Cojuangco-Suntay vs. Suntay

A judgment admitting a will to probate may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic fraud where the testator deliberately conceals the proceedings from compulsory heirs by failing to provide their addresses and ensuring they are not notified, thereby depriving them of their day in court.

Federico C. Suntay (Federico) was the grandfather of petitioners Isabel and Emilio Jr. After a prior Supreme Court decision (Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay) confirmed the petitioners' status as legitimate grandchildren and compulsory heirs, Federico executed a second Last Will and Testament on March 20, 1999. This will disinherited the petitioners, citing a newly discovered document and allegations of maltreatment. Federico filed a petition for probate of this second will with the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, instead of in Baguio City where he resided. He failed to state the petitioners' addresses in the petition.

• Parties and Prior Litigation: Petitioners Isabel and Emilio Jr. are the legitimate grandchildren of the deceased Federico C. Suntay, a status confirmed by a prior Supreme Court decision. Respondents Emilio III and Nenita are Federico's legally adopted children and the named executor and executrix in his will. The parties were involved in prior contentious litigation over the estate of Federico's wife, Cristina.
• Execution of the Second Will: On March 20, 1999, Federico executed a second will. This will explicitly disinherited the petitioners, alleging they had maltreated him and referencing a purported document by which their father had repudiated his inheritance.
• Filing of the Probate Petition: Federico filed a petition for probate of this second will with the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, on August 2, 1999. He did not state the addresses of the petitioners in the petition, despite knowing them.
• Probate Proceedings: The RTC set the case for hearing. The notices were addressed to the petitioners "c/o Federico Suntay" at Federico's address. The envelopes were returned marked "RTS Unknown at given address." There was no affidavit of service as required by the Rules of Court. No opposition was filed.
• RTC Judgments: The RTC rendered a Decision on October 18, 1999, admitting the will to probate. After Federico's death, it rendered a second Decision on January 29, 2002, approving the intrinsic validity of the will and the project of partition that disinherited the petitioners.
• Discovery and Annulment Petition: Petitioners discovered the proceedings on December 17, 2002. They filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with the CA, alleging extrinsic fraud and lack of due process. The CA denied the petition, finding service sufficient and the petition barred by laches.

• Extrinsic Fraud and Lack of Notice: Petitioners argued that Federico's acts of filing the case in La Trinidad, omitting their addresses, and failing to serve them with notices constituted a deliberate scheme to conceal the proceedings and prevent them from opposing the will, amounting to extrinsic fraud.
• Defective Service: Petitioners maintained that the proof of service was fatally defective because there was no affidavit of service for the registered mail, and the evidence showed the notices were never actually delivered to them.
• Timeliness of Action: Petitioners contended their petition for annulment was filed within the four-year prescriptive period from discovery of the fraud, as provided under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

• Presumption of Regularity: Respondents countered that the service of court processes enjoys a presumption of regularity, and the registry return receipts on record proved that notices were served.
• Publication as Cure: Respondents argued that, assuming there was a defect in personal notice, the publication of the notice of hearing cured this infirmity, as personal notice to heirs is merely procedural and not jurisdictional.
• Laches and Prescription: Respondents asserted that the petition for annulment was barred by laches due to the unreasonable delay in filing, and by prescription.

• Extrinsic Fraud: Whether the acts of the testator in filing the probate petition in an improper venue, omitting the heirs' addresses, and failing to serve them with notices constitute extrinsic fraud warranting annulment of the probate judgments.
• Due Process: Whether the failure to provide compulsory heirs with personal notice of the probate proceedings constitutes a denial of due process.
• Timeliness of Remedy: Whether the Petition for Annulment of Judgment was barred by prescription or laches.

• Extrinsic Fraud: The testator's deliberate acts collectively constituted extrinsic fraud. Filing the petition in La Trinidad, omitting the heirs' addresses in violation of procedural rules, and then failing to serve the notices as ordered by the court were calculated to keep the heirs ignorant of the proceedings and prevent them from having their day in court. This fraud justified the annulment of the judgments.
• Due Process: The annulment was also warranted on the ground of lack of due process. The mandatory requirement under the Rules of Court to give personal notice to compulsory heirs is intended to safeguard their constitutional right to due process. The complete failure to notify the petitioners deprived them of the opportunity to protect their hereditary interests.
• Timeliness of Remedy: The petition was timely. The four-year prescriptive period for annulment based on extrinsic fraud runs from its discovery. The petitioners discovered the fraud on December 17, 2002, and filed their petition on November 30, 2006, well within the period. Laches did not apply because the delay was directly caused by the testator's fraud, and the petitioners actively pursued other legal remedies once they discovered the proceedings.

• Extrinsic Fraud in Annulment of Judgment — Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party committed outside the trial that prevents the defeated party from fully presenting their case. It exists where the successful party's scheme keeps the opponent away from court or in ignorance of the suit. The overriding consideration is that the fraud prevented the petitioner from having their day in court. In this case, the testator's deliberate concealment of the probate proceedings from his compulsory heirs was held to be a clear example of extrinsic fraud.
• Mandatory Notice to Compulsory Heirs in Probate — The requirement under Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court to give notice of a probate hearing to designated or known heirs, legatees, and devisees is mandatory, not merely directory. The use of the word "shall" underscores its obligatory nature. This requirement is a procedural safeguard for the substantive right to due process. Compliance with the publication requirement does not substitute for this personal notice, especially when the testator himself petitions for probate and publication is not required.

• "Federico's deliberate acts of filing the Second Probate Petition in La Trinidad, omitting petitioners' addresses, and then failing to serve them with copies of the notices of hearing, taken collectively, constitute extrinsic fraud. He kept petitioners ignorant of his acts to disinherit them and prevented them from having their day in court."
• "The requirement to serve notices to designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees in the Philippines is mandatory, and that the requirement of the law for the allowance of a will is not sufficiently satisfied by mere compliance with the publication requirement of the notice of hearing."
• "The use of the word 'shall' in Section 4, Rule 76 of the ROC which directs notice to be given to the heirs necessarily means that it is mandatory. It pronounced that giving personal notice to all heirs is of paramount importance because it is intended to safeguard their right to due process..."

• Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, 360 Phil. 932 (1998) — Cited as the prior Supreme Court decision that established with finality the petitioners' status as legitimate grandchildren and compulsory heirs of Federico, a fact he acknowledged but later sought to circumvent.
• Chico v. Ciudadano, G.R. No. 249815, July 4, 2022 — Applied as controlling precedent where the Court annulled a judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud for the deliberate failure to implead and notify a real party in interest, thereby preventing her from having her day in court.
• Sps. Benatiro v. Heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, 582 Phil. 470 (2008) — Cited for the principle that a final order of a probate court granting partition may be annulled for lack of due process if compulsory heirs were not notified of the proceedings.
• De Aranz v. Judge Galing, 244 Phil. 645 (1988) and Racca v. Echague, G.R. No. 237133, January 20, 2021 — Relied upon to establish the mandatory nature of personal notice to heirs in probate proceedings as a jurisdictional requirement for due process.

• Rule 47, Section 2, Rules of Court — Provides that a petition for annulment of judgment may be filed on the grounds of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction. The Court also recognized lack of due process as an additional ground.
• Rule 47, Section 3, Rules of Court — States that a petition based on extrinsic fraud must be filed within four (4) years from its discovery.
• Rule 76, Section 2, Rules of Court — Requires a petition for probate to include the names and addresses of the heirs, legatees, and devisees. Federico's omission of the petitioners' addresses violated this rule.
• Rule 76, Section 4, Rules of Court — Mandates that the court shall cause notices to be given to the designated heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines. The Court held the word "shall" makes this requirement mandatory.
• Rule 13, Section 13, Rules of Court — Provides that service by registered mail is proved by the registry receipt issued to the sender and an affidavit of the person who mailed the document. The absence of this affidavit was fatal to proving service in this case.
• Article III, Section 1, 1987 Philippine Constitution — The due process clause. The Court invoked this constitutional guarantee as the fundamental basis for annulling the judgments that deprived the petitioners of their property rights without a hearing.

• Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa (Chairperson)
• Justice Japar B. Dimaampao
• Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh
• Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Gaerlan (Ponente)

N/A — The decision was unanimous.