AI-generated
1

Corpuz vs. Jimenez

The appeal was dismissed, without costs. Fernando Corpuz appealed from the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying his petition for relief from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Quezon City in an ejectment case filed by J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc. After judgment had become final and a writ of execution had issued, Corpuz sought to lift the writ and later filed a petition for certiorari or relief from judgment, which the Court of First Instance denied. While the appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals, J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc. moved to dismiss on the ground that Corpuz had voluntarily vacated the premises by removing his house and other constructions, rendering the issues moot and academic. Corpuz failed to answer the motion, and the Supreme Court treated that failure as implied acquiescence and dismissed the appeal.

Primary Holding

An appellant’s failure to answer a motion to dismiss the appeal, after being required to do so, is treated as implied acquiescence to the motion and warrants dismissal of the appeal. Here, appellee moved to dismiss on the ground that appellant had voluntarily vacated the premises and rendered the issues moot and academic; appellant filed no answer, and the appeal was dismissed without costs.

Background

Fernando Corpuz and J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc. were the opposing parties in a dispute over possession of a portion of land at Barrio North Tatalon, Quezon City, on which Corpuz had constructed a house. J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc. claimed the land as its own.

History

  1. May 1958 — J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc. filed an ejectment complaint against Fernando Corpuz with the Municipal Court of Quezon City, Civil Case No. 4689, alleging illegal entry on December 1, 1957 into a portion of its land at Barrio North Tatalon, Quezon City and construction of a house thereon.

  2. July 10, 1959 — The Municipal Court of Quezon City, in open court and in the presence of the parties and their respective counsel, set the case for trial on August 11, 1959.

  3. August 11, 1959 — Appellant and his counsel failed to appear; the Municipal Court proceeded to hear appellee’s evidence and rendered judgment ordering appellant to vacate the premises and to pay reasonable rents therefor until the same is vacated.

  4. October 21, 1959 — After the judgment became final, the Municipal Court, upon motion of appellee, issued the corresponding writ of execution.

  5. November 9, 1959 — Appellant filed a motion to lift the writ of execution on the ground that appellee’s filing on April 24, 1959 of another complaint against him for recovery of possession of the same parcel of land with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Civil Case No. Q-4341, constituted an implied waiver or abandonment of the first case.

  6. December 9, 1959 — The Municipal Court denied appellant’s motion to lift the writ of execution; appellee thereafter moved for a special order of demolition.

  7. January 15, 1960 — Appellant filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Civil Action No. Q-4916, entitled “A Writ of Certiorari or Relief from Judgment with Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction,” to annul the Municipal Court’s decision in Civil Case No. 4689 and its December 9, 1959 order denying his motion to lift the writ of execution.

  8. March 22, 1960 — The Court of First Instance of Rizal issued the appealed order denying the petition for relief.

  9. The appeal was originally filed in the Court of Appeals; appellee moved to dismiss on the ground that appellant had voluntarily vacated the premises by removing his house and other constructions, rendering the issues moot and academic.

  10. The Court of Appeals required appellant to answer the motion, but appellant filed no answer; the court resolved to take up the motion when the appeal was decided on the merits, and the case was thereafter certified to the Supreme Court.

  11. September 29, 1967 — The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without costs, treating appellant’s failure to answer the motion as implied acquiescence.

Facts

Fernando Corpuz occupied a portion of land at Barrio North Tatalon, Quezon City, belonging to J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., and constructed his house thereon. In May 1958, J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc. filed with the Municipal Court of Quezon City a complaint for ejectment against Corpuz, docketed as Civil Case No. 4689, alleging that on December 1, 1957, he illegally entered the land and built his house. After several postponements, on July 10, 1959, the municipal court, in open court and in the presence of the parties and their respective counsel, set the case for trial on August 11, 1959.

Corpuz and his counsel failed to appear on August 11, 1959. The municipal court proceeded to hear the evidence of J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc. and rendered judgment ordering Corpuz to vacate the premises and to pay reasonable rents therefor until the same was vacated. The judgment became final, and on October 21, 1959, upon motion of J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., the court issued the corresponding writ of execution.

