Crispino vs. Tansay

In ordinary appeals, the Court of Appeals may receive evidence only when it grants a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, notwithstanding its general power under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, to receive evidence to resolve factual issues in cases within its jurisdiction; this limitation arises from the interplay between the statute and the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals.

Anatolia Tansay, twice widowed, treated Zenaida Capili as her own child beginning in 1947. Zenaida married Ben Ricaredo Echaves and had several children, including petitioners Luz Anatolia E. Crispino and Caridad O. Echaves. The family resided in the "Tansay Compound" in Cebu City, consisting of Lot No. 1048 (3,107 sq. m.) which Anatolia acquired and subdivided into three lots. By deeds of sale dated July 6, 1981 and July 11, 1989, Anatolia allegedly transferred Lots 1048-A-1 and 1048-A-3 to Zenaida and to petitioners, respectively. In 1991, Zenaida discovered the certificates of title missing from her room and filed a petition for reconstitution. Anatolia subsequently instituted Civil Case No. CEB-14547 before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City for revocation of trust, declaration of nullity of transfer, and cancellation of titles, alleging that the transfers were merely trusts and that no consideration was paid for the properties.

• The Relationship: Anatolia Tansay took in Zenaida Capili in 1947 and treated her as her own child. Zenaida married Ben Ricaredo Echaves and had several children, including petitioners Luz Anatolia E. Crispino and Caridad O. Echaves. The family lived in Anatolia's house in the Tansay Compound in Cebu City, where Anatolia was called "nanay" by Zenaida's children and "honey" by Zenaida herself. Anatolia paid for the education of Zenaida's children and helped Zenaida's husband find employment.
• The Property: Anatolia acquired Lot No. 1048 (3,107 sq. m.) in Cebu City and subdivided it into Lot No. 1048-A-1 (617 sq. m.), Lot No. 1048-A-2 (555 sq. m.), and Lot No. 1048-A-3 (1,845 sq. m.), where Anatolia constructed her residence.
• The Alleged Sales: On July 6, 1981, Anatolia allegedly sold Lot No. 1048-A-1 to Zenaida for P6,170.00. On July 11, 1989, she allegedly sold Lot No. 1048-A-3 to petitioners Luz Anatolia and Caridad. Zenaida's daughter testified that since 1975, Luz Anatolia and Caridad deposited sums in Anatolia's account for the purchase, but Anatolia merely turned these over to Zenaida.
• Trial Court Findings: The Regional Trial Court found that petitioners did not pay any monetary or valuable consideration for the transfers and that Anatolia never intended to sell the lots but merely constituted petitioners as trustees. The court declared Anatolia the lawful owner and ordered cancellation of the titles issued to petitioners.
• The Alleged New Evidence: On January 15, 1998, three years after the RTC decision, Anatolia allegedly executed a "Confirmation of Previous Sales" affidavit affirming the validity of the sales and stating that her filing of the case was a mistake. This document was allegedly discovered after Anatolia's death on August 11, 2001, prompting petitioners to file a motion to remand the case for re-opening of trial to present this evidence.

• Power to Receive Evidence: Petitioners argued that Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, grants the Court of Appeals the power to "receive all kinds of evidence to resolve factual issues within its original and appellate jurisdiction," which is not limited to newly discovered evidence.
• Nature of Motion: The Urgent Motion to Remand Records for Re-Opening of Trial should have been treated as a motion to receive further evidence under the expanded jurisdiction of BP 129, not as a motion for new trial under Rule 53 of the Rules of Court.
• Scope of New Trials: Even assuming the motion was for new trial, the Court of Appeals' power to conduct new trials is not limited to those based on newly discovered evidence.

• Propriety of Remedy: Respondent countered that the Petition for Review was improper because petitioners were assailing the interlocutory Resolution dated July 25, 2006 denying the motion to remand, which should have been challenged via certiorari under Rule 65, not in an appeal of the final decision.
• Finality of Interlocutory Order: The Resolution had become final and executory as it was not challenged through appeal or motion for reconsideration.
• Authenticity: Respondent argued it was unlikely Anatolia executed the affidavit because she had requested early resolution of the appeal through letters dated March 27, 2001 and July 20, 2001, and the motion to remand was filed suspiciously just days after her death.

