Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. vs. COMELEC

A party-list organization cannot be disqualified and have its registration cancelled for a term-sharing agreement among its nominees that was never implemented, and the COMELEC commits grave abuse of discretion when it cancels a party-list group's registration on a ground that was never raised or noticed during the proceedings conducted for the review of the organization's accreditation, thereby violating the party's right to due process.

The Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS) was accredited as a party-list organization by the COMELEC on March 16, 2007, under Republic Act No. 7941 (the Party-List System Act). After failing to secure the required 2% of votes in the 2007 elections, it was allocated one seat through the procedure established in BANAT vs. Commission on Elections, with its first nominee, Godofredo V. Arquiza, serving in the House of Representatives. The organization subsequently split into two rival factions—one led by Arquiza (the Arquiza Group) and another by third nominee Francisco G. Datol, Jr. (the Datol Group)—each claiming leadership. Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 authorizes the COMELEC to cancel the registration of a party-list organization, after due notice and hearing, on enumerated grounds including violation of or failure to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to elections.

The Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS) was accredited as a party-list organization by the COMELEC on March 16, 2007. It participated in the May 14, 2007 elections but failed to secure the required 2% of total votes cast. Thereafter, through the procedure established in BANAT vs. Commission on Elections, SENIOR CITIZENS was allocated one seat in Congress, filled by its first nominee, Godofredo V. Arquiza (Rep. Arquiza). The organization was later allowed to participate in the May 10, 2010 elections.

On May 5, 2010, the five nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an "Irrevocable Covenant" agreeing on the order of official candidates and a scheme for sharing power. Under the covenant, if only one seat was won, the first nominee would serve two years and the second nominee one year; if two seats were won, the first nominee would serve three years, the second and third nominees one-and-a-half years each; if three seats were won, the first nominee would serve three years, the second and third nominees two years each, and the fourth and fifth nominees one year each. The covenant also provided for sharing of rights, benefits, and privileges among the nominees.

After the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second among all party-list candidates and was allocated two seats, occupied by Rep. Arquiza as first nominee and David L. Kho (Rep. Kho) as second nominee. A split within the organization emerged shortly thereafter. According to the Datol Group, a national convention was held on November 27, 2010 to address Rep. Arquiza's unfulfilled commitments, and a new set of officers was elected, with third nominee Francisco G. Datol, Jr. chosen as chairman. On November 30, 2010, Datol was expelled from SENIOR CITIZENS by the Board of Trustees allied with Rep. Arquiza. Thereafter, two factions—each with its own set of officers—claimed leadership of the organization.

On December 14, 2011, Rep. Arquiza informed COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. that Rep. Kho had tendered his resignation effective December 31, 2011, and that the fourth nominee, Remedios D. Arquiza, should assume the vacant position in view of Datol's expulsion. The Arquiza Group filed a petition with the COMELEC, docketed as E.M. No. 12-040, seeking confirmation of the replacement. Rep. Kho's resignation letter, addressed to the Speaker, stated that his resignation was effective December 31, 2011 if only two seats were won, and June 30, 2012 if three seats were won. Meanwhile, on February 21, 2012, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9366, Section 7 of Rule 4 of which provided that the filling of vacancy as a result of term-sharing agreements among nominees of winning party-list groups shall not be allowed.

On March 12, 2012, the Arquiza-aligned Board of Trustees issued Board Resolution No. 003-2012, recalling its acceptance of Rep. Kho's resignation and allowing him to continue his term subject to certain conditions. At a hearing conducted by the COMELEC En Banc on April 18, 2012, counsel for the Arquiza Group admitted that Rep. Kho's resignation was made pursuant to the nominees' term-sharing agreement but stated that the Board had reconsidered and allowed Kho to complete his term. On June 27, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc dismissed the Arquiza Group's petition in E.M. No. 12-040, declaring the term-sharing agreement null and void, refusing to recognize Rep. Kho's resignation, and ruling that no vacancy was created.

Meanwhile, both factions filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the May 13, 2013 elections under the name SENIOR CITIZENS, docketed as SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) (Datol Group) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) (Arquiza Group). On August 24, 2012, both factions appeared before the COMELEC En Banc and submitted evidence of their continuing compliance with accreditation requirements. On December 4, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc, by a 4-3 vote, ordered the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS' registration, finding that the term-sharing agreement violated Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 7, Rule 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366, constituting a violation of election laws under Section 6(5) of R.A. No. 7941.

Both factions challenged this resolution before the Supreme Court, which initially granted status quo ante orders on December 11, 2012. The petitions were consolidated with Atong Paglaum vs. Commission on Elections. On April 2, 2013, the Court promulgated its Decision in Atong Paglaum, remanding the cases to the COMELEC for determination of qualifications. On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued the assailed Omnibus Resolution, denying the Manifestations and cancelling SENIOR CITIZENS' registration, reiterating that the term-sharing agreement was contrary to public policy. Despite the disqualification, SENIOR CITIZENS obtained 677,642 votes in the May 13, 2013 elections. Both factions then filed the instant petitions for certiorari.

• Due Process (Datol Group): The Datol Group faulted the COMELEC for cancelling the registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS without giving the organization the opportunity to show that it complied with the parameters laid down in Atong Paglaum, and without notice that the term-sharing agreement would be a basis for cancellation.
• Due Process (Arquiza Group): The Arquiza Group argued that no notice and hearing were given to SENIOR CITIZENS for the cancellation of its registration on account of the term-sharing agreement, as the August 24, 2012 hearing focused on the group's programs, accomplishments, and related matters, not on the term-sharing issue.
• Retroactivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 (Datol Group): The Datol Group argued that the public policy prohibiting term-sharing was provided under Section 7, Rule 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366, promulgated only on February 21, 2012, and should not be applied retroactively to the 2010 term-sharing agreement, as nothing therein provides for retroactive effect.
• Non-implementation of the Agreement (Datol Group): The Datol Group pointed out that the mere execution of the Irrevocable Covenant should not have been a ground for cancellation because the nominees never actually implemented the agreement.
• Non-implementation of the Agreement (Arquiza Group): The Arquiza Group stressed that no term-sharing actually transpired, as Rep. Kho's resignation was disapproved by the Board of Trustees and the agreement did not materialize.
• Vested Right (Arquiza Group): Assuming retroactive application of Resolution No. 9366, the Arquiza Group contended that SENIOR CITIZENS already earned a vested right in 2010 as a party-list organization.
• Invalidity of COMELEC and NBOC Resolutions (Arquiza Group): The Arquiza Group challenged the validity of the May 10 and May 24, 2013 COMELEC En Banc Resolutions and the NBOC Resolutions Nos. 0006-13 and 0008-13 as having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion.

• Opportunity to Be Heard: The COMELEC countered that petitioners were actually given the opportunity to present their side on the issue of the term-sharing agreement during the hearing on April 18, 2012, which was allegedly conducted to determine petitioners' continuing compliance for accreditation.
• Public Policy Violation: The COMELEC maintained that the term-sharing agreement was contrary to public policy because it subjected a constitutionally-ordained fixed term to contractual bargaining and treated public office as a commodity, rendering the agreement void from the time the Constitution was ratified in 1987 and R.A. No. 7941 was enacted in 1995.
• No Ex Post Facto Violation: The COMELEC argued that the prohibition on term-sharing was not penal in character, and thus the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws did not apply.
• Piercing the Corporate Veil: The COMELEC asserted that SENIOR CITIZENS could not hide behind the veil of corporate fiction because the corporate veil can be pierced when used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, or protect fraud.

• Due Process: Whether the COMELEC violated SENIOR CITIZENS' right to due process when it cancelled the organization's registration based on the term-sharing agreement without proper notice and hearing on that specific ground.
• Term-Sharing as Ground for Disqualification: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it disqualified SENIOR CITIZENS and cancelled its registration solely on account of the term-sharing agreement among its nominees.
• Retroactivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366: Whether Section 7, Rule 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366, prohibiting term-sharing, can be applied retroactively to the 2010 term-sharing agreement.
• Vested Right to Registration: Whether SENIOR CITIZENS acquired a vested right to its registration as a party-list organization that would preclude the retroactive application of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366.

• Due Process: Yes. The COMELEC violated SENIOR CITIZENS' right to due process by cancelling its registration on the ground of the term-sharing agreement without apprising the organization that this issue would be a material consideration in the evaluation of its qualifications, contrary to the requirement of due notice and hearing under Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941.
• Term-Sharing as Ground for Disqualification: No. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion because the term-sharing agreement was never implemented; Rep. Kho continued to serve his full term after the COMELEC itself refused to recognize the agreement in E.M. No. 12-040, and there was no subsequent attempt to implement it.
• Retroactivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366: The Court found that COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 does not provide for retroactive effect, but held that the disqualification was still improper for the independent reason that the agreement was never implemented, rendering the retroactivity question largely academic.
• Vested Right to Registration: No. A public office is not a property right; no one has a vested right to any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding public office. The COMELEC is duty-bound to review the grant of registration to ensure continuous adherence to legal requirements.

• Due Process: Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 requires "due notice and hearing" before the COMELEC may cancel a party-list organization's registration. The cardinal primary rights in administrative proceedings, as outlined in Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations and applied to the COMELEC in Mendoza vs. Commission on Elections, require that parties be given the opportunity to present their case and adduce evidence on the issues to be decided. While both factions were given the opportunity to present evidence on their continuing compliance with accreditation requirements during the August 24, 2012 hearing, they were not apprised that the term-sharing agreement would be a material consideration in the evaluation of their qualifications. The April 18, 2012 hearing cited by the COMELEC was conducted for E.M. No. 12-040 (the petition for confirmation of replacement), not for the review of SENIOR CITIZENS' qualifications. Chairman Brillantes's admonition during that hearing was not sufficient to constitute fair warning that the term-sharing agreement would be a ground for cancellation. After the Atong Paglaum remand, the COMELEC should have afforded SENIOR CITIZENS the opportunity to be heard on the term-sharing issue, either through a hearing or written memoranda, but instead issued the May 10, 2013 Omnibus Resolution without further proceedings.

• Term-Sharing as Ground for Disqualification: The ground invoked by the COMELEC—the term-sharing agreement—was not implemented. The Arquiza Group manifested during the April 18, 2012 hearing that it was withdrawing its petition for confirmation of Rep. Kho's replacement. The COMELEC itself, in its June 27, 2012 Resolution in E.M. No. 12-040, refused to recognize the term-sharing agreement and Rep. Kho's resignation, declaring that no vacancy was created. There was no indication that the nominees subsequently tried to implement or succeeded in implementing the agreement. Rep. Kho continued to serve his term. Since the agreement was never carried out, there was no violation of any election law, rule, or regulation to speak of. Penalizing SENIOR CITIZENS for an agreement that was never implemented constituted unfair and arbitrary treatment, amounting to grave abuse of discretion.

• Retroactivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366: The general rule under Article 4 of the Civil Code is that laws have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided, and COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 does not provide for retroactive application. Remedial statutes or those that do not create new or take away vested rights may operate retroactively. However, the Court found it unnecessary to definitively resolve the retroactivity question because the disqualification failed on the independent ground of non-implementation of the term-sharing agreement.

• Vested Right to Registration: Citing Montesclaros vs. Commission on Elections, the Court held that a public office is not a property right; a public office is a public trust. No one has a vested right to any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding public office. Under Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC is entrusted with the function to register political parties, organizations, or coalitions, and is duty-bound to review the grant of registration to ensure continuous adherence to legal requirements. SENIOR CITIZENS could not claim a vested right to its registration that would preclude retroactive application of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366.

• Cardinal Primary Rights in Administrative Proceedings (Ang Tibay Doctrine) — The seven due process requirements in administrative/quasi-judicial proceedings: (1) the right to a hearing and to present evidence; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have something to support it; (4) the evidence must be substantial; (5) the decision must be based on the evidence presented or contained in the record; (6) the decision-maker must independently consider the law and facts, not simply accept a subordinate's views; (7) the decision must render the issues and reasons so the parties can understand the decision. The Court applied this doctrine to find that SENIOR CITIZENS was denied due process because it was not apprised that the term-sharing agreement would be a ground for cancellation, and thus was deprived of the opportunity to adequately explain its side or adduce evidence on that specific issue.

• No Vested Right to Public Office — A public office is not a property right; a public office is a public trust. No one has a vested right to any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the argument that SENIOR CITIZENS had a vested right to its registration as a party-list organization that would preclude retroactive application of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366.

• Prospectivity of Laws — Laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided (Article 4, Civil Code). Statutes and administrative rules operate prospectively unless legislative intent for retroactivity is manifest by express terms or necessary implication. Remedial statutes, or those that do not create new or take away vested rights, do not fall under the general rule against retroactive operation. The Court invoked this principle in analyzing the retroactivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 but found it unnecessary to resolve the issue definitively due to the dispositive finding of non-implementation.

• "Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by the COMELEC En Banc. Verily, how can there be disobedience on the part of SENIOR CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying out their agreement? Hence, there was no violation of an election law, rule, or regulation to speak of." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the non-implementation issue: a party-list organization cannot be penalized for a term-sharing agreement that its nominees never carried out, as there is no violation to speak of without implementation.

• "The term of office of public officials cannot be made subject to any agreement of private parties. Public office is not a commodity that can be shared, apportioned or be made subject of any private agreement. Public office is vested with public interest that should not be reined by individual interest." — This passage, quoted from the COMELEC's June 27, 2012 Resolution, articulates the public policy against term-sharing in party-list representation: the constitutionally fixed term of office cannot be subjected to private contractual arrangements.

• "a public office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states, a 'Public office is a public trust.' No one has a vested right to any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office." — This passage, quoted from Montesclaros vs. Commission on Elections, defines the doctrine that no vested right exists in public office, which the Court applied to reject the argument that SENIOR CITIZENS' registration could not be subjected to retroactive application of COMELEC rules.

• Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations — Foundational case establishing the seven cardinal primary rights in administrative proceedings. Cited as the controlling framework for determining whether the COMELEC afforded due process to SENIOR CITIZENS.
• Mendoza vs. Commission on Elections — Applied the Ang Tibay due process standards specifically to the COMELEC as an administrative and quasi-judicial tribunal. Cited for the proposition that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to be heard.
• Montesclaros vs. Commission on Elections — Cited for the doctrine that a public office is not a property right and no one has a vested right to any public office, applied to reject the vested-right argument.
• Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Reyes — Cited for the principle that remedial statutes, or those that do not create new or take away vested rights, do not fall under the general rule against retroactive operation of statutes.
• Lintag and Arrastia vs. National Power Corporation — Cited for the principle that statutes and administrative rules operate prospectively unless legislative intent for retroactivity is manifest.
• BANAT vs. Commission on Elections — Cited for the procedure on allocation of additional seats under the party-list system, through which SENIOR CITIZENS was initially allocated a seat.
• Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections — Cited as the case that established parameters for determining party-list qualifications and remanded the disqualification cases, including those involving SENIOR CITIZENS, to the COMELEC for summary evidentiary hearings.

• Section 6, Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) — Provides the grounds for refusal and/or cancellation of registration of party-list organizations, requiring "due notice and hearing." The COMELEC invoked Section 6(5) — violation of or failure to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to elections — as the ground for cancelling SENIOR CITIZENS' registration. The Court found that the due notice and hearing requirement was not satisfied because SENIOR CITIZENS was not apprised that the term-sharing agreement would be a basis for cancellation.
• Section 7, Article VI, 1987 Constitution — Provides that Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years beginning at noon on June 30 next following their election. The COMELEC cited this provision to argue that the term-sharing agreement violated the constitutionally fixed term of office.
• Section 7, Rule 4, COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 — Provides that the filing of vacancy as a result of term-sharing agreements among nominees of winning party-list groups shall not be allowed. The COMELEC applied this provision to the 2010 term-sharing agreement; the Court found that the resolution does not provide for retroactive effect but did not definitively resolve the retroactivity issue.
• Article 4, Civil Code — Provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. Cited in the discussion of whether COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 could be applied retroactively to the 2010 agreement.
• Section 2(5), Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution — Entrusts the COMELEC with the function to register political parties, organizations, or coalitions. Cited in holding that the COMELEC is duty-bound to review registrations to ensure continuous adherence to legal requirements.

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, and Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Portugal Perez, Jose Catral Mendoza, Bienvenido L. Reyes, Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, and Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen. Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. took no part due to the party-list affiliation of his wife. No separate concurring opinions were issued.