Codilla, Sr. vs. De Venecia

A candidate who garners the highest number of votes cannot be excluded from proclamation on the basis of a disqualification resolution that has not attained finality, and the second placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead; once the COMELEC en banc has finally adjudicated the rightful winner, the House Speaker and Secretary-General have a ministerial duty to implement that decision, which may be compelled by mandamus.

Petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. was the Mayor of Ormoc City, while respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin was the incumbent Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Both vied for the same congressional seat in the May 14, 2001 elections. The dispute implicates the jurisdictional boundaries between the COMELEC's authority over disqualification cases and pre-proclamation controversies, the HRET's exclusive jurisdiction over election contests involving House members, and the House of Representatives' duty to give effect to final COMELEC decisions.

Petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., then Mayor of Ormoc City, and respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin, then the sitting Representative, were candidates for Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte in the May 14, 2001 elections. Six days before the elections, on May 8, 2001, one Josephine de la Cruz filed a Petition for Disqualification against Codilla directly with the COMELEC main office, docketed as SPA No. 01-208 and assigned to the Second Division. The petition alleged that Codilla used City Government of Ormoc equipment and vehicles to extract, haul, and distribute gravel and sand to residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing voters to support him, in violation of Section 68(a) of the Omnibus Election Code. The Second Division delegated the hearing and reception of evidence to the Regional Election Director of Region VIII on May 10, 2001, and sent a telegram informing Codilla of the petition on May 11, 2001.

When elections were held on May 14, 2001, the Regional Election Director had not yet conducted any hearing on the disqualification case. Codilla was thus included on the ballot and received the highest number of votes. Before counting could be completed, Locsin intervened in the case and filed on May 16, 2001 a "Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation" alleging that the evidence against Codilla was "very strong." No registry receipt was attached to prove service on Codilla. Two days later, on May 18, 2001, Locsin filed a "Second Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation," with a registry receipt attached but no indication of when Codilla received it. On that same day, the COMELEC Second Division issued an ex-parte order directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers to suspend Codilla's proclamation, citing only the "seriousness of the allegations" without any finding that evidence of guilt was strong. Codilla received the telegraphed order on May 22, 2001, and only then personally obtained a copy of the disqualification petition from the COMELEC Regional Office, filing his Answer on May 24, 2001. He denied authorizing the road repairs and submitted counter-affidavits and documentary evidence.

On May 25, 2001, Codilla filed a Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension, arguing denial of due process and absence of factual and legal basis. An oral argument was held on May 30, 2001, and the parties were ordered to submit memoranda. Codilla's Memorandum, filed June 4, 2001, was confined to supporting the Motion to Lift the Suspension and urged a full-dress hearing on the main disqualification case. The Motion to Lift was never resolved. Instead, on June 14, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding Codilla guilty of indirect solicitation of votes, ordering his disqualification, and directing the immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes to his exclusion. The Resolution was faxed to Codilla's counsel in Cebu City in the afternoon of June 15, 2001 — by which time the Provincial Board of Canvassers had already convened that morning, declared Codilla's 71,350 votes stray, and proclaimed Locsin, who had received 53,447 votes, as the duly-elected Representative. Locsin took her oath on June 18, 2001 and assumed office on June 30, 2001.

