Cristobal vs. Labrador

An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. The pardoning power of the Chief Executive extends to accessory and resultant disabilities, including statutory disqualifications from voting, and when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, an absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction.

The case involves the interpretation of the pardoning power of the President under Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons after conviction, except in cases of impeachment. The respondent, Teofilo C. Santos, had been convicted of estafa and later granted an absolute pardon by the President. The petitioner, Miguel Cristobal, sought to exclude Santos from the list of registered voters based on Section 94(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 357, the Election Code, which disqualifies from voting any person "declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against the property." The central question was whether the presidential pardon removed this statutory disqualification.

On March 15, 1930, the Court of First Instance of Rizal found Teofilo C. Santos guilty of the crime of estafa and sentenced him to six months of arresto mayor with the accessories provided by law, to return to the offended parties, Toribio Alarcon and Emilio Raymundo, the amounts of P375 and P125, respectively, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. On appeal, the Supreme Court, on December 20, 1930, confirmed the judgment of conviction. Santos was confined in the provincial jail of Pasig, Rizal, from March 14, 1932 to August 18, 1932, and paid the corresponding costs of trial. His civil liability was condoned by the complainants.

Notwithstanding his conviction, Santos continued to be a registered elector in the municipality of Malabon, Rizal, and was seated as municipal president of that municipality for the period between 1934 and 1937. On August 22, 1938, Commonwealth Act No. 357, otherwise known as the Election Code, was approved, Section 94(b) of which disqualifies from voting any person "declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against the property." In view of this provision, Santos applied to the President for an absolute pardon, his petition bearing date of August 15, 1939. Upon the favorable recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, the Chief Executive, on December 24, 1939, granted the petition, restoring Santos to his "full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property responsibility."

On November 16, 1940, the petitioner, Miguel Cristobal, filed a petition for the exclusion of the name of Teofilo C. Santos from the list of voters in precinct No. 11 of Malabon, Rizal, on the ground that the latter is disqualified under paragraph (b) of Section 94 of Commonwealth Act No. 357. After hearing, the court below rendered its decision on November 28, 1940, denying the petition for exclusion. The petitioner then filed the present petition for certiorari, impugning the decision of the court below on several grounds.

• Pardoning Power Does Not Apply to Legislative Prohibitions: Petitioner contended that the pardon granted by the President to the respondent did not restore the latter to the full enjoyment of his political rights because the pardoning power of the Chief Executive does not apply to legislative prohibitions.
• Unlawful Exercise of Legislative Function: Petitioner argued that the pardoning power here would amount to an unlawful exercise by the Chief Executive of a legislative function.
• Nothing to Pardon: Petitioner maintained that the respondent having served his sentence and all the accessory penalties imposed by law, there was nothing to pardon.

N/A — The decision does not recount the specific arguments raised by the respondents in defense of the pardon's effect.

• Nature and Extent of the Pardoning Power: Whether the absolute pardon granted by the President to the respondent restored him to the full enjoyment of his political rights, notwithstanding the statutory disqualification under Section 94(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 357.
• Effect of Pardon on Statutory Disqualification: Whether the disqualification imposed by Section 94(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 357 falls within the purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive.

• Nature and Extent of the Pardoning Power: Yes. An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. The pardoning power extends to accessory and resultant disabilities, and when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, an absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction.
• Effect of Pardon on Statutory Disqualification: Yes. The disqualification imposed in paragraph (b) of Section 94 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 falls within the purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive. The suggestion that it does not would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power, not contemplated in the Constitution, and would result in no way of restoring the political privilege except through legislative action.

• Nature and Extent of the Pardoning Power: The Court observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of the pardoning power by the Chief Executive: (a) that the power be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to these limitations, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its command; there are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, an absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction.
• Effect of Pardon on Statutory Disqualification: The Court noted that while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility," it is absolute insofar as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political rights." While there are cases in the United States which hold that the pardoning power does not restore the privilege of voting, this is because in the United States the right of suffrage is a matter exclusively in the hands of the State and not in the hands of the Federal Government. Even then, there are cases to the contrary. The suggestion that the disqualification imposed in paragraph (b) of Section 94 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 does not fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power, not contemplated in the Constitution, and would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature except through legislative action.

• Absolute Pardon Removes All Disabilities Resulting from Conviction — An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the disqualification from voting under Section 94(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 357, being a disability resulting from conviction, was removed by the absolute pardon granted to the respondent.
• Pardoning Power Extends to Accessory and Resultant Disabilities — Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its command; there are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities. The Court applied this principle to conclude that the pardoning power extends to statutory disqualifications from voting.
• Pardoning Power Cannot Be Restricted or Controlled by Legislative Action — Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the argument that the statutory disqualification under the Election Code falls outside the scope of the pardoning power.

• "An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the convictions." — This passage states the core ratio decidendi of the case, defining the effect of an absolute pardon on the legal consequences of a criminal conviction.
• "Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities." — This excerpt articulates the principle that the pardoning power covers not only the principal penalty but also all accessory and resultant disabilities flowing from a conviction.
• "When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction." — This passage clarifies that a pardon granted after the sentence has been served still operates to remove remaining legal consequences of the conviction.
• "Upon the other hand, the suggestion that the disqualification imposed in paragraph (b) of section 94 of Commonwealth Act No. 357, does not fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, not contemplated in the Constitution, and would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature except through legislative action." — This excerpt rejects the argument that statutory disqualifications are beyond the scope of the pardoning power, emphasizing that such a view would unduly impair the constitutional prerogative of the Chief Executive.

• Jones vs. Board of Registrars, 56 Miss. 766 — Cited as authority for the proposition that the pardoning power can restore the privilege of voting, contrary to other United States cases holding otherwise.
• Hildreth vs. Heath, 1 Ill. App. 82 — Cited alongside Jones vs. Board of Registrars as a case supporting the view that a pardon can restore the right of suffrage.

• Section 11, Article VII, 1935 Constitution — The constitutional provision granting the President the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and to remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment. The Court interpreted this provision to define the nature and extent of the pardoning power.
• Section 94(b), Commonwealth Act No. 357 (Election Code) — The statutory provision disqualifying from voting any person "declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against the property." The Court held that this disqualification is a disability resulting from conviction that falls within the purview of the pardoning power.

Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, and Diaz, JJ., concurred.

• Justice Horrilleno — Dissented, arguing that: (1) the pardon decree in favor of respondent Santos had no object because he had already served his sentence and recovered his right of suffrage upon the extinction of his penalty; (2) while a pardon remits the punishment imposed on the accused, it does not have the virtue of erasing the commission of the crime and the conviction; and (3) Section 94(b) of the Election Code is not, properly speaking, a penalty or a disability resulting from the conviction, but rather a general measure of prevention and protection that the State, in the exercise of its police powers, has enacted to safeguard the purity of suffrage. The dissent also argued that the pardon was conditional, not absolute, due to the exception regarding eligibility for public office or employment, and that the disqualification under the Election Code does not conflict with the Constitution, as the power to determine voter disqualifications lies exclusively with the Legislature.