Concepcion vs. Paredes

The Philippine Legislature cannot enact laws that diminish the authority conferred by an Act of Congress on the Chief Executive and a branch of the Legislature; appointment by lot is not appointment by the Governor-General with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate. The second paragraph of section 148 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2941, which required judges of first instance to exchange judicial districts by lot every five years, was held invalid for violating the Organic Act.

The case arose in the context of the Philippine Islands under American colonial rule, where the Organic Act (Act of Congress of August 29, 1916) served as the fundamental law defining and limiting governmental powers. The Organic Act vested supreme executive power in the Governor-General, conferred upon him the authority to appoint and commission officers, and required that judges of the Courts of First Instance be appointed by the Governor-General with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate. In early March 1921, the Secretary of Justice called all judges of first instance to Manila to participate in a "drawing of lots" for judicial districts pursuant to Act No. 2941, prompting prominent members of the Philippine Bar to challenge the law's validity.

Judge Pedro Concepcion was appointed judge of first instance for the Ninth Judicial District, Manila, by the Governor-General with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate. In his official oath of office, he swore to "faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as Judge, Ninth Judicial District, Manila, according to the best of my ability and understanding, agreeably to the laws of the Philippine Islands." As such judge, he had jurisdiction only in the judicial district comprehending the metropolis.

In early March 1921, all judges of first instance were called to Manila by the Secretary of Justice to participate in a "drawing of lots" for judicial districts, pursuant to Act No. 2941, "An Act to amend and repeal certain provisions relative to the judiciary, etc." The second paragraph of section 148 of the Administrative Code, as superseded by Act No. 2941, section 1, provided that on March 15, 1921, and every five years thereafter, judges of first instance with the same salaries would exchange judicial districts, with the exchange determined by lot, and no judge would continue to serve in the district in which he had been serving during the last five years.

Prominent members of the Philippine Bar united to halt the holding of the judicial lottery and to challenge the validity of Act No. 2941. Judge Concepcion filed the test case, primarily interested in securing an order prohibiting the holding of the judicial lottery and in having the provision of law on which the lottery rested declared unconstitutional. The Secretary of Justice and the Attorney-General vigorously resisted the attempt to nullify the law. If the judicial lottery had been held as planned on March 15, 1921, Judge Concepcion would have been removed from Manila and would have had to proceed to another district, either pursuant to the certification of the Secretary of Justice or pursuant to a new appointment by the Governor-General with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate.

• Violation of the Organic Act: Petitioner argued that the second paragraph of section 148 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2941, was unconstitutional because it violated the Organic Act, which vests the power to appoint judges of first instance in the Governor-General with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate.
• Usurpation of Appointing Power: Petitioner maintained that the judicial lottery substituted chance for executive judgment, and that appointment by lot is not appointment by the Governor-General nor appointment with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate.

• Validity of the Law: Respondent argued that Act No. 2941 was valid, citing two decisions of the Court: Conchada vs. Director of Prisons (1915), which approved a law establishing a new division of judicial territory without altering the organization of the courts, and Chanco vs. Imperial (1916), which held valid a provision requiring judges to cease being such upon completing the sixty-fifth year of their age.
• Distinction Between Appointment and Qualifications: Respondent relied on the reasoning in Chanco vs. Imperial that prescribing the method of appointment does not involve the qualifications of the judge, and that Congress entering the field of appointment does not thereby prohibit the Philippine Legislature from legislating as to qualifications.

• Constitutionality of the Judicial Lottery: Whether the second paragraph of section 148 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2941, which required judges of first instance to exchange judicial districts by lot every five years, is valid under the Organic Act.
• Usurpation of the Appointing Power: Whether the judicial lottery provision usurped the power of appointment and confirmation vested by the Organic Act in the Governor-General and the Philippine Senate.

• Constitutionality of the Judicial Lottery: No. The second paragraph of section 148 of the Administrative Code, as superseded by Act No. 2941, is in violation of the provisions of the Organic Act and, consequently, invalid.
• Usurpation of the Appointing Power: Yes. The power of appointment and confirmation vested by the Organic Act in the Governor-General and the Philippine Senate is usurped by a lottery of judicial offices every five years.

• Constitutionality of the Judicial Lottery: The Court reasoned that the various Acts of Congress formally and expressly extended to the Philippines, especially the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, constitute the major portion of the so-called Constitution of the Philippine Islands. These Acts define, prescribe, and limit the powers of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and it is beyond the power of any branch of that government to exercise its functions in any other way than that prescribed by the organic law. An Act of the Philippine Legislature is valid unless the subject-matter has been covered by Congressional legislation or its enactment forbidden by some provision of the organic law. The Organic Act vests supreme executive power in the Governor-General, confers upon him authority to appoint and commission officers, and specifically prescribes that judges of the Courts of First Instance shall be appointed by the Governor-General with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate. Appointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise of discretion, and the action of the Philippine Senate in considering nominations requires the exercise of its best judgment. When judges of first instance are selected for positions on the bench, the appointments are for specific offices; judges are not appointed judges of first instance of the Philippine Islands but are appointed judges of the Courts of First Instance of the respective Judicial Districts. The intention of the law is to recognize separate and distinct judicial offices.

