Co vs. Rosario

The selection or removal of a special administrator is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators; the probate court may appoint or remove a special administrator on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at its sound discretion, and higher courts will not interfere with that discretion absent grave abuse thereof. Such discretion, however, is not license for partiality and must be exercised on reason, equity, justice and legal principles.

The estate of Co Bun Chun was the subject of settlement proceedings docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4615 before Branch 66 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Petitioner Luis L. Co is a son of the decedent, and Alvin Milton Co, whom Luis nominated for appointment, is the decedent's grandson; the respondents include the presiding judge of the probate court and the other heirs impleaded in the settlement proceedings, together with the Estate of Lim See Te. The Rules of Court distinguish between regular and special administrators, committing the selection and removal of the latter to the discretion of the probate court rather than to the enumerated grounds governing regular administrators. That distinction supplies the framework against which the challenged revocation was reviewed.

On March 4, 1998, in Sp. Proc. No. M-4615, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 66, appointed Luis L. Co and Vicente O. Yu, Sr. as special administrators of the estate of Luis's father, Co Bun Chun. Acting on the motion of the other heirs, the trial court thereafter set aside Luis's appointment as special co-administrator.

Luis thereupon nominated his son, Alvin Milton Co, for appointment as co-administrator of the estate, and on August 31, 1998, the RTC appointed Alvin as special co-administrator.

Almost four years thereafter, the RTC, acting on a motion filed by one of the heirs and captioned as a Motion to Disqualify Alvin Milton S. Co as Special Administrator, issued its January 22, 2002 Order revoking and setting aside Alvin's appointment. The trial court reasoned that Alvin had become unsuitable to discharge the trust given to him as special co-administrator because his capacity, ability or competence to perform the functions of co-administrator had been beclouded by the filing of several criminal cases against him which, even if there was no conviction yet, had provided the heirs ample reason to doubt his fitness to handle the subject estate with utmost fidelity, trust and confidence. Luis moved for reconsideration of the Order, but the motion was denied in the RTC Order of May 14, 2002.

On the factual question of Alvin's fitness, the appellate court observed that in revoking the appointment the lower court had taken into consideration the fiduciary nature of the office of a special administrator, which demands a high degree of trust and confidence in the person appointed. The court a quo found that, burdened with the criminal charges of falsification of commercial documents leveled against him and the corresponding profound duty to defend himself in those proceedings, Alvin's ability and qualification to act as special co-administrator of the estate were beclouded, and the recall of his appointment was proper under the attendant circumstances. Without condemning him as guilty before he was found such by the appropriate tribunal, the court merely declared that it was more consistent with the demands of justice and orderly processes that Alvin, already bidden to defend himself against criminal charges for falsification in other fora, be relieved of his duties and functions as special administrator in order to avoid conflicts and possible abuse.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in the Revocation: Whether the Regional Trial Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in revoking and setting aside the appointment of Alvin Milton Co as special co-administrator of the estate of Co Bun Chun, so as to warrant the issuance of the writ of certiorari.
• Governing Grounds for Removal of a Special Administrator: Whether the removal of a special administrator is governed by the grounds enumerated in the Rules of Court for the removal of a regular administrator.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in the Revocation: No. The trial court's revocation of Alvin's appointment was grounded on reason, equity, justice and legal principle and was not characterized by patent and gross capriciousness, pure whim, arbitrariness or despotism correctible by certiorari.
• Governing Grounds for Removal of a Special Administrator: No. The selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules on regular administrators; the court may remove a special administrator on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at its discretion, subject to review only for grave abuse.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in the Revocation: The appellate court's ruling that the trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Alvin's appointment was affirmed. The trial court's judgment on the issue of Alvin's removal was found to be grounded on reason