CREBA vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 does not lie against a government official acting in a quasi-legislative or administrative capacity, as the writ is available only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; and reclassification of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses—whether by LGUs or Presidential Proclamations—does not dispense with the need for DAR conversion approval, the date of effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 serving as the cut-off for automatic reclassifications exempt from DAR conversion clearance.

CREBA is a private non-stock, non-profit corporation organized under Philippine law, serving as the umbrella organization of approximately 3,500 private corporations, partnerships, single proprietorships, and individuals involved in land and housing development, building and infrastructure construction, materials production and supply, and related professional services. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform is named respondent as the duly appointed head of the DAR, whose administrative issuances are the subject of the petition. The dispute arises within the framework of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) established by Republic Act No. 6657, which took effect on 15 June 1988, and the DAR's authority to regulate the conversion of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses as conferred by Executive Order No. 129-A and Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657.

CREBA is a private non-stock, non-profit corporation organized under Philippine law, serving as the umbrella organization of some 3,500 private corporations, partnerships, single proprietorships, and individuals directly or indirectly involved in land and housing development, building and infrastructure construction, materials production and supply, and related professional services. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform is named respondent as the duly appointed head of the DAR whose administrative issuances are challenged in the petition.

On 29 October 1997, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 07-97, entitled "Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses," which consolidated all existing implementing guidelines related to land use conversion. These rules embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands reclassified by Local Government Units (LGUs) into non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988. On 30 March 1999, the Secretary issued DAR AO No. 01-99, entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses," amending and updating the previous rules. Its coverage included agricultural lands to be converted to residential, commercial, industrial, institutional, and other non-agricultural purposes; lands to be devoted to another type of agricultural activity such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond—effecting exemption from CARP coverage; lands to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that previously authorized; and lands reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 pursuant to Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 and other pertinent laws.

On 28 February 2002, the Secretary issued DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled "2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion," which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99 and repealed all inconsistent issuances. DAR AO No. 01-02 covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use. Section 3.4 thereof specifically includes within its coverage the conversion of agricultural lands or areas that have been reclassified by the LGU or by way of a Presidential Proclamation to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988. Thereafter, on 2 August 2007, the Secretary amended certain provisions of DAR AO No. 01-02 by issuing DAR AO No. 05-07, particularly addressing land conversion in times of exigencies and calamities.

To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development, the Secretary further issued Memorandum No. 88 on 15 April 2008, which temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all land use conversion applications. This memorandum was issued upon the instruction of the President, prompted by a worsening rice shortage in the country, to ensure sufficient agricultural lands for rice cultivation and production. CREBA claimed that the memorandum caused an actual slowdown of housing projects, which in turn aggravated the housing shortage, unemployment, and illegal squatting problems to the substantial prejudice of its members and the nation. CREBA thereupon filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition directly with the Supreme Court, seeking to nullify DAR AO No. 01-02 (as amended) and Memorandum No. 88 on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and that certain provisions were illegal and unconstitutional.

• DAR Jurisdiction Over Reclassified Lands: Petitioner argued that under Republic Act No. 6657 and Republic Act No. 8435, the term "agricultural lands" refers to lands devoted to or suitable for cultivation and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or industrial land. By including "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" in the definition of agricultural lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform impermissibly expanded the legal signification of the term through a mere administrative issuance, acting without jurisdiction.
• Excess of Jurisdiction: Petitioner contended that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was issued in violation of Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 because nothing in that section or any other provision of law confers upon the DAR the authority to require that non-awarded lands or reclassified lands be submitted to its conversion authority. Thus, the Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
• Violation of Local Autonomy: Petitioner asseverated that Section 2.19, Article I of DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, making reclassification of agricultural lands subject to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion, violates Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, because nothing therein provides that reclassification by LGUs shall be subject to conversion procedures or that DAR's approval or clearance must be secured. This also contravenes the constitutional mandate on local autonomy under Section 25, Article II and Section 2, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
• Due Process and Equal Protection: Petitioner argued that the promulgation and enforcement of DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, constitute deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law because lands outside DAR's jurisdiction are unjustly, arbitrarily, and oppressively prohibited or restricted from legitimate use on pain of administrative and criminal penalties. The administrative order is also patently biased in favor of the peasantry at the expense of all other sectors of society, violating the equal protection clause.
• Invalidity of Memorandum No. 88: Petitioner avowed that DAR Memorandum No. 88 is not a valid exercise of police power, as that prerogative belongs to the legislature, and that it is unconstitutional because it suspended land use conversion without any basis.