Codilla seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc on June 20, 2001, and a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Proclamation on June 21, 2001. After pleadings were submitted, the COMELEC en banc, by a 4-vote majority (Chairman Benipayo and Commissioners Borra, Tuason, Jr., and Lantion), reversed the Second Division's resolution for insufficiency of evidence, lifted the suspension order as null and void, and declared Locsin's proclamation null and void. Locsin did not appeal this decision. Instead, she obtained an opinion from the House of Representatives Chief Legal Counsel opining that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction to nullify her proclamation after she had assumed office, and declared in a privileged speech on September 4, 2001 that she would "openly defy and disobey" the COMELEC ruling. On September 6, 2001, the COMELEC en banc ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the highest vote-getter; on September 12, 2001, Codilla was proclaimed with 71,350 votes and took his oath before Executive Judge Madrona of the RTC of Ormoc City. Codilla informed the House of Representatives of these developments on September 14, 2001, but no action was taken despite a memorandum from the House Legal Affairs Deputy Secretary-General stating there was "no legal obstacle" to compliance. Speaker De Venecia, in a letter dated October 30, 2001, acknowledged the finality of the COMELEC decision but declined to implement it, citing the prospect of two legislators occupying the same seat and deferring the matter to the Supreme Court. Codilla then filed the present petition.

• Ministerial Duty to Implement COMELEC Decision: Petitioner maintained that by virtue of the COMELEC en banc resolution, which had become final and executory due to Locsin's failure to appeal, it became the ministerial duty of the Speaker to implement the resolution by installing him as duly-elected Representative, and of the Secretary-General to register his name in the Roll of Members and delete Locsin's name therefrom.
• Usurpation of Public Office: Petitioner contended that respondent Locsin had been usurping and unlawfully holding the office of Representative, her premature proclamation having been declared null and void by the COMELEC en banc.
• Deprivation of Lawful Right: Petitioner alleged that the action and inaction of the public respondents had deprived him of his lawful right to assume the office to which he was duly elected and proclaimed.
• HRET Jurisdiction Inapplicable: Petitioner asserted that the HRET has no jurisdiction over a petition for declaration of nullity of proclamation based not on ineligibility or disloyalty but on the ground that the proclaimed candidate did not obtain the highest number of votes, and that such a petition is a pre-proclamation controversy within the COMELEC's exclusive jurisdiction.
• Enforcement Not Legislative Power: Petitioner argued that enforcement of a final COMELEC decision involves a ministerial act that does not encroach on legislative power, and that the power to determine who sits as Member of the House is vested in the sovereign will of the electorate, not in legislative discretion.

• Mandamus Improper — Discretionary Function (Speaker De Venecia): Respondent Speaker argued that mandamus will not lie because implementing the COMELEC decision is not merely ministerial but requires the exercise of discretion, as it affects the membership of the House, and that nothing in the House Rules imposes a duty on the Speaker to implement a COMELEC decision unseating an incumbent member.
• Acting on Counsel's Opinion (Secretary-General Nazareno): Respondent Secretary-General contended that in reading Locsin's name during roll call and allowing her to sit as Member, he was merely performing official acts in compliance with opinions rendered by the House Chief Legal Counsel stating that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction to nullify the proclamation after Locsin assumed office. He maintained that determining who sits as Member is not a ministerial function and cannot be compelled by mandamus.
• HRET Exclusive Jurisdiction (Locsin): Respondent Locsin asserted that the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction over quo warranto involving a House member, as Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution vests the HRET with sole jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of House members.
• Separation of Powers (Locsin): Respondent Locsin argued that the Court cannot issue mandamus against a co-equal legislative department without violating the principle of separation of powers, and that recognizing who should be seated is a legislative prerogative, not a ministerial function.
• COMELEC Decision Null and Void (Locsin): Respondent Locsin urged that the COMELEC en banc resolution was void for lack of jurisdiction because (1) the COMELEC should have dismissed the case after her proclamation and oath, (2) the petition for declaration of nullity is a pre-proclamation controversy that must first be heard by a COMELEC Division, and (3) the decision was a "hodge-podge" disposition.
• HRET Affirmation of Qualification (Locsin): Respondent Locsin asserted that her qualification had been categorically affirmed by the HRET when it dismissed the quo warranto case filed against her in HRET Case No. 01-043 (Paciano Travero vs. Ma. Victoria Locsin).

• Validity of Proclamation: Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin by the COMELEC Second Division is valid.
• COMELEC Jurisdiction Post-Proclamation: Whether said proclamation divested the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review its validity.
• Ministerial Duty of House Officials: Assuming the invalidity of said proclamation, whether it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to recognize petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte vice respondent Locsin.

• Validity of Proclamation: No. Locsin's proclamation was null and void, having been made in violation of due process — without proper service of summons, without a hearing on the merits, without a finding that evidence of guilt was strong, and on the basis of a disqualification resolution that had not attained finality.
• COMELEC Jurisdiction Post-Proclamation: No. The COMELEC en banc was not divested of jurisdiction, because the validity of Locsin's proclamation was a core issue in Codilla's timely Motion for Reconsideration, which suspended the finality of the Second Division's resolution; the HRET cannot review COMELEC resolutions and has no jurisdiction where the issue is nullity of proclamation rather than eligibility.
• Ministerial Duty of House Officials: Yes. The administration of the oath and registration of Codilla's name in the Roll of Members is a ministerial duty, the facts being settled and the COMELEC en banc decision having become final and executory; mandamus properly lies to compel its performance.

• Validity of Proclamation: The proclamation of Locsin was null and void on multiple grounds. First, Codilla was denied due process throughout the proceedings. COMELEC Resolution No. 3402 requires the issuance of summons to the respondent candidate within three days from filing of the disqualification petition, but no summons was ever served on Codilla; the records contain no copy of summons or proof of service. He learned of the petition only through a telegram from the Second Division and obtained a copy himself from the Regional Office. The suspension of his proclamation was likewise issued ex parte: Locsin's First Most Urgent Motion contained no registry receipt, rendering it a mere scrap of paper that could not be acted upon; the Second Most Urgent Motion was filed and the suspension order issued on the same day, making it impossible for Codilla to have received and answered the motion. Under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, the COMELEC may suspend proclamation only when "the evidence of his guilt is strong," yet the Second Division's order cited only the "seriousness of the allegations" — an insufficient basis. Second, no hearing on the disqualification case was ever conducted, in violation of Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and COMELEC Resolution No. 3402. The hearing on the Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension could not substitute for a hearing on the merits; the evidence relevant to each may differ. The Second Division ruled on the disqualification based solely on the affidavits attached to the petition and the parties' memoranda, without hearing the affiants or considering Codilla's additional evidence. Third, the disqualification resolution was not based on substantial evidence. The affidavits relied upon failed to prove the elements of Section 68(a) of the Omnibus Election Code — that Codilla personally gave money or material consideration for the purpose of influencing voters. Several affidavits were hearsay, others alleged acts extraneous to the charge, and still others pertained to election offenses under Section 261 that fall outside the COMELEC's disqualification jurisdiction and are criminal in nature. Fourth, even assuming arguendo that the disqualification was valid, the votes cast for Codilla could not be declared stray because the resolution had not attained finality — Codilla filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration, which under Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure suspends execution. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require a final judgment before the election for votes to be considered stray. Finally, the proclamation of Locsin as second placer violated the settled doctrine that a candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed in place of a disqualified winner; the election fails entirely, and the wreath of victory cannot be transferred to the repudiated loser.

• COMELEC Jurisdiction Post-Proclamation: The COMELEC en banc retained jurisdiction for two reasons. First, the validity of Locsin's proclamation was squarely raised as a central issue in Codilla's timely Motion for Reconsideration, which challenged the Second Division's directive to proclaim the second highest vote-getter as premature given the resolution's lack of finality. Under Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC en banc is empowered to review, on motion for reconsideration, decisions or resolutions of its divisions. The timely filing of the motion suspended the finality and execution of the Second Division's resolution, meaning Locsin's proclamation rested on an unenforceable order. Second, the HRET had no jurisdiction. The issue before the COMELEC was not the election, returns, or qualifications of Locsin within the meaning of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, but the validity of the COMELEC's own pronouncements — a matter the HRET has no power to review. Moreover, quo warranto before the HRET lies only on grounds of ineligibility or disloyalty; Locsin's eligibility was not in question. She was a loser who was proclaimed through a void order, and it would be absurd to require the winner to unseat her through a quo warranto proceeding designed for duly proclaimed members whose eligibility is challenged.

