Consigna vs. People

The real nature of a criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the Information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. An Information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense, the acts or omissions complained of, the name of the offended party, the approximate time of commission, and the place wherein the offense was committed, such that a person of common understanding can know what offense is intended to be charged.

The petitioner was the Municipal Treasurer of General Luna, Surigao del Norte, a public officer with Salary Grade below 27, while Jose Herasmio (referred to in the Information as Jaime Rusillon) was the incumbent Municipal Mayor with Salary Grade 27. The case arose from a loan transaction wherein the petitioner obtained ₱320,000.00 from private respondent Emerlina Moleta, purportedly to pay municipal employees' salaries and to construct the municipal gymnasium because the municipality's Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) had not yet arrived. The charges were brought under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, which penalizes public officers who cause undue injury to any party through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence in the discharge of their official functions, and under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes swindling by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts.

Silverina E. Consigna was the Municipal Treasurer of General Luna, Surigao del Norte, and Jose Herasmio (referred to in the Information as Jaime Rusillon) was the incumbent Municipal Mayor. On or about 14 June 1994, Consigna, together with Herasmio, obtained a loan of ₱320,000.00 from private respondent Emerlina Moleta, representing that the money was needed to pay the salaries of municipal employees and to construct the municipal gymnasium because the municipality's Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) had not yet arrived. As payment, Consigna issued three Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) checks signed by Rusillon: Check No. 11281104 for ₱130,000.00 dated 14 June 1994; Check No. 9660500 for ₱130,000.00 dated 14 June 1994; and Check No. 9660439 for ₱60,000.00 dated 11 July 1994.

Between 15 June 1994 and 18 August 1994, Moleta demanded payment from Consigna and Rusillon on several occasions, but to no avail. On 18 August 1994, Moleta deposited the three checks to her account in Metrobank-Surigao Branch, but the checks were returned for lack of funds. The following day, Moleta deposited the checks to her LBP account, but they were again returned for the reason "Signature Not on File." Upon verification, LBP informed Moleta that the municipality's account was already closed and transferred to the Development Bank of the Philippines, and that Consigna had been relieved from her position as municipal treasurer.

Moleta thereafter filed two sets of Information with the Sandiganbayan against Consigna and Rusillon. The Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 alleged that the accused, with evident bad faith, in cooperation with each other, and taking advantage of their official positions, borrowed ₱320,000.00 from Moleta, misrepresenting that the loan was for the municipality when in fact it was not, and failed to pay the amount, causing undue injury to Moleta. The Information for Estafa alleged that the accused, representing themselves to be transacting on behalf of the Municipality of General Luna when in truth they were not, contracted a loan from Moleta and issued three checks knowing fully well that the account belonged to the municipality and that they had no personal funds in the account, such that the checks were dishonored upon presentation.

As defense, Consigna argued that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction because the Information for Estafa did not specify the provision of law allegedly violated, and that Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 did not fall within the court's jurisdiction because the offense could stand independently of public office. She also contended that there was no fraud or misrepresentation, pointing out that Moleta's demand for payment from Rusillon attested to the absence of fraud. Rusillon, for his part, maintained that he had no participation in the acts committed by Consigna, testifying that he signed the three checks to pay for the payroll, daily expenses of the municipal building, construction of the municipal gymnasium, and the health office's medical supplies. The Sandiganbayan found that the only link of Rusillon to Consigna with respect to the loan transaction was his signature on the three checks.

The Sandiganbayan found Consigna guilty of both charges but acquitted Rusillon. The court observed that Consigna contradicted her own testimony that the municipality suffered a shortage of funds at the time she borrowed from Moleta, given her admission that when she was relieved as municipal treasurer, the municipality had more than ₱1 million in Land Bank from the IRA of ₱600,000.00 a month for the past three months. The court also noted that Consigna failed to establish that the ₱268,800.00 she disbursed to Rusillon came from the money she loaned from Moleta, and that standard accounting procedure would have required every transaction to be properly entered in the municipality's books of accounts.

• Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan: Petitioner argued that the court a quo had no jurisdiction because the Information for Estafa did not specify the provision of law allegedly violated, i.e., the specific type of Estafa, and because Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 does not fall within the jurisdiction of the court a quo since the offense can stand independently of public office and public office is not an element of the crime.
• Relation to Official Functions: Petitioner argued that when allegations in the Information do not show that the official position of the petitioner was connected with the offense charged, the accused is not charged with an offense in relation to her official functions, citing Lacson vs. The Executive Secretary for the proposition that the mere allegation that the offense was committed in relation to office is a mere conclusion of law, not a factual averment.
• Absence of Fraud: Petitioner contended that there was no fraud or misrepresentation because Moleta's act of demanding payment from Rusillon attested that no fraud or misrepresentation existed, reasoning that Moleta would not have insisted on payment from Rusillon if she had no knowledge that the money loaned had reached him.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner argued that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in its findings of fact, in convicting her on "false pretense, fraudulent act or means" made prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud, and in concluding that she acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence.

