Concepcion, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

A non-party to a COMELEC accreditation proceeding is not an aggrieved party and lacks standing to assail the COMELEC's adjudicatory resolution through an original petition for certiorari under Rule 65; an original Rule 65 petition also cannot be used to directly challenge a COMELEC regulation issued in the exercise of its rule-making power when dissociated from any valid challenge to a quasi-judicial action. The proper remedies for a stand-alone challenge to the regulation include declaratory relief under Rule 63 or prohibition under Rule 65.

Jose Concepcion, Jr. was the incumbent Punong Barangay of Barangay Forbes Park, Makati City, and the National Chairman of the National Citizen's Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL). NAMFREL sought accreditation from the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) as a citizens' arm for the May 14, 2007 national and local elections. The statutory backdrop included Section 3 of Executive Order No. 94, which prohibited barangay officials from appointment as members of the Board of Election Inspectors or as official watchers of registered major political parties or similar organizations, and COMELEC Resolution No. 7798, which implemented that prohibition by barring barangay officials, employees, and tanods from serving in the BEIs or as watchers and from being members of accredited citizens' arms. The dispute concerned the effect of Resolution No. 7798 on Concepcion's dual role as barangay chairman and NAMFREL National Chairman.

Jose Concepcion, Jr. was the incumbent Punong Barangay of Barangay Forbes Park, Makati City, and the National Chairman of the National Citizen's Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL). On January 5, 2007, NAMFREL filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition for Accreditation to Conduct the Operation Quick Count, docketed as SSP No. 07-001. Concepcion was one of the signatories of the petition in his capacity as NAMFREL National Chairman. On the same date, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7798, which prohibited the appointment of barangay officials—including the Punong Barangay, Barangay Kagawad, Barangay Secretary, Barangay Treasurer, and Barangay Tanod—as chairman/person and/or member of the Boards of Election Inspectors (BEIs) or as official watcher of any candidate, duly registered major political party, or any similar organization, or any socio-civic, religious, professional organization in the May 14, 2007 national and local elections. The prohibition extended to barangay officials, employees, and tanods who were members of accredited citizens' arms. It also prohibited barangay officials, employees, and tanods from staying inside any polling place except to cast their vote. Resolution No. 7798 was to take effect on the seventh day after publication in two newspapers of general circulation.

On April 2, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc conditionally granted NAMFREL's petition for accreditation as its citizens' arm in the May 14, 2007 elections, subject to its direct and immediate control and supervision. The COMELEC imposed the condition that Jose S. Concepcion, Jr., NAMFREL's National Chairman, must first be removed both as a member and overall Chairman of NAMFREL. It reasoned that Concepcion, being the Barangay Chairman of Barangay Forbes Park, Makati City, could not be a member, much less the overall chairman, of a citizens' arm such as NAMFREL under COMELEC Resolution No. 7798. The accreditation was also subject to conditions requiring NAMFREL to reorganize and submit a list of responsible officers and members deleting the names of any previous officer or member similarly situated with Concepcion who were disqualified, and providing that the accreditation would be automatically revoked for violation of the conditions.

NAMFREL thereafter filed a "Manifestation and Request for Re-Examination." It provided information regarding NAMFREL's reorganization and its new set of officers showing that Concepcion had stepped down as National Chair and had been replaced by a new Chair. It manifested NAMFREL's acceptance of the conditional grant of accreditation and requested a re-examination, without further arguments, of the April 2, 2007 Resolution as it specifically affected Concepcion's membership with NAMFREL. In the same manifestation, NAMFREL outlined its objections and concerns on the legality or validity of Resolution No. 7798.

In its Order of May 8, 2007, the COMELEC noted the information relating to NAMFREL's current officers and denied the request to examine its interpretation of the April 2, 2007 Resolution prohibiting Concepcion's direct participation as member and National Chairman of NAMFREL. The COMELEC reasoned that the April 2, 2007 Resolution was clear and that NAMFREL had not presented any convincing argument to warrant the requested examination. NAMFREL did not question the COMELEC's ruling.

Instead of NAMFREL, Concepcion filed the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65, seeking to set aside the COMELEC's April 2, 2007 Resolution and May 8, 2007 Order. The petition ostensibly questioned the April 2, 2007 Resolution but actually raised issues against Resolution No. 7798. Concepcion argued that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7798 without statutory basis; that the resolution was retroactively applied to NAMFREL's petition; and that he was denied due process because he was not given the opportunity to question Resolution No. 7798 or to present his side regarding the prohibition. He further argued that Executive Order No. 94 applied only to the February 2, 1987 plebiscite, that the COMELEC exceeded its rule-making authority, that the regulation was unreasonable and violated his right to association, and that it was an invalid implementing regulation. The petition was filed before the Supreme Court.

