Corpuz vs. Lugue

A driver who, after discovering an impending peril, has no opportunity to avoid a collision despite applying all means at hand cannot be held negligent, the last clear chance doctrine being inapplicable where the party charged is required to act instantaneously and the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means available after the peril is or should have been discovered.

Edison Lugue was a passenger of an Isuzu KC-20 passenger jeep owned and operated by Ricardo Santiago and driven by Jimmy Basilio. Amador Corpuz owned a Mazda minibus driven by Romeo Gonzales. Oscar Jaring owned a tanker truck driven by Gerardo Lim. The dispute arose from a multi-vehicle accident on Roman Highway in Barangay Pias, Orion, Bataan, involving these three vehicles and a parked Transcon service truck, resulting in physical injuries to Lugue and other passengers of the KC-20. Lugue filed an action for damages against the owners and drivers of the minibus and the tanker truck, who in turn filed a third-party complaint against the owner and driver of the KC-20.

On September 14, 1984, at around 7:15 in the morning, an Isuzu KC-20 passenger jeep driven by Jimmy Basilio was traversing the right side of Roman Highway in Barangay Pias, Orion, Bataan, with Edison Lugue among its passengers. A tanker truck owned by Oscar Jaring and driven by Gerardo Lim was then moving from the right shoulder of the highway. The KC-20 collided with the tanker truck, causing the KC-20 to be thrown toward the left lane of the highway. A Mazda minibus owned by Amador Corpuz and driven by Romeo Gonzales, which had been trailing the KC-20 and was in the process of overtaking it, then bumped the KC-20. The KC-20 spun and struck a Transcon service truck parked on the left side of the highway. The minibus hit the KC-20 again, pushing it toward a deep portion on the left side of the road. As a consequence, passengers of the KC-20, including Lugue, suffered physical injuries.

Lugue filed an action for damages before the RTC of Balanga, Bataan, Branch 2, against Corpuz and Gonzales (owner and driver of the minibus) and Jaring and Lim (owner and driver of the tanker truck). The defendants filed a third-party complaint against Ricardo Santiago and Jimmy Basilio (owner and driver of the KC-20). Two versions of the accident emerged at trial. The Lugue-Corpuz version, testified to by four witnesses — Lugue, Remigio Gervacio, Patrocinio Carillo, and Gonzales — held that the tanker truck bumped the KC-20 on its right side as the truck was beginning to make a headstart from the shoulder, throwing the KC-20 to the left lane where it was struck by the minibus. The Jaring-Lim version, testified to by only one witness, Ricardo Puno, was pure hearsay because Lim himself admitted he was at the guardhouse having invoices recorded and did not witness the accident.

The trial court found that the tanker truck was either improperly parked with its left wheels protruding into the right concrete lane, or was moving from the shoulder into the right lane without checking for oncoming vehicles. The court also found that KC-20 driver Basilio was reckless in not slackening his speed or swerving despite seeing the tanker truck at a distance of 25 to 35 meters, and that this reckless imprudence constituted the proximate cause that set the chain of events in motion. The trial court nevertheless held all defendants jointly and severally liable, finding Gonzales grossly negligent in the manner he drove the minibus and constituting an intervening cause. On appeal, the Court of Appeals absolved Jaring and Lim but sustained the liability of Corpuz and Gonzales, reasoning in a single paragraph that Gonzales recklessly proceeded to overtake the KC-20 unmindful of spatial limitations. Corpuz and Gonzales filed the present petition, contending that the trial court's decision contained no finding supporting the conclusion that they were liable.

• Insufficiency of Trial Court's Findings: Petitioners argued that nowhere in the trial court's 43-page decision was there any finding that would remotely support the conclusion that they were liable for the injuries suffered by respondent Lugue, and that the appellate court thus erred in holding them liable based on the facts adduced by the trial court.

• Negligence of Minibus Driver: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioners Amador Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales liable for damages based on the findings of fact adduced by the trial court, specifically whether the appellate court's conclusion that minibus driver Romeo Gonzales was negligent was warranted by the evidence on record.