• Sufficiency of the Information: The prosecution maintained that the averments in the two sets of Information clearly stated facts and circumstances constituting the elements of the crime of estafa, sufficient to duly inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation and to enable them to prepare their respective defenses.
• Presence of Deceit: The prosecution established that petitioner's representations were outright distortions of the truth perpetrated for the sole purpose of inducing Moleta to hand over ₱320,000.00 purportedly for the Municipality of General Luna, supported by the issuance of three LBP checks taken from the municipality's account and signed by the municipal mayor.
• Relation to Official Functions: The prosecution proved during trial that the manner by which petitioner perpetrated the crime necessarily related to her official function as municipal treasurer, as her official function created an impression of authority to transact business with Moleta involving government financial concerns.

• Sufficiency of the Information for Estafa: Whether the court a quo committed a reversible error for finding petitioner guilty of estafa based on an Information which does not specifically designate the provision of law allegedly violated.
• Guilt for Estafa: Whether petitioner is guilty of estafa as penalized under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Guilt for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019: Whether petitioner is guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

• Sufficiency of the Information for Estafa: No. The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the Information or from the specification of the provision of law allegedly violated, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. The averments in the Information clearly stated facts and circumstances constituting the elements of estafa, sufficient to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation.
• Guilt for Estafa: Yes. All the elements of estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC were present: false pretense or fraudulent act, made prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, reliance by the offended party, and resulting damage. Petitioner's representations that the money was for municipal purposes were outright distortions of the truth that induced Moleta to part with her money.
• Guilt for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019: Yes. All three essential elements of violation of Section 3(e) were present: petitioner was a public officer discharging official functions, she acted with evident bad faith, and her action caused undue injury to Moleta. The last sentence of Section 3(e) is not a restrictive requirement limiting its coverage to officers charged with granting licenses or other concessions.

• Sufficiency of the Information for Estafa: The Court applied the entrenched dictum that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. Citing People vs. Dimaano, the Court enumerated the requisites of a sufficient Information: it must state the name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute, the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate time of commission, and the place wherein the offense was committed. The Court also cited United States vs. Lim San for the proposition that it is of no concern to the accused what the technical name of the crime is, as the real question is whether he performed the acts alleged in the body of the information. The Court found that the averments in the two sets of Information clearly stated facts and circumstances constituting the elements of estafa, sufficient to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation.
• Guilt for Estafa: The Court applied the elements of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC: (a) there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of it; and (d) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. The Court found that petitioner's representations were outright distortions of the truth perpetrated for the sole purpose of inducing Moleta to hand over ₱320,000.00 purportedly for the Municipality of General Luna. Being the Municipal Treasurer, there was reason for Moleta to rely on petitioner's representations that money was needed for the payment of employees' salaries and for the construction of the gymnasium. The Court noted the Sandiganbayan's observation that petitioner contradicted her own testimony that the municipality suffered a shortage of funds, given her admission that when she was relieved as municipal treasurer, the municipality had more than ₱1 million in Land Bank from the IRA of ₱600,000.00 a month for the past three months. The Court also relied on Rusillon's testimony regarding the circumstances behind the issuance of the three checks, which showed that the checks were intended for legitimate municipal purposes, not for the payment of the loan to Moleta.
• Guilt for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019: The Court applied the essential elements of violation of Section 3(e): (1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (3) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions. The Court found that petitioner, being a municipal treasurer, was a public officer discharging official functions when she misused such position to obtain a loan from Moleta, who was misled into believing that petitioner was acting on behalf of the municipality. Applying Montilla vs. Hilario, the Court held that the relation between the crime and the office must be direct and not accidental, such that the office must be a constituent element of the crime. In this case, it was not only alleged in the Information but proved with certainty during trial that the manner by which petitioner perpetrated the crime necessarily related to her official function as municipal treasurer. The Court found that petitioner's official function created in her favor an impression of authority to transact business with Moleta involving government financial concerns, establishing a direct relation between the commission of the crime and petitioner's office. The Court also addressed the last sentence of Section 3(e), citing Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan, which categorically declared that a prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public officer is "charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions," as the last sentence is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of offices or government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of "public officers," may not come within the term.

• Nature of the Criminal Charge — The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. What is controlling is the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited, not the title of the complaint nor the designation of the offense charged. The Court applied this doctrine to reject petitioner's argument that the Information for Estafa was defective for failing to specify the provision of law allegedly violated.
• Sufficiency of an Information — For a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the place wherein the offense was committed. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense.
• Elements of Estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC — The elements of estafa by means of deceit, whether committed by false pretenses or concealment, are: (a) there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means; and (d) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. The Court found all elements present in petitioner's transaction with Moleta.
• Elements of Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 — The essential elements are: (1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (3) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions. There are two ways by which a public official violates Section 3(e): (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference. The use of the disjunctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation.
• Offense Committed in Relation to Office — The relation between the crime and the office must be direct and not accidental; the office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute. The use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element unless the office is a constituent element of the crime. In this case, the Court found that petitioner's official function created in her favor an impression of authority to transact business with Moleta involving government financial concerns, establishing a direct relation between the commission of the crime and petitioner's office.
• Evident Bad Faith — "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. The Court found that this manifested in petitioner's actuations and representations.
• Scope of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 — The last sentence of Section 3(e) is not a restrictive requirement which limits the application or extent of its coverage. A prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public officer is "charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions." The last sentence is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of offices or government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of "public officers," may not come within the term.