• Hierarchy of Courts: Whether the petition, filed directly with the Supreme Court, should be dismissed for failure to observe the doctrine on hierarchy of courts.
• Proper Remedy: Whether the petition, though styled as certiorari, is in essence a petition for declaratory relief over which the Supreme Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.
• Availability of Certiorari: Whether certiorari under Rule 65 lies against the DAR Secretary, who issued the challenged administrative orders in the exercise of quasi-legislative and administrative—not judicial or quasi-judicial—functions.
• DAR Jurisdiction Over Reclassified Lands: Whether the DAR Secretary has jurisdiction over lands that have been reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial, or for other non-agricultural uses, and whether the inclusion of such lands in DAR AO No. 01-02 constitutes an impermissible expansion of the statutory definition of agricultural lands.
• Local Autonomy: Whether DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, violates the local autonomy of LGUs by subjecting reclassification to DAR conversion requirements.
• Due Process and Equal Protection: Whether DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
• Validity of Memorandum No. 88: Whether DAR Memorandum No. 88 is a valid exercise of police power.

• Hierarchy of Courts: Yes. The petition should have been initially filed with the Court of Appeals, as petitioner failed to set forth special and important reasons justifying direct recourse to the Supreme Court, thereby failing to satisfy the conditions in Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor.
• Proper Remedy: Yes. The petition, in essence, seeks a declaration of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned administrative issuances, partaking of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which the Supreme Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.
• Availability of Certiorari: No. Certiorari under Rule 65 lies only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The DAR Secretary issued the questioned orders in the exercise of quasi-legislative and administrative functions, never adjudicating the rights of parties.
• DAR Jurisdiction Over Reclassified Lands: No. The DAR Secretary did not act without jurisdiction or in excess thereof. Under Executive Order No. 129-A, the DAR was authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for agrarian reform implementation, including defining agricultural lands for purposes of land use conversion. The inclusion of lands reclassified after 15 June 1988 within DAR's conversion authority is consistent with jurisprudence distinguishing reclassification from conversion.
• Local Autonomy: No. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 explicitly provides that nothing therein shall be construed as repealing, amending, or modifying the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657, thereby validly recognizing DAR's authority to approve conversion of agricultural lands.
• Due Process and Equal Protection: No. The administrative and criminal penalties under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, implement Sections 73 and 74 of Republic Act No. 6657 and Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8435, and are imposed upon illegal or premature conversion of lands within DAR's jurisdiction.
• Validity of Memorandum No. 88: Yes. Memorandum No. 88 was issued upon the instruction of the President to address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands amid a worsening rice shortage, pursuant to the general welfare of the public.

• Hierarchy of Courts: Although the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction, such concurrence does not give a petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. There is a hierarchy of courts that serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that hierarchy indicates that petitions for extraordinary writs against lower courts should be filed with the Court of Appeals. Direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. Petitioner failed to specifically and sufficiently set forth such reasons, failing to satisfy the conditions in Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor. The rationale for this rule is two-fold: it would be an imposition upon the precious time of the Court, and it would cause inevitable delay in the adjudication of cases. The present petition should have been initially filed with the Court of Appeals.

• Proper Remedy: Although styled as a petition for certiorari, the petition in essence seeks the declaration by the Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88. It thus partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. It is beyond the province of certiorari to declare administrative issuances unconstitutional and illegal, as certiorari is confined only to the determination of the existence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

• Availability of Certiorari: The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its essential requisites are: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform, in issuing the questioned administrative orders, did so in accordance with his mandate to implement the land use conversion provisions of Republic Act No. 6657. He neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto himself any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. The issuance and enforcement of the orders were done in the exercise of quasi-legislative and administrative functions. A tribunal, board, or officer is said to be exercising judicial function where it has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function applies to the actions of public administrative officers required to investigate facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action. The Secretary never made any adjudication of rights of parties, and thus certiorari does not lie.

• DAR Jurisdiction Over Reclassified Lands: Executive Order No. 129-A vested upon the DAR the responsibility of implementing the CARP. Section 5(c) thereof authorized the DAR to establish and promulgate operational policies, rules, and regulations for agrarian reform implementation. Section 4(k) authorized the DAR to approve or disapprove the conversion, restructuring, or readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses. Section 5(l) gave the DAR the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial, and other land uses. Section 7 vested the authority and responsibility for the exercise of the DAR's mandate in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. In including "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" in the definition of agricultural lands, the Secretary merely acted within the scope of his authority to promulgate rules and regulations, including the authority to define agricultural lands for purposes of land use conversion. The definition merely refers to the category of agricultural lands that may be subject to conversion and is not confined to agricultural lands in the context of land redistribution. Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, clarified that after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988, the DAR has been given the authority to approve land conversion. In Ros vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, the Court held that after the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, agricultural lands, though reclassified, must go through the process of conversion, jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR; however, agricultural lands already reclassified before 15 June 1988 are exempt from conversion. The date of effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 served as the cut-off period for automatic reclassifications or rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer require DAR conversion clearance. The argument that Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 limits DAR's conversion authority only to lands already awarded after five years was rejected, as such a narrow reading would open a loophole allowing landowners to evade compliance with the agrarian reform program. In Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that reclassification and conversion differ: conversion is the act of changing the current use of agricultural land as approved by the DAR, while reclassification is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedures for land use conversion. A mere reclassification does not automatically allow a landowner to change the land's use; conversion is still required. This applies whether the reclassification was made by LGUs or by Presidential Proclamations. An exception exists where public agricultural lands have been reserved by Presidential Proclamation for public use or purpose, as held in Republic vs. Estonilo, where only a positive act of the President is needed to segregate or reserve land for public purpose, and such reservation effectively converts the land without undergoing any conversion process.

• Local Autonomy: Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 explicitly provides that "nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending, or modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657." The power of LGUs to reclassify agricultural lands is therefore not absolute. The authority of the DAR to approve conversion of agricultural lands covered by Republic Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has been validly recognized by Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160. DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, does not violate the autonomy of LGUs.

• Due Process and Equal Protection: The administrative and criminal penalties provided under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, are imposed upon the illegal or premature conversion of lands within DAR's jurisdiction. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform simply implemented the provisions of Sections 73 and 74 of Republic Act No. 6657 and Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8435, which prescribe penalties for prohibited acts including premature or illegal conversion. Contrary to petitioner's assertions, the penalties are not arbitrarily imposed on lands outside DAR's jurisdiction.

• Validity of Memorandum No. 88: Memorandum No. 88 was issued upon the instruction of the President to address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development because of the worsening rice shortage at that time. The measure was made to ensure sufficient agricultural lands for rice cultivation and production. The issuance was made pursuant to the general welfare of the public and therefore cannot be argued to have been made without any basis.

• Doctrine on Hierarchy of Courts — Although the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction, such concurrence does not accord parties an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of forum. A becoming regard for the judicial hierarchy indicates that petitions for extraordinary writs against lower courts should be filed with the Court of Appeals, and direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. The Court applied this doctrine to dismiss the petition, as CREBA failed to set forth special and important reasons justifying direct recourse to the Supreme Court.

• Certiorari Does Not Lie Against Quasi-Legislative Acts — The writ of certiorari under Rule 65 is available only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions who has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A government official issuing administrative orders in the exercise of quasi-legislative or administrative functions—not adjudicating rights of parties—cannot be the subject of a certiorari petition. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the DAR Secretary, who issued the questioned orders in his quasi-legislative and administrative capacity, was not a proper respondent for certiorari.

• Distinction Between Reclassification and Conversion — Reclassification is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, or commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedures for land use conversion. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the DAR. A mere reclassification of agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use; the landowner must still undergo the process of conversion before being permitted to use the agricultural land for other purposes. The Court applied this distinction to hold that reclassified agricultural lands must still undergo DAR conversion proceedings.

• Cut-Off Date for Automatic Reclassification — The date of effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 served as the cut-off period for automatic reclassifications or rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer require DAR conversion clearance or authority. Agricultural lands reclassified before 15 June 1988 are exempt from conversion; any reclassification made on or after that date is subject to DAR's conversion authority. The Court applied this rule to uphold the validity of Section 3.4 of DAR AO No. 01-02, which includes lands reclassified on or after 15 June 1988 within DAR's conversion jurisdiction.

• "A tribunal, board, or officer is said to be exercising judicial function where it has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is 'a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies x x x required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.'" — This passage defines the distinction between judicial, quasi-judicial, and quasi-legislative functions, which is central to the Court's holding that certiorari does not lie against the DAR Secretary's issuance of administrative orders.

• "Reclassification of agricultural lands is one thing, conversion is another. Agricultural lands that are reclassified to non-agricultural uses do not ipso facto allow the landowner thereof to use the same for such purpose." — This formulation articulates the controlling distinction between reclassification and conversion, establishing that reclassification alone does not authorize a change in land use without DAR conversion approval.

• "It bears emphasis that said Memorandum No. 88 was issued upon the instruction of the President in order to address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development because of the worsening rice shortage in the country at that time. Such measure was made in order to ensure that there are enough agricultural lands in which rice cultivation and production may be carried into." — This passage provides the factual and legal basis for upholding Memorandum No. 88 as a valid measure issued pursuant to the general welfare.

