Crisologo vs. Daray

A judge is not administratively liable for erroneous judicial acts performed in good faith absent bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption.

Two consolidated civil cases involving the Crisologo family's ancestral property were pending for nearly a decade before RTC Branch 19 in Digos City, presided by respondent Judge in an acting capacity. The original parties submitted a compromise agreement ceding the property to the Rural Bank of Tagum, Inc. (RBTI). Complainant Jesus G. Crisologo, claiming co-ownership and asserting that the registered owner held the property in trust, sought to intervene to protect his proprietary rights. Respondent Judge denied the intervention, prompting complainant to file a motion for reconsideration and, subsequently, a notice of appeal and a motion for voluntary inhibition after learning of the decision approving the compromise agreement and the execution proceedings.

• Consolidated Civil Cases and Compromise Agreement: On May 23, 1995, and September 10, 1996, Marina Crisologo, Jr. and Salvador Crisologo filed separate actions against Victor Callao and the Rural Bank of Tagum, Inc. (RBTI) involving the same property, which were consolidated and raffled to RTC Branch 19. On January 22, 2004, the original parties submitted a Compromise Agreement ceding full ownership of the subject land to RBTI.
• Motion for Intervention: On February 13, 2004, complainant Jesus G. Crisologo and his sister Carolina C. Abrina moved to intervene, alleging co-ownership and that the property was held in trust for them.
• Denial of Intervention: On August 23, 2004, respondent Judge denied the motion for intervention, reasoning that the Compromise Agreement had already been entered into, intervention would unduly delay the adjudication of rights of the original parties in a decade-old case, and complainant's claims could be pursued in a separate action.
• Procedural Missteps: Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration on September 15, 2004, which RBTI opposed for lacking a notice of hearing. Respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration on October 15, 2004, for lack of the requisite notice of hearing. On October 27, 2004, respondent Judge approved the Compromise Agreement. Copies of both the Order denying the motion for reconsideration and the Decision were mistakenly sent to complainant's former counsel, Atty. Ta-asan, instead of the counsel of record, Atty. Crisologo.
• Appeal and Inhibition: On November 8, 2004, after learning of the execution proceedings, complainant filed an Urgent Manifestation and Notice of Appeal, along with a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition. Respondent Judge inhibited herself on December 8, 2004, but refrained from acting on the notice of appeal. The notice of appeal was acted upon only on March 15, 2005, by the newly appointed presiding judge.

• Gross Misconduct: Complainant maintained that respondent Judge exhibited gross misconduct by failing to furnish his new counsel of record with copies of the Order denying his motion for reconsideration and the Decision approving the compromise agreement, thereby violating his right to due process.
• Undue Delay: Complainant argued that respondent Judge unduly delayed the resolution of his notice of appeal, which deprived him of his right to appeal and forced him to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
• Gross Ignorance of the Law: Complainant asserted that the denial of his motion for intervention constituted gross ignorance of the law, as he was a co-owner and indispensable party whose participation was essential before a final adjudication could be made.

• Honest Mistake: Respondent countered that the failure to serve court processes on the counsel of record was unintentional and constituted an honest oversight by court personnel, asserting that administrative liability for gross misconduct cannot attach absent a clear showing of bad faith.
• Justified Inaction on Appeal: Respondent maintained that her failure to act on the notice of appeal was justified by her voluntary inhibition from the civil cases, arguing she could no longer be expected to perform acts pertaining to the case after inhibiting herself.
• Sound Discretion in Denying Intervention: Respondent argued that the denial of the motion for intervention was a valid exercise of discretion prompted by the existence of the Compromise Agreement and the decade-long pendency of the cases, insisting the administrative complaint was purely harassment.

• Gross Misconduct: Whether respondent Judge is administratively liable for gross misconduct for the failure to serve copies of court processes on the complainant's counsel of record.
• Undue Delay: Whether respondent Judge is administratively liable for undue delay in resolving complainant's notice of appeal.
• Gross Ignorance of the Law: Whether respondent Judge is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law in denying complainant's motion for intervention.

• Gross Misconduct: Administrative liability for gross misconduct was not established. The failure to furnish complainant's new counsel with copies of court processes was an honest oversight by court personnel, not an act attended by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption on the part of the respondent Judge.
• Undue Delay: No undue delay was committed. The notice of appeal was filed simultaneously with the motion for inhibition. Respondent Judge inhibited herself on the 30th day after the notice of appeal was filed. Once inhibition occurred, the duty to act on the appeal and transmit the records devolved upon the incoming judge; thus, respondent could no longer be expected to perform any act pertaining to the appeal.
• Gross Ignorance of the Law: Administrative liability for gross ignorance of the law was not established. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Respondent's denial of the motion was based on valid considerations—the existence of a compromise agreement, the age of the case, and the availability of a separate action—which are recognized under the rules on intervention. Absent bad faith, malice, or corrupt motives, a judge cannot be sanctioned for erroneous rulings made in the performance of official duties.

• Judicial Good Faith — As a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. A judge cannot be held civilly, criminally, or administratively liable for official acts, no matter how erroneous, provided they are performed in good faith. To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the decision, order, or act must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but must also be attended by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption. Good faith and absence of malice are sufficient defenses against charges of ignorance of the law.
• Sound Discretion in Intervention — The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The permissive tenor of the rules gives the court full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing intervention. Considerations such as the potential delay to the prejudice of the original parties and the availability of a separate action to protect the intervenor's rights are valid factors in exercising this discretion.
• Perfection of Appeal by Notice of Appeal — A party's appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to them upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time and the payment of docket fees. The notice of appeal does not require the approval of the court; its function is merely to notify the trial court of the availing of the right to appeal. The trial court's only duty is to transmit the original record to the appellate court within 30 days from the perfection of the appeal.

• "It is settled that as a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability – civil, criminal or administrative – for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith."
• "In any case, to constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, such decision, order or act must be attended by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption."
• "The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The permissive tenor of the rules shows the intention to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the intervention."

• Maylas, Jr. v. Judge Sese, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2012 (August 4, 2006) — Followed. Cited for the doctrine that judges are not administratively liable for judicial acts performed in good faith, and that an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for correcting perceived judicial errors where a judicial remedy exists.
• Santos v. Judge How, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1946 (January 26, 2007) — Followed. Cited to emphasize that judges are not infallible and cannot be held liable for erroneous acts absent bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption.
• Enriquez v. Judge Caminade, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1966 (March 21, 2006) — Distinguished/Explained. Cited for the principle that inexcusable failure to observe basic laws constitutes gross ignorance of the law; the Court distinguished the present case by finding no such inexcusable failure.
• San Miguel Corporation v. Sandiganbayan, 394 Phil. 608 (2000) — Followed. Cited as controlling precedent for the principle that intervention is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
• Victory Liner, Inc. v. Malinias, G.R. No. 151170 (May 29, 2007) — Followed. Cited for the rule that a notice of appeal does not require court approval and is perfected upon filing and payment of fees.

• Rule 41, Section 12, Rules of Court — Cited to define the trial court's duty to transmit the original record of the case to the appellate court within 30 days from the perfection of the appeal. Applied to show that respondent Judge's duty was merely ministerial and that her inhibition relieved her of this duty, transferring it to her successor.

Antonio T. Carpio, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Ruben T. Reyes