• "For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charge or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited." — This passage from People vs. Dimaano, quoted by the Court, articulates the controlling doctrine on the sufficiency of an Information and the determination of the nature of the criminal charge, which was central to rejecting petitioner's first assigned error.
• "The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth." — This passage from United States vs. Lim San, quoted by the Court, establishes that the accused's substantial rights are protected by the factual allegations in the Information, not by the technical designation of the crime, and was relied upon to reject petitioner's argument that the Information was defective.
• "The relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is, in our opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the Constitution, the relation has to be such that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the office." — This passage from Montilla vs. Hilario, quoted by the Court, defines the standard for determining when an offense is committed in relation to office, which the Court applied to find that petitioner's official position was a constituent element of the crimes charged.
• "Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any public officers declared unlawful. Its reference to 'any public officer' is without distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. We agree with the view adopted by the Solicitor General that the last sentence of paragraph [Section 3] (e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of officers or government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of 'public officers' may not come within the term." — This passage from Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan, quoted by the Court, settles the interpretation of the last sentence of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, rejecting petitioner's argument that the provision applies only to officers charged with granting licenses or other concessions.

• People vs. Dimaano, 506 Phil. 630, 649-650 (2005) — Cited as controlling authority for the requisites of a sufficient Information and the principle that the nature of the criminal charge is determined by the actual recital of facts, not by the designation of the offense or the provision of law allegedly violated.
• United States vs. Lim San, 17 Phil. 273, 278-279 (1910) — Cited as early authority for the proposition that the accused's substantial rights are protected by the factual allegations in the Information, not by the technical name of the crime, and that the court alone determines the name of the crime.
• Lacson vs. The Executive Secretary, 361 Phil. 251 (1999) — Cited by petitioner for the proposition that the mere allegation that the offense was committed in relation to office is a mere conclusion of law, but the Court distinguished it by finding that the relation between the crime and petitioner's office was proved with certainty during trial.
• Montilla vs. Hilario, 90 Phil. 49, 51 (1951) — Cited as controlling authority defining the "offense committed in relation to the office" as requiring that the office be a constituent element of the crime, which the Court applied to find a direct relation between petitioner's office and the commission of the crimes.
• Cabrera vs. Sandiganbayan, 484 Phil. 350, 360 (2004) — Cited as authority for the essential elements of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and for the two modes by which a public official may violate the provision.
• Quibal vs. Sandiganbayan, 314 Phil. 66 (1995) — Cited as authority for the proposition that the use of the disjunctive term "or" in Section 3(e) connotes that either act qualifies as a violation.
• Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan, 235 Phil. 400 (1987) — Cited as controlling authority for the interpretation of the last sentence of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, holding that a prosecution will lie regardless of whether the accused public officer is charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
• Cruz vs. Sandiganbayan, 504 Phil. 321 (2005) — Cited as authority affirming the Mejorada ruling on the interpretation of the last sentence of Section 3(e).
• R.R. Paredes vs. Calilung, 546 Phil. 198, 223 (2007) — Cited as authority for the elements of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC.
• Uriarte vs. People, 540 Phil. 477, 494 (2006) — Cited as authority for the definition of "evident bad faith" as connoting a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will.

• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 — The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act provision penalizing public officers who, in the discharge of their official functions, cause undue injury to any party, including the Government, or give any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence. The Court applied this provision to convict petitioner, finding that she acted with evident bad faith in misrepresenting to Moleta that the loan was for municipal purposes.
• Article 315(2)(a), Revised Penal Code — The provision penalizing swindling (estafa) committed by using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business, or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits. The Court applied this provision to convict petitioner, finding that her representations that the money was for municipal purposes constituted false pretenses that induced Moleta to part with her money.
• Rule 45, Section 1, Rules of Court — The provision governing petitions for review on certiorari, which are generally limited to the review of legal issues. The Court noted that petitioner correctly filed under Rule 45 but improperly framed her arguments as jurisdictional errors, which are the proper subject of a Rule 65 petition.
• Rule 45, Section 2, Rules of Court — The provision setting the fifteen-day period within which to file a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court noted that petitioner timely filed her petition within this period.
• Rule 65, Section 1, Rules of Court — The provision governing the special civil action of certiorari, which is strictly confined to the determination of whether the trial court has jurisdiction and whether the exercise of jurisdiction was attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court distinguished this from a Rule 45 petition.
• Rule 65, Section 4, Rules of Court — The provision setting the sixty-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The Court contrasted this with the shorter period under Rule 45.

• Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson)
• Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion
• Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
• Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe