Corliss vs. The Manila Railroad Co.

A railroad company is not liable for damages arising from a collision at a railroad crossing when the evidence shows it observed the degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances demanded, and the injury was caused by the deceased's own failure to stop his vehicle despite being sufficiently warned of the oncoming train. Negligence is a relative or comparative concept, not an absolute term, and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require.

The plaintiff-appellant, Preciolita V. Corliss, was the widow of Ralph W. Corliss Jr., an air police of the Clark Air Force Base. The defendant-appellee, the Manila Railroad Company, operated the railroad line that crossed a public road in front of the Clark Air Force Base. The action was predicated on Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which makes a person who by act or omission causes damage to another through negligence obliged to pay for the damage done.

In December 1956, Preciolita V. Corliss, then 19 years of age, married Ralph W. Corliss Jr., 21 years of age, who was an air police of the Clark Air Force Base. Close to midnight on the evening of February 21, 1957, Corliss Jr. was driving a jeep, together with a P.C. soldier, returning to the Base, when the jeep collided with a locomotive of the defendant-appellee Manila Railroad Company at the railroad crossing in Balibago, Angeles, Pampanga, in front of the Clark Air Force Base. Corliss Jr. died of serious burns at the Base Hospital the next day, while the soldier sustained serious physical injuries and burns.

According to the testimony of Ronald J. Ennis, a witness for the plaintiff, he was awaiting transportation at the entrance of Clark Field, about 40 to 50 yards away from the tracks, when he saw the jeep coming towards the Base. The jeep slowed down before reaching the crossing and made a brief stop, but it did not stop — dead stop. While it was slowing down, Corliss Jr. shifted into first gear, which was what the witness meant by a brief stop. Ennis could see the train coming from the direction of San Fernando and heard a warning, but it was not sufficient enough to avoid the accident. Another witness for the plaintiff, Virgilio de la Paz, testified that he was at the Balibago checkpoint and saw the train coming from Angeles and a jeep going towards the direction of Clark Field. He heard the whistle of the locomotive and saw the collision. The jeep, which caught fire, was pushed forward. He stated that he saw the jeep running fast and heard the tooting of the horn, and that it did not stop at the railroad crossing.

The main witness for the defendant-appellee, Teodorico Capili, who was at the engine at the time of the mishap, testified that before the locomotive, which had been previously inspected and found to be in good condition, approached the crossing, that is, about 300 meters away, he blew the siren and repeated it in compliance with the regulations until he saw the jeep suddenly spurt. Although the locomotive was running between 20 and 25 kilometers an hour and although he had applied the brakes, the jeep was caught in the middle of the tracks. The lower court concluded that Corliss Jr., who had undoubtedly crossed the checkpoint frequently, if not daily, must have known that locomotive engines and trains usually pass at that particular crossing. The lower court found that Corliss Jr. was so sufficiently warned in advance of the oncoming train that it was incumbent upon him to avoid a possible accident, which consisted simply in stopping his vehicle before the crossing and allowing the train to move on.

• Factual Errors (Whistle and Brakes): Plaintiff-appellant assigned as error the lower court's failure to appreciate the true situation, including the claim that the whistle was not sounded and the brakes not applied at a distance of 300 meters before reaching the crossing.
• Duty to Stop and Driver Qualification: Plaintiff-appellant argued that the lower court erred in not holding that the crossing bars not having been put down and there being no guard at the gate-house, there still was a duty on the part of Corliss to stop his jeep to avoid a collision, and that Teodorico Capili, who drove the engine, was not qualified to do so at the time of the accident.
• Reliance on Outdated Doctrines: Plaintiff-appellant alleged that the lower court relied on the rigid and inflexible doctrines in Mestres vs. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co. and United States vs. Manlabat & Pasibi, which require a person approaching a railroad crossing to stop, look, and listen, and that there has been a drift away from such doctrines as evidenced by Lilius vs. Manila Railroad Co.

N/A — The decision does not specifically recount the arguments presented by the respondent-appellee, the Manila Railroad Company, other than through the testimony of its witness, Teodorico Capili, and the lower court's findings which it presumably defended on appeal.

• Standard of Review for Factual Findings: Whether the lower court's finding as to the non-existence of negligence attributable to the defendant-appellee should be disturbed on appeal.
• Existence of Negligence: Whether the defendant-appellee Manila Railroad Company was guilty of negligence that would render it liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
• Applicability of the "Stop, Look, and Listen" Doctrine: Whether the lower court erred in relying on the doctrines in Mestres and Manlabat which require a person approaching a railroad crossing to stop, look, and listen, given the alleged drift away from such rigid rules.

• Standard of Review for Factual Findings: No. The lower court's finding is entitled to great respect and has in its favor the presumption of correctness, and the appellate function is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the result reached by the trial court.
• Existence of Negligence: No. The defendant-appellee was not negligent, as it observed the degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances demanded, and the deceased, who was sufficiently warned, failed to stop his vehicle before the crossing.
• Applicability of the "Stop, Look, and Listen" Doctrine: No. While there has been a drift away from the rigid and inflexible doctrine, each case on questions of negligence is to be decided in accordance with the peculiar circumstances that present themselves, and there can be no hard and fast rule.

• Standard of Review for Factual Findings: The lower court judgment has in its favor the presumption of correctness and is entitled to great respect, as the lower court had the opportunity of weighing carefully what was testified to. The appellate function is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the result reached by the trial court. The Court cited Medina vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, Jai-Alai Corporation vs. Ching Kiat, and Arrieta vs. National Rice & Corn Corp. for the principle that when the credibility of witnesses is at issue, the trial court's judgment as to their degree of credence deserves serious consideration, and in the absence of compelling reasons, its determination is best left to the trial judge who had the advantage of hearing the parties testify and observing their demeanor on the witness stand. The Court found no reason for rejecting the findings of the lower court.

• Existence of Negligence: The action is predicated on Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which makes a person who by act or omission causes damage to another, there being negligence, under obligation to pay for the damage done. The Court cited the definition of negligence from Cooley's work on Torts, quoted with approval in United States vs. Juanillo and United States vs. Barias: "The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstance justly demand whereby such other person suffers injury." The Court also cited Ahern vs. Oregon Telephone Co.: "Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances." Applying this test, no negligence could be imputed to the defendant-appellee. The facts compel the conclusion that the liability sought to be fastened on the defendant-appellee had not arisen. The Court found that it would go against the evidence to maintain the view that the whistle was not sounded and the brakes not applied at a distance of 300 meters before reaching the crossing. The Court also held that one cannot single out a circumstance and confidently assign to it decisive weight and significance, and that the decisive considerations are too variable and too dependent upon a common sense estimate of the situation for the Court to say that this or that element having been isolated, negligence is shown. The circumstances indicative of lack of due care must be judged in the light of what could reasonably be expected of the parties, and if the objective standard of prudence be met, then negligence is ruled out.

• Applicability of the "Stop, Look, and Listen" Doctrine: The Court acknowledged that there has been a drift away from the apparent rigid and inflexible doctrine set forth in Mestres and Manlabat, as evidenced by Lilius vs. Manila Railroad Co., the controlling facts of which, however, are easily distinguishable from the present case. The Court cited Prosser's discussion of the evolution of the doctrine in American jurisprudence, from Justice Holmes's attempt in Baltimore & Ohio Railway vs. Goodman to lay down a standard once for all requiring an automobile driver approaching a railroad crossing with an obstructed view to stop, look, and listen, to the later decision in Pakora vs. Wabash Railway where Justice Cardozo rejected the "get out of the car" requirement as "an uncommon precaution, likely to be futile and sometimes even dangerous," and said that the driver need not always stop. The Court emphasized that each and every case on questions of negligence is to be decided in accordance with the peculiar circumstances that present themselves, and there can be no hard and fast rule. There must be that observance of that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands. The Court agreed with the lower court's conclusion that, predicated on the testimonies of the plaintiff's witnesses, on the knowledge of the deceased and his familiarity with the setup of the checkpoint, the existence of the tracks, and on the further fact that the locomotive had blown its siren or whistle, which was heard by said witnesses, Corliss Jr. was so sufficiently warned in advance of the oncoming train that it was incumbent upon him to avoid a possible accident — and this consisted simply in stopping his vehicle before the crossing and allowing the train to move on. A prudent man under similar circumstances would have acted in this manner, which Corliss Jr. failed to do.

• Negligence — Negligence is defined as "the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstance justly demand whereby such other person suffers injury." It is "want of the care required by the circumstances," a relative or comparative, not an absolute term, and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. The Court applied this definition to find that the defendant-appellee was not negligent, as it had observed the required degree of care by blowing the siren and applying the brakes, while the deceased failed to stop his vehicle despite being sufficiently warned.

• Presumption of Correctness of Trial Court Findings — The lower court judgment has in its favor the presumption of correctness and is entitled to great respect, as the lower court had the opportunity of weighing carefully what was testified to. The appellate function is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the result reached by the trial court. The Court applied this doctrine in affirming the lower court's dismissal of the complaint, finding no substantial error in the lower court's factual conclusions.

