Cometa vs. Court of Appeals

A complaint for malicious prosecution states a cause of action only if it alleges all four requisites: (1) the defendant was the prosecutor or instituted the prosecution at his instance; (2) the prosecution terminated in the plaintiff's acquittal; (3) the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (4) the prosecutor was actuated by malice. The dismissal of a criminal case on demurrer to evidence for failure to establish a prima facie case does not, by itself, establish lack of probable cause for malicious prosecution.

Private respondent Honeycomb Builders, Inc. sought from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board a license to sell townhouse units at the RSG Condominium-Gueventville II Subdivision. Where the property covered by the application was mortgaged, HLURB required an affidavit of undertaking from the mortgagee or financing institution. Petitioners State Investment Trust, Inc. and Reynaldo T. Cometa were allegedly the mortgagee and its president, respectively, while private respondent Reynaldo S. Guevarra was associated with the applicant corporations. The present action is a civil complaint for malicious prosecution arising from the criminal charge of falsification of public documents filed against Guevarra.

Private respondent Honeycomb Builders, Inc. applied with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board for a license to sell townhouse units at the RSG Condominium-Gueventville II Subdivision. The properties covered by the application were mortgaged to petitioner State Investment Trust, Inc., whose president was petitioner Reynaldo T. Cometa. Private respondent Reynaldo S. Guevarra was an incorporator, stockholder, director, and officer of the applicant corporations. Under HLURB requirements, if the property was mortgaged, the applicant had to submit an affidavit of undertaking from the mortgagee or financing institution; without it, the application would not be recommended for approval.

A supposed Affidavit of Undertaking dated September 9, 1987, bearing Cometa's purported signature, was allegedly submitted to the HLURB in connection with the application. Cometa claimed that the signature was not his and that the document was forged. Sometime in 1989, while SIHI's appeal from an order of the lower court was pending with the appellate courts, SIHI and Cometa filed a criminal case for falsification of public documents against Guevarra with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Makati, docketed as I.S. No. 89-3747. The basis was the supposed forged Affidavit of Undertaking.

After the parties submitted their respective affidavits, the Makati Provincial Fiscal dismissed the case. Petitioners appealed to the Department of Justice, which reversed the dismissal and ordered the filing of the corresponding information in court. A criminal information was filed against Guevarra in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61, docketed as Criminal Case No. 90-3018. A warrant of arrest was issued; Guevarra posted bail and the warrant was lifted. He was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The prosecution, represented by a private prosecutor hired by the defendants, presented its evidence. Its principal evidence consisted of Cometa's sworn testimony that Guevarra had submitted the forged document to the HLURB; the NBI handwriting expert's questioned documents report showing that the signature above Cometa's name in the undertaking and Cometa's specimen signatures were not written by the same person; and the testimony of an HLURB official on the standard requirements for license applications, including the need for an affidavit of undertaking if the property was mortgaged. Documentary evidence included corporate papers and titles of Guevent and Honeycomb.

After the prosecution rested, Guevarra filed a Motion to Dismiss on a Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the prosecution's evidence did not suffice to show that he committed the crime. On March 26, 1992, the RTC Makati granted the motion and dismissed the criminal case for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case, without pronouncement as to costs. The trial court found neither direct nor circumstantial evidence that Guevarra was the author of the falsified document. It noted that the forged Letter of Undertaking was dated September 9, 1987, while Guevarra's application and attached documents were dated September 3, 1987, so it was not clear that he was responsible for sending the later document and the legal presumption that the possessor of a forged instrument is the forger did not apply. The trial court also noted that Guevarra had represented in an affidavit to the HLURB that the property was unencumbered, so there was no need for him to submit a letter of undertaking, which was required only if the property was mortgaged.

Private respondents Guevarra and Honeycomb Builders, Inc. thereafter filed a complaint for malicious prosecution against petitioners in Civil Case Q-93-15691. The complaint alleged that the criminal case had absolutely no basis in fact and in law and that petitioners filed it with the sole intent of harassing and pressuring Guevarra, as chairman of Guevent Industrial Development Corporation, to give in to their alleged desire to appropriate the remaining unsold properties of GIDC and/or to influence the appellate courts to decide in their favor in the GIDC case. The complaint also alleged the criminal case proceedings, the fiscal's dismissal, the DOJ reversal, the filing of the information, the warrant and bail, the arraignment, the prosecution's evidence, and the RTC's March 26, 1992 dismissal on demurrer. The Supreme Court found that the complaint did not sufficiently allege absence of probable cause, even taking its allegations and the attached trial court order as true.

• Probable Cause and Absence of Malice: Petitioners contended that the complaint and its annexes show they acted with probable cause and without malice in charging Guevarra with falsification of public documents.
• Non-Inclusion of Government Prosecutors: Petitioners argued that the non-inclusion in the civil case for malicious prosecution of the government prosecutors who directed the filing of the criminal case in court shows the existence of probable cause and the absence of malice.
• Reliance on Martinez vs. United Finance Corporation: Petitioners cited Martinez vs. United Finance Corporation, where a malicious prosecution complaint was dismissed upon showing that a preliminary investigation was conducted by the fiscal; that despite plaintiff's opposition, an information was filed by the fiscal; and that plaintiff was acquitted of the offense charged.

• Sufficient Allegation of Lack of Probable Cause: Private respondents argued that the absence of probable cause was sufficiently alleged in their complaint because petitioners' criminal action against Guevarra had no basis in fact and in law.
• Effect of Dismissal on Demurrer: Private respondents maintained that the trial court's dismissal of the criminal case for falsification of public documents on Guevarra's demurrer to evidence sufficiently established the absence of probable cause.

• Sufficiency of Complaint for Malicious Prosecution: Whether the complaint for malicious prosecution states a cause of action, specifically whether it sufficiently alleges that petitioners acted without probable cause.
• Effect of Dismissal on Demurrer: Whether the dismissal of the criminal case on demurrer to evidence, by itself, establishes lack of probable cause for malicious prosecution.

• Sufficiency of Complaint for Malicious Prosecution: No. The complaint failed to state a cause of action because it did not sufficiently allege absence of probable cause, an essential element of malicious prosecution separate and distinct from malice.
• Effect of Dismissal on Demurrer: No. The dismissal of the criminal case on demurrer to evidence does not by itself establish lack of probable cause; probable cause is different from and requires a lower quantum of proof than prima facie evidence.

• Sufficiency of Complaint for Malicious Prosecution: The requisites of malicious prosecution are: (1) the defendant was himself the prosecutor or at least the prosecution was instituted at his instance; (2) the prosecution finally terminated in the acquittal of the plaintiff; (3) in bringing the action the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (4) the prosecutor was actuated by malice, i.e., by improper and sinister motives. The first two requisites were sufficiently alleged. Malice was also sufficiently pleaded, because a general averment of malice is sufficient under Rule 8, §5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; the allegation that petitioners filed the criminal case to harass and pressure Guevarra to accede to their alleged desire to appropriate GIDC properties and/or influence the appellate courts sufficed. The third requisite, lack of probable cause, was not sufficiently alleged. Lack of probable cause is an element separate and distinct from malice; one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. A determination that there was no probable cause cannot rest solely on the trial court's dismissal of the criminal prosecution on demurrer, nor on the DOJ's reversal of the fiscal's findings and order to file the criminal case. The first would transform all acquittals into countersuits for malicious prosecution; the second would result in the dismissal of all complaints for malicious prosecution. The inquiry should be whether sufficient facts are alleged showing that in bringing the criminal action, the defendant in the civil action for malicious prosecution acted without probable cause. For purposes of malicious prosecution, probable cause means such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. Even considering the complaint's allegations and the attached trial court order as true, they did not establish absence of probable cause. The prosecution evidence showed probable cause: Cometa testified that he did not execute the undertaking and that his signature was not his; the NBI handwriting expert reported that the signature and Cometa's specimen signatures were not written by the same person; an HLURB official testified that if the property was mortgaged, an affidavit of undertaking from the mortgagee or financing institution was required and without it the application would not be recommended for approval; and the records showed Guevarra submitted the application with the required documents. Private respondents admitted that the properties were mortgaged to petitioner SITI, so a letter of undertaking by the mortgagee was needed for the issuance of a license to sell to HBI. The trial court's finding that no prima facie case was established did not imply lack of probable cause. Prima facie evidence is different from probable cause; prima facie evidence requires a degree or quantum of proof greater than probable cause. Prima facie evidence denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain a prosecution or establish the facts, as to counterbalance the presumption of innocence and warrant the conviction of the accused. Probable cause for the filing of an information merely means reasonable ground for belief in the existence of facts warranting the proceedings complained of, or an apparent state of facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry which would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent man to believe that the accused person has committed the crime. What is needed to bring an action in court is simply probable cause, not prima facie evidence. Under Rule 112, §11 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, what is required for bringing a criminal action is only such evidence as is sufficient to engender a well-founded belief as to the facts of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. The trial court's findings, as summarized above, clearly show that petitioners had reasonable ground to believe that Guevarra was responsible for the forged Letter of Undertaking submitted to the HLURB in connection with HBI's application for a license to sell units at the RSG Condominium-Gueventville II Subdivision. Thus, the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
• Effect of Dismissal on Demurrer: The dismissal on demurrer was based on failure to establish a prima facie case. Prima facie evidence is different from probable cause; it requires a greater quantum of proof. Probable cause for filing an information means reasonable ground for belief in the existence of facts warranting the proceedings, or an apparent state of facts found upon reasonable inquiry that would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent man to believe the accused committed the crime. What is needed to bring an action in court is simply probable cause, not prima facie evidence. Under Rule 112, §11, only evidence sufficient to engender a well-founded belief as to the facts of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt is required. Therefore, the trial court's dismissal on demurrer did not establish lack of probable cause. The prosecution evidence, as summarized by the trial court, showed probable cause.

• Malicious Prosecution — Requisites — A complaint for malicious prosecution states a cause of action only if it alleges: (1) the defendant was himself the prosecutor or at least the prosecution was instituted at his instance; (2) the prosecution finally terminated in the acquittal of the plaintiff; (3) in bringing the action the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (4) the prosecutor was actuated by malice, i.e., by improper and sinister motives. In this case, the first, second, and fourth requisites were sufficiently alleged, but the third was not; the complaint therefore failed to state a cause of action.
• Probable Cause vs. Prima Facie Evidence — Probable cause for malicious prosecution means such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is different from and requires a lower quantum of proof than prima facie evidence, which denotes evidence that, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain a prosecution or establish the facts, counterbalance the presumption of innocence, and warrant conviction. The dismissal of a criminal case on demurrer for failure to establish a prima facie case does not by itself establish lack of probable cause.
• Effect of Dismissal and DOJ Reversal — A determination that there was no probable cause cannot rest solely on the trial court's dismissal of the criminal prosecution on demurrer, nor on the Department of Justice's reversal of the fiscal's findings and order to file the criminal case. The first would transform all acquittals into countersuits for malicious prosecution; the second would result in the dismissal of all complaints for malicious prosecution.
• General Averment of Malice — Under Rule 8, §5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a general averment of malice is sufficient. The allegation that petitioners filed the criminal case to harass and pressure Guevarra to accede to their alleged desire to appropriate GIDC properties and/or influence the appellate courts was sufficient to plead malice.
• Sufficiency of Complaint on Motion to Dismiss — When dismissal is sought on the ground that the complaint does not state a sufficient cause of action, the question is whether, taking the facts alleged in the complaint and its annexes to be true, they constitute a cause of action, not whether the allegations are true.

• "a complaint for malicious prosecution states a cause of action if it alleges the following: (1) that the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that at least the prosecution was instituted at his instance; (2) that the prosecution finally terminated in the acquittal of the plaintiff; (3) that in bringing the action the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (4) that the prosecutor was actuated by malice, i.e. by improper and sinister motives." — States the four requisites of malicious prosecution and frames the Court's central test for sufficiency of the complaint.
• "To be sure, lack of probable cause is an element separate and distinct from that of malice. It follows, therefore, that one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause." — Articulates the ratio decidendi that absence of probable cause must be independently alleged and proved; malice alone does not suffice.
• "prima facie evidence is different from probable cause. Prima facie evidence requires a degree or quantum of proof greater than probable cause." — Defines the distinction that defeats private respondents' reliance on the dismissal on demurrer to establish lack of probable cause.
• "probable cause" means "such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted." — Supplies the canonical definition of probable cause applied to the prosecution evidence.

• Suyom vs. Collantes, 69 SCRA 514 (1976) — Cited for the rule that when dismissal is sought for failure to state a cause of action, the question is whether the facts alleged in the complaint, taken as true, constitute a cause of action.
• Madera vs. Lopez, 102 SCRA 700 (1981) — Cited for the requisites of malicious prosecution.
• Ventura vs. Bernabe, 38 SCRA 587 (1971) — Cited in support of the rule that lack of probable cause cannot be determined solely from the trial court's dismissal or the DOJ's reversal.
• Buchanan vs. Vda. de Esteban, 32 Phil. 363, 365 (1915) — Cited for the definition of probable cause in malicious prosecution.
• People vs. Montilla, 285 SCRA 703, 720 n. 22 (1998) — Cited for the definition of prima facie evidence and probable cause.
• Cruz, Jr. vs. People, 233 SCRA 439, 459 (1994) — Cited for the rule that what is needed to bring an action in court is simply probable cause, not prima facie evidence.
• Martinez vs. United Finance Corporation, 34 SCRA 524 (1970) — Cited by petitioners in support of their argument that the complaint showed probable cause and absence of malice; the Court resolved the case on the complaint's failure to sufficiently allege lack of probable cause.

• Rule 8, §5, Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that a general averment of malice is sufficient. Applied: the complaint's allegation that petitioners filed the criminal case to harass and pressure Guevarra was sufficient to plead malice.
• Rule 112, §11, Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that what is required for bringing a criminal action is evidence sufficient to engender a well-founded belief as to the facts of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. Applied: probable cause, not prima facie evidence, is the standard for filing an information; thus the trial court's dismissal for lack of prima facie case did not establish lack of probable cause.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.