Costabella Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

A compulsory easement of right of way cannot be granted when the dominant estate already possesses an adequate outlet to a public highway, even if that outlet is inconvenient; mere convenience is never the gauge—adequacy is—and all four requisites under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must concur.

Costabella Corporation owns Lots Nos. 5122 and 5124 of the Opon Cadastre in Sitio Buyong, Maribago, Lapu-Lapu City, on which it constructed a beach hotel and resort. The private respondents—Katipunan Lumber Co., Inc., Aurora Bustos Lopez, Manuel S. Satorre, Jr., Josefa C. Revilles, Felix Tiukinhoy, Jr., Perfecta L. Chuangco, and Cesar T. Espina—own adjoining properties designated as Lots Nos. 5123-A and 5123-C of the same cadastre. Before the petitioner's hotel construction began, the private respondents had traversed a passageway across the petitioner's property to reach the provincial road. The dispute arose when the petitioner closed that passageway and later fenced its entire property, prompting the respondents to sue for injunction and damages.

Costabella Corporation owns Lots Nos. 5122 and 5124 of the Opon Cadastre, situated at Sitio Buyong, Maribago, Lapu-Lapu City, where it constructed a beach hotel and resort. The private respondents are the owners of adjoining properties known as Lots Nos. 5123-A and 5123-C of the same cadastre. Before the petitioner began construction of its beach hotel, the private respondents, in traveling to and from their respective properties and the provincial road, passed through a passageway that traversed the petitioner's property.

In 1981, the petitioner closed that passageway upon commencing construction of its hotel but nonetheless opened an alternative route across its property through which the private respondents continued to pass. Sometime in August 1982, when the petitioner undertook the second phase of its beach hotel construction, it fenced its entire property, thereby closing even the alternative passageway and preventing the private respondents from traversing any part of it. The private respondents also complained that the petitioner had constructed a dike on the beach fronting its property without the necessary permit, obstructing the passage of residents and local fishermen and trapping debris and flotsam that prevented them from using their properties as intended.

As a direct consequence of these closures, the private respondents filed an action for injunction with damages against the petitioner on September 2, 1982 before the then Court of First Instance of Cebu. In their complaint, they assailed the closure of the original passageway, which they claimed to be an "ancient road right of way" existing before World War II and used continuously by them, the community, and the general public. The petitioner, in its answer, denied the existence of any ancient road and averred that the use of its property by the respondents and others had been temporary, intermittent, and gratuitous—by mere tolerance and as an act of neighborliness. It justified the fencing as necessary for the safety and security of its hotel guests and patrons. The petitioner further alleged that the respondents were not entirely dependent on the subject passageway, as they had another existing and adequate access to the public road through other properties. With respect to the alleged dike, the petitioner clarified that it had built a breakwater on the foreshore land fronting its property, which it said benefited the community.

After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision on March 15, 1984, finding that the private respondents had acquired a vested right over the passageway based on its long existence and continued use not only by them but also by the community at large. The trial court ordered the petitioner to reopen the road, to pay monthly damages to Katipunan Lumber Co., Inc. and Perfecto Guangco, and to pay attorney's fees and costs. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, with the petitioner questioning the alleged vested right and the respondents assailing the dismissal of their prayer for demolition of the dike. The appellate court held that no easement had been acquired by prescription, since an easement of right of way is discontinuous and under Article 622 of the Civil Code may be acquired only by virtue of a title and not by prescription. Nevertheless, the appellate court, in the exercise of equity jurisdiction, treated the easement as a compulsory one legally demandable by the owner of the dominant estate from the owner of the servient estate, and granted the respondents the right to use the passageway unless the petitioner provided another equally accessible and convenient route. The appellate court also confirmed that "there is another outlet for the plaintiff to the main road," though it deemed that outlet "inconvenient."

