Corpus B. Alzate vs. Hon. Raphiel F. Alzate

A judge’s disqualification is compulsory, not discretionary, where his or her spouse has actively participated as counsel in the case; failure to inhibit constitutes gross ignorance of the law or procedure, and the spouse’s later withdrawal does not excuse the judge.

Respondent Judge Raphiel F. Alzate presided over Branch 58, Regional Trial Court, Bucay, Abra, which complainant alleged was known among lawyers in Abra and nearby provinces as the “Annulment Capital of the North” because annulment cases were filed there despite the parties’ non-residence. Respondent’s wife, Atty. Maria Saniata Liwliwa Gonzales-Alzate, was a lawyer who allegedly dealt with parties in annulment cases and assigned them to other counsel. The administrative complaint implicated Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court and the New Code of Judicial Conduct on disqualification, impartiality, and propriety. Respondent had prior administrative cases, including Sindon vs. Alzate and In re Alzate.

Complainant Judge Corpus Alzate alleged that RTC-Branch 58, presided by respondent Judge Raphiel F. Alzate, was notoriously known to practicing lawyers in Abra and nearby provinces as the “Annulment Capital of the North.” Trial lawyers allegedly filed annulment cases in Bucay, Abra even if the parties were not residents thereof, because respondent allegedly disregarded the residency requirement. Complainant further alleged that respondent and his wife, Atty. Maria Saniata Liwliwa Gonzales-Alzate, earned a reputation as a “conjugal syndicate” for offering “package deals” to married couples seeking annulment within a brief period. According to complainant, Atty. Gonzales-Alzate initially dealt with the parties and later assigned their case to a lawyer; respondent would then decide in their favor. The assigned lawyers often had no idea about the cases and did not participate, but could not complain out of fear of jeopardizing their other cases before respondent.

In one instance, a lawyer allegedly turned down an assignment; Atty. Gonzales-Alzate appointed another lawyer, a lady lawyer from Ilocos Norte who had no idea who her clients were and only lent her name and signed pleadings prepared by the “conjugal syndicate.” Another accommodating lawyer, Atty. Byrone B. Alzate, agreed to handle a case assigned by Atty. Gonzales-Alzate; he said he was never notified of scheduled hearings and his office was simply furnished a copy of respondent’s decisions, and he claimed he did not receive any share in the “success fee.”

Complainant cited two cases: Villanueva vs. Villanueva, Civil Case No. 13-764, and Bermudez vs. Bermudez, Civil Case No. 14-804. In Villanueva, the counsel on record was Atty. Gonzales-Alzate. The case was filed when Judge Jaime L. Dojillo, Jr. was still presiding judge of RTC-Branch 58. To establish jurisdiction, Atty. Gonzales-Alzate made it appear that petitioner Paquito Villanueva, Jr. was a resident of North Poblacion, Bucay, Abra; however, Villanueva actually resided in Zone 2, Bangued, Abra, and had been respondent’s best friend since childhood. Complainant knew this because when respondent was still complainant’s clerk of court, respondent requested complainant to recommend Villanueva for the position of accountant in an electric cooperative; Villanueva’s house was only about 20 meters from respondent’s family house. When respondent was designated acting presiding judge of RTC-Branch 58, his wife withdrew as counsel on November 4, 2013. However, the Minutes of the March 2014 hearing showed that Atty. Gonzales-Alzate still appeared as Villanueva’s counsel. Complainant claimed this was a gross violation of Rule 137 because her previous appearances influenced respondent’s decision.

In Bermudez, the counsel on record was Atty. Byrone B. Alzate, who allegedly signed the petition only to accommodate Atty. Gonzales-Alzate’s request and to receive appearance fees. The petition was granted without him presenting any witness or any hearing being scheduled.