• Negligence of Minibus Driver: Yes, the Court of Appeals erred. The petition was granted and the CA decision was reversed as to petitioners, the trial court's own findings having established that the proximate cause was the collision between the KC-20 and the tanker truck, and Gonzales having had no opportunity to avoid impact after the peril was discovered.

• Negligence of Minibus Driver: The trial court's own findings established that the proximate cause of the accident was the collision between the KC-20 and the tanker truck, specifically the reckless imprudence of KC-20 driver Jimmy Basilio, who failed to slacken his speed or swerve despite seeing the tanker truck 25 to 35 meters away. The testimonies of Remigio Gervacio, Romeo Gonzales, and Patrocinio Carillo consistently showed that the minibus was attempting to overtake the KC-20 when the way was clear, and that the KC-20 was suddenly thrown into the minibus's path as a result of the tanker truck bumping it. Gonzales signaled to overtake because the way was clear, applied full brakes upon seeing the KC-20 thrown into his path, but could not avoid impact because the KC-20 was already too close. The minibus was already occupying the left portion of the road, a little beyond the center line, at the time of impact. The Court of Appeals' conclusion that Gonzales was reckless was unwarranted because it ignored the unchallenged testimonies showing he had no opportunity to avoid the collision. The last clear chance doctrine cannot apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously and the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered. Gonzales could not be deemed negligent for failing to prevent the collision after applying all means available to him within the few instants when he discovered the impending peril.

• Proximate Legal Cause — That acting first and producing the injury either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. The Court applied this doctrine as defined in Bataclan vs. Medina to determine that the proximate cause of the accident was the initial collision between the KC-20 and the tanker truck, not the subsequent impact by the minibus.

• Last Clear Chance Doctrine — Limitation — The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered. The Court relied on this limitation, as articulated in Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Baesa (citing Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District), to absolve Gonzales, who had only a few seconds before collision and no real opportunity to avoid it despite applying full brakes.

• Reckless Imprudence (Article 365, Revised Penal Code) — Consists in the doing or failing to do an act, voluntarily, but without malice, from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. The trial court applied this definition to find KC-20 driver Basilio negligent for failing to slacken speed or swerve despite seeing the tanker truck at a distance of 25 to 35 meters.

• "Petitioner Gonzales cannot be deemed negligent for failing to prevent the collision even after applying all means available to him within the few instants when he had discovered the impending peril." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: a driver who applies all available means upon discovering peril but has no opportunity to avoid collision cannot be held negligent.

• "the last clear chance doctrine 'can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have be discovered.'" — This is the canonical formulation of the limitation on the last clear chance doctrine, cited from Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Baesa, which in turn cited Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District.

• "proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted" — This defines proximate legal cause as applied by the trial court, citing Bataclan vs. Medina, and was central to the Court's determination that the initial KC-20–tanker collision, not the minibus impact, was the proximate cause.

• Bataclan vs. Medina, 102 Phil. 186 (1957) — Cited by the trial court for the definition of proximate legal cause; the Supreme Court relied on this definition to identify the initial collision between the KC-20 and the tanker truck as the proximate cause of the injuries.

• Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Baesa, G.R. Nos. 79050-51, 14 November 1989, 179 SCRA 384 — Cited for the principle that the last clear chance doctrine cannot apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously and the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is discovered; this was the controlling authority for absolving Gonzales.

• Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 397 (1958) — Cited within Pantranco as the source of the last clear chance doctrine limitation; followed by the Court in support of its ruling.

• Article 365, Revised Penal Code — Defines reckless imprudence as the doing or failing to do an act, voluntarily, but without malice, from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution. The trial court applied this provision to find KC-20 driver Basilio reckless in failing to slacken speed or swerve.

• Articles 2176 to 2194, Civil Code — Govern quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The trial court held the tanker truck driver and owner liable under these provisions for gross negligence constituting the proximate cause of the accident.

• Articles 1733 to 1766, Civil Code — Govern the liability of employers for damages caused by their employees. The trial court held the minibus and tanker truck owners liable under these provisions for failing to prove observance of the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

Reynato S. Puno (Chairman), Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Dante O. Tinga concurred.