Cristobal vs. Melchor

A final judgment ordering reinstatement of an illegally dismissed civil service employee carries with it, by necessary implication, the right to a position and compensation comparable to that held at the time of dismissal, computed at the rate prevailing at reinstatement, including allowances, benefits, and salary increases, because for all legal purposes the employee is considered not to have left office.

Jose C. Cristobal was a civil service eligible who had served as Private Secretary I in the Private Office of the President during the administrations of Presidents Ramon Magsaysay and Carlos P. Garcia. Alejandro Melchor and Federico Arcala were the incumbent Executive Secretary and cash disbursing officer of the Office of the President who succeeded the original defendants in the litigation over Cristobal’s dismissal. The present matter concerns the implementation of the Court’s final judgment of July 29, 1977, which had ordered Cristobal’s reinstatement and payment of back salaries, and the President’s guidelines for reinstating wrongly ousted officers.

Jose C. Cristobal was a civil service eligible who had served as Private Secretary I in the Private Office of the President during the administrations of Presidents Ramon Magsaysay and Carlos P. Garcia. On January 1, 1962, upon the assumption of office of President Diosdado P. Macapagal, he was dismissed; the Court later held by final judgment that the dismissal was wrongful. Alejandro Melchor and Federico Arcala, then Executive Secretary and cash disbursing officer of the Office of the President, were the incumbent public officials who succeeded the original defendants in the litigation.

In its judgment of July 29, 1977, the Court directed these officials to reinstate Cristobal either in the Office of the President or in some other government office, to any position for which he was qualified by reason of his civil service eligibility, subject to present requirements of age and physical fitness, and to pay him back salaries for five years at P4,188.00 per annum without qualification and deduction.

By letter dated July 15, 1978, Presidential Assistant Juan Tuvera informed the Court that the President had ordered Cristobal’s immediate reinstatement and payment of accumulated back salaries in accordance with the decision, and on the same date extended him an appointment as Assistant in the office staff of the President at P4,188.00 per annum effective upon assumption of duty. Cristobal assumed the position but complained in his letter of November 19, 1978 and subsequent pleadings that the position was not in accordance with the President’s guidelines for reinstatement of wrongly ousted officers, which required priority to employees separated from the service and reinstatement to the last held position if possible, otherwise to at least a comparable position in the same organization. He further complained that the compensation based on the old rate of P4,188.00 per annum was lower than that of the lowest janitor, amounting to P349.00 a month or P11.60 a day, and was not comparable to his former position of Private Secretary I in the President’s private office. He stated that Felix Hidalgo, chief of the Malacañang Personnel Division, told him there was no place for him inside Malacañang and that he had to find a position in 17 other offices under the President; the application letters he filed met with either no vacancy or no reply.

After receiving the Solicitor General’s comment, the Court issued a Resolution on June 20, 1979, directing Cristobal to comply with the instruction to assume his duty under the appointment and report to the Personnel Division, and directing the Chief of the Personnel Division, Felix Hidalgo, to grant Cristobal the allowances and benefits granted and paid to other regular employees of the government; both petitioner and respondent were required to submit a report on action taken within ten days. The compliance reports submitted by the Solicitor General stated that Cristobal was temporarily detained at Hidalgo’s office until a suitable permanent assignment could be found; that in a conference with Atty. Rocamora of the Office of Presidential Assistant Juan C. Tuvera and Hidalgo, Cristobal was informed that he could not be entitled to any allowances because his appointment as Assistant at P4,188.00 per annum did not qualify him for allowances, which were only given to positions higher than what he held.