• Lack of Statutory Basis and Limited Scope of Executive Order No. 94: Petitioner argued that Executive Order No. 94, which prohibits the appointment of barangay officials as members of the BEI or as official watchers of registered major political parties or similar organizations, applied only to the February 2, 1987 plebiscite; nothing in it prohibited his membership with NAMFREL or his appointment as Chair or member of a COMELEC-accredited citizens' arm, and he was never appointed as a BEI member or poll watcher.
• Invalid Exercise of Rule-Making Power: Petitioner maintained that the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of regulation, go beyond or expand the mandate of a law because it has no law-making powers; Resolution No. 7798 was an invalid implementing regulation for failing the requisites that rules and regulations be issued on the authority of law, within the scope and purview of the law, reasonable, and not contrary to law or the Constitution.
• Retroactive Application: Petitioner argued that Resolution No. 7798 could not be applied retroactively because its effectivity clause made it effective only on the seventh day after publication, or January 14, 2007, while NAMFREL's petition was filed on January 5, 2007, before the resolution's effectivity.
• Unreasonableness and Right to Association: Petitioner objected that Resolution No. 7798 was unreasonable, harsh, oppressive, and bore no relation to the purpose of the law, and that it violated his right to association through its enforced removal of him as member and Chair of NAMFREL.
• Procedural Due Process: Petitioner claimed that the COMELEC denied him procedural due process because he was not afforded the opportunity to be heard or to comment on Resolution No. 7798, upon which his removal as National Chair and member of NAMFREL was based; he was not a party to the accreditation petition in his personal capacity, and the April 2, 2007 Resolution should be nullified insofar as it required his resignation as a precondition for accreditation.

• Valid Exercise of Quasi-Legislative Power: The Office of the Solicitor General defended Resolution No. 7798 as a valid exercise of the COMELEC's quasi-legislative power to implement election laws, citing Section 52(c) of the Omnibus Election Code; notice and hearing are not required for the validity of a quasi-legislative act, as opposed to a quasi-judicial act.
• Applicability of Executive Order No. 94: Respondent argued that Executive Order No. 94 applies to the May 14, 2007 national and local elections; although issued primarily for the February 2, 1987 plebiscite, its spirit and intent find applicability and relevance to future elections, making the COMELEC's reliance on it valid and proper.
• Conflict of Interest and Non-Partisanship: Respondent contended that even if petitioner was not appointed as a BEI member or watcher, he labored under a conflict of interest because a COMELEC-accredited citizens' arm is entitled under Section 180 of the Omnibus Election Code to appoint a watcher in every polling place; his simultaneous roles as barangay chairman and NAMFREL Chair raised questions on his neutrality and non-partisanship and could compromise COMELEC non-partisanship.
• Broad Constitutional Power of COMELEC: Respondent argued that Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC broad power to administer the conduct of elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and recalls, including all necessary and incidental powers to achieve free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

• Personality to Assail COMELEC Adjudicatory Resolution: Whether petitioner, who was not a party to NAMFREL's accreditation proceedings before the COMELEC, is an aggrieved party with legal standing to file an original petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to assail the COMELEC's April 2, 2007 Resolution and May 8, 2007 Order.
• Propriety of Rule 65 to Challenge COMELEC Regulation: Whether an original petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be used to directly challenge COMELEC Resolution No. 7798, a regulation issued in the exercise of the COMELEC's rule-making power, when the petition is ostensibly directed at an adjudicatory resolution but actually attacks the regulation.
• Liberality and Transcendental Importance: Whether the Court should overlook the procedural defects and entertain the petition in the name of liberality and the transcendental importance doctrine.

• Personality to Assail COMELEC Adjudicatory Resolution: No. Petitioner was not a party to the COMELEC accreditation proceedings; only an aggrieved party—one who was a party to the original proceedings—may bring a decision, order, or ruling of a constitutional commission to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution and Rules 64 and 65.
• Propriety of Rule 65 to Challenge COMELEC Regulation: No. An original Rule 65 certiorari petition cannot be used as a direct challenge to Resolution No. 7798 dissociated from any COMELEC quasi-judicial action; the petition's thrust converted an express challenge to an adjudicatory resolution into a challenge to a regulation without the requisite standing.
• Liberality and Transcendental Importance: No. The Court cannot and should not entertain such petitions in the name of liberality and transcendental importance; available remedies existed under the Rules, and the alleged weighty issues did not justify blatant disregard of procedure.

