Commission on Human Rights vs. Office of the Ombudsman

The Ombudsman's dismissal of a criminal complaint for lack of probable cause will not be disturbed via certiorari absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and allegations based on hearsay and contradicted by the complainants' own evidence are insufficient to establish probable cause.

The Commission on Human Rights (CHR), exercising its constitutional visitorial power over jails, prisons, and detention facilities, investigated reports of a secret detention cell at Raxabago Police Station 1 in Tondo, City of Manila, then under the command of Police Superintendent Robert C. Domingo. After its visit on April 27, 2017, the CHR filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman charging several police officers with violations of the Revised Penal Code (arbitrary detention, delay in delivery of detained persons, grave threats, grave coercion, and robbery/extortion), Republic Act No. 9745 (Anti-Torture Act of 2009), and the 2013 Revised PNP Operational Procedures. The Ombudsman dismissed both the criminal and administrative aspects of the complaint for lack of probable cause, prompting the CHR to elevate the criminal aspect to the Supreme Court via certiorari.

On April 27, 2017, in the early evening, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) visited Raxabago Police Station 1 in Tondo, City of Manila, acting on information about a secret detention cell in the station. The station was then under the command of Police Superintendent Robert C. Domingo. During the visit, the CHR discovered a room inside the Drug Enforcement Unit's (DEU) office measuring one meter by five meters, its entrance concealed by a wooden shelf. The CHR described the room as cramped, dingy, fetid, and dark, with no lights or windows, and only one male urinal—conditions that allegedly forced some detainees to urinate and defecate in plastic bags.

Inside the room were three women and nine men, allegedly arrested for various violations of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). Their periods of confinement ranged from two days to one week. The CHR alleged that the detainees' names were not recorded in the station's logbooks, that they had not been subjected to inquest proceedings as of April 27, 2017, that they were not provided food, that some police officers demanded money in exchange for their release—amounts ranging from ₱30,000 to ₱300,000—and that some detainees were physically assaulted and electrocuted with a taser. To support these allegations, the CHR submitted a video of the confrontation with station personnel, photos of the cell's exterior and interior, sworn statements from individuals whose relatives had been detained there, and affidavits from CHR attorneys.

PSUPT Domingo, the only respondent who submitted a counter-affidavit, maintained that the detainees were lawfully arrested during a legitimate police operation conducted at around 4:30 a.m. on April 27, 2017. He explained that the room in question was a "holding room," not a secret detention cell, used to separate newly arrested persons from persons already being tried, for expediency given its proximity to the DEU office, to decongest regular detention cells, to enforce stiffer security, and to safeguard police officers' welfare. He claimed the room had sufficient lighting, ventilation, water supply, and urinals, and that its entrance could be seen from Capulong Street, which had a separate ingress and egress. He denied all allegations of torture, inhumane treatment, unlawful arrest, and extortion, and noted that on the day of the CHR's visit, the station held 78 men and 18 women detainees despite a capacity for only 50. PO2 Verdan, PO2 Ubarre, and PO1 Apolonio did not submit counter-affidavits or position papers.

The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint, finding that the detainees were arrested on April 26 or 27, 2017 based on indorsements to the inquest prosecutor and joint affidavits of arrest, with no showing of detention beyond the allowable period. Ten of the twelve detainees executed sworn statements before the Public Attorney's Office that did not support the CHR's claims; on the contrary, they stated their conditions were fine. Detainee Cesar De Guzman recanted his earlier affidavit to support the CHR's allegations, but the Ombudsman found his credibility questionable because medical certificates issued on separate dates showed no external signs of physical injury. The Ombudsman also noted that the CHR's video footage only showed a dark room with a male urinal, without sufficient detail to corroborate the described conditions. The CHR sought reconsideration, which was denied. Thereafter, the CHR filed the present Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court, assailing only the criminal aspect of the Ombudsman's rulings.

• Quantum of Evidence: The CHR argued that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the complaint using "clear and convincing evidence" as the quantum of evidence instead of "probable cause," which is the proper standard for determining whether a criminal information should be filed.
• Sufficiency Under Probable Cause: The CHR maintained that with probable cause as the correct standard, it had sufficiently established the crimes charged against respondents.

