Consular Area Residents Association, Inc. vs. Casanova

A petition denominated as one for prohibition but which ultimately seeks to permanently stop a demolition is essentially an action for injunction, and under Section 21 of RA 7227, only the Supreme Court may issue injunctions to restrain the implementation of military reservation conversion projects. However, a writ of injunction requires a clear and unmistakable right in esse; in its absence, the writ must not issue, and demolitions and evictions may be validly carried out without a judicial order when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented pursuant to Section 28(b) of RA 7279.

The Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) is a government-owned and controlled corporation created under Republic Act No. 7227, the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992, to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into alternative productive uses and to raise funds through the sale of portions of Metro Manila military camps. Executive Order No. 40, Series of 1992, identified Fort Bonifacio as one of the military camps earmarked for development and disposition. Within Fort Bonifacio are the JUSMAG Area, a 34.5-hectare area along Lawton Avenue where military officers and their families occupied housing units originally constructed by the AFP, and the Diplomatic and Consular Area, which was declared alienable and disposable land by Proclamation No. 1725 and whose administrative jurisdiction was transferred to the BCDA.

Petitioner Consular Area Residents Association, Inc., composed of residents of the Diplomatic and Consular Area of Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, represented by its President Benjamin V. Zabat, Romeo Jugado, Jr., and Nancy Quino, filed a petition denominated as one for "Prohibition with plea for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction" against respondents Arnel Paciano D. Casanova, President and Chief Executive Officer of the BCDA, Engr. Tomas Macrohon, the Local Housing Board of Taguig City, and the City Government of Taguig, seeking to enjoin the BCDA from demolishing what it claimed were the remaining structures in the JUSMAG Area in Fort Bonifacio.

In 1992, Congress enacted RA 7227, creating the BCDA to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into alternative productive uses and to raise funds by the sale of portions of Metro Manila military camps. EO No. 40, Series of 1992, identified Fort Bonifacio as one of the military camps earmarked for development. The JUSMAG Area, a 34.5-hectare area along Lawton Avenue, was being developed by Megaworld Corporation as the McKinley West. The Diplomatic and Consular Area was declared alienable and disposable land by Proclamation No. 1725, signed on February 10, 2009, with its administrative jurisdiction transferred to the BCDA.

On July 18, 2012, the Local Housing Board of Taguig City issued a Certificate of Compliance on Demolition declaring that the BCDA had complied with the "Just and Humane Demolition and Eviction" requirement under Section 28 of RA 7279 for the demolition of structures within the JUSMAG Area. Consequently, Casanova sent a Letter dated July 20, 2012, informing petitioner and its members that they should, within a seven-day period ending on July 27, 2012, coordinate with BCDA officials should they choose to either accept the relocation package or voluntarily dismantle their structures and peacefully vacate the property.

Petitioner filed the present case to enjoin the demolition of their structures, which they claimed were within the Diplomatic and Consular Area, and not the JUSMAG Area. They averred that the BCDA itself declared on its own website that the Diplomatic and Consular Area is not its property, and that its members were occupying the area with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines given at the time of their assignments in the military service, and hence could not be demolished, especially in the absence of a court order. Petitioner further posited that Casanova had no authority to act for and on behalf of the BCDA considering his "highly anomalous and irregular" appointment as President thereof.

Respondents Casanova and Engr. Macrohon maintained that the clearing operations undertaken by the BCDA covered only the JUSMAG area, on which the structures possessed by petitioner's members are located. They argued that under Section 28(b) of RA 7279, eviction or demolition is allowed when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented, even in the absence of a court order. They also maintained that Casanova acted with authority as President and CEO of the BCDA, having been duly appointed by the President of the Philippines, and that the case had been rendered moot because the demolition was already completed on September 21, 2012. The Local Housing Board of Taguig City and the City Government of Taguig substantially adopted these contentions but separately argued that the petition should have been filed before the RTC, not the Supreme Court.

