Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin

A lawyer’s oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to the duty to the client; thus, a counsel who, despite knowing the patent futility of the client’s position, actively files multiple actions and forum-shops to delay the execution of a final judgment may be sanctioned with treble costs and adverse professional remarks. A counsel must resist the whims of a client, temper the propensity to litigate, and advise acquiescence rather than traverse the incontrovertible; persistence despite obvious futility constitutes an abuse of court processes warranting disciplinary consequence.

After the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a simple money judgment in Civil Case No. 39407 that became final and executory, the levy and projected execution sale of shares of stock became the subject of protracted litigation. Damaso Perez had earlier challenged the extent of the levy in CA-G.R. 29962-R, and the Court of Appeals, on November 15, 1962, sustained his position. Following that decision, the Perez spouses and their counsels did not accept its consequences. Instead, they launched a succession of actions, successively or concurrently, in multiple courts seeking to enjoin the execution sale, raising the conjugal nature of the levied shares. These moves repeatedly postponed the execution sale — six times — and more than eight years after finality, the judgment remained unsatisfied. The Supreme Court’s decision of May 22, 1968, on a petition for certiorari, included pointed observations about the dilatory character of the litigation and imposed treble costs against the petitioners, payable by their counsel. The counsels moved for partial reconsideration of that aspect.

• The Underlying Judgment and Execution: A final and executory simple money judgment was rendered in Civil Case No. 39407 by Branch VII of the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by respondent Judge Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution was issued on August 15, 1961, and the respondent City Sheriff levied on certain shares of stock to satisfy the judgment.
• Initial Attack on the Levy: Damaso Perez challenged the extent of the levy in CA-G.R. 29962-R. On November 15, 1962, the Court of Appeals sustained his position regarding the extent of the levy.
• Post-Appeal Dilatory Pattern: After the appellate ruling, the Perez spouses and their counsels embarked on a series of alternating and simultaneous actions designed to prevent the execution sale. The maneuvers included the following:
  • Civil Case No. 7532 (CFI Rizal): Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez filed this case in the Court of First Instance of Rizal and obtained an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the execution sale. She and her counsel knew or ought to have known that the CFI of Rizal lacked jurisdiction to enjoin acts under execution from a Manila court. On October 4, 1963, Judge Eulogio Mencias lifted the writ, applying the doctrine that courts have no power to restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions.
  • Urgent Motion in the Main Case: A month before the Rizal writ was lifted, on September 3, 1963, Mrs. Perez filed in Civil Case No. 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of execution, raising the conjugal nature of the shares — the very same ground advanced in the still-pending Rizal case. Neither she nor her counsel appeared at the scheduled hearing, and the motion was deemed submitted for resolution and later denied.
  • Civil Case No. 55292 and Forum Shopping: After the Rizal writ was recalled, the Perez spouses sought another injunction, this time from Branch XXII of the CFI Manila (not the branch that issued the writ), in connection with Civil Case No. 55292, which was filed in the CFI of Rizal and then transferred. Judge Alikpala denied the preliminary injunction on November 8, 1963, on the ground that a court cannot interfere by injunction with the judgment or decree of a coordinate court.
  • Simultaneous “Urgent Motion for Reconsideration”: On the very day Judge Alikpala denied the injunction, Damaso Perez filed in the main civil case an “Urgent Motion for Reconsideration” of the order denying his wife’s motion to recall the writ — a motion he was not even a party to — offering to replace the levied stocks with supposed cash dividends. The promise to produce the dividends within five days was never fulfilled, and the motion was denied on January 4, 1964.
  • Abandonment of the Independent Actions: Civil Case No. 7532 was dismissed on November 9, 1963 upon Mrs. Perez’s own motion. Civil Case No. 55292 was dismissed on March 20, 1964 with the consent of the parties, because the instant petition for certiorari was then pending. The independent actions were thus never pursued to prove the conjugal nature of the shares, serving merely as vehicles for abortive injunction applications.

• Absence of Deliberate Delay: The movants averred that in none of the various incidents did any particular counsel of the petitioners act with deliberate aforethought to delay the enforcement of the judgment in Civil Case No. 39407.
• Assertive Advocacy: They contended that any delay resulted only because petitioners’ counsel happened to be more assertive, a quality they argued should not be condemned.
• Proper Remedy Recognized: They claimed that the civil cases 7532 and 55292 were the “proper remedy” as acknowledged by the Court itself in the May 22 decision, and thus could not be branded as instituted for delay.
• Ambiguity of “Counsel”: They pointed out that petitioners had several counsel with limited individual participation, and that the word “counsel” in the treble costs order was unclear.