• Personality to Assail COMELEC Adjudicatory Resolution: The requirement of personality or interest is sanctioned by Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that a decision, order, or ruling of a constitutional commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt. This is repeated in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, applicable to petitions for certiorari under Rule 64 of decisions, orders, or rulings of constitutional commissions pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64. Under Section 1, Rule 65, a person aggrieved by any act of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may file a petition for certiorari. An aggrieved party is one who was a party to the original proceedings that gave rise to the original action for certiorari under Rule 65. Tang vs. Court of Appeals clarified that the term "person aggrieved" is not to be construed to mean any person who feels injured by the lower court's order or decision; in a situation where the order or decision underwent adversarial proceedings, the person aggrieved pertains to one who was a party in the proceedings before the lower court. Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Commission on Audit likewise held that the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not available to any person who feels injured by the decision of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; the person aggrieved under Section 1 of Rule 65 pertains only to one who was a party in the proceedings before the court a quo, or in that case, before the COA. The real party in interest who stands to benefit or suffer from the judgment must prosecute or defend an action; interest means material interest, an interest in issue that the decision will affect, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved or a mere incidental interest. Here, petitioner was not a party to the NAMFREL accreditation case before the COMELEC. NAMFREL was the direct party, and it accepted the conditional accreditation and did not question the COMELEC ruling. Petitioner could have intervened before the COMELEC as an affected party in NAMFREL's Manifestation and Request for Examination, or filed the present petition with NAMFREL as petitioner and himself as intervenor, or expressly asked the Supreme Court to suspend the rules based on unusual circumstances. None of these actions took place. Thus, petitioner could not be recognized as a party-in-interest who could directly assail the COMELEC's April 2, 2007 Resolution in an original Rule 65 petition.
• Propriety of Rule 65 to Challenge COMELEC Regulation: The petition professed to be an express challenge to the COMELEC's adjudicatory April 2, 2007 Resolution, but its arguments solely attacked and prayed for the partial nullity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7798, which was issued in the exercise of the COMELEC's rule-making power. This approach was fatally defective because it converted an express challenge of an adjudicatory resolution—made without the requisite standing—into a challenge for the nullity of a regulation through an original Rule 65 petition for certiorari. A COMELEC adjudicatory action can be challenged on the basis of the invalidity of the law or regulation that underlies the action, but to do this, a valid challenge to the adjudicatory action must exist; at the very least, the petitioner must have the requisite personality to mount the legal challenge to the COMELEC adjudicatory action. Where this basic condition is absent, the challenge is unmasked for what it really is—a direct challenge to the underlying law or regulation masquerading as a challenge to a COMELEC adjudicatory action. Petitioner was not without a viable remedy to directly challenge Resolution No. 7798: a stand-alone challenge to the regulation could have been made through a petition for declaratory relief with the appropriate Regional Trial Court under Rule 63, or through a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 to prevent the implementation of the regulation, or in the course of validly contesting an adjudicatory order of the COMELEC. Such a challenge, however, cannot be made in an original petition for certiorari under Rule 65 dissociated from any COMELEC action made in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. The petitioner's unusual approaches and use of Rule 65 appeared to be a backdoor approach to achieve what he could not directly do in his individual capacity under Rule 65, and at the very least an attempted bypass of other available, albeit lengthier, modes of review. The petition was therefore dismissed for its blatant violation of the Rules.
• Liberality and Transcendental Importance: The transgressions alleged in a petition, however weighty they may sound, cannot be justifications for blatantly disregarding the rules of procedure, particularly when remedial measures were available under the same rules to achieve the petitioner's objectives. The Court cannot and should not—in the name of liberality and the "transcendental importance" doctrine—entertain these types of petitions. As held in Lozano, et al. vs. Nograles, the liberal approach has its limits and should not be abused.