• Error of the Court of Appeals: Petitioner contended that the CA decision was grossly erroneous and not in accord with the provisions of Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code on easements and prevailing jurisprudence.
• No Vested Right or Prescription: Petitioner denied the existence of an ancient road through its property and maintained that any use of its property by the respondents and others was temporary, intermittent, and gratuitous—by mere tolerance and purely as an act of neighborliness, insufficient to create any easement by prescription.
• Justification for Closure: Petitioner justified the walling in of its property on the ground of ensuring the safety, security, privacy, and convenience of its hotel patrons and guests.
• Existence of Another Outlet: Petitioner alleged that the respondents were not entirely dependent on the subject passageway, as they had another existing and adequate access to the public road through other properties.
• Failure to Implead Indispensable Parties: Petitioner assailed the complaint for failure to implead as defendants the owners of the other properties supposedly traversed by the alleged ancient road right of way, who were indispensable parties without whom no final adjudication could be rendered.

• Ancient Road Right of Way: Respondents claimed the passageway was an "ancient road right of way" that had existed before World War II and had been used continuously by them, the community, and the general public, either as pedestrians or by means of vehicles, in going to and from Lapu-Lapu City and other parts of the country.
• Deprivation of Access and Damages: Respondents averred that by closing the alleged road right of way, the petitioner had deprived them of access to their properties and caused them damages.
• Obstructive Dike: Respondents alleged that the petitioner had constructed a dike on the beach fronting its property without the necessary permit, obstructing the passage of residents and local fishermen and trapping debris and flotsam that prevented them from using their properties for their intended purposes.

• Easement by Prescription: Whether the private respondents had acquired an easement of right of way over the petitioner's property by prescription.
• Compulsory Easement: Whether the Court of Appeals properly granted a compulsory easement of right of way in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction despite the respondents' failure to establish the four requisites under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code.
• Standard for Grant of Compulsory Right of Way: Whether inconvenience of an existing outlet, as opposed to inadequacy, justifies the grant of a compulsory easement of right of way.

• Easement by Prescription: No. An easement of right of way is discontinuous and, under Article 622 of the Civil Code, may be acquired only by virtue of a title and not by prescription. The appellate court was correct on this point.
• Compulsory Easement: No. The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in treating the passageway as a compulsory easement, because the private respondents failed to establish the four requisites mandated by Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code.
• Standard for Grant of Compulsory Right of Way: No. The convenience of the dominant estate has never been the gauge for the grant of a compulsory right of way; the true standard is adequacy, and when an existing adequate outlet exists, even if inconvenient, the imposition of another servitude is entirely unjustified.

• Easement by Prescription: An easement of right of way is a discontinuous easement. Under Article 622 of the New Civil Code, discontinuous easements may be acquired only by virtue of a title and not by prescription. The appellate court correctly adhered to this principle in holding that the private respondents had not acquired a vested right over the passageway by prescription. The petitioner's own position—that the respondents' use of the passageway was temporary, intermittent, and gratuitous by mere tolerance—was consistent with the legal character of the easement as discontinuous and non-prescriptible.

• Compulsory Easement: After correctly holding that no easement by prescription existed, the appellate court erred in nonetheless granting a compulsory easement on equity grounds. Under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, the owner of a dominant estate may demand a compulsory right of way only upon concurrence of four requisites: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. The burden of proving these requisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate. Here, the respondents failed to establish any of the four. The appellate court itself admitted that "there is another outlet for the plaintiff to the main road" and that "legally the old road could be closed," yet ordered the reopening of the passageway solely because the existing outlet was "inconvenient." The respondents also failed to indicate willingness to pay indemnity, failed to show that the isolation was not due to their own acts, and failed to allege or prove that the passageway sought was at a point least prejudicial to the petitioner, whose hotel and beach resort operations required strict security.

• Standard for Grant of Compulsory Right of Way: The true standard for the grant of a legal right of way is "adequacy," not convenience. When an existing outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway is adequate, even if inconvenient, the need to open another servitude is entirely unjustified. There must be a real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for the easement. Manresa's commentary, cited with approval, elucidates that an estate bordering a public road through an inaccessible slope or precipice is in fact isolated, while an estate with a passageway that can be crossed conveniently at all times is not. The isolation of the dominant estate is also dependent on the particular need of the dominant owner, and the estate need not be totally landlocked; what matters is whether a right of way is necessary to fill a reasonable need. But where, as here, an adequate outlet already exists, no compulsory easement may be demanded. Furthermore, under Article 650, the easement must be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and this criterion prevails over shortest distance. The court is not bound to establish the shortest route; a longer way may be established to avoid injury to the servient tenement.

• Discontinuous easements are not acquired by prescription — Under Article 622 of the Civil Code, discontinuous easements—those which are used only at intervals and require the act of man for their use—may be acquired only by virtue of a title and not by prescription, regardless of the length of time they have been enjoyed. An easement of right of way is discontinuous. The Court applied this to reject the respondents' claim of a vested right based on long and continuous use of the passageway.

• Four requisites for a compulsory easement of right of way — Under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, a compulsory right of way is demandable only when all four requisites concur: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of proper indemnity; (3) the isolation is not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way is established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance to a public highway may be the shortest. The burden of proving all requisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate. The Court found that none of the four were established by the respondents.

• Adequacy, not convenience, is the standard for compulsory right of way — The grant of a compulsory easement requires a real necessity, not mere convenience. When an existing outlet to a public highway is adequate, even if inconvenient, the dominant estate cannot demand a right of way. There must be a real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for the easement. The Court emphasized that the appellate court's reliance on the "inconvenience" of the existing outlet was legally erroneous.

• Least prejudice prevails over shortest distance — Under Article 650, the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. According to Tolentino, "least prejudice" prevails over "shortest distance." The court is not bound to establish the shortest route; a longer way may be established to avoid injury to the servient tenement.

• "On this score, it is apparent that the Court of Appeals lost sight of the fact that the convenience of the dominant estate has never been the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi that adequacy, not convenience, governs the grant of a compulsory easement, directly reversing the appellate court's equity-based reasoning.

• "To be sure, the true standard for the grant of the legal right is 'adequacy.' Hence, when there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, even if the said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified." — This is the canonical formulation of the adequacy standard, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on compulsory easements of right of way.

• "For to justify the imposition of an easement or right of way, 'there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial necessity for it.'" — This formulation, quoting from Ramos, Sr. vs. Gatchalian Realty, Inc., defines the necessity requirement that must be proven by the dominant estate owner before a compulsory easement may be granted.

• Ronquillo vs. Roco, 103 Phil. 84 (1958) — Cited for the established doctrine that an easement of right of way is discontinuous and cannot be acquired by prescription.
• Cuaycong vs. Benedicto, 37 Phil. 781 (1918) — Cited alongside Ronquillo for the same proposition that discontinuous easements are not prescriptible.
• Locsin vs. Climaco, 26 SCRA 816 (1969) — Cited for the rule that the burden of proving the existence of the four requisites for a compulsory easement lies on the owner of the dominant estate.
• Angela Estate, Inc. vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, 24 SCRA 500 (1968) — Cited for the same proposition regarding the burden of proof on the four requisites.
• Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. vs. Capitol Subdivision, 17 SCRA 731 (1966) — Cited for the same proposition regarding the burden of proof on the four requisites.
• Rivera vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 169 SCRA 307 (1989) — Cited for the principle that convenience of the dominant estate is not the gauge for the grant of a compulsory right of way.
• Ramos, Sr. vs. Gatchalian Realty, Inc., 154 SCRA 703 (1987) — Cited for the requirement that there must be a real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for the imposition of an easement.

• Article 622, Civil Code — Provides that discontinuous easements, whether apparent or non-apparent, may be acquired only by virtue of a title and not by prescription. The Court applied this to hold that the easement of right of way, being discontinuous, could not have been acquired by the respondents through long use.
• Article 649, Civil Code — Governs the compulsory easement of right of way, providing that the owner of an immovable surrounded by other immovables and without adequate outlet to a public highway may demand a right of way through neighboring estates after payment of proper indemnity, and that the easement is not compulsory if the isolation is due to the proprietor's own acts. The Court applied this to enumerate the first three requisites and found that the respondents failed to prove any of them.
• Article 650, Civil Code — Provides that the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance to a public highway may be the shortest. The Court applied this to identify the fourth requisite and noted that the respondents failed to allege or prove that the passageway sought was at a point least prejudicial to the petitioner's hotel and resort operations.
• Article 651, Civil Code — Allows adjustments as to the width of an existing right of way when the dominant owner's needs have changed. The Court cited this provision to illustrate that adequacy may evolve with the dominant owner's needs, but did not apply it directly to the facts.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concurred.