• Location of Structures: Petitioner claimed that the structures sought to be protected were within the Diplomatic and Consular Area, not the JUSMAG Area, relying on a printed copy of BCDA's website declaration that the Diplomatic and Consular Area is a non-BCDA property and a map of the South Bonifacio Properties showing the metes and bounds of BCDA properties.
• Consent of the Republic: Petitioner averred that its members were occupying the Diplomatic and Consular Area with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines given at the time of their assignments in the military service, and hence could not be demolished, especially in the absence of a court order.
• Lack of Court Order: Petitioner argued against the legality of the intended demolition, insisting that there should be a court order authorizing the demolition pursuant to Article 536 of the Civil Code and Section 28 of RA 7279, and not a mere Certificate of Compliance on Demolition.
• Premature Notice: Petitioner decried that the demolition was premature as the notice given to them was not issued thirty (30) days prior to the intended date of the same.
• Casanova's Authority: Petitioner posited that Casanova had no authority to act for and on behalf of the BCDA considering his "highly anomalous and irregular" appointment as President thereof, made contrary to Section 9 of RA 7227, which purportedly mandates that the Chairman of the BCDA shall also be its President.

• Location of Structures: Respondents Casanova and Engr. Macrohon maintained that the clearing operations undertaken by the BCDA covered only the JUSMAG area, on which the structures possessed by petitioner's members are located.
• Government Infrastructure Exception: Respondents argued that under Section 28(b) of RA 7279, eviction or demolition is allowed when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented, even in the absence of a court order.
• Casanova's Authority: Respondents maintained that Casanova acted with authority as President and Chief Executive Officer of the BCDA, having been duly appointed by the President of the Philippines.
• Mootness: Respondents maintained that the instant case had been rendered moot and academic because the act sought to be enjoined, i.e., the demolition of the remaining structures in the JUSMAG Area, was already completed on September 21, 2012.
• Improper Venue: Respondents Local Housing Board of Taguig City and the City Government of Taguig contended that the instant petition should have been filed before the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area, instead of the Supreme Court, citing Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

• Nature of the Petition: Whether the petition, although denominated as one for prohibition, is actually an action for injunction governed by Section 21 of RA 7227.
• Collateral Attack on Title: Whether the collateral attack on respondent Casanova's title as President and Chief Executive Officer of the BCDA is proper in this petition.
• Right to Injunction: Whether petitioner established a clear and unmistakable right to the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the demolition.
• Validity of Demolition Without Court Order: Whether the demolition may be validly carried out without a court order under Section 28(b) of RA 7279.
• Compliance with Just and Humane Demolition: Whether the demolition complied with the parameters of just and humane eviction or demolition under Section 28 of RA 7279, particularly the thirty-day prior notice rule.
• Mootness: Whether the petition has been rendered moot by the completion of the demolition on September 21, 2012.

• Nature of the Petition: The petition, albeit denominated as one for prohibition, is essentially an action for injunction. It is not the caption of the pleading that determines the nature of the complaint but rather its allegations. Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court would not apply; instead, Section 21 of RA 7227 governs, which solely authorizes the Supreme Court to issue injunctions to restrain or enjoin the implementation of projects for the conversion into alternative productive uses of military reservations.
• Collateral Attack on Title: Improper. The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings, and it cannot be assailed collaterally. Prohibition does not lie to inquire into the validity of the appointment of a public officer.
• Right to Injunction: No. Petitioner failed to prove that the structures for which they seek protection against demolition fall within the Diplomatic and Consular Area. In order for a writ of injunction to issue, the petitioner must establish: (a) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (b) a violation of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the absence of a clear legal right, the writ must not issue.
• Validity of Demolition Without Court Order: Yes. Demolitions and evictions may be validly carried out even without a judicial order when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented pursuant to Section 28(b) of RA 7279. The demolition of the properties was the precursory step to the conversion of the JUSMAG area into a residential and mixed-use development under a Joint Venture Agreement between the BCDA and Megaworld Corporation.
• Compliance with Just and Humane Demolition: Yes. The demolition fully — if not, substantially — complied with all the parameters laid down under Section 28(b) of RA 7279, including the thirty-day prior notice rule, considering the unrefuted circumstances of consultations, financial compensation and relocation packages, and numerous 30-day notices given to affected settlers.
• Mootness: Yes. Since prayers for injunctive reliefs do not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli, there is no other proper course of action but to dismiss the petition.

• Nature of the Petition: The Court first resolved the preliminary concern raised by respondents Local Housing Board of Taguig City and the City Government of Taguig, who sought outright dismissal on the ground that the petition should have been filed before the RTC. While the petition was denominated as one for prohibition, a careful perusal revealed that it was actually a petition for injunction as it ultimately sought that a writ of injunction be issued to permanently stop respondents from carrying out the demolition of petitioner's properties. More significantly, respondents (with the exception of Casanova) were not asked to be prevented from exercising any judicial or ministerial function on account of any lack or excess of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion, which allegation is key in an action for prohibition. The Court cited the requisites for a writ of prohibition: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Citing the distinction between prohibition and injunction from Nuclear Free Philippine Coalition vs. National Power Corporation, the Court noted that prohibition is a remedy to stop a tribunal from exercising a power beyond its jurisdiction, while injunction is a different remedy. It is a fundamental rule of procedural law that it is not the caption of the pleading that determines the nature of the complaint but rather its allegations. Hence, Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court would not apply. Instead, Section 21 of RA 7227 governs, which solely authorizes the Supreme Court to issue injunctions to restrain or enjoin the implementation of projects for the conversion into alternative productive uses of the military reservations.

• Collateral Attack on Title: The Court observed that the collateral attack on respondent Casanova's title as President and Chief Executive Officer, which is a public office by nature, was improper to resolve in this petition. The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings, and it cannot be assailed collaterally. It has already been settled that prohibition does not lie to inquire into the validity of the appointment of a public officer. Petitioner impliedly recognized the impropriety of raising this issue by stating that "until the final resolution regarding the purported authority of [respondent Casanova], he should be prohibited from acting for and on behalf of BCDA and from issuing notices of demolition." Thus, the characterization of this action as one for injunction, and the consequent conclusion that it was properly filed before the Court, remained.

• Right to Injunction: The Court found that petitioner failed to prove that the structures for which they seek protection against demolition fall within the Diplomatic and Consular Area. Its supposition was anchored on two documents: (a) a printed copy of BCDA's declaration in its website that the Diplomatic and Consular Area is a non-BCDA property; and (b) a map of the South Bonifacio Properties showing the metes and bounds of the properties of the BCDA as well as the properties contiguous to them. However, none of these documents substantiated petitioner's claim: the website posting was a mere statement that the Diplomatic Consular Area is supposedly a non-BCDA property, whereas the map only depicted the metes and bounds of the BCDA's properties. Plainly, none of them showed whether or not the structures to be demolished were indeed within the Diplomatic and Consular Area as petitioner claimed. On the other hand, records showed that on the basis of Relocation Survey Plan Rel-00-001297 approved by the DENR, the BCDA came up with a Structural Map of the JUSMAG Area, conducted ground surveys, and tagged the location of informal settlers whose structures would be affected by the demolition. The Urban Poor Affairs Office of the City of Taguig assisted the BCDA in the conduct of house tagging and validation of the affected families in the JUSMAG Area as well as a joint inspection to verify the boundaries of the JUSMAG and Diplomatic and Consular Areas. Relying on the prima facie credibility of these documents as opposed to petitioner's flimsy argumentation, the Court found that respondents had correctly identified petitioner's structures as those belonging to the JUSMAG Area. Thus, since petitioner's purported right in esse was hinged on the premise that the structures do not fall within the JUSMAG but within the Diplomatic and Consular Area, the petition should already fail.

• Validity of Demolition Without Court Order: The Court settled, citing Kalipunan ng Damay ang Mahihirap, Inc. vs. Robredo, that demolitions and evictions may be validly carried out even without a judicial order when, among others, government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented pursuant to Section 28(b) of RA 7279. Records showed that the demolition of the properties was the precursory step to the conversion of the JUSMAG area into a residential and mixed-use development as provided under the terms of a Joint Venture Agreement dated April 13, 2010 between the BCDA and Megaworld Corporation. As such, it fell within the ambit of Section 28(b) of RA 7279, which authorizes eviction or demolition without the need of a court order.