• Usurpation of the Appointing Power: The Court reasoned that if the judicial lottery had been held, either Judge Concepcion would go to another district pursuant to the certification of the Secretary of Justice, which would violate the law because there can be no valid appointment without the exercise of the appointing power, or he would go to the new district pursuant to a new appointment by the Governor-General with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate, which would also violate the law because instead of an exercise of judgment, the appointing power would be required to perform merely a ministerial act and register approval of an appointment determined by chance. The phraseology of Act No. 2941, which speaks of the "new office," "commissioned," and "reappointed," indicates that the legislative intent was to require new appointments every five years, acts in the nature of indirect removals in derogation of the powers conferred by the fundamental law. The Court concluded that chance was substituted for executive judgment, and that appointment by lot is not appointment by the Governor-General nor appointment with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate. To leave the selection of a person for a given judicial office to lot is not to appoint but to gamble with the office. The Court found persuasive authority in Commonwealth vs. County Commissioners (1813), where the court refused to recognize an appointment made by drawing cuts, stating that the law intended the appointment to be made by the judgment of the commissioners and not by chance.

• Organic Act as the Constitution of the Philippine Islands — The Acts of Congress formally and expressly extended to the Philippines, especially the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, constitute the major portion of the Constitution of the Philippine Islands. These Acts define, prescribe, and limit the powers of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and it is beyond the power of any branch of that government to exercise its functions in any other way than that prescribed by the organic law or by local laws which conform to the organic law.

• Validity of Local Legislation Under the Organic Act — An Act of the Philippine Legislature which has not been expressly disapproved by Congress is valid unless the subject-matter has been covered by Congressional legislation or its enactment forbidden by some provision of the organic law. The specific inquiry is whether the field has been entered by Congress to such an extent as to exclude the Philippine Legislature therefrom.

• Appointment as an Executive Act Involving Discretion — Appointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise of discretion. The action of the Philippine Senate in its consideration of nominations requires the exercise of its best judgment. Appointment by lot is not appointment by the Governor-General and is not appointment with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate; chance cannot substitute for executive judgment.

• Separate and Distinct Judicial Offices — Judges of first instance are not appointed judges of first instance of the Philippine Islands but are appointed judges of the Courts of First Instance of the respective Judicial Districts. They hold these positions until they either resign, reach the age of retirement, or are removed through impeachment proceedings. The intention of the law is to recognize separate and distinct judicial offices.

• "Appointment to the office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise of discretion." — This passage establishes the foundational principle that appointment is an executive function requiring judgment, which cannot be delegated to chance.

• "Chance has been substituted for executive judgment. Appointment by lot is not appointment by the Governor-General. Appointment by lot is not appointment with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate. To leave the selection of a person for a given judicial office to lot is not to appoint, but is to gamble with the office. To such a method we cannot give the seal of our approval." — This is the core ratio decidendi, articulating why the judicial lottery provision was unconstitutional.

• "It is not within the power of the Philippine Legislature to enact laws which either expressly or impliedly diminish the authority conferred by an Act of Congress on the Chief Executive and a branch of the Legislature." — This states the controlling constitutional principle that the Philippine Legislature cannot diminish powers vested by the Organic Act in the Governor-General and the Philippine Senate.

• "It is our holding that the second paragraph of section 148 of the Administrative Code, as superseded by Act No. 2941, is in violation of the provisions of the Organic Act and, consequently, invalid." — This is the final holding of the Court, declaring the specific provision unconstitutional.

• Keim vs. U.S., 177 U.S. 290 (1900) — Cited as authority for the proposition that appointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise of discretion.

• Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 343 (1921) — Cited as authority for the proposition that the intention of the law is to recognize separate and distinct judicial offices.

• Conchada vs. Director of Prisons, 31 Phil. 94 (1915) — Distinguished by the Court; the case approved a law establishing a new division of judicial territory without altering the organization of the courts or depriving them of their jurisdiction, unlike the judicial lottery provision.

• Chanco vs. Imperial, 34 Phil. 329 (1916) — Distinguished by the Court; the case held valid a provision requiring judges to cease being such upon completing the sixty-fifth year of their age, but the Court noted that prescribing the method of appointment is separate from prescribing qualifications of officers.

• Commonwealth vs. County Commissioners, 5 Binney's Reports 534 (1813) — Cited as persuasive authority; the court refused to recognize an appointment made by drawing cuts, holding that the law intended the appointment to be made by the judgment of the commissioners and not by chance.

• Section 8, Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (Organic Act) — Grants general legislative power to the Philippine Legislature, except as otherwise provided. The Court applied this provision to determine whether Congress had entered the field of judicial appointments to such an extent as to exclude the Philippine Legislature therefrom.

• Section 21, Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (Organic Act) — Vests supreme executive power in the Governor-General and confers upon him authority to appoint and commission officers. The Court applied this provision to establish that the appointing power resides in the Governor-General.

• Section 26, Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (Organic Act) — Provides that judges of the Courts of First Instance shall be appointed by the Governor-General with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate. The Court applied this provision to hold that the judicial lottery provision usurped this appointing power.

• Section 148, Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2941 — The provision requiring judges of first instance to exchange judicial districts by lot every five years. The Court declared this provision unconstitutional for violating the Organic Act.

Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concurred. Justice Avanceña concurred in the result, limiting his vote to that part of the decision whereby Act No. 2941, paragraph 2, as applied to the case of Honorable Pedro Concepcion, formerly appointed judge of the Court of First Instance for the Ninth Judicial District, is held invalid in so far as its application would make him a judge of another district without having been appointed by the Governor-General with the advice and consent of the Senate, or without this appointing power having any discretion to act on the appointment. Justices Street and Villamor reserved their votes.

N/A — No dissenting opinions were rendered; Justices Street and Villamor reserved their votes, and Justice Avanceña concurred with a limited vote.