• Ministerial Duty of House Officials: Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, mandamus lies when a tribunal, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office. A purely ministerial act is one performed in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to the exercise of judgment on the propriety of the act. Here, the facts were settled and beyond dispute: Codilla garnered 71,350 votes against Locsin's 53,447; the COMELEC en banc reversed the Second Division and ordered Codilla's proclamation; and that decision was not challenged before the Court and had become final and executory. The issue of who is the rightful Representative had been finally adjudicated by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction over the matter. The administration of the oath and registration of Codilla's name in the Roll of Members thus required neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment, and the rule of law demands obedience to the final COMELEC decision by all officials.

• Due Process in Election Disqualification Cases — A candidate facing disqualification must be afforded the opportunity to be heard, including proper service of summons and a hearing on the merits. The COMELEC may not suspend a winning candidate's proclamation without a specific finding that evidence of guilt is strong, and may not resolve the disqualification case based solely on ex parte affidavits without conducting a hearing. In this case, the absence of summons, the ex parte suspension order, and the lack of a hearing on the merits rendered the disqualification resolution and subsequent proclamation void.

• Non-Finality of Disqualification and Stray Votes — Votes cast for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment before the election cannot be declared stray. Under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code, a final judgment of disqualification before the election is required for votes to be considered stray. A timely Motion for Reconsideration suspends the execution of a division resolution, preventing it from serving as a basis for excluding votes or proclaiming another candidate.

• Second Placer Rule — A candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner when the winning candidate is disqualified. The effect of a disqualification is that the election fails entirely; the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser. This applies regardless of whether the disqualification is based on personal circumstances (age, residence, citizenship) or on election offenses under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, as held in Trinidad vs. COMELEC.

• Ministerial vs. Discretionary Duty — A purely ministerial act is one performed in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to the exercise of judgment. A duty is discretionary when the law gives the officer the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed. Mandamus lies only to compel ministerial duties. In this case, implementing a final and executory COMELEC decision proclaiming the winning candidate was ministerial, as the facts were settled and no discretion remained.

• COMELEC En Banc Jurisdiction Over Division Resolutions on Motion for Reconsideration — Under Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC en banc has jurisdiction to review, on motion for reconsideration, decisions or resolutions of its divisions. A timely motion for reconsideration suspends the finality and execution of the division resolution, and the en banc may rule on all issues raised therein, including the validity of any proclamation made pursuant to the division's order.

• HRET Jurisdiction Limited to Duly Proclaimed Members — The HRET's jurisdiction as sole judge of contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of House members attaches only after a valid proclamation and assumption of office. Where the validity of the COMELEC's own pronouncements is challenged, or where the issue is nullity of proclamation rather than eligibility, the HRET has no jurisdiction. Quo warranto before the HRET lies only on grounds of ineligibility or disloyalty, not on the ground that the proclaimed candidate did not obtain the highest number of votes.

• "In a democracy, the first self-evident principle is that he who has been rejected by the people cannot represent the people." — Opens the decision and frames the philosophical premise: a candidate who lost the election cannot claim to represent the constituency, regardless of procedural maneuvers.

• "It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed winner and imposed as representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him." — Quoted from Domino vs. COMELEC, articulating the second-placer rule and the principle that the people's will cannot be subverted by transferring victory to a repudiated candidate.

• "The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion." — Concludes the decision's reasoning, emphasizing that finality of judgments and obedience to constitutional bodies are foundational to legal order.

• "The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. When a party is deprived of that basic fairness, any decision by any tribunal in prejudice of his rights is void." — States the fundamental due process principle applied to election disqualification proceedings, underscoring that procedural fairness is a condition precedent to valid adjudication.

• Domino vs. COMELEC, 310 SCRA 546 (1999) — Controlling precedent on the second-placer rule. The Court held that a candidate who has not obtained the plurality of votes cannot be proclaimed winner and imposed as representative of a constituency that rejected him; the effect of disqualifying a winner is that the election fails entirely, not that victory transfers to the second placer. Extensively quoted in this decision.

• Trinidad vs. COMELEC, 315 SCRA 175 (1999) — Followed. Established that the effect of a judgment disqualifying a candidate after winning the election is the same whether the disqualification is based on personal circumstances or on election offenses under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code: the second placer cannot take the place of the disqualified winner. Used to reject Locsin's attempted distinction between the two categories of disqualification.

• Labo vs. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989) — Cited as authority for the principle that votes cast for a candidate not disqualified by final judgment before the election cannot be declared stray, as doing so would disenfranchise the electorate.

• Puzon vs. Cua, HRET Case No. 42, July 25, 1988 — Cited as even the HRET's own ruling acknowledging that the doctrine of HRET jurisdiction upon proclamation "could not have been immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves," supporting the conclusion that the HRET cannot review COMELEC resolutions.

• Reyes vs. COMELEC, 254 SCRA 514 (1996) and Nolasco vs. COMELEC, 275 SCRA 762 (1997) — Cited for the principle that voters who cast ballots for a candidate not yet disqualified by final judgment do so bona fide, without intention to misapply their franchise.

• Section 68, Omnibus Election Code — Defines disqualifications for candidates found by the COMELEC of having given money or other material consideration to influence voters, among other acts. Applied to determine the elements required for disqualification: (a) the candidate personally or through instructions gave money or material consideration, and (b) the act was for the purpose of influencing, inducing, or corrupting voters. The affidavits relied upon by the Second Division failed to prove these elements.

• Section 72, Omnibus Election Code — Provides that a candidate not declared by final judgment before the election to be disqualified, and who is voted for and receives the winning number of votes, shall not be prevented from proclamation and assumption of office. Applied to hold that Codilla's proclamation should not have been suspended, as no final judgment of disqualification existed before or at the time of the election.

• Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646 (Electoral Reform Law of 1987) — Authorizes the COMELEC to suspend the proclamation of a winning candidate during the pendency of a disqualification case "upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor" whenever "the evidence of his guilt is strong." Applied to hold that the Second Division's suspension order was void for lacking any finding that evidence of guilt was strong and for being issued without proper motion and notice.

• Section 3, Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution — Empowers the COMELEC en banc to review, on motion for reconsideration, decisions or resolutions decided by a division. Applied to uphold the COMELEC en banc's jurisdiction to reverse the Second Division's disqualification resolution and nullify Locsin's proclamation.

• Section 17, Article VI, 1987 Constitution — Establishes the HRET as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of House members. Distinguished: the HRET's jurisdiction attaches only after a valid proclamation and assumption of office, and does not extend to reviewing the validity of COMELEC pronouncements or to cases involving nullity of proclamation rather than eligibility.

• Rule 65, Section 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs petitions for mandamus, available when any tribunal, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office. Applied to compel the Speaker and Secretary-General to perform their ministerial duty of implementing the final COMELEC decision.

• COMELEC Resolution No. 3402 — Sets the procedure for disqualification cases pursuant to Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, including requirements for summons, answer, summary hearing, and submission of findings. Applied to demonstrate that the Second Division violated procedural requirements by failing to serve summons, conduct a hearing, and complete the reception of evidence.

• COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 — Provides guidelines on the finality of decisions or resolutions in disqualification cases, stating that a division resolution becomes final after five days unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. Applied to confirm that Codilla's timely motion for reconsideration suspended the finality of the Second Division's disqualification resolution.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concurred.

N/A — Justice Carpio took no part in the decision. No dissenting opinion was provided in the text.