Respondent denied the accusations. He stated that the Villanueva petition was filed on June 24, 2013, when Judge Dojillo was still presiding; respondent became acting presiding judge on September 2, 2013. His wife withdrew her appearance after he took over, and the November 7, 2013 hearing was solely for granting her withdrawal; she never appeared again. He claimed Villanueva was a resident of North Poblacion, Bucay, Abra, residing in the house of his relative Winifredo Villanueva since May 2012, supported by Winifredo’s affidavit and a certification from Barangay Captain Amado Acosta that Villanueva had not resided in Barangay Zone 2, Bangued, Abra from May 2012 to May 2016. He denied personal knowledge of the alleged relationship with Villanueva and denied requesting complainant to recommend him.

As to Bermudez, respondent maintained there were no irregularities; petitioner Nathaniel Bermudez was a resident of South Poblacion, Bucay, Abra even before filing. He submitted the First Alzate Affidavit, in which Atty. Alzate denied speaking to complainant about any irregularity but admitted being Bermudez’s counsel and claimed he was notified of and attended all hearings. Bermudez’s affidavit stated he had been staying at a relative’s house in South Poblacion since 2013; Barangay Captain Darroll Azdi Bernandez Gonzales confirmed his residence, and a certification from Barangay Captain Correa P. Seares stated Bermudez was no longer a resident of Zone IV, Bangued, Abra from 2013 to 2016. In reply, complainant attached a photographed copy of the March 2014 Minutes in Villanueva bearing Atty. Gonzales-Alzate’s name and a Second Alzate Affidavit denying the First Alzate Affidavit and insisting he was never notified of or attended any hearing in Bermudez. In rejoinder, respondent said the Minutes merely contained the written name “Gonzales-Alzate” and the incident was reset; his wife’s name was inadvertently written by a staff member, as certified by Court Interpreter III Rigoberto R. Barbero. He also maintained that Atty. Alzate voluntarily executed the First Alzate Affidavit, submitting another original copy and an affidavit from Cesar Pacursa Banayos stating that Atty. Alzate instructed him to give two copies to respondent. Complainant reiterated his prayer in his sur-rejoinder.

The investigating justice found the evidence on the alleged rigging insufficient, noting that Villanueva was filed before respondent was assigned to RTC-Branch 58 and that the continued appearance of Atty. Gonzales-Alzate was inconclusive because a court staff member explained the Minutes as inadvertence. The JIB likewise found no substantial evidence of package deals or corruption.

• Gross Misconduct and Dishonesty: Complainant alleged that respondent and his wife operated as a “conjugal syndicate” that offered “package deals” to couples seeking annulment, with Atty. Gonzales-Alzate dealing with parties and assigning cases to lawyers who did not participate, while respondent decided in their favor.
• Disregard of Residency Requirement: Complainant maintained that RTC-Branch 58 was known as the “Annulment Capital of the North” because respondent accepted annulment cases even when the parties were not residents of Bucay, Abra, as in Villanueva and Bermudez.
• Failure to Inhibit: Complainant argued that in Villanueva, Atty. Gonzales-Alzate was counsel on record, prepared the petition, and presented evidence; despite her withdrawal, she appeared in the March 2014 Minutes, and respondent should have inhibited himself as a matter of delicadeza and under Rule 137.
• Bermudez Irregularity: Complainant alleged that Atty. Byrone B. Alzate only lent his name, was never notified of hearings, and did not participate, yet the petition was granted without any hearing or witness.
• Disbarment: Complainant prayed that the administrative case also be considered a disciplinary proceeding against respondent as a member of the Bar for purposes of disbarment.