Cristobal prayed that his backpay be paid as stated in the decision; that his reinstatement mean he be placed back into the service as of January 1, 1962; that his sick leave and vacation leave benefits be counted from January 1, 1962; that benefits arising from automatic promotions and increases in salary be considered part of his reinstatement; and that allowances and benefits arising from presidential decrees be considered and added to his basic salary. In his letter of February 10, 1980, he complained against having to start life all over again at the same compensation of P4,188.00 per annum and stated that even with standard general increases he remained the lowest salaried employee in the Office of the President, Malacañang. He compared his situation with former co-employees: Mrs. Esperanza M. Gutierrez, who in 1962 held the position of Stenographer at P1,980.00 per annum, was then Supervising Presidential Staff Officer at P30,621.00 per annum; and Mrs. Leticia Nonato, who took over his position as Private Secretary I, was then Senior Presidential Staff Officer at P27,732.00 per annum. His present position as Assistant (temporary) upon reinstatement on July 25, 1978, after 15 years of legal fight, paid P5,528.16 per annum after 10% and 20% increases on the basic salary of P4,188.00 per annum, or P460.00 a month, or P15.35 a day; his transportation alone from Pasay City to Malacañang cost P6.00 a day.

Cristobal reiterated his plea on September 4, 1980 in his Urgent Motion for Implementation of the Resolution dated June 20, 1979, and in his Second Urgent Motion of December 10, 1980. He had been paid his backpay for five years computed at P4,188.00 per annum in accordance with paragraph 2 of the Court’s judgment.

• Reinstatement Position: Petitioner maintained that the position given by way of supposed reinstatement was not in accordance with the President’s own guidelines for reinstatement of wrongly ousted officers, which provided that priority in filling vacancies should be given to employees separated from the service and that reinstates should be given the position last held if possible, otherwise at least a comparable position in the same organization.
• Compensation: Petitioner argued that compensation based on the old rate of P4,188.00 per annum at the time of his wrongful dismissal on January 1, 1962 was lower than that of the lowest janitor and was not comparable to his former position of Private Secretary I in the President’s private office.
• Placement Efforts: Petitioner complained that he was told there was no place for him inside Malacañang and had to find a position in 17 other offices under the President, but his applications met with either a reply of no vacancy or no reply.
• Benefits and Backpay: Petitioner prayed that his backpay be paid as stated in the decision; that his reinstatement mean he be placed back into the service as of January 1, 1962; that his sick and vacation leave benefits be counted from January 1, 1962; that benefits from automatic promotions and increases in salary be considered part of his reinstatement; and that allowances and benefits arising from presidential decrees be added to his basic salary.
• Equity and Implementation: Petitioner invoked the Court’s judgment that the reinstatement order implied compensation corresponding to the present existing rate under the law plus such increases of pay and financial aids effected by law and Presidential Decrees, and reiterated his plea in urgent motions.

• Reporting and Assignment: Respondents, through the Solicitor General, stated that petitioner should report to the Personnel Division daily until a suitable permanent assignment could be found for him under the appointment extended to him as Assistant in the Office Staff of the President with a salary of P4,188.00 per annum.
• Allowances: Respondents asserted that petitioner could not be entitled to any allowances because his appointment as Assistant with compensation at the rate of P4,188.00 per annum did not qualify him for allowances, which were only given to positions higher than what he held.

• Scope of Reinstatement: Whether the final judgment ordering reinstatement of an illegally dismissed civil service employee entitles petitioner to a position and compensation comparable to that held at the time of dismissal, rather than the old rate of P4,188.00 per annum.
• Compensation Rate and Benefits: Whether petitioner’s compensation must be fixed at the rate prevailing at the time of reinstatement or issuance of the appointment on July 15, 1978, together with allowances, benefits, and standard or automatic general salary increases thereafter.
• Sick and Vacation Leave; Seniority: Whether petitioner’s sick and vacation leave benefits and other benefits and increases must be counted from the date of his illegal dismissal on January 1, 1962, as if he had not left office.
• Backpay Differential: Whether petitioner is entitled to the accumulated differential between the recomputed compensation and the old rate of P4,188.00 per annum actually paid from the time he reported for duty pursuant to the June 20, 1979 Resolution.

