Conde vs. Mamenta Jr.

A criminal action will not lie where the governing ordinance neither defines the act as an offense nor prescribes punishment for it; a surcharge for late or non-payment of municipal fees is an administrative penalty, not a criminal sanction, and is recoverable only through civil action.

Petitioner Avelina Conde was a stallholder in the public market of Masinloc, Zambales, leasing a stall from the municipal government at a monthly rental of ₱27.00. The Sangguniang Bayan of Masinloc enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 3-A, series of 1980, amending the Masinloc Revenue Code to increase market stall rental rates. The dispute arose from petitioner's refusal to pay the increased rental, which she challenged before the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development as excessive.

Petitioner Avelina Conde was one of the stallholders in the public market of Masinloc, Zambales, paying a monthly rental of ₱27.00 for her stall. On June 28, 1980, the Sangguniang Bayan of Masinloc passed Municipal Ordinance No. 3-A, series of 1980, amending Article B (Market Fees), Section 5 B.03 (Imposition of Fees) of the Masinloc Revenue Code. The ordinance fixed new monthly rental rates for market stalls, increasing petitioner's rental to ₱140.02. The ordinance was scheduled to take effect on October 1, 1980.

The Municipal Treasurer attempted to collect the new rental fees from petitioner, but she refused to pay. She objected on the ground that the increased rate was excessive and that she had questioned the increase before the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development. Despite several demands from the Municipal Treasurer, petitioner continued to refuse payment of the increased rentals from October 1, 1980 through December 31, 1981, accumulating unpaid dues of ₱2,640.37 including surcharges.

On February 1, 1982, the Acting Station Commander of the INP, Masinloc, Zambales, filed a criminal complaint against petitioner before the 2nd Municipal Circuit Court of Masinloc and Palauig, Zambales, charging her with violation of Section 5 B.05, Article B, Chapter V, Revenue Code of Masinloc, as amended. The complaint alleged that petitioner willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously refused and ignored demands to pay the monthly dues for the stall she occupied. The trial court treated her refusal to pay and to vacate as "tantamount to economic sabotage" and convicted her on July 15, 1983, ordering her to immediately vacate the premises and to pay ₱4,701.64 representing rentals and surcharges from October 1, 1980 to December 31, 1982, plus continuing monthly rental of ₱140.82 until she actually vacated. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Zambales affirmed the decision in toto on May 9, 1984. The case was then elevated to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which certified it to the Supreme Court as one within its exclusive jurisdiction.

• Criminal Liability for Non-Payment of Municipal Fees: Whether petitioner can be criminally prosecuted for her failure to pay the increased monthly rental of a market stall leased to her by a municipal corporation.

• Criminal Liability for Non-Payment of Municipal Fees: No. Neither the municipal ordinance nor the Revenue Code provision defined non-payment of fees as an offense or prescribed punishment for it; the surcharge imposed was an administrative penalty recoverable only by civil action, not a criminal sanction, and the trial court was without criminal jurisdiction over the matter.

• Criminal Liability for Non-Payment of Municipal Fees: The Court examined both Municipal Ordinance No. 3-A, series of 1980, which fixed the increased rental rates, and Section 5 B.05, Article B, Chapter V of the Revenue Code of Masinloc, which was the provision specifically alleged in the criminal complaint as having been violated. Section 5 B.05 provided that a lessee who fails to pay the monthly rental fee shall pay a surcharge of twenty-five percent of the total rent due, and that failure to pay for three consecutive months shall cause automatic cancellation of the contract of lease. Neither enactment made non-payment of fees an offense nor provided for punishment for violation. The judgment of conviction itself was bereft of any criminal sanction. The surcharge imposed by Section 5 B.05 for late or non-payment of monthly rentals was not a penalty under criminal law but an additional amount added to the usual charge — more of an administrative penalty recoverable only by civil action. Because no offense was defined and no punishment was prescribed, a criminal action would not lie. Criminal jurisdiction being the authority to hear and try a particular offense and impose the punishment provided by law, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court was without criminal jurisdiction over the matter.

• Criminal Jurisdiction Requires a Defined Offense and Prescribed Punishment — Criminal jurisdiction is the authority to hear and try a particular offense and impose the punishment provided by law. Where the governing ordinance or law neither defines the act as an offense nor prescribes punishment for it, no criminal action will lie and the trial court is without criminal jurisdiction. The Court applied this principle to hold that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court lacked jurisdiction over the criminal complaint against petitioner, since the ordinance and Revenue Code provision at issue imposed only a surcharge — an administrative penalty — rather than a criminal sanction.

• Surcharge as Administrative Penalty — A surcharge for late or non-payment of municipal fees is not a penalty under criminal law but an additional amount added to the usual charge, functioning as an administrative penalty recoverable only through civil action. The Court distinguished the surcharge under Section 5 B.05 of the Masinloc Revenue Code from a criminal penalty, holding that it could not serve as the basis for criminal prosecution.

• "It should be noted that neither one of the following enactments makes non-payment of fees an offense nor provides for punishment for violation. The judgment itself is bereft of any criminal sanction." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi: the absence of an offense definition and a prescribed punishment in the governing enactments precludes criminal prosecution.

• "The surcharge imposed by Section 5 B.05 for late or non-payment of monthly rentals is not a penalty under criminal law but an additional amount added to the usual charge. It is more of an administrative penalty, which should be recoverable only by civil action." — This defines the nature of a surcharge as an administrative rather than criminal penalty, a distinction central to the Court's holding.

• "There being no offense defined nor punishment prescribed, a criminal action will not lie, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Court was without criminal jurisdiction over the matter." — This states the operative conclusion flowing from the absence of both an offense definition and a prescribed punishment.

• People vs. Mariano, 71 SCRA 600 (1976) — Cited as authority for the definition of criminal jurisdiction as the authority to hear and try a particular offense and impose the punishment provided by law. The Court relied on this definition to conclude that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court lacked criminal jurisdiction where no offense was defined and no punishment prescribed.

• Municipal Ordinance No. 3-A, Series of 1980, Municipality of Masinloc, Zambales — Amended Article B (Market Fees), Section 5 B.03 of the Masinloc Revenue Code by fixing new monthly rental rates for market stalls, increasing petitioner's rental from ₱27.00 to ₱140.02, effective October 1, 1980. The Court found that this ordinance neither defined non-payment as an offense nor prescribed punishment.

• Section 5 B.05, Article B, Chapter V, Revenue Code of Masinloc, Zambales — Provided for a surcharge of twenty-five percent of the total rent due for failure to pay monthly rental fees, and automatic cancellation of the lease contract upon failure to pay for three consecutive months. The Court held that this provision imposed an administrative penalty, not a criminal sanction, and could not serve as the basis for criminal prosecution.

Abad Santos (Chairman), Yap, Narvasa, and Cruz, JJ., concurred.