• Case-by-Case Determination of Negligence — Each and every case on questions of negligence is to be decided in accordance with the peculiar circumstances that present themselves, and there can be no hard and fast rule. The decisive considerations are too variable and too dependent upon a common sense estimate of the situation for a court to say that this or that element having been isolated, negligence is shown. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting the plaintiff-appellant's attempt to single out individual circumstances, such as the crossing bars not being put down or the absence of a guard, as decisive of negligence.

• "The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstance justly demand whereby such other person suffers injury." — This is the definition of negligence quoted with approval from Cooley's work on Torts in the decisions of United States v. Juanillo and United States v. Barias, which the Court applied to determine whether the defendant-appellee was negligent.

• "Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances." — This formulation, cited from Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co., establishes the relative and contextual nature of negligence, which the Court used to rule that the defendant-appellee had met the required standard of care.

• "Predicated on the testimonies of the plaintiff's witnesses, on the knowledge of the deceased and his familiarity with the setup of the checkpoint, the existence of the tracks; and on the further fact that the locomotive had blown its siren or whistle, which was heard by said witnesses, it is clear that Corliss Jr. was so sufficiently warned in advance of the oncoming train that it was incumbent upon him to avoid a possible accident — and this consisted simply in stopping his vehicle before the crossing and allowing the train to move on. A prudent man under similar circumstances would have acted in this manner. This, unfortunately, Corliss, Jr. failed to do." — This is the lower court's conclusion, which the Supreme Court adopted, finding that the deceased was sufficiently warned and failed to act as a prudent man would have under the circumstances, thus ruling out negligence on the part of the defendant-appellee.

• Jai-Alai Corporation vs. Ching Kiat, L-7969, March 30, 1960 — Cited for the principle that in the absence of compelling reasons, the trial court's determination of credibility is best left to the trial judge who had the advantage of hearing the parties testify and observing their demeanor on the witness stand.
• Medina vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, L-15113, January 28, 1961 — Cited for the rule that when the credibility of witnesses is at issue, the trial court's judgment as to their degree of credence deserves serious consideration by the appellate court.
• Arrieta vs. National Rice & Corn Corp., L-15645, January 31, 1964 — Cited for the principle that the appellate court is denied the prerogative to disturb the trial court's findings on questions of fact when the conclusion is sufficiently borne out by the evidence presented.
• United States vs. Juanillo, 23 Phil. 212 (1912) — Cited for the definition of negligence from Cooley's work on Torts, which was quoted with approval.
• United States vs. Barias, 23 Phil. 434 (1912) — Cited for the same definition of negligence from Cooley's work on Torts.
• Ahern vs. Oregon Telephone Co., 35 Pac. 549 (1894) — Cited for the formulation that negligence is "want of the care required by the circumstances" and is a relative or comparative, not an absolute term.
• Mestres vs. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., 32 Phil. 496 (1915) — Cited for the doctrine that where a person is nearing a street crossing toward which a car is approaching, the duty is on the party to stop and avoid a collision who can most readily adjust himself to the exigencies of the case.
• United States vs. Manlabat & Pasibi, 28 Phil. 560 (1914) — Cited for the doctrine that a person in control of an automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular road crossing, and who does not exercise that precaution and control over it as to be able to stop the same almost immediately upon the appearance of a train, is guilty of criminal negligence.
• Lilius vs. Manila Railroad Co., 59 Phil. 758 (1934) — Cited as evidence of the drift away from the rigid and inflexible doctrine in Mestres and Manlabat, though its controlling facts are distinguishable from the present case.
• Baltimore & Ohio Railway vs. Goodman — Cited through Prosser's treatise for Justice Holmes's attempt to lay down a standard once for all requiring an automobile driver approaching a railroad crossing with an obstructed view to stop, look, and listen.
• Pakora vs. Wabash Railway, 292 US 98 — Cited through Prosser's treatise for Justice Cardozo's rejection of the "get out of the car" requirement as "an uncommon precaution, likely to be futile and sometimes even dangerous," and the statement that the driver need not always stop.

• Article 2176, Civil Code — The provision that makes a person who by act or omission causes damage to another, there being negligence, under obligation to pay for the damage done. The Court applied this provision as the basis of the plaintiff-appellant's action, but found that the defendant-appellee was not negligent.
• Article 1902, Civil Code of Spain — The predecessor provision of Article 2176, which the Court noted was reiterated in the current Civil Code.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concurred.

N/A — No dissenting opinions were noted in the case text.