• Scope of Reinstatement: Yes. The reinstatement order implies a position and compensation commensurate and comparable to the office of Private Secretary I or a comparable position, in accordance with the President’s guidelines and Tañala vs. Legaspi.
• Compensation Rate and Benefits: Yes. Compensation must be at the rate prevailing at the time of reinstatement or issuance of the appointment on July 15, 1978, plus allowances and benefits appurtenant thereto and standard or automatic general salary increases thereafter, not the old P4,188.00 per annum.
• Sick and Vacation Leave; Seniority: Yes. Sick and vacation leave benefits must be counted from January 1, 1962, and automatic promotions and salary increases during the illegal dismissal must be considered in determining the comparable position and compensation.
• Backpay Differential: Yes. Respondents were directed to pay the accumulated differential between the recomputed compensation and the old rate actually paid from the time petitioner reported for duty pursuant to the June 20, 1979 Resolution.

• Scope of Reinstatement: The July 29, 1977 judgment ordered reinstatement to any position for which petitioner was qualified by civil service eligibility. The President’s own guidelines required priority to separated employees and reinstatement to the last held position if possible, otherwise to a comparable position in the same organization. Although petitioner need not be restored to the exact position of Private Secretary I, the judgment’s substance and legal effects necessarily included a comparable position and compensation. Tañala vs. Legaspi held that an illegally dismissed or suspended classified civil service employee later reinstated is considered as not having left his office for all legal purposes and is entitled to all rights and privileges accruing by virtue of the office held; this applied mutatis mutandis. Perez vs. Evite and Section 45, Rule 39, Rules of Court provided that a judgment is not confined to what appears on its face but includes matters necessarily included or necessary thereto. Padua vs. Robles held that a judgment’s sufficiency and efficacy are tested by substance rather than form and that its legal effects, including those necessarily following, govern. Equity likewise required complete justice and moral justice, not a rigid application of law that would render the reinstatement right illusory.
• Compensation Rate and Benefits: The old rate of P4,188.00 per annum was the rate petitioner received sixteen years earlier at the time of his illegal dismissal. The judgment’s paragraph 2 fixed back salaries for five years at that old rate, but it did not limit the compensation for the position to which he was reinstated. Reinstatement meant a position and compensation comparable to Private Secretary I in the Office of the President or a comparable position, with compensation fixed at the rate prevailing at the time of reinstatement or issuance of the appointment on July 15, 1978, together with allowances and benefits appurtenant thereto and all standard or automatic general increases in salary and other special allowances and benefits decreed thereafter from time to time by the President. Merits were found in petitioner’s plea that he should not receive the old outmoded rate.
• Sick and Vacation Leave; Seniority: Because Tañala vs. Legaspi treats the illegally dismissed employee as not having left office for all legal purposes, petitioner’s sick and vacation leave benefits had to be counted from January 1, 1962 up to reinstatement and thereafter, as if he had not left or been separated from office at all. All benefits arising from automatic promotions, if any, and increases in salary during the fifteen-year period of illegal dismissal had to be considered in determining the comparable position and compensation given him at reinstatement. The dispositive portion also directed that he suffer no loss of seniority rights and other benefits and increases granted or recognized by law during the period of illegal dismissal corresponding to the position held by him.
• Backpay Differential: Petitioner had already been paid backpay for five years computed at P4,188.00 per annum under paragraph 2 of the judgment. Since the compensation for his reinstated position had to be recomputed at the prevailing rate and with the appurtenant allowances, benefits, and increases, respondents were directed to pay the accumulated differential between such recomputed compensation and the old rate actually paid from the time he reported for duty pursuant to the June 20, 1979 Resolution. They were also required to submit a report on compliance within ten days from notice.