• Aggrieved Party Rule in Certiorari Against Constitutional Commissions — Under Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64, a decision, order, or ruling of a constitutional commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt. An aggrieved party is one who was a party to the original proceedings that gave rise to the certiorari action; a person who merely feels injured by the ruling but was not a party cannot use Rule 65. Applied: petitioner was not a party to NAMFREL's accreditation proceedings and therefore lacked standing to assail the COMELEC's April 2, 2007 Resolution.
• Real Party in Interest and Material Interest — The real party in interest who stands to benefit or suffer from the judgment must prosecute or defend an action. Interest means material interest, an interest in issue that the decision will affect, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved or a mere incidental interest. Applied: petitioner's personal stake in the COMELEC ruling did not make him a party to the accreditation case; NAMFREL was the direct party.
• Direct Challenge to a Regulation Cannot Be Made Through an Original Rule 65 Certiorari Petition Dissociated from a Quasi-Judicial Action — A COMELEC adjudicatory action may be challenged on the basis of the invalidity of the law or regulation underlying it, but a valid challenge to the adjudicatory action must first exist, including the requisite personality. Absent that condition, the challenge is a direct challenge to the underlying law or regulation masquerading as a challenge to a COMELEC adjudicatory action. A stand-alone challenge to a regulation may be made through a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63, a petition for prohibition under Rule 65, or in the course of validly contesting an adjudicatory order. Applied: the petition was dismissed because it used Rule 65 to attack Resolution No. 7798 without a valid challenge to the COMELEC's adjudicatory resolution.
• Limits of Liberality and Transcendental Importance — The liberal application of procedural rules has limits and should not be abused. Alleged weighty transgressions do not justify blatant disregard of the Rules of Court, especially when other remedial measures are available. Applied: the Court refused to entertain the petition despite the petitioner's claims of grave violations.

• "An aggrieved party under Section 1, Rule 65 is one who was a party to the original proceedings that gave rise to the original action for certiorari under Rule 65." — This states the ratio decidendi for the first fatal defect: petitioner's lack of standing because he was not a party to the COMELEC accreditation proceedings.
• "The real party in interest who stands to benefit or suffer from the judgment in the suit must prosecute or defend an action. We have held that "interest" means material interest, an interest in issue that the decision will affect, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest." — This defines the material-interest requirement and explains why petitioner's personal interest did not confer standing.
• "Where this basic condition is absent, the challenge is unmasked for what it really is – a direct challenge to the underlying law or regulation masquerading as a challenge to a COMELEC adjudicatory action." — This captures the second fatal defect: the petition's attempt to attack Resolution No. 7798 through a Rule 65 petition nominally aimed at an adjudicatory resolution.
• "For our part, we cannot and should not – in the name of liberality and the "transcendental importance" doctrine – entertain these types of petitions." — This states the Court's refusal to relax procedural rules despite the petitioner's claims.

• Tang vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117204, February 11, 2000, 325 SCRA 394 — Followed to define "person aggrieved" under Section 1, Rule 65; only a party in the proceedings before the lower court can question the order or decision via certiorari.
• Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 144516, February 11, 2004, 422 SCRA 459 — Followed; Rule 65 certiorari is not available to any person who feels injured; the "person aggrieved" pertains only to one who was a party in the proceedings before the court a quo or the COA.
• Lozano, et al. vs. Nograles, G.R. Nos. 187883/187910, June 16, 2009 — Cited to hold that the liberal approach has limits and should not be abused; the Court refused to entertain the petition in the name of liberality and transcendental importance.

• Section 7, Article IX, 1987 Constitution — Provides that a decision, order, or ruling of each constitutional commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy. Applied to deny petitioner standing because he was not a party to the COMELEC accreditation proceedings.
• Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Provides that a person aggrieved by any act of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may file a petition for certiorari. Applied to hold that an aggrieved party is one who was a party to the original proceedings.
• Section 2, Rule 64, Rules of Court — Provides that a judgment or final order or resolution of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65. Applied to require aggrieved-party status for the challenge to the COMELEC's April 2, 2007 Resolution.
• Section 3, Executive Order No. 94 — Prohibits a barangay official from being appointed as member of the Board of Election Inspectors or as official watcher of each duly registered major political party or any socio-civic, religious, professional, or similar organization of which they may be members. It was the statutory basis cited for COMELEC Resolution No. 7798; the Court did not resolve its merits because the petition was dismissed on procedural grounds.
• Rule 63, Rules of Court — Mentioned as the proper mode for a stand-alone challenge to COMELEC Resolution No. 7798 through a petition for declaratory relief before the appropriate Regional Trial Court. Applied to show petitioner had available remedies other than an original Rule 65 certiorari petition.

The decision lists the following under "WE CONCUR," with those on leave noted as indicated in the text: Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno; Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing; Justice Antonio T. Carpio (On leave); Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (On leave); Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro; Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago; Justice Renato C. Corona; Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario; Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura; Justice Diosdado M. Peralta; and Justice Lucas P. Bersamin.