• "Any reclassification, therefore, of agricultural lands to residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses either by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations enacted on or after 15 June 1988 must undergo the process of conversion, despite having undergone reclassification, before agricultural lands may be used for other purposes." — This statement synthesizes the Court's holding on the scope of DAR's conversion authority over reclassified lands, establishing 15 June 1988 as the operative cut-off date.

• Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor, G.R. No. 140954, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 460 — Controlling precedent on the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The Court reaffirmed that concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and Regional Trial Courts to issue extraordinary writs does not give parties unrestricted freedom of choice of forum, and that direct recourse to the Supreme Court should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons clearly set out in the petition.

• Ros vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 132477, 31 August 2005, 468 SCRA 471 — Controlling precedent on DAR's conversion authority over reclassified lands. The Court held that after the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, agricultural lands, though reclassified, must go through the process of conversion, jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR, while agricultural lands already reclassified before 15 June 1988 are exempt from conversion.

• Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, 453 Phil. 373 (2003) — Followed precedent establishing the distinction between reclassification and conversion. The Court held that reclassification does not suffice to change the use of agricultural land; conversion, as approved by the DAR, is required.

• Republic vs. Estonilo, G.R. No. 157306, 25 November 2005, 476 SCRA 265 — Distinguished precedent. The Court held that where public agricultural lands have been reserved by Presidential Proclamation for public use or purpose, only a positive act of the President is needed to segregate or reserve the land, and conversion is no longer necessary—unlike reclassification of private agricultural lands, which still requires DAR conversion.

• Roxas & Company, Inc. vs. DAMBA-NFSW and the Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. Nos. 149548, 167505, 167540, 167543, 167845, 169163 and 179650, 4 December 2009 — Cited for the definition of reclassification as embodied in DAR Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 1994, supporting the distinction between reclassification and conversion.

• Junio vs. Garilao, G.R. No. 147146, 29 July 2005, 465 SCRA 173 — Cited for the proposition that the effectivity date of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 served as the cut-off period for automatic reclassifications exempt from DAR conversion clearance.

• Heirs of Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149621, 5 May 2006, 489 SCRA 590 — Cited in support of the cut-off date rule for automatic reclassifications.

• Section 5, Article VIII, 1987 Philippine Constitution — Defines the Supreme Court's powers, including original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, and appellate jurisdiction to review cases involving constitutionality or validity of treaties, laws, decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, or regulations. The Court applied this provision to hold that it has only appellate—not original—jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief, which the petition essentially was.

• Section 1, Rule 65, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that certiorari lies only when a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court applied this rule to hold that certiorari does not lie against the DAR Secretary, who acted in a quasi-legislative and administrative capacity.

• Section 65, Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) — Authorizes the DAR, upon application, to authorize the reclassification or conversion of agricultural lands after five years from award when the land ceases to be economically feasible for agricultural purposes or the locality has become urbanized. The Court rejected petitioner's argument that this provision limits DAR's conversion authority exclusively to awarded lands, holding that such a narrow reading would create a loophole for evading the agrarian reform program.

• Section 20, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Governs the reclassification of agricultural lands by LGUs, limiting the percentage of agricultural land that may be reclassified and explicitly providing that nothing therein shall be construed as repealing, amending, or modifying the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657. The Court applied this provision to hold that DAR's conversion authority over agricultural lands covered by Republic Act No. 6657 is validly recognized and does not violate local autonomy.

• Sections 73 and 74, Republic Act No. 6657 — Define prohibited acts and omissions, including the conversion of agricultural land to non-agricultural use with intent to avoid CARP coverage, and prescribe penalties of imprisonment and fines. The Court cited these provisions to hold that the administrative and criminal penalties under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, are a valid implementation of statutory law.

• Section 11, Republic Act No. 8435 (Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act of 1997) — Prescribes penalties for premature or illegal conversion of agricultural lands, including imprisonment, fine, forfeiture of land and improvements, and administrative penalties such as cancellation of conversion authorization and blacklisting. The Court cited this provision to uphold the penalty provisions of DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended.

• Executive Order No. 129-A (Reorganization Act of the Department of Agrarian Reform) — Vested upon the DAR the responsibility of implementing the CARP, authorizing it to promulgate operational policies, rules, and regulations (Section 5(c)), approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands (Section 4(k)), and exercise exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion (Section 5(l)), with the authority and responsibility vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform (Section 7). The Court relied on these provisions to hold that the Secretary acted within his authority in defining agricultural lands for conversion purposes.

• Section 25, Article II and Section 2, Article X, 1987 Philippine Constitution — Provide for the autonomy of local governments. The Court found no violation, as DAR's conversion authority over agricultural lands covered by Republic Act No. 6657 is expressly recognized by Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160.

Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chairperson), Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro, and Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo concurred with the decision of Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez.