Primary Holding
An employer-employee relationship exists for purposes of workmen's compensation where the employer owns the premises where the employee is assigned and pays his salary directly from its funds, even if the employee was recruited through a watchmen's agency; and the defense of intoxication must be supported by clear and convincing proof that the employee's drunkenness rendered him incapable of performing his work and that the injury arose from that condition rather than from the employment.
Background
Compañia Maritima is a domestic corporation engaged in interisland trade, owning vessels such as the M/V BASILAN. Pablo Velez Special Watchmen's Agency is a single proprietorship that supplies watchmen and protective services to shipping companies, recruiting its watchmen from the Manila Bay Watchmen's Association, a registered labor organization with which Velez maintained a collective bargaining contract collecting fifteen percent of the watchmen's wages as commission. In late August 1954, during a strike by the Marine Officer's Guild, Compañia Maritima contracted with the Velez Agency for security services, and among the watchmen detailed to the company was Dionisio Hio, who was assigned as gangwayman aboard the M/V BASILAN.
History
-
The widow Ernesta Cabagnot Vda. de Hio filed a claim for death compensation with the Workmen's Compensation Commission on behalf of herself and her minor children.
-
The Workmen's Compensation Commission found that Dionisio Hio died of an accident in the course of his employment and declared Compañia Maritima as the employer, ordering it to pay ₱4,000.00 as death compensation, ₱200.00 as burial reimbursement, and ₱41.00 in fees under Section 55 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
-
Compañia Maritima appealed by certiorari to the Supreme Court, challenging the existence of an employer-employee relationship and alleging intoxication.
Facts
Compañia Maritima, a domestic corporation engaged in interisland trade, contracted with Pablo Velez Special Watchmen's Agency for security services during a strike staged by the Marine Officer's Guild in late August 1954. The Velez Agency supplied watchmen recruited from the Manila Bay Watchmen's Association, collecting fifteen percent of their wages as commission. Among those detailed to Compañia Maritima was Dionisio Hio, who was assigned as gangwayman aboard the M/V BASILAN, a vessel owned by the petitioner.
On September 4, 1954, Dionisio Hio was on night shift duty as gangwayman of the M/V BASILAN. At about 8:30 in the evening, the Chief Engineer of the vessel picked up Hio and several other watchmen in a jeep to escort him to his residence at Perla, Harrison, Pasay City. Upon arrival, the engineer offered drinks to the deceased and the other watchmen. After several rounds of liquor, the watchmen left the engineer's house and arrived at their respective posts at about 2:00 a.m. on September 5, 1954. At about 6:00 that morning, Hio's body was found floating near the side of the M/V BASILAN along the gangway where he had been assigned for duty.
The deceased was survived by his wife Ernesta Cabagnot Hio and three minor children, all dependent on his wages at the time of his death. The widow filed a claim for compensation with the Workmen's Compensation Commission, which found that Hio died of an accident occurring in the course of his employment and declared Compañia Maritima as his employer. The Commission ordered the company to pay ₱4,000.00 as death compensation, ₱200.00 as burial reimbursement, and ₱41.00 in fees under Section 55 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Compañia Maritima appealed, disclaiming any employer-employee relationship and alleging that the deceased was intoxicated at the time of death.
Arguments of the Petitioners
- No Employer-Employee Relationship: Petitioner claimed it never had any employer-employee relationship with the deceased, arguing that Hio was recruited through the Pablo Velez Special Watchmen's Agency and not directly hired by the company.
- Casual Employee: Petitioner contended that the deceased was but a casual employee whose services were engaged only for the duration of the strike and therefore not entitled to compensation under Section 39(b) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which excludes persons whose employment is "purely casual and is not for the purpose of the occupation or business of the employer."
- Intoxication: Petitioner insisted that the deceased was intoxicated while performing his duty as gangwayman in the early morning of September 5, 1954, and that such intoxication should excuse the company from liability.
Issues
- Employer-Employee Relationship: Whether the deceased was an employee of Compañia Maritima entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
- Intoxication: Whether the deceased was intoxicated while performing his duty as watchman at the time of his death.
Ruling
- Employer-Employee Relationship: Yes. An employer-employee relationship existed, the petitioner owning the vessel where the deceased was assigned and paying his salary directly from its funds, and the security work being connected with the business of the shipping company.
- Intoxication: No. The defense of intoxication was not established by clear and convincing proof, the autopsy report showing no alcohol in the body and the burden of proving intoxication resting on the employer.
Ruling Rationale
-
Employer-Employee Relationship: Although no written employment contract was presented, the petitioner owned the vessel M/V BASILAN where the deceased was assigned as gangwayman, and the Commission found that the deceased's salary was paid directly from the funds of the petitioner. These circumstances established that the deceased was under petitioner's employ at the time of the accident. The contention that he was a casual employee engaged only for the duration of the strike was rejected under Section 39(b) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which excludes only those whose employment is "purely casual and is not for the purpose of the occupation or business of the employer." Relying on Cajes vs. Philippine Manufacturing Co., the Court held that the casual-service exclusion must be construed by whether the service is related to the employer's business. The petitioner itself admitted having permanently employed watchmen performing the same duties as the deceased — providing security to the vessel's cargo and to the lives of its officers and crew — which is indispensable to the conduct of maritime business. The deceased's work was therefore in connection with the business of the petitioner.
