Crisostomo vs. Court of Appeals

A travel agency is not a common carrier but a mere agent of the airline, bound only to exercise the ordinary diligence of a good father of a family under Article 1173 of the Civil Code, not the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers.

In May 1991, Estela Crisostomo engaged Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. to arrange a "Jewels of Europe" package tour. The agency's ticketing manager, Meriam Menor—who was also Crisostomo's niece—delivered the travel documents and plane ticket to Crisostomo's residence two days before the scheduled departure, verbally advising her that the flight was on a Saturday. Crisostomo did not verify the departure date printed on her ticket and proceeded to the airport on Saturday, only to discover that the flight had departed the previous day.

• The Booking: Petitioner contracted respondent for the "Jewels of Europe" tour at a total cost of P74,322.70, receiving a discount and waived booking fee due to her niece's employment as respondent's ticketing manager.
• The Missed Flight: On June 12, 1991, Menor delivered the travel documents and tickets, verbally instructing petitioner to be at the NAIA on Saturday, two hours before the flight. Petitioner went to the airport on Saturday, June 15, 1991, but the ticket was for a flight that had departed the previous day, June 14.
• The Substitute Tour: Menor persuaded petitioner to take the "British Pageant" tour instead. Petitioner made a partial payment of US$300 and completed the tour in July 1991.
• The Demand for Refund: Upon returning, petitioner demanded a refund of P61,421.70, representing the difference between the amount paid for the first tour and the balance owed for the second. Respondent refused, claiming the amount was non-refundable as it had been remitted to its Singapore principal and citing industry practice.

• Common Carrier Standard: Petitioner maintained that respondent is a common carrier bound to observe extraordinary diligence; thus, even if both parties were negligent, respondent's negligence is greater, making the principle of pari delicto inapplicable.
• Refundability of Tour: Petitioner argued that the "Jewels of Europe" tour was not indivisible, and the amount paid therefor is refundable.
• Damages for Breach: Petitioner insisted that she is entitled to consequential damages resulting from the alleged breach of contract of carriage.

• Due Diligence: Respondent countered that it exercised due diligence, as the departure date was clearly and legibly printed on the ticket, and the documents were delivered two days in advance.
• Petitioner's Negligence: Respondent argued that petitioner was solely negligent for failing to read the ticket and verify the flight schedule, having only herself to blame for missing the flight.
• No Refund: Respondent maintained that the payment was already remitted to the foreign principal, and industry practice disallows refunds for individuals who fail to take a booked tour.
• Separate Contract: Respondent asserted that the "British Pageant" was an independent procurement, not a substitute for the missed tour, and petitioner still owed the balance of P12,901.00.

• Nature of Contract: Whether a travel agency is a common carrier bound by extraordinary diligence.
• Negligence: Whether respondent was negligent in the performance of its contractual obligation.
• Evidentiary Presumption: Whether the presumption of suppressed evidence under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court arises from respondent's failure to present its employee, Menor, as a witness.

• Nature of Contract: A travel agency is not a common carrier. Its covenant with customers is limited to making travel arrangements, procuring tickets, and facilitating travel permits; it does not undertake to transport passengers. At most, it acts as an agent of the airline. Accordingly, it is bound only by the ordinary diligence of a good father of a family under Article 1173 of the Civil Code, not the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers.
• Negligence: Respondent was not negligent. It performed its prestation diligently by properly booking the tour, procuring the tickets, and delivering the documents two days prior to the flight. The departure date was clearly printed on the ticket. Petitioner was solely negligent in failing to read the travel documents to verify the flight details.
• Evidentiary Presumption: The presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced does not apply. The witness, Menor, was working in France at the time of the complaint, making her physically unavailable. Furthermore, the opportunity to obtain her testimony belonged to both parties, as she was not only respondent's employee but also petitioner's niece.

• Travel Agency as an Ordinary Contracting Party — A travel agency is not a common carrier because it does not undertake to transport passengers or goods from one place to another. Its obligation is simply to make travel arrangements in behalf of its clients. Consequently, it is bound by the standard of ordinary diligence (diligence of a good father of a family) under Article 1173 of the Civil Code, not the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers under Article 1755.
• Presumption of Suppressed Evidence — The presumption under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court—that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced—is inapplicable when the evidence is not intentionally omitted but is simply physically unavailable, or when the same could have been obtained by both parties.

• "While petitioner concededly bought her plane ticket through the efforts of respondent company, this does not mean that the latter ipso facto is a common carrier. At most, respondent acted merely as an agent of the airline, with whom petitioner ultimately contracted for her carriage to Europe."
• "Said presumption would logically be inoperative if the evidence is not intentionally omitted but is simply unavailable, or when the same could have been obtained by both parties."

• Jarco Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 991 (1999) — Cited for the test to determine negligence: whether the defendant used reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation.
• Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412 (1994) — Followed for the imposition of a 6% interest per annum from the time the counterclaim was filed until the finality of the decision, and 12% interest per annum thereafter until the obligation is fully settled.

• Article 1732, Civil Code — Defines a common carrier as persons, corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods for compensation, offering their services to the public. Applied to distinguish a travel agency, which does not transport passengers, from a common carrier.
• Article 1173, Civil Code — Prescribes the diligence of a good father of a family as the standard of care when the law or contract does not state the diligence to be observed. Applied as the correct standard of care for a travel agency's contractual obligations.
• Rule 131, Section 3(e), Rules of Court — Provides the disputable presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. Held inapplicable where the witness is physically unavailable and equally accessible to both parties.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.