Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. The Insular Collector of Customs

A general statutory prohibition against export duties does not impliedly repeal a prior special law imposing wharfage charges, where Congress itself treated wharfage and export duties as distinct categories and where the two provisions are not absolutely incompatible.

The plaintiff-appellant, Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, was a tobacco company engaged in export operations from the Philippine Islands. The defendant-appellee, the Insular Collector of Customs at Manila, was the official responsible for collecting duties imposed under Acts of the United States Congress then in force in the Philippines. The dispute arose under two enactments of the U.S. Congress: the Act of August 5, 1909, which in Section 13 levied export duties on certain articles and in Section 14 imposed a wharfage charge on exported goods, and the Jones Law of 1916, whose Section 11 declared that no export duty shall be levied or collected on exports from the Philippine Islands. The question was whether the later general prohibition on export duties swept away the earlier specialized wharfage charge.

On March 6, 1923, Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas paid under protest to the Insular Collector of Customs at Manila the sum of P1,427.26, collected pursuant to Section 14 of the Act of Congress of the United States of August 5, 1909, entitled "An Act to raise revenue for the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes." That section imposed a duty of one dollar per gross ton of one thousand kilos upon all articles, goods, wares, or merchandise — except coal, timber, and cement — that were the product of the Philippine Islands and were exported through Philippine ports of entry or shipped to the United States or its possessions, as a charge for wharfage, regardless of the port of destination or the nationality of the exporting vessel. The section exempted articles imported, exported, or shipped in transit for the use of the Government of the United States or of the Philippine Islands.

The appellant thereafter brought an action to recover the P1,427.26 as having been illegally collected. Its theory rested on Section 11 of the Jones Law, enacted by the same U.S. Congress, which declared that "no export duty shall be levied or collected on exports from the Philippine Islands." The appellant contended that this provision operated as an implied repeal of Section 14 of the 1909 Act, because the wharfage charge was in substance an export duty prohibited by the Jones Law.

The trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint, prompting the present appeal. The agreed statement of facts did not contain any proof that the articles upon which the P1,427.26 was collected had actually passed through any government wharf, a circumstance the Court noted but declined to resolve, treating the question of collection absent use of a government wharf as abstract and unnecessary to the decision.

• Implied Repeal by the Jones Law: The appellant contended that Section 14 of the Act of Congress of August 5, 1909, was impliedly repealed by Section 11 of the Jones Law, which prohibits the levying or collection of export duties on exports from the Philippine Islands.
• Wharfage Duty as Export Duty: The appellant argued at length that the wharfage duties referred to in Section 14 of the 1909 Act were in fact export duties, and thus fell within the prohibition of Section 11 of the Jones Law.

• Implied Repeal: Whether Section 14 of the Act of Congress of August 5, 1909 (imposing a wharfage duty) was impliedly repealed by Section 11 of the Jones Law (prohibiting export duties on exports from the Philippine Islands).

• Implied Repeal: No. Section 14 of the 1909 Act was not impliedly repealed by Section 11 of the Jones Law, the two provisions not being absolutely incompatible, and the former imposing a wharfage charge rather than an export duty.

• Implied Repeal: Implied repeal rests on a presumption of legislative intent to repeal, which arises only when the new and old laws are absolutely incompatible. No such incompatibility exists between Section 11 of the Jones Law and Section 14 of the 1909 Act. Section 11 prohibits the collection of export duties, while Section 14 imposes a charge for wharfage — a distinct category. That Congress itself treated them as different is evident from the structure of the 1909 Act: Section 13 was written under the caption "Export Duties" and Section 14 under the caption "Wharfage." This distinction was further confirmed by the Tariff Law of 1913, enacted by the same Congress, which expressly repealed Section 13 (the export-duty provision) while preserving Section 14 (the wharfage provision). Moreover, Section 11 of the Jones Law is a general provision, whereas Section 14 of the 1909 Act is a special one; under settled rule, a general law does not repeal a special law unless expressly provided or the two are incompatible. The Jones Law was enacted to fix, in general terms, the powers of the Philippine Legislature, and there is no indication that Congress intended to repeal a prior special law on a determinate matter. Although the negative phrasing of Section 11 ("no export duty shall be levied or collected") creates a stronger inference of intent to repeal than affirmative language would, that circumstance loses force when, as here, the legislative intent to repeal does not otherwise appear and the contrary intent is evident. The Court also declined to address whether the wharfage duty could be collected when exported articles did not pass through any government wharf, because the agreed statement of facts contained no proof on that point, rendering the question abstract.

• Implied Repeal — Implied repeal rests only on the presumption of legislative intent to repeal, and that presumption arises only when the new and old law are absolutely incompatible. Where the two provisions can coexist — as when one governs export duties and the other governs wharfage charges — there is no implied repeal. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Section 11 of the Jones Law did not impliedly repeal Section 14 of the 1909 Act, because the two were not irreconcilably inconsistent.
• General Law Does Not Repeal a Special Law — A general law does not repeal a prior special law unless there is express provision to that effect or the two are incompatible. The Court applied this principle by classifying Section 11 of the Jones Law as a general provision and Section 14 of the 1909 Act as a special one, concluding that the general prohibition on export duties did not sweep away the specialized wharfage charge.
• Legislative Intent as the Controlling Inquiry — Even when the form of a statute (e.g., negative phrasing) creates a stronger inference of intent to repeal, the ultimate question is the intention of the law. Where the surrounding legislative history — such as Congress's express repeal of the export-duty section while preserving the wharfage section in a subsequent tariff law — shows no intent to repeal, the inference from statutory form yields to the contrary evidence of intent.

• "An implied repeal rests only on the presumption of the intention to repeal. This presumption arises when the new and the old law are absolutely incompatible." — This passage states the controlling standard for implied repeal, the ratio decidendi upon which the Court's conclusion rests.
• "On the other hand, section 11 of the Jones Law is a general provision, while section 14 of the Act of August 5, 1909, is a special one. The rule is that a general law does not repeal another special one unless it is so expressly provided, or they are incompatible." — This passage articulates the general-versus-special-law rule as applied to the statutory provisions at issue, reinforcing the conclusion against implied repeal.
• "Evidently, according to this, the Congress has considered both things, export duty and wharfage duty, as different. So much so that in the Tariff Law of 1913 of the same Congress, section 13 of the Act of August 15, 1909, was expressly repealed and yet section 14 was preserved." — This passage highlights the legislative history evidence — Congress's own treatment of the two provisions as distinct and its selective repeal — that the Court found decisive.

• Smith, Bell & Company vs. Rafferty, 40 Phil. 691 — Cited in the dissenting opinion for the proposition that any tax accruing by reason of the exportation of merchandise is an export duty, with approval of the U.S. Supreme Court case Crew Levick Co. vs. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292. The majority did not rely on this citation.
• Brown vs. State of Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 and other U.S. Supreme Court cases — Cited in the dissenting opinion for the proposition that taxes or burdens placed upon exportation of merchandise, even under the guise of occupation taxes, have been held invalid. These citations appear exclusively in Justice Johnson's dissent.

• Section 14, Act of Congress of August 5, 1909 (Tariff Act of 1909) — Imposed a duty of one dollar per gross ton on articles exported from the Philippine Islands as a charge for wharfage. The Court held this provision remained in force and was not repealed by the Jones Law.
• Section 13, Act of Congress of August 5, 1909 (Tariff Act of 1909) — Levied specific export duties on abaca, sugar, copra, and tobacco. This section was expressly repealed by the Tariff Law of 1913, a fact the Court used to show that Congress knew how to distinguish and selectively repeal export-duty provisions while preserving wharfage charges.
• Section 11, Jones Law (Act of Congress of August 29, 1916) — Declared that "no export duty shall be levied or collected on exports from the Philippine Islands." The Court construed this as a general provision that did not impliedly repeal the special wharfage charge in Section 14 of the 1909 Act.
• Section 4, Tariff Act of October 3, 1913 — Repealed Section 13 of the 1909 Act (export duties) while preserving Section 14 (wharfage), cited by the Court as legislative history demonstrating Congress's intent to treat the two charges as distinct.

Street, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concurred.

• Johnson, J. — Justice Johnson dissented, arguing that the wharfage duty under Section 14 of the 1909 Tariff Act was in substance an export duty and therefore fell within the prohibition of Section 11 of the Jones Law. He emphasized that the Jones Law's language — "no export duty shall be levied or collected on exports from the Philippine Islands" — was clear, emphatic, and unqualified, and that its manifest purpose was to foster and encourage export trade. He contended that any tax accruing by reason of the exportation of merchandise is an export duty, citing Smith, Bell & Company vs. Rafferty, 40 Phil. 691, and numerous U.S. Supreme Court authorities for the proposition that burdens placed upon exportation, even under the guise of other charges, are invalid. He rejected the majority's characterization of the charge as mere wharfage, noting that the statute itself used the word "duty" and that no export duty can be justified by the plea that the proceeds might be used for wharf construction. He concluded that Section 14 was repugnant to Section 11 of the Jones Law and must yield, and that the judgment should be revoked.