• Compliance with Just and Humane Demolition: The Court found no merit to petitioner's statement that there was non-compliance with the parameters of just and humane eviction or demolition under Section 28 of RA 7279. Records showed that the demolition fully — if not, substantially — complied with all the parameters laid down under Section 28(b), including the thirty-day prior notice rule, considering the following unrefuted circumstances: (a) a Local Inter-Agency Committee consisting of members of the BCDA, local government of Taguig, the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council, the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor, the People's Organization, the Commission on Human Rights, and various barangays of Fort Bonifacio was convened for the purpose of conducting meetings and consultations with the affected settlers; (b) after said meetings and consultations, the said Committee came up with a financial compensation and relocation package which it offered to those affected by the demolition and eviction of the JUSMAG Area; and (c) affected settlers were given numerous 30-day notices of the impending demolition and eviction activities, with the warning that their failure to heed the same would constitute a waiver of their right to claim anything under the aforesaid financial compensation and relocation package. It was in view of these accomplished acts that respondent Local Housing Board of Taguig City issued a Certificate of Compliance on Demolition dated July 18, 2012. Hence, bereft of any clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, such certificate should be accorded the presumption of regularity in the performance of the official duties of respondent Local Housing Board of Taguig City. The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty; the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

• Mootness: The Court noted the manifestation of respondents that the demolition and eviction activities in the JUSMAG Area, on which petitioner's claimed structures belong, had already been performed and completed on September 21, 2012. Thus, since prayers for injunctive reliefs do not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli, there was no other proper course of action but to dismiss the petition.

• Nature of the Pleading Determined by Allegations, Not Caption — It is a fundamental rule of procedural law that it is not the caption of the pleading that determines the nature of the complaint but rather its allegations. The Court applied this doctrine in characterizing the petition as one for injunction rather than prohibition, based on the relief actually sought in the body of the petition.

• Distinction Between Prohibition and Injunction — Prohibition is a remedy to stop a tribunal from exercising a power beyond its jurisdiction; it is an extraordinary prerogative writ of a preventive nature, its proper function being to prevent courts or other tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they are not vested. Injunction, by contrast, is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantial rights and interests. The Court applied this distinction to determine that the petition was essentially for injunction.

• Requisites for a Writ of Prohibition — For a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court found these requisites absent in the petition.

• Requisites for a Writ of Injunction — In order for a writ of injunction to issue, the petitioner should be able to establish: (a) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (b) a violation of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the absence of a clear legal right, the writ must not issue. A restraining order or an injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantial rights and interests, and it is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of adequate existing rights is not a ground for injunction.

• Collateral Attack on Title to Public Office — The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings, and it cannot be assailed collaterally. Prohibition does not lie to inquire into the validity of the appointment of a public officer. The Court applied this doctrine in refusing to resolve petitioner's challenge to Casanova's appointment.

• Demolition Without Court Order Under Section 28(b) of RA 7279 — Demolitions and evictions may be validly carried out even without a judicial order when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented pursuant to Section 28(b) of RA 7279. The Court applied this doctrine in upholding the validity of the demolition as a precursory step to the conversion of the JUSMAG area into a residential and mixed-use development.

• Presumption of Regularity of Official Acts — The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. The Court applied this doctrine in crediting the Certificate of Compliance on Demolition issued by the Local Housing Board of Taguig City.

• Mootness of Injunctive Relief — Prayers for injunctive reliefs do not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli. The Court applied this doctrine in dismissing the petition after the demolition was completed on September 21, 2012.

• "Prohibition is not the same as injunction. Lawyers often make the mistake of confusing prohibition with injunction. Basically, prohibition is a remedy to stop a tribunal from exercising a power beyond its jurisdiction." — This passage, quoted from former Chief Justice Ramon Aquino's opinion in Nuclear Free Philippine Coalition vs. National Power Corporation, articulates the fundamental distinction between prohibition and injunction that the Court applied in characterizing the petition.

• "It is a fundamental rule of procedural law that it is not the caption of the pleading that determines the nature of the complaint but rather its allegations." — This statement states the controlling rule for determining the true nature of a pleading, which the Court applied to recharacterize the petition as one for injunction despite its caption.