• Reinstatement of illegally dismissed civil service employee; deemed not to have left office — When a government official or employee in the classified civil service has been illegally suspended or illegally dismissed and reinstatement is later ordered, for all legal purposes he is considered as not having left his office, so that he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue to him by virtue of the office he held. The Court applied this to Cristobal, holding that even if he was not restored to the exact position of Private Secretary I, he was entitled to a comparable position and compensation, with sick and vacation leave benefits counted from January 1, 1962 and with salary increases and promotions during the illegal dismissal considered.
• Final judgment includes matters necessarily included or necessary thereto — Under Section 45, Rule 39, Rules of Court, a judgment is not confined to what appears upon its face but also includes those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. The Court used this to construe the reinstatement order as carrying with it the right to compensation at the prevailing rate, allowances, benefits, and salary increases.
• Substance over form in construing judgments — The sufficiency and efficacy of a judgment must be tested by its substance rather than its form; in construing a judgment, its legal effects, including those that necessarily follow because of legal implications, rather than the language used, govern. Its meaning, operation, and consequences are ascertained like any other written instrument, with the intention of the court gathered from every part, including the situation to which it applies and the attendant circumstances. The Court applied this to avoid a narrow reading of the reinstatement order.
• Equity as complement of legal jurisdiction — Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance. The Court invoked equity to grant relief that would serve the ends of justice and to prevent the reinstatement right from being rendered illusory in fact.
• Moral justice in interpreting judgments — Even if a statement is reasonably susceptible of two or more interpretations, that which achieves moral justice should be adopted, eschewing other interpretations that would negate moral justice. The Court applied this principle in construing the final judgment in Cristobal’s favor.

• "when a government official or employee in the classified civil service had been illegally suspended or illegally dismissed, and his reinstatement had later been ordered, for all legal purposes he is considered as not having left his office, so that he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue to him by virtue of the office that he held." — This is the controlling doctrine from Tañala vs. Legaspi, quoted by the Court and applied mutatis mutandis to Cristobal to justify comparable compensation and benefits.
• "Under Section 45 of Rule 39, Rules of Court a judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but also those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto." — This states the rule used to construe the reinstatement order as including compensation, allowances, and benefits not expressly spelled out in the judgment.
• "The sufficiency and efficacy of a judgment must be tested by its substance rather than its form. In construing a judgment, its legal effects including such effects that necessarily follow because of legal implications, rather than the language used, govern." — This is the Court’s canonical formulation of substance-over-form in judgment interpretation, applied to clarify the scope of Cristobal’s reinstatement.
• "equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do." — This passage from Air Manila, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations supplied the equitable basis for granting complete relief rather than a narrow, literal implementation of the judgment.

• Tañala vs. Legaspi, 13 SCRA 566, 576 (1965) — Controlling precedent; held that an illegally dismissed or suspended classified civil service employee later reinstated is considered as not having left his office and is entitled to all rights and privileges of the office. The Court applied it mutatis mutandis to Cristobal.
• Perez vs. Evite, 1 SCRA 949, 953 (1961) — Followed; held that under Section 45, Rule 39, a judgment includes not only what appears on its face but also matters necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. The Court relied on it to expand the reinstatement order.
• Padua vs. Robles, 66 SCRA 485, 488 (1975) — Followed; held that a judgment’s sufficiency and efficacy are tested by substance rather than form and that its legal effects, including those necessarily following, govern. The Court used it to construe the final judgment according to its intent and moral justice.
• Air Manila, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 83 SCRA 579, 589 (1978) — Followed; held that equity complements legal jurisdiction and seeks to do complete justice where rigid rules would prevent adaptation to special circumstances. The Court invoked it to grant full relief.
• Ingles vs. Mutuc, 26 SCRA 171 — Cited as an example of the Court giving justice to plaintiffs under equity; the Court stated that just as in that case, it would do justice to Cristobal.

• Section 45, Rule 39, Rules of Court (1940) — Provides that only that is deemed adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. The Court, through Perez vs. Evite, applied this provision to hold that the reinstatement judgment necessarily included the right to a comparable position, prevailing compensation, allowances, benefits, and salary increases.
• Article 103, Revised Penal Code — Cited in the discussion of Padua vs. Robles to describe the subsidiary civil liability of a taxi owner for damages arising from the criminal negligence of its driver; it was not applied to Cristobal’s reinstatement.

Teehankee, J., wrote the majority opinion, with Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concurring. Makasiar, J., filed a separate concurring opinion stating: “Because the decision is now final and therefore the law of the case, which should be implemented is executed.”