N/A — No separate opposition or argument by the respondents was recorded in the resolution.

• Justification of Adverse Remarks: Whether the adverse observations against the professional conduct of the petitioners’ counsels were justified by the record.
• Liability for Treble Costs: Whether the assessment of treble costs against the counsels was proper, in light of the claim that they did not act with deliberate intent to delay and that their participation was limited.
• Characterization of Independent Actions: Whether the institution of Civil Cases 7532 and 55292 constituted a legitimate assertion of the correct remedy, negating the finding of dilatory intent.

• Justification of Adverse Remarks: The adverse remarks were fully justified. A mature re-examination of the record demonstrated that the counsels actively participated in a deliberate stratagem to thwart the execution. The sequential filing of jurisdictional flawed injunction applications, the simultaneous interposition of remedies, the abandonment of cases once the interim relief was denied, and the offer of unperformed substitutes collectively revealed an inescapable purpose to cause delay, not to secure an adjudication on the merits. The lawyers foreshadowed their own reversals and merely experimented with remedies to prolong the litigation.
• Liability for Treble Costs: The imposition of treble costs on the counsels was proper. Assertiveness does not include persistence despite patent futility. The duty of a counsel to advise a client to submit when a cause is defenseless, and to uphold the cause of justice, is supreme over the duty to the client. The word “counsel” was meant to refer to the counsels on record responsible for the inordinate delay after November 15, 1962, who were specifically identified as the movants Atty. Bolinas and Atty. Baizas (and his firm). Their active participation was evident on the record, and the treble costs were made jointly and severally payable by them.
• Characterization of Independent Actions: The reference in the earlier decision to civil cases 7532 and 55292 as the “remedy” was taken out of context; the Court used “incidentally” advisedly to indicate that the petitioners accidentally stumbled upon the remedy while searching for delay devices. But those cases were definitely not the proper remedy insofar as they sought preliminary injunctions from courts that had no jurisdiction to restrain the execution by a co-equal or coordinate court. The cases were abandoned, not pursued to final judgment, confirming they were mere dilatory instruments.

• Primacy of the Lawyer’s Oath Over Client Duty — “A lawyer’s oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.” A lawyer must resist the whims of a client, temper the propensity to litigate, and if the client’s cause is defenseless, the lawyer has the bounden duty to advise acquiescence rather than to traverse the incontrovertible.
• Dilatory Conduct Sanction — The active use of multiple simultaneous or alternating actions that counsel knows or ought to know are jurisdictionally futile, resulting in protracted delay of the execution of a final judgment, constitutes an abuse of court processes for which the counsel may be held personally liable for costs and be subject to adverse professional remarks.
• Co-equal Court Non-Interference / Territorial Jurisdiction — A court has no power to issue an injunction restraining acts outside its territorial jurisdiction, nor may a court interfere by injunction with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. These settled rules were the grounds for the predictable failure of the petitioners’ successive injunction applications.

• “It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.” — This passage encapsulates the core ethical duty of candor and restraint and is frequently cited in disciplinary cases involving dilatory tactics.
• “A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.” — The Court distinguished legitimate zealous advocacy from sanctionable abuse.

• Acosta, et al. vs. Alvendia, et al., L-14598, October 31, 1960 — Followed; established that courts of first instance have no power to restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions. Applied to justify the lifting of the Rizal court’s ex parte writ.
• Cabigao vs. Del Rosario, 44 Phil. 182; Philippine National Bank vs. Javellana, 92 Phil. 525; Araneta vs. Commonwealth Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 522 — Followed as settled authority that a court cannot interfere by injunction with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction, validating Judge Alikpala’s denial of the second injunction.

N/A — The resolution relied on general principles of legal ethics, case law on jurisdiction and injunctions, and the inherent power of the Court to sanction counsel for abuse of its processes; no specific codal or statutory provision was applied to the ethical violation beyond the lawyer’s oath.

Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Angeles concurred. Chief Justice Concepcion voted for denial of the motion for reconsideration. Justice Fernando took no part.

None.