• "In order for a writ of injunction to issue, the petitioner should be able to establish: (a) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (b) a violation of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the absence of a clear legal right, the writ must not issue." — This passage states the requisites for the issuance of a writ of injunction, which the Court applied in finding that petitioner failed to establish a clear legal right to the writ.

• "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption in rebutted, it becomes conclusive." — This passage states the doctrine of presumption of regularity of official acts, which the Court applied in crediting the Certificate of Compliance on Demolition issued by the Local Housing Board of Taguig City.

• Nuclear Free Philippine Coalition vs. National Power Corporation, 225 Phil. 266 (1986) — Cited for the distinction between prohibition and injunction, particularly the discussion by former Chief Justice Ramon Aquino that prohibition is a remedy to stop a tribunal from exercising a power beyond its jurisdiction.

• Kalipunan ng Damay ang Mahihirap, Inc. vs. Robredo, G.R. No. 200903, July 22, 2014, 730 SCRA 322 — Cited as controlling precedent for the rule that demolitions and evictions may be validly carried out even without a judicial order when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented pursuant to Section 28(b) of RA 7279.

• Republic of the Philippines vs. Southside Homeowners Association, Inc., 534 Phil. 8 (2006) — Cited for the proposition that the BCDA was authorized to own, hold, and administer portions of the Metro Manila military camps that may be transferred to it by the President.

• Samahan ng Masang Filipino sa Makati, Inc. vs. Bases Conversion Development Authority, 542 Phil. 86 (2007) — Cited for the proposition that EO No. 40 identified Fort Bonifacio as one of the military camps earmarked for development, and for the requisites for a writ of injunction.

• Monies vs. CA, 523 Phil. 98 (2006) — Cited for the requisites for a writ of prohibition.

• Topacio vs. Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan Gregory Santos Ong, 595 Phil. 491 (2008) — Cited for the rule that the title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings, and cannot be assailed collaterally.

• Bustillo vs. People, 634 Phil. 547 (2010) — Cited for the doctrine of presumption of regularity of official acts.

• Bernardez vs. COMELEC, 628 Phil. 720 (2010) — Cited for the rule that prayers for injunctive reliefs do not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli.

• Section 21, RA 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992) — Provides that the implementation of projects for the conversion into alternative productive uses of military reservations shall not be restrained or enjoined except by an order issued by the Supreme Court of the Philippines. The Court applied this provision to hold that the petition was properly filed before it.

• Section 28, RA 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) — Provides the situations when eviction or demolition may be allowed, including: (a) when persons or entities occupy danger areas; (b) when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented; or (c) when there is a court order for eviction and demolition. The Court applied Section 28(b) to uphold the validity of the demolition without a court order.

• Section 28, RA 7279, mandatory parameters for just and humane eviction or demolition — Lists the mandatory requirements for executing eviction or demolition orders involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, including: (1) notice at least thirty (30) days prior; (2) adequate consultations; (3) presence of local government officials; (4) proper identification of persons taking part; (5) execution only during regular office hours from Mondays to Fridays and during good weather; (6) no use of heavy equipment except for permanent and concrete structures; (7) proper uniforms for PNP members; and (8) adequate relocation. The Court found substantial compliance with these parameters.

• Section 9, RA 7227 — Provides for the composition of the BCDA Board of Directors, including that a full-time chairman who shall also be the president of the Conversion Authority. Petitioner cited this provision in challenging Casanova's appointment, but the Court held the collateral attack improper.

• Section 4, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Provides where to file petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. Respondents cited this provision in arguing that the petition should have been filed with the RTC, but the Court held it inapplicable because the petition was essentially one for injunction.

• Article 536, Civil Code — Provides that in no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto, and that he who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the competent court. Petitioner cited this provision in arguing that a court order was required for the demolition, but the Court held that Section 28(b) of RA 7279 provided an exception.

• Proclamation No. 1725 — Declared certain parcels of land as alienable and disposable identified as the Diplomatic and Consular Area situated in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila, and transferred to the BCDA the administration thereof.

• Executive Order No. 40, Series of 1992 — Implemented the provisions of RA 7227 authorizing the BCDA to raise funds through the sale of Metro Manila military camps transferred to BCDA to form part of its capitalization.

Sereno, C.J. (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Caguioa, JJ., concurred.