Corpus, Jr. vs. Pamular

An amendment to an information adding a new accused and alleging conspiracy is merely formal and permissible after arraignment provided it does not alter the prosecution's theory or require the accused to adopt a new defense incompatible with his original plea, but the trial court may proceed with the issuance of a warrant of arrest despite a pending petition for review before the Department of Justice, as the 60-day suspension under Rule 116, Section 11(c) applies only to arraignment, not to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

On June 4, 2008, Carlito Samonte shot and killed Angelito Espinosa with an unlicensed firearm at Corpuz Street, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. Samonte was arrested in flagrante delicto and charged with murder. Upon arraignment, he admitted the killing but interposed self-defense. During the pendency of the trial, witness Alexander Lozano executed an affidavit implicating Mayor Amado Corpus, Jr. as the person who instructed Samonte to kill the victim. The prosecution subsequently moved to amend the information to include Corpus as a co-accused and to allege conspiracy between the two.

The Shooting and Initial Prosecution On June 4, 2008, at approximately 10:30 a.m. on Corpuz Street, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, Carlito Samonte shot Angelito Espinosa with an unlicensed Colt .45 caliber pistol, inflicting fatal gunshot wounds. Samonte was apprehended in flagrante delicto immediately thereafter. On June 5, 2008, an Information for murder was filed against him before the RTC, Branch 33, Guimba, Nueva Ecija. Upon arraignment, Samonte admitted the killing but interposed the defense of self-defense, and trial on the merits ensued.

The Alleged Conspiracy and Motion to Amend Following the presentation of the prosecution's second witness, Priscilla Espinosa, the victim's widow, filed a Reply-Affidavit dated September 8, 2008, together with supporting affidavits from witnesses including Vice Mayor John Diego and Alexander Lozano. Lozano's supplemental affidavit dated June 30, 2008, stated that on the morning of the shooting, he saw Samonte whispering to Mayor Amado Corpus, Jr. outside the latter's office, after which Corpus allegedly handed Samonte a firearm and stated, "Putang inang Lito yan! Sige! Birahin mo!" Based on these affidavits, Provincial Prosecutor Floro Florendo conducted a reinvestigation and issued a Resolution on January 26, 2009, finding probable cause to indict Corpus for murder and directing the filing of an amended information naming both Samonte and Corpus as co-accused.

The Amended Information and Assailed Order The amended information inserted the phrase "conspiring and confederating together" and named Corpus as a co-accused, alleging that both accused, acting in concert, willfully and feloniously attacked and shot the victim. Despite opposition from petitioners and the pendency of a Petition for Review before the DOJ, Judge Ramon Pamular issued an Order dated February 26, 2009, granting the motion to amend, admitting the amended information, and directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Corpus. The Order denied petitioners' motion to defer or suspend arraignment and further proceedings.

Procedural Antecedents Petitioners filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ on February 9, 2009. On June 26, 2009, the DOJ dismissed the petition and directed the filing of the appropriate information against Corpus. However, on September 8, 2009, the DOJ granted the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, reversed its June 26, 2009 Resolution, and directed the Provincial Prosecutor to withdraw the information against Corpus. Meanwhile, on October 30, 2013, Samonte executed an affidavit before the Public Attorney's Office stating that Corpus had ordered him to kill Espinosa and that the plan had been long in the making.

• Prematurity of Proceedings During DOJ Review: Petitioners argued that Judge Pamular committed grave abuse of discretion in proceeding with the amended information and issuing the warrant of arrest despite the pendency of their Petition for Review before the DOJ, citing Ledesma v. Court of Appeals and Tolentino v. Bonifacio for the proposition that trial courts should defer proceedings until the DOJ resolves the review.
• Substantial Amendment After Arraignment: They maintained that the addition of Corpus as a co-accused and the insertion of the allegation of conspiracy constituted a substantial amendment prohibited under Rule 110, Section 14 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as it would prejudice Samonte who had already been arraigned and pleaded self-defense.
• Prejudice to the Accused's Rights: Petitioners contended that the amendment would require Samonte to abandon his defense of self-defense and instead defend against the collective acts of co-conspirators under the theory that "the act of one is the act of all," citing People v. Montenegro and People v. Zulueta.
• Lack of Personal Determination of Probable Cause: They claimed that Judge Pamular failed to comply with the constitutional mandate of personally determining probable cause, asserting that the assailed Order contained only bare legal conclusions without a factual examination of the complainant and witnesses under oath.

• Propriety of Formal Amendment: Respondent Priscilla Espinosa and the Office of the Solicitor General countered that the amendment was merely formal as it did not alter the prosecution's theory that Samonte willfully and intentionally shot the victim, and conspiracy is not an essential or qualifying element of murder that would change the nature of the offense.
• Jurisdiction of the Trial Court: They argued that once the information was filed in court, jurisdiction vested in the RTC, which was not bound by the pendency of the DOJ review to proceed with the issuance of a warrant and further proceedings, citing Crespo v. Mogul and De Lima v. Reyes.
• Scope of Suspension Under Rule 116: The OSG asserted that Rule 116, Section 11(c) provides only for a maximum 60-day suspension of arraignment, which had already lapsed, and does not apply to the issuance of warrants of arrest necessary to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
• Satisfaction of Personal Determination Requirement: Judge Pamular maintained that he satisfied the constitutional requirement by conducting a careful perusal of the records and supporting documents, and by holding a hearing on February 13, 2009, wherein the parties were given the opportunity to argue.

• Propriety of Proceeding Despite Pending DOJ Review: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in conducting further proceedings and issuing the warrant of arrest despite the pendency of a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice.
• Suspension of Arraignment Under Rule 116: Whether the arraignment of Corpus may proceed after the lapse of the 60-day suspension period provided under Rule 116, Section 11(c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
• Nature of the Amendment: Whether the amendment adding Corpus and alleging conspiracy constituted a substantial amendment prejudicial to Samonte's rights after his arraignment.
• Personal Determination of Probable Cause: Whether Judge Pamular personally determined the existence of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against Corpus as required by Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.

• Procedural Requirement of Motion for Reconsideration: The failure to file a motion for reconsideration with the RTC before filing the Petition for Certiorari is generally fatal, as it is a condition sine qua non under Rule 65, Section 1; however, exceptions apply where the issue involves pure questions of law or public interest.
• Jurisdiction Upon Filing of Information: Once a complaint or information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case, and any disposition rests in its sound discretion. The filing of a petition for review before the DOJ does not divest the court of jurisdiction, though it may suspend arraignment for a maximum of 60 days under Rule 116, Section 11(c).
• Scope of Suspension Under Rule 116: The 60-day suspension applies only to arraignment, not to the issuance of a warrant of arrest necessary to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused. After the lapse of the 60-day period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or deny the motion to defer.
• Formal vs. Substantial Amendment: An amendment alleging conspiracy is merely formal if it does not alter the prosecution's basic theory that the accused willfully committed the crime. However, under Rule 110, Section 14, after an accused enters a plea, only formal amendments not prejudicial to the rights of the accused are permitted. Applying the test in People v. Casey—whether a defense under the original information remains available and whether evidence would remain applicable—the addition of conspiracy after Samonte pleaded self-defense is prejudicial because it requires him to adopt a new defense regarding the acts of co-conspirators.
• Personal Determination of Probable Cause: The constitutional requirement that probable cause be determined personally by the judge does not require the judge to personally examine the complainant and witnesses; the judge may rely on the prosecutor's report and supporting documents, provided he satisfies himself that based on the evidence presented, a crime has been committed and the person to be arrested is probably guilty. Judge Pamular satisfied this requirement by personally evaluating the resolution and supporting evidence and conducting a hearing on February 13, 2009.

• Test for Prejudicial Amendment — An amendment to an information after plea is merely formal if: (1) it relates only to the range of penalty; (2) it does not charge another offense distinct from the original; (3) it does not alter the prosecution's theory so as to cause surprise or affect the form of defense; and (4) it does not adversely affect any substantial right. The test of prejudice is whether a defense under the original information would still be available after the amendment and whether any evidence the accused might have would remain applicable.
• Conspiracy as Formal Amendment — The allegation of conspiracy is merely formal if it does not change the prosecution's basic theory of the case. However, if the accused has already been arraigned, the amendment is prejudicial if it requires the accused to abandon his original defense and adopt a new one to meet the collective responsibility of co-conspirators.
• Jurisdiction Upon Filing of Information — Once a complaint or information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. The filing of a petition for review before the DOJ does not divest the court of jurisdiction, though it may suspend arraignment for a maximum of 60 days under Rule 116, Section 11(c).
• Personal Determination of Probable Cause — The Constitution requires the judge to personally determine probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest, but the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and witnesses. The judge may rely on the prosecutor's report and supporting documents, provided he satisfies himself that based on the evidence submitted, a crime has been committed and the person to be arrested is probably guilty.

• "An allegation of conspiracy to add a new accused without changing the prosecution's theory that the accused willfully shot the victim is merely a formal amendment."
• "The test of whether an accused is prejudiced by an amendment is to determine whether a defense under the original information will still be available even after the amendment is made and if any evidence that an accused might have would remain applicable even in the amended information."
• "Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution by the secretary of justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss the case."
• "The judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge."

• People v. Casey, 190 Phil. 748 (1981) — Established the test for determining whether an amendment prejudices the accused: whether a defense under the original information remains available after amendment and whether evidence would remain applicable.
• People v. Court of Appeals, 206 Phil. 637 (1983) — Held that an allegation of conspiracy which does not change the prosecution's theory that the accused willfully shot the victim is merely a formal amendment.
• People v. Montenegro, 242 Phil. 655 (1988) — Distinguished as inapplicable where the amendment changed the nature of the crime or exposed the accused to a higher penalty; cited for the proposition that conspiracy can be substantial if it alters the defense required.
• Crespo v. Mogul, 235 Phil. 465 (1987) — Established that once an information is filed in court, jurisdiction vests in the court, and any disposition rests in its sound discretion, though the fiscal retains direction and control of prosecution.
• Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 344 Phil. 207 (1997) — Distinguished as involving suspension of arraignment rather than warrant issuance; held that trial courts should defer arraignment pending DOJ review but are not bound by the resolution.
• Soliven v. Makasiar, 249 Phil. 394 (1988) — Clarified that the judge need not personally examine witnesses but must personally determine probable cause based on the prosecutor's report and supporting documents.

• Article III, Section 2, 1987 Constitution — Requires that no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and witnesses.
• Rule 65, Section 1, Revised Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs petitions for certiorari and requires that there be no appeal or plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non.
• Rule 110, Section 14, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Allows amendment of information before plea without leave of court; after plea, only formal amendments without prejudice to the accused's rights are permitted with leave of court.
• Rule 112, Section 6, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Requires the judge to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence within ten days from filing; if probable cause exists, the judge shall issue a warrant.
• Rule 116, Section 11(c), Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides for suspension of arraignment for a maximum of sixty days when a petition for review is pending before the DOJ.

Peralta (Chairperson), A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, and J. Reyes, Jr.