing to return it for P800.
• Double Jeopardy: No. The dismissal was based on lack of jurisdiction, so it did not bar prosecution in the proper court.
• Dismissal and Non-inclusion: No. These are matters for the fiscal to determine, and the SC should not interfere absent a showing of clear and grave abuse.
• Penalty: Modified. The penalty should be one month and one day of arresto mayor under Articles 309, 53, 61, and 71, because the value is more than P200 but not exceeding P6,000 and the accessory penalty is two degrees lower; with no middle ground between destierro maximum and arresto mayor minimum, the more favorable arresto mayor minimum was imposed.
• Indemnity and Valuation: Modified. The indemnity should be P1,200, not P2,000, after deducting the P800 petitioner paid to Rolando; the ring’s value should not be less than P1,200, and sentimental value may be considered under Article 106, but the deduction avoids unjust enrichment.

• Finality of CA Factual Findings: The SC held that the CA’s finding that petitioner disposed of the ring knowing it had been stolen is a finding of fact final and conclusive upon the SC. The SC is not empowered to review and reverse it, citing Hodges vs. People, section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 3, and Republic Act No. 52. The SC therefore did not re-examine the CA’s factual conclusion on knowledge.
• Accessory Liability: Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code defines accessories as those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission by profiting themselves or assisting the offenders to profit by the effects of the crime. The SC found that petitioner learned from Mrs. Caro that the ring had been stolen from her son; after that knowledge, he claimed to have disposed of the ring for P1,200 after agreeing to return it to Mrs. Caro for the P800 he had paid. United States vs. Montaño held that to convict as an accessory it was not necessary to show participation; it was sufficient to show knowledge of the crime and subsequent disposal or concealment of the property. The Viada-cited case was distinguished because there the accused did not dispose of the jewels after learning they had been stolen, while petitioner disposed of the ring after he had been informed by the offended party that her son had stolen it. The SC concluded that petitioner profited by disposing of the stolen property at P1,200 after agreeing to return it for P800.
• Double Jeopardy: The SC rejected the plea because petitioner had previously been prosecuted in the Municipal Court of Manila, which after trial dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction since the amount involved in the theft was in excess of P200 under section 2468 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 361. Since the dismissal was based on lack of jurisdiction, it did not constitute a bar to the prosecution of the offense in the proper court, as held in U.S. vs. Bernardo, 19 Phil. 265.
• Dismissal and Non-inclusion: The SC held that the dismissal of the case against Jose Martinez and the non-inclusion in the information of Francisco Cueva are matters for the fiscal to determine. The SC should not interfere in the absence of a showing of clear and grave abuse. No such showing was made.
• Penalty: Article 309, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code provides that where the value of the property stolen is more than P200 but does not exceed P6,000, the penalty is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. As an accessory to the commission of a consummated felony, the accused should receive a penalty lower by two degrees under Article 53. Two degrees lower than prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods is destierro in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period, under Article 61, paragraph 5, in relation to Article 71, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 217. The medium degree should be imposed because there were neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances. Destierro in its maximum period is from four years, two months, and one day to six years of banishment, while arresto mayor in its minimum period is one month and one day to two months of imprisonment. There is no medium or middle ground between these two penalties, so the SC had to impose either one or the other; it imposed one month and one day of arresto mayor as preferable or more favorable to the accused.
• Indemnity and Valuation: Article 106 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the court shall determine the amount of damage, taking into consideration the price of the thing whenever possible and its special sentimental value to the injured party, and reparation shall be made accordingly. The trial court’s appraisal of P3,000 had nothing to support it except the owner’s testimony that she had turned down an offer for that amount before the war. Petitioner’s uncontradicted declaration was that the diamond ring had only 1 ½ carats and that before the war a carat cost only about P120. The value of diamonds must have gone up after the war because petitioner actually paid P800 for the ring and himself said that it was resold for P1,200; the value of the stolen ring should not be set at less than P1,200. The CA added P800 to the P1,200 resale price to cover sentimental value, raising the value to P2,000. The SC held that the CA erred in not deducting from the P2,000 the P800 petitioner had paid to Rolando Caro, the son of the offended party; otherwise, Rolando and his mother would enrich themselves by that amount at petitioner’s expense. The indemnity was therefore reduced to P1,200.

• Accessory to Theft under Article 19, Revised Penal Code — An accessory is one who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime and without having participated therein as principal or accomplice, takes part subsequent to its commission by profiting or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime. The SC applied this to Cristobal because he learned the ring was stolen, then disposed of it for P1,200 after agreeing to return it for P800, thereby profiting.
• Finality of CA Factual Findings — A finding of fact by the CA is final and conclusive upon the SC, which is not empowered to review and reverse it. The SC applied this to the CA’s finding that Cristobal disposed of the ring knowing it had been stolen.
• Double Jeopardy — Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction — A dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction does not bar a subsequent prosecution in the proper court. The SC applied this to the Municipal Court of Manila’s dismissal because the amount involved exceeded P200.
• Fiscal’s Prerogative to Determine Who to Charge — The dismissal of a case against a co-accused and the non-inclusion of another person in the information are matters for the fiscal to determine, and courts should not interfere absent clear and grave abuse. The SC applied this to the dismissal of Jose Martinez and the non-inclusion of Francisco Cueva.
• Penalty for Accessory to Consummated Felony — An accessory to a consummated felony receives a penalty lower by two degrees than that for the principal. If the resulting range has no middle ground between two penalties, the SC may impose the one more favorable to the accused. The SC applied this to reduce the penalty to one month and one day of arresto mayor.
• Indemnity for Stolen Property and Sentimental Value — In fixing indemnity, the court considers the price of the thing and its special sentimental value to the injured party under Article 106. The amount paid by the accessory to the thief must be deducted to avoid unjust enrichment. The SC applied this to reduce the indemnity to P1,200.

• "In order to convict the defendant of the crime of being accessory to the crime of robbery committed as shown by the evidence in this case, it was not necessary to show he had participated therein. It was sufficient to show that he had knowledge of it, and the proof shows that he acquired such knowledge when he was told by the owners that these carabaos had been taken away from the owners by robbery. After having obtained this knowledge he disposed of the property or concealed the same so that the owners were deprived of their property-the body and effects of the crime." — The SC relied on this passage from United States vs. Montaño to hold that knowledge of the crime plus subsequent disposal or concealment of stolen property is sufficient for accessory liability, without proof of participation.
• "There can be no question that the appellant profited by disposing of the stolen property at P1,200 after he had agreed to return it to the owner upon the latter's reimbursing to him the P800 he had paid for it." — The SC applied the accessory rule to Cristobal, finding that he profited from the stolen ring after learning it had been stolen.
• "Since the dismissal was based on lack of jurisdiction, it did not constitute a bar to the prosecution of the offense in the proper court." — The SC rejected the double jeopardy plea because the municipal court had dismissed the prior case for lack of jurisdiction.
• "However, we think the Court of Appeals erred in not deducting from the sum of P2,000 as the value of the ring the sum of P800 which the appellant had paid to Rolando Caro, the son of the offended party; otherwise, the latter and his mother would enrich themselves by that amount at the expense of the appellant." — The SC corrected the indemnity to avoid unjust enrichment, reducing it to P1,200.

• Hodges vs. People, 40 Off. Gaz. (1st Supp.), 227 — Cited to support the rule that the CA’s finding of fact is final and conclusive on the SC.
• United States vs. Montaño, 3 Phil. 110, 111 — Followed; held that knowledge of the crime plus subsequent disposal or concealment of stolen property is sufficient to convict as an accessory, without proof of participation.
• U.S. vs. Bernardo, 19 Phil. 265 — Followed; held that a dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction does not bar prosecution in the proper court.
• Viada-cited case (Volume 1, pages 386-387) — Distinguished; in that case the accused did not dispose of the jewels after learning they had been stolen, unlike Cristobal.

• Article 19, Revised Penal Code — Defines accessories; applied to Cristobal because after learning the ring was stolen he disposed of it and profited.
• Article 309, paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code — Sets the penalty for theft where the value is more than P200 but not exceeding P6,000 at prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods; used as the base penalty.
• Article 53, Revised Penal Code — Requires a penalty lower by two degrees for an accessory to a consummated felony; applied to reduce Cristobal’s penalty.
• Article 61, paragraph 5, in relation to Article 71, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 217 — Determines the penalty two degrees lower; applied to arrive at destierro in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period.
• Article 106, Revised Penal Code — Requires the court to determine damage considering the price of the thing and its special sentimental value; applied to the valuation and indemnity.
• Section 2468, Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 361 — Limits the municipal court’s jurisdiction over theft by the amount involved; applied to the prior dismissal for lack of jurisdiction because the amount exceeded P200.
• Section 3, Commonwealth Act No. 3, and Republic Act No. 52 — Cited with Hodges vs. People as basis for the finality of the CA’s factual findings; applied to bar review of the CA’s finding of knowledge.