• Legitimate Police Operation: PSUPT Domingo countered that the detainees were lawfully arrested during a legitimate police operation and that the room in question was a holding room, not a secret detention cell, used for valid operational and security reasons including congestion management.
• Denial of Allegations: PSUPT Domingo denied the allegations of torture, inhumane treatment, unlawful arrest, and extortion, asserting that the holding room had sufficient lighting, ventilation, water supply, and urinals.
• Ombudsman's Non-Participation: The Ombudsman manifested that it would not participate in the proceedings, as doing so would amount to advocating for the innocence or non-culpability of respondents.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the criminal aspect of the complaint for lack of probable cause.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint, the evidence presented being insufficient to establish probable cause for the crimes charged. The Ombudsman's references to "clear and convincing evidence" were descriptive of the quality of the CHR's evidence, not the quantum of proof required, and even under the probable cause standard, the evidence fell short.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Court reaffirmed the well-settled doctrine that the Ombudsman possesses full discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be filed or dismissed, and that the Court consistently adopts a policy of non-interference in the exercise of this constitutionally mandated power. While certiorari jurisdiction may be invoked when the Ombudsman's action is tainted with grave abuse of discretion—defined as a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, or an arbitrary or despotic manner so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty—the CHR bore the burden of proving such abuse and failed to do so.

As to the CHR's argument that the Ombudsman applied the wrong quantum of evidence, the Court found that a careful reading of the Ombudsman's Joint Resolution and Joint Order showed that the phrases "clear and convincing evidence" and "clear and strong evidence" did not pertain to the quantum of evidence necessary to establish the complaint. Rather, the Ombudsman was describing the pieces of evidence presented by the CHR as not clear, convincing, and strong enough to warrant a finding of probable cause. This was evident because the Ombudsman first ruled that the CHR "failed to establish probable cause" and then immediately followed with the statement that the CHR "failed to show by clear and strong evidence" the factual basis for the charges.

Even assuming arguendo that probable cause was the correct standard and applying it on the merits, the Court agreed with the Ombudsman's appreciation of the evidence. The CHR's allegations constituting grave threats, grave coercion, robbery/extortion, and violations of Republic Act No. 9745 were based on hearsay, as the CHR itself stated that the detainees relayed the information to them. Worse, ten of the twelve detainees executed sworn statements before the Public Attorney's Office that did not support the CHR's claims; on the contrary, they stated their condition inside the station was fine. Medical certificates issued on separate dates showed no manifestation of physical abuse. As to arbitrary detention and delay in delivery of detained persons, the detainees' own statements established that they were arrested on April 26 or 27, 2017, and the indorsements to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, together with supporting documents, were received on April 28, 2017. The CHR failed to provide evidence of any delay beyond the allowable period and even failed to allege details showing the supposed delay.

As to the alleged secret detention cell, the CHR failed to submit the video footage before the Court. The Court also noted that at the time of the visit, the number of detainees exceeded the station's capacity, a fact the CHR did not deny. Absent a showing that other available spaces existed for the twelve detainees, the Court could not find bad faith on the part of respondents. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties further operated against the CHR, which failed to present evidence that respondents failed to perform their duties. While the Court acknowledged the deplorable state of jail facilities and the State's constitutional and statutory obligations to provide clean, adequately equipped, and sanitary penal facilities—including those articulated in the Nelson Mandela Rules—it declined to hold the officers on the ground responsible for systemic overcrowding and budgetary constraints, and instead called on policymakers, implementers, and stakeholders to urgently improve jail facilities.

• Ombudsman's Prosecutorial Discretion — The Ombudsman has full discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be filed or not, and may dismiss a complaint found insufficient in form or substance. The Court consistently adopts a policy of non-interference in the exercise of this constitutionally mandated power. Certiorari may be invoked only when the Ombudsman's exercise of power is tainted with grave abuse of discretion—defined as a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, or an arbitrary or despotic manner so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. In this case, the Court found no such abuse.

• Probable Cause — Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which they were prosecuted. It signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious person's belief that the accused is guilty. The Ombudsman must find enough relevant evidence to support the belief that the accused most likely committed the crimes charged. Here, the CHR's evidence—based on hearsay, contradicted by the detainees' own sworn statements, and unsupported by medical evidence—did not meet this standard.

• Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Official Duties — Absent evidence that public officers failed to perform their duty, it is presumed that they performed their duty properly. This presumption operated against the CHR, which failed to present evidence overcoming it.

• "the Ombudsman is describing the pieces of evidence presented by the CHR which are not clear, convincing, and strong enough to warrant probable cause." — This passage resolves the central procedural argument by clarifying that the Ombudsman's references to "clear and convincing evidence" were descriptive of evidentiary quality, not a misapplication of the quantum of proof required for probable cause.

• "Hence, the Court cannot find bad faith on respondents when they put the 12 detainees in a small room, which appeared to have no artificial light, considering that there is no showing that there were other available spaces where the 12 detainees may be detained." — This is the operative conclusion on the secret detention cell issue, declining to attribute bad faith to the police officers given the absence of alternative spaces and the station's overcrowded conditions.

• "Other than the alleged secret detention cell which the CHR has seen firsthand, its allegations constituting the crimes of grave threats, grave coercion, robbery/extortion, violations of Republic Act No. 9745, specifically Section 4(a)(1) to (4) and Section 4(b)(3) and (11) were based on hearsay considering that the CHR stated that the detainees relayed it to them." — This passage identifies the evidentiary deficiency that proved fatal to the CHR's complaint: the hearsay nature of the allegations regarding the most serious charges.

• Vergara vs. Ombudsman, 600 Phil. 26 (2009) — Controlling precedent cited for the doctrine that the filing or non-filing of an information is primarily lodged within the full discretion of the Ombudsman, and for the definition of probable cause.

• Arroyo vs. Sandiganbayan, 869 Phil. 400 (2020) — Followed for the principle that the Ombudsman is endowed with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory prerogatives and that the Court does not generally interfere with the exercise of this constitutional mandate, consistent with the principle of separation of powers.

• Ciron vs. Ombudsman, 758 Phil. 354 (2015) — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion that would justify certiorari review of the Ombudsman's actions.

• Almonte vs. People, 878 Phil. 628 (2020) — Cited extensively for the recognition of deplorable jail conditions and the State's obligations under the Nelson Mandela Rules, as articulated in the separate opinions of then SAJ Perlas-Bernabe and now SAJ Leonen. The Court used this case to call attention to the need for improved penal facilities while distinguishing the systemic problem from the individual culpability of the police officers in this case.

• Tetangco vs. Ombudsman, 515 Phil. 230 (2006) — Cited for the definition of probable cause as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to warrant a cautious person's belief in the accused's guilt.

• Article III, Section 19(2), 1987 Constitution — Provides that the employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law. The Court cited this provision to underscore the State's obligation to provide adequate penal facilities while calling on policymakers to act.

• Republic Act No. 6975, Section 63 (Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990) — Mandates the establishment and maintenance in every district, city, and municipality of a secured, clean, adequately equipped, and sanitary jail for the custody and safekeeping of city and municipal prisoners. Cited to reinforce the State's duty regarding jail standards.

• Republic Act No. 10575 (Bureau of Corrections Act of 2013), Sections 2 and 4 — Declares State policy to promote the general welfare and safeguard the basic rights of every prisoner, and mandates the Bureau of Corrections to provide decent provisions of quarters, food, water, and clothing in compliance with established United Nations standards. Cited to connect domestic law to the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules).

• Republic Act No. 9745 (Anti-Torture Act of 2009), Section 4(a)(1) to (4) and Section 4(b)(3) and (11) — Defines and penalizes acts of torture, including systematic beating, food deprivation, electric shock, and cigarette burning. The CHR charged respondents with violating these provisions, but the Court found the evidence insufficient to establish probable cause.

• Rule 65, Section 1, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for certiorari. The Court noted that the CHR failed to include in its petition the attachments to PSUPT Domingo's counter-affidavit, in violation of this rule, though the deficiency was cured by Domingo's supplemental comment.

Lazaro-Javier, M. Lopez, and J. Lopez, JJ., concurred.

• Leonen, SAJ. — Senior Associate Justice Leonen voted to GRANT the petition, disagreeing with the majority's finding that the CHR failed to establish probable cause. He argued that the deplorable conditions of the secret detention cell—measuring one by five meters housing twelve individuals, with no lights or windows, a single male urinal, and its entrance concealed by a wooden shelf—were themselves sufficient to show probable cause of violations of the individuals' rights against torture and freedom from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. He rejected the police officers' claim that the room had a separate ingress and egress along Capulong Street, noting that photos in the record showed the supposed access was blocked by steel bars. He characterized the presumption of regularity as insufficient to justify the obvious deficiencies and argued that the police officers should be held for trial at least for violations of Sections 5 and 7 of the Anti-Torture Act (cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, and prohibited detention). He further urged the Court to formulate a judicial remedy grounded on social justice called the writ of kalayaan to address the systemic problem of substandard detention conditions, reiterating his earlier proposal in Almonte vs. People that persons deprived of liberty should be able to file actions for violations of their constitutional rights against cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment.