Cobarrubias vs. Dizon

A probate court may revoke the appointment of a special administrator, and any authority granted to withdraw estate assets, when the appointment was obtained through false or incorrect representations, even without prior notice, because the office is one of trust and the court must protect the heirs' interests. A sworn renunciation of hereditary rights, once approved by the court, cannot be withdrawn at the party's pleasure.

Special Proceeding No. 70686, Intestado de la Finada Pilar Leyba y Cobarrubias, concerned the settlement of the estate of Pilar Leyba y Cobarrubias. Magdalena Cobarrubias was the petitioner in that proceeding; the respondents were Judges Arsenio P. Dizon and Buenaventura Ocampo and the Philippine Trust Company. The controversy concerned the probate court's orders regarding the appointment of a special administratrix, the withdrawal of estate jewelry, and the conversion of the intestate proceeding into a guardianship proceeding.

On July 5, 1945, in Special Proceeding No. 70686, Intestado de la Finada Pilar Leyba y Cobarrubias, Magdalena Cobarrubias filed an urgent motion alleging that the deceased Pilar Leyba had deposited jewelry valued at P4,500 in a safe deposit box of the Bank of the Philippine Islands; that the bank had notified all interested parties to withdraw the contents as soon as possible; and that she should be appointed special administratrix and authorized to withdraw the jewelry. She stated that she was the only forced heir of the deceased. Accepting these allegations, Judge Arsenio P. Dizon appointed her special administratrix under a P200 bond.

On July 6, 1945, Judge Dizon authorized Cobarrubias to withdraw the jewelry from the bank and directed her to report the result of her management within forty-eight hours. On July 13, 1945, she asked the court to suspend publication and postpone the July 28, 1945 hearing because she wanted time to arrange an extrajudicial partition with her co-heirs.

On July 17, 1945, after learning that the true facts were contrary to Cobarrubias's allegations, the court revoked both the July 5 appointment and the July 6 authority. On July 19, 1945, she asked for cancellation of the P200 bond and its return to her attorney. On July 20, 1945, she filed a duly sworn amended motion alleging that the only heirs of the deceased were her daughters Rosario and Carmencita, and renouncing in their favor all her right, interest, and participation in the properties left by the deceased.

At the July 28, 1945 hearing, Cobarrubias's attorney asked that the intestate proceeding be converted into a guardianship proceeding for minors Rosario and Carmen, stating that the minors were the absolute owners of all the properties described in the petition and asking that he be appointed their guardian. Acting on the evidence presented, Cobarrubias's sworn amended motion, and her attorney's petition, Judge Dizon on August 28, 1945 declared that all the properties mentioned in the July 5, 1945 petition as amended belonged to the minors, then nine and six years old; that a parcel of land with a house of strong materials had already been transferred in their names; that the furniture corresponding to items 2, 3, and 7 had already been sold by the deceased; and that no other property remained to be administered in the deceased's name. To protect the minors' interests, he converted the intestate proceeding into a guardianship proceeding.

On August 29, 1945, Cobarrubias sought reconsideration of the August 28 order. After several transfers requested by the parties, Judge Buenaventura Ocampo denied the motion for reconsideration on January 2, 1946. Cobarrubias then filed a petition for certiorari against Judges Dizon and Ocampo and the Philippine Trust Company, seeking annulment of the July 17, 1945, August 28, 1945, and January 2, 1946 orders. The probate court's factual findings material to the Supreme Court's analysis were that Cobarrubias's original representation of sole forced heirship was inaccurate, that she herself had acknowledged co-heirs and later identified the minors as the only heirs, and that she had sworn to a renunciation of her rights in their favor.

• Revocation of Special Administratrix: Whether the Court of First Instance abused its discretion or acted without jurisdiction in revoking, on July 17, 1945, the appointment of Magdalena Cobarrubias as special administratrix and her authority to withdraw the deposited jewelry.
• Approval of Renunciation and Conversion to Guardianship: Whether the Court of First Instance erred in its August 28, 1945 order declaring the properties to belong to minors Rosario and Carmen, approving Magdalena Cobarrubias's renunciation, and converting the intestate proceeding into a guardianship proceeding.

• Revocation of Special Administratrix: No. The probate court did not abuse its discretion or act outside its jurisdiction; the power to set aside an appointment obtained through false or incorrect representations is indisputable, and the office of special administrator is one of trust.
• Approval of Renunciation and Conversion to Guardianship: No. The court acted on Cobarrubias's own sworn declarations and approved her renunciation; any attempt to withdraw that renunciation after judicial approval is improper, and the conversion to guardianship was in accordance with the petition and for the protection of the minors.

• Revocation of Special Administratrix: The appointment and authority to withdraw the jewelry rested on Cobarrubias's essential allegation that she was the only forced heir of the deceased. Because the jewelry was valued at P4,500 while the bond was only P200, the court had ample reason to act immediately upon receiving information that the allegation was inaccurate—information confirmed by Cobarrubias's own motion to postpone the hearing so she could arrange an extrajudicial partition with her co-heirs. An intestate proceeding is commenced for the benefit of the heirs, not the administrators, and the court could revoke the orders even without notice to the administratrix. The office of special administrator is one of trust; once the court lost confidence in Cobarrubias's integrity, it was fully justified in revoking her appointment and annulling her authority to withdraw the jewelry from the bank.
• Approval of Renunciation and Conversion to Guardianship: The August 28, 1945 order was based on the evidence, Cobarrubias's sworn amended motion, and her attorney's petition. In her July 20, 1945 sworn motion, Cobarrubias declared that the only heirs were the minors Rosario and Carmencita and renounced in their favor all her right, interest, and participation in the properties left by the deceased. The court approved that renunciation. Any attempt to withdraw it after judicial approval is improper; judicial action is not Penelope's web to be woven and unwoven at the pleasure of one party. Because Cobarrubias had renounced all her rights and retained no interest, any further declaration of heirs had no reason to be made. Her inconsistent sworn statements—that she was the only forced heir, that she wished to arrange an extrajudicial partition with co-heirs, and that the only heirs were the minors and she renounced in their favor—placed her in an untenable situation.

• Power to Revoke Appointment of a Special Administrator for False Representations — A probate court may set aside the appointment of a special administrator when the appointment was obtained through false or incorrect representations. The power is indisputable and may be exercised even without prior notice when immediate action is necessary to protect the estate and the heirs.
• Special Administrator as an Office of Trust — The position of special administrator is one of confidence. Once the court loses confidence in the administrator's integrity, it is justified in revoking the appointment and annulling any authority granted to withdraw estate assets.
• Finality and Effect of an Approved Sworn Renunciation — A sworn renunciation of hereditary rights, once approved by the court, cannot be withdrawn at the party's pleasure. The renouncing party retains no right, interest, or participation in the properties renounced.
• Conversion of an Intestate Proceeding into a Guardianship Proceeding — When the properties in an intestate proceeding belong to minors and no estate remains to be administered in the deceased's name, the court may convert the proceeding into a guardianship proceeding to protect the minors' interests, especially upon the petition of the party concerned.
• Certiorari and Abuse of Discretion — Certiorari does not lie where the probate court acted within its jurisdiction and did not abuse its discretion. The Court found neither abuse nor lack of jurisdiction in the challenged orders.

• "El poder del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de dejar sin efecto el nombramiento de un administrador, cuando se haya obtenido el nombramiento mediante representaciones falsas o incorrectas, es indiscutible." — This states the ratio decidendi on the probate court's authority to revoke an appointment obtained through false representations.
• "El cargo de administradora especial es uno de confianza. Tan pronto como perdio su confianza en la integridad de la solicitante, el Juzgado estaba plenamente justificado en revocar su nombramiento de administradora especial y anular su autorizacion para retirar las alhajas del banco." — This defines the special administrator's office as one of trust and justifies revocation once confidence in the administrator's integrity is lost.
• "La actuacion judicial no es tela de Penelope que se teje y se desteje, a gusto de una de las partes." — This is the Court's frequently quoted formulation rejecting a party's attempt to withdraw a sworn renunciation after judicial approval.

Moran, Pres.; Ozaeta; Paras; Jaranilla; Feria; De Joya; Perfecto; Hilado; Bengzon; and Briones concurred.