• No Irregularity in Villanueva: Respondent denied the accusations and maintained that the Villanueva petition was filed on June 24, 2013, before he became acting presiding judge on September 2, 2013; his wife withdrew as counsel on November 4, 2013, and the November 7, 2013 hearing was solely for that withdrawal.
• Residency of Villanueva: Respondent claimed Villanueva was a resident of North Poblacion, Bucay, Abra, residing with his relative Winifredo Villanueva since May 2012, as supported by affidavits and barangay certifications.
• No Personal Knowledge: Respondent denied having personal knowledge of the alleged relationship with Villanueva and denied requesting complainant to recommend Villanueva for a position in an electric cooperative.
• No Irregularity in Bermudez: Respondent maintained that Bermudez was a resident of South Poblacion, Bucay, Abra, and that Atty. Alzate was counsel, was notified of and attended all hearings, as stated in the First Alzate Affidavit.
• Inadvertence in Minutes: Respondent explained that the March 2014 Minutes bearing his wife’s name was due to an inadvertent act of a court staff member, as certified by Court Interpreter III Rigoberto R. Barbero, and that the incident was reset.
• Non-Inhibition Justified: Respondent asserted that he did not inhibit because he believed he was acting in accordance with law and the Rules of Court as Acting Presiding Judge, especially after his wife withdrew and after the OSG and prosecutor complied with requirements.

• Gross Misconduct and Dishonesty: Whether respondent is administratively liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty in deciding Villanueva vs. Villanueva and Bermudez vs. Bermudez and in allegedly engaging in corrupt activities in annulment cases.
• Compulsory Disqualification: Whether respondent’s failure to inhibit from Villanueva, where his wife had been counsel and had prepared the petition and presented evidence, violated Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court and the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
• Proper Offense and Penalty: Whether the failure to inhibit constitutes simple misconduct or gross ignorance of the law or procedure, and what penalty is proper considering respondent’s prior administrative liabilities and dismissal from service.
• Disbarment: Whether the administrative case should also be treated as a disciplinary proceeding against respondent as a member of the Bar for purposes of disbarment.

• Gross Misconduct and Dishonesty: No. Complainant failed to prove by substantial evidence that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, or corruption; mere allegations, conjectures, and suppositions cannot sustain an administrative complaint.
• Compulsory Disqualification: Yes. Respondent was duty-bound to inhibit from Villanueva because his wife had actively participated as counsel; the disqualification was compulsory under Rule 137, Section 1 and the New Code of Judicial Conduct, and her withdrawal did not excuse the failure.
• Proper Offense and Penalty: Gross ignorance of the law or procedure. Under Rule 140, it is a serious charge punishable by a fine of more than PHP 100,000.00 but not exceeding PHP 200,000.00; considering prior liabilities and dismissal, a PHP 200,000.00 fine was imposed.
• Disbarment: No. The offense does not affect respondent’s qualification as a lawyer, so penalizing him as a member of the bench was sufficient; nonetheless, the JIB was directed to report on his fitness to remain a Member of the Bar.

• Gross Misconduct and Dishonesty: In administrative proceedings, the complainant bears the burden of proving the allegations by substantial evidence, which is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Reliance on mere allegations, conjectures, and suppositions leaves an administrative complaint without basis. Gross misconduct is a serious transgression of an established rule, such as unlawful behavior or gross negligence tending to threaten the administration of justice, and may manifest in corruption or similar acts done with clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of rules; dishonesty is a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud. The JIB found no substantial evidence that respondent and his wife negotiated “package deals” or that respondent was involved in corrupt activities in annulment cases. The residency allegations were disputed by affidavits and certifications, and the claim that Atty. Alzate did not participate in Bermudez did not support corruption. The audit case found respondent guilty of gross neglect of duty for proceeding without pre-trial and without awaiting collusion reports, but that did not establish gross misconduct or dishonesty in this case. Thus, the charges of gross misconduct and dishonesty failed.
• Compulsory Disqualification: Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that no judge shall sit in a case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, without the written consent of all parties. Canon III, Sections 5(f) and (g) and Canon IV, Section 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct likewise require judges to disqualify themselves where they are related to counsel or a party, where their spouse has a financial or other interest in the subject matter, or where a family member represents a litigant or is associated with the case. Respondent did not deny that his wife filed the petition in Villanueva; Justice Santos noted that Atty. Gonzales-Alzate prepared the petition and presented the evidence in chief for petitioner. Although she withdrew as counsel on November 4, 2013, her prior active participation remained, and respondent’s failure to inhibit created a perception that the case was decided in his wife’s favor. Inhibition was not discretionary but compulsory; there was no excuse for respondent’s failure to inhibit. A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear impartial, and public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by improper conduct. Thus, respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law or procedure, not merely simple misconduct.
• Proper Offense and Penalty: Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge. The sanctions for a serious charge include dismissal from service, suspension from office without salary and benefits for more than six months but not exceeding one year, or a fine of more than PHP 100,000.00 but not exceeding PHP 200,000.00. Paderanga vs. Judge Paderanga held that disobeying the rule on compulsory self-disqualification renders a judge accountable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure. Respondent had previously been penalized in Sindon vs. Alzate for violating the rule on compulsory disqualification when he failed to inhibit in his wife’s application for notarial commission, for which he was reprimanded with a warning. In the Audit Case, he was found guilty of gross neglect of duty and suspended for five years, and he was subsequently dismissed from service for failing to comply with the Court’s directive in that case. This was the second time he was found guilty of violating compulsory disqualification and the third time he was held administratively liable. Because he had already been dismissed from service, the Court imposed a fine of PHP 200,000.00.
• Disbarment: The offense for which respondent was found guilty does not affect his qualification as a lawyer. It was therefore sufficient to penalize him as a member of the bench. However, the JIB was directed to prepare a comprehensive report and recommendation regarding his fitness to remain a Member of the Bar.

• Compulsory Disqualification of Judges — Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court and the New Code of Judicial Conduct require a judge to disqualify himself or herself in cases where the judge, spouse, or child has a pecuniary interest, where the judge is related to a party or counsel within the specified degrees, or where the judge’s spouse or child has a financial or other interest in the subject matter or a party, or where a family member represents a litigant or is associated with the case. The disqualification is compulsory, not discretionary. In this case, respondent’s wife had been counsel in Villanueva, prepared the petition, and presented evidence; her later withdrawal did not erase her prior participation or the appearance of partiality. Failure to inhibit therefore constituted gross ignorance of the law or procedure.
• Substantial Evidence in Administrative Proceedings — The complainant bears the burden of proving the allegations in an administrative complaint by substantial evidence, defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Mere allegations, conjectures, and suppositions are insufficient. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the charges of gross misconduct, dishonesty, and corruption because complainant presented no competent evidence beyond allegations.
• Gross Misconduct — Gross or grave misconduct is a serious transgression of an established and definite rule of action, such as unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer or employee, that tends to threaten the very existence of the system of administration of justice; it may manifest in corruption or similar acts done with clear intent to violate the law or in flagrant disregard of established rules. The Court found the evidence insufficient to establish this offense.
• Dishonesty — Dishonesty is a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive, or betray. The Court found no substantial evidence of dishonesty.
• Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure — Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Disobeying the basic rule on compulsory self-disqualification of judges renders a judge liable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure. The Court applied this to respondent’s failure to inhibit in Villanueva.
• Impartiality and Appearance of Impartiality — A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial. Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct, and judges must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. The Court relied on this principle in holding that respondent’s failure to inhibit created a perception of bias.
• Penalty for Serious Charges — Under Rule 140, Section 17, a serious charge may be punished by dismissal from service, suspension without salary and benefits for more than six months but not exceeding one year, or a fine of more than PHP 100,000.00 but not exceeding PHP 200,000.00. The Court imposed the maximum fine because of prior administrative liabilities and dismissal from service.

• “Respondent's inhibition in Villanueva is not merely discretionary; it is compulsory. There is no excuse for respondent's failure to inhibit in said case.” — This passage states the ratio decidendi on compulsory disqualification and explains why the failure to inhibit was not excused by the wife’s withdrawal.
• “The rules on the disqualification of judges, particularly compulsory self-disqualification, are basic legal guidelines that must be at the palm of every judge's hands. They are as basic as a rule of thumb. That the respondent disobeyed them should render him fully accountable for gross ignorance of the law or rule.” — Quoted from Paderanga vs. Judge Paderanga, this passage supplies the standard for classifying the failure to inhibit as gross ignorance of the law or procedure.
• “In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” — This passage defines the burden and quantum of proof that defeated the charges of gross misconduct and dishonesty.
• “A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial [. . .]. Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges.” — This passage articulates the impartiality and propriety standard applied to respondent’s non-inhibition.