On November 9, 1959, Corpuz filed a motion to lift the writ of execution, asserting that the filing on April 24, 1959 by J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc. of another complaint against him for recovery of possession of the same parcel of land with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Civil Case No. Q-4341, constituted an implied waiver or abandonment of the first case. J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc. objected, alleging that the land subject matter of Civil Case No. Q-4341 was different from that of the case decided by the inferior court. The municipal court denied Corpuz’s motion on December 9, 1959, and J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc. moved for a special order of demolition.

Before the court could act on the demolition motion, Corpuz filed on January 15, 1960 a petition in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Civil Action No. Q-4916, entitled “A Writ of Certiorari or Relief from Judgment with Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction,” to annul the municipal court’s decision in Civil Case No. 4689 and its December 9, 1959 order denying his motion to lift the writ of execution. On March 22, 1960, the Court of First Instance issued the appealed order. On appeal, originally filed with the Court of Appeals, J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc. moved to dismiss on the ground that Corpuz had voluntarily vacated the premises by removing his house and other constructions, rendering the issues moot and academic. The Court of Appeals required Corpuz to answer the motion, but he filed no answer, and the court resolved to take up the motion when the appeal was decided on the merits. The case was thereafter certified to the Supreme Court.

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • Implied Waiver or Abandonment: Appellant argued that the filing by appellee of another complaint for recovery of possession of the same parcel of land constituted an implied waiver or abandonment of the first ejectment case, and on that basis moved to lift the writ of execution.
  • Annulment of Ejectment Judgment: Appellant sought a writ of certiorari or relief from judgment with preliminary and mandatory injunction to annul the Municipal Court’s decision and its order denying his motion to lift the writ of execution.

Arguments of the Respondents

  • Different Land Subject Matter: Appellee objected to appellant’s motion to lift the writ, alleging that the land subject matter of Civil Case No. Q-4341 was different from that of the case decided by the inferior court.
  • Moot and Academic: Appellee moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that appellant had voluntarily vacated the premises subject matter thereof by removing his house and other constructions, rendering the issues raised in the appeal moot and academic.

Issues

  • Dismissal for Failure to Answer Motion to Dismiss: Whether the appeal should be dismissed where appellee moved to dismiss on the ground that appellant had voluntarily vacated the premises and rendered the issues moot and academic, and appellant failed to answer the motion.

Ruling

  • Dismissal for Failure to Answer Motion to Dismiss: Yes. Appellant’s failure to answer the motion was taken as implied acquiescence; the appeal was dismissed without costs.

Ruling Rationale

  • Dismissal for Failure to Answer Motion to Dismiss: Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the appeal in the Court of Appeals on the ground that appellant had voluntarily vacated the premises by removing his house and other constructions, rendering the issues moot and academic. The Court of Appeals required appellant to answer the motion, but appellant filed no answer; the court resolved to take up the motion when the appeal was decided on the merits, and the case was certified to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court treated appellant’s failure to answer as implied acquiescence to the motion. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, without costs.

Doctrines

  • Implied Acquiescence to a Motion to Dismiss — Failure to answer a motion to dismiss an appeal, after the appellate court requires an answer, may be taken as implied acquiescence to the motion. In this case, appellee moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that appellant had voluntarily vacated the premises and rendered the issues moot and academic; appellant filed no answer, and the Supreme Court treated that silence as acquiescence and dismissed the appeal without costs.

Key Excerpts

  • "In the Court of Appeals — where the appeal had been originally filed — appellee filed a motion for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that appellant had voluntarily vacated the premises subject matter thereof by removing his house and other constructions therefrom and that, therefore, the issues raised in the present appeal had become moot and academic." — This states the ground of the motion to dismiss that the Court treated as unopposed.
  • "The Court of Appeals required appellant to answer the motion, but as the latter filed no such answer, the court resolved to take up the motion when the appeal is decided on the merits." — This establishes that appellant was given the opportunity to answer and failed to do so.
  • "We take appellant's failure to answer the motion mentioned in the preceding paragraph as an implied acquiescence thereto." — This is the ratio decidendi: failure to answer is implied acquiescence.
  • "WHEREFORE, the appeal is dismissed, without costs." — This is the dispositive portion.

Notable Concurring Opinions

Concepcion, C.J.; Reyes, J.B.L.; Makalintal; Zaldivar; Sanchez; Castro; Angeles; and Fernando, JJ., concurred. Bengzon, J.P., J., was on leave.