-
Intoxication: The Workmen's Compensation Commission noted serious contradictions in the testimony of the witnesses for the Velez Agency regarding the alleged drinking spree: one witness testified that after drinking at the Chief Engineer's house the watchmen proceeded to their posts at Pier 8, while another claimed they went to other night spots in Pasay City. The widow testified that the deceased never got drunk while on duty, and the autopsy report and testimony of Dr. Cabreira of the Manila Police Department showed no indications of alcohol in the body. Citing Napoleon vs. McCullough, the Court noted that where evidence conflicts on whether the deceased was intoxicated, it is not error to fail to find intoxication, as such a ruling is necessarily included in a finding that the accident arose out of employment. The defense of drunkenness in workmen's compensation cases must be supported by clear and convincing proof that intoxication rendered the employee incapable of doing his work and that the injury arose from the drunken condition rather than from the work. No such evidence was adduced. Notably, the witnesses who testified on alleged drunkenness were from the Velez Agency, not from the petitioner, which could have presented its own Chief Engineer but failed to do so. Citing Ruprecht vs. Red Lumber Co., the Court held that the burden of establishing intoxication and its causal connection to the injury is on the employer.
Doctrines
-
Casual Employment Exclusion under the Workmen's Compensation Act — Under Section 39(b), a person whose employment is "purely casual and is not for the purpose of the occupation or business of the employer" is excluded from the term "laborer" or "employee." The exclusion turns on whether the service is related to the employer's occupation or business. Where the employee performs duties indispensable to the employer's business — such as providing security to a shipping company's vessels, cargo, officers, and crew — the employment is not "purely casual" even if the employee was recruited through an agency and initially engaged during a strike. The Court relied on Cajes vs. Philippine Manufacturing Co. in interpreting this provision.
-
Burden and Standard of Proof for the Defense of Intoxication — In workmen's compensation cases, the defense of intoxication must be supported by clear and convincing proof that the employee's drunkenness rendered him incapable of performing his work and that the injury arose from the drunken condition rather than from the employment. The burden of establishing intoxication and its causal connection to the injury rests on the employer. Where the evidence is conflicting on whether the deceased was intoxicated, and the autopsy report shows no alcohol in the body, the defense fails. The Court cited Napoleon vs. McCullough and Ruprecht vs. Red Lumber Co. in support.
Key Excerpts
-
"The defense of drunkenness in workmen's compensation cases must be supported by clear and convincing proof to the effect that such intoxication or drunkenness rendered the employee incapable of doing his work so that he could not be said to be engaged in his employment." — This passage articulates the standard of proof required for the intoxication defense, establishing that mere evidence of drinking is insufficient; the employer must show incapacity and causal connection to the injury.
-
"The accident or injury must be shown to have arisen out of his drunken condition and not out of the work. No such evidence was adduced in the present case." — This sentence defines the causal requirement of the intoxication defense, distinguishing injuries arising from drunkenness from those arising out of and in the course of employment.
-
"It has been ruled that the burden of establishing intoxication and that it caused the injury is on the employer." — This passage fixes the evidentiary burden on the employer asserting intoxication, a principle drawn from Ruprecht vs. Red Lumber Co.
Precedents Cited
-
Cajes vs. Philippine Manufacturing Co., 40 Off. Gaz. 1251 — Followed. This case interpreted Section 39(b) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, holding that the casual-service exclusion must be construed by whether the service is related to the employer's occupation or business. The Court applied this principle to find that the deceased's security work was connected with Compañia Maritima's maritime business.
-
Napoleon vs. McCullough, 89 N.J.L. 716; 99 Atl. 385 — Cited as persuasive foreign authority. This case supported the proposition that where testimony conflicts on whether the deceased was intoxicated, it is not error to fail to find intoxication, as such a ruling is necessarily included in a finding that the accident arose out of employment.
-
Ruprecht vs. Red Lumber Co., 2 Cal. Ind. Acc. Comm. 860; 12 N.C.C.A. 79 — Cited as persuasive foreign authority. This case established that the burden of proving intoxication and its causal connection to the injury rests on the employer.
Provisions
-
Section 39(b), Workmen's Compensation Act (as amended) — Defines "laborer" or "employee" as every person who has entered the employment of or works under a service or apprenticeship contract for an employer, excluding persons whose employment is "purely casual and is not for the purpose of the occupation or business of the employer." The Court interpreted this exclusion narrowly, finding that the deceased's security work was connected with the petitioner's maritime business and therefore not purely casual.
-
Section 55, Workmen's Compensation Act (as amended) — Authorizes the assessment of fees in connection with compensation awards. The Commission ordered the petitioner to pay ₱41.00 as fees required under this section.
Notable Concurring Opinions
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, and Barrera, JJ., concurred.