• Zara vs. Joyas, 853 Phil. 21 (2019) — Held that in administrative proceedings the complainant bears the burden of proving the allegations by substantial evidence and that mere allegations, conjectures, and suppositions cannot sustain an administrative complaint; followed to dismiss the gross misconduct and dishonesty charges.
• Anonymous Complaint Against Judge Pintac, 886 Phil. 1 (2020) — Defined gross or grave misconduct as a serious transgression of an established rule that tends to threaten the administration of justice; cited in the Court’s analysis of the gross misconduct charge.
• Office of the Court Administrator vs. Indor, 685 Phil. 272 (2012) — Defined dishonesty as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; cited in the Court’s analysis of the dishonesty charge.
• Paderanga vs. Judge Paderanga, 766 Phil. 581 (2015) — Found a judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law or procedure for disobeying the rule on compulsory self-disqualification; followed and applied to respondent’s failure to inhibit.
• Re: Anonymous Complaint Against Judge Aldea-Arocena, 861 Phil. 143 (2019) — Held that a judge should not handle a case where there is a perception of bias or partiality because of relationship or other ground, and emphasized impartiality and propriety; cited in support of the ruling on non-inhibition.
• Sindon vs. Alzate, 869 Phil. 632 (2020) — Showed respondent had previously been penalized for violating the rule on compulsory disqualification for failing to inhibit in his wife’s application for notarial commission; cited as an aggravating circumstance.
• In re Alzate, 940 Phil. 505 (2023) — The Audit Case, where respondent was found guilty of gross neglect of duty for proceeding with nullity cases without pre-trial and without awaiting collusion reports; cited as a prior administrative liability.
• In re Alzate, 951 Phil. 380 (2024) — Noted respondent’s subsequent dismissal from service for failing to comply with the Court’s directive in the Audit Case; cited in determining the penalty.

• Rule 137, Section 1, Rules of Court — Provides for disqualification of judges, including compulsory disqualification where the judge or his wife or child is pecuniarily interested, or where the judge is related to a party or counsel within the specified degrees, without the written consent of all parties. Applied because respondent’s wife had been counsel in Villanueva and had actively participated before withdrawing.
• Canon III, Section 5, New Code of Judicial Conduct (A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC) — Requires judges to disqualify themselves from proceedings in which they cannot decide impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they cannot do so, including under subsections (f) and (g) where the judge is related to counsel or a party or where the judge’s spouse has an interest in the subject matter or a party. Applied to respondent’s failure to inhibit.
• Canon IV, Sections 1 and 4, New Code of Judicial Conduct — Section 1 requires judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety; Section 4 prohibits judges from participating in a case in which a family member represents a litigant or is associated with the case. Applied because respondent’s wife had represented the petitioner in Villanueva.
• Rule 140, Sections 14(j), 17(1), and 20, Rules of Court, as amended — Section 14(j) classifies gross ignorance of the law or procedure as a serious charge; Section 17(1) prescribes the sanctions for serious charges, including a fine of more than PHP 100,000.00 but not exceeding PHP 200,000.00; Section 20 governs manner of imposition. Applied in finding respondent guilty and imposing the PHP 200,000.00 fine.
• Rule 71, Section 3, Rules of Court — Governs contempt proceedings for disobeying a lawful order of the Court. Cited in the dispositive portion as the consequence of respondent’s failure to comply with payment and proof of compliance.

Gesmundo, C.J.; Leonen, SAJ; Caguioa; Hernando; Lazaro-Javier; Inting; Gaerlan; J. Lopez; Dimaampao; and Kho, Jr., JJ., concurred. No separate concurring opinions were noted.