• Procedural: Whether an interlocutory order denying a motion to remand may be assailed in an appeal of the Court of Appeals' final decision.
• Nature of Motion: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in treating the motion to remand as a motion for new trial under Rule 53.
• Limitation on Reception of Evidence: Whether the Court of Appeals' power to grant new trials and receive evidence is limited to motions based on newly discovered evidence.

• Procedural: An interlocutory order may be questioned as part of an appeal from the final judgment rendered in the case; petitioners committed no procedural infirmity by assailing the July 25, 2006 Resolution in the appeal of the January 24, 2007 Decision rather than filing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
• Nature of Motion: The Court of Appeals correctly treated the motion to remand as a motion for new trial under Rule 53, as petitioners sought to introduce additional evidence after the case had been submitted for decision.
• Limitation on Reception of Evidence: In ordinary appeals, the Court of Appeals may receive evidence only when it grants a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 6 of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals read in conjunction with Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; the power to receive evidence is qualified by the Internal Rules.
• Newly Discovered Evidence: The "Confirmation of Previous Sales" affidavit did not qualify as newly discovered evidence because, although executed after the trial, it was not of such character as would probably change the result, the validity of contracts being determined by law and not by subsequent stipulation of the parties.

• Interlocutory Orders in Appeals — Unlike final judgments, interlocutory orders may not be questioned on appeal except as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case. The remedy against an interlocutory order is not appeal but certiorari under Rule 65, though parties may wait to assail it in the appeal from the final judgment.
• Power to Receive Evidence (CA) — While Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 grants the Court of Appeals the power to receive evidence to resolve factual issues, this power is qualified by the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals. In ordinary appeals, evidence may be received only when a new trial is granted based on newly discovered evidence. In contrast, in actions falling within the original jurisdiction of the CA (such as certiorari, prohibition, mandamus), the power to receive evidence is unqualified.
• Newly Discovered Evidence — Evidence sought to be introduced in a new trial must satisfy two criteria: (a) it could not have been discovered prior to the trial in the court below by the exercise of due diligence; and (b) it is of such character as would probably change the result.

• "The Court of Appeals' power to receive evidence to resolve factual issues in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction is qualified by its internal rules."
• "In an ordinary appeal, the Court of Appeals may receive evidence when a motion for new trial is granted based on newly discovered evidence."
• "Unlike a 'final' judgment or order, which is appealable... an 'interlocutory' order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case."
• "Newly discovered evidence is evidence that could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at the trial, and which, if presented, would probably alter the result."

• Republic v. Mupas, G.R. No. 181892 (2015) — Held that the Court of Appeals' power to receive evidence under Section 9 of BP 129 is qualified by its Internal Rules, which enumerate specific instances when evidence may be received.
• Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 231 Phil. 302 (1987) — Established that interlocutory orders may be questioned as part of an appeal from the final judgment.
• Maralit v. Philippine National Bank, 613 Phil. 270 (2009) — Distinguished that in special civil actions for certiorari (original jurisdiction), the Court of Appeals has ample authority to receive new evidence, unlike in ordinary appeals.

• Section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (as amended by Republic Act No. 7902) — Grants the Court of Appeals the power to try cases, conduct hearings, receive evidence, and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.
• Rule 53, Section 1, Rules of Court — Limits motions for new trial in the Court of Appeals to grounds of newly discovered evidence which could not have been discovered prior to the trial in the court below by the exercise of due diligence and which is of such character as would probably change the result.
• Section 3, Rule 6, Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (2002) — Enumerates the specific instances when the Court of Appeals may receive evidence, including in appeals in civil cases where a new trial is granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence pursuant to Section 3, Rule 53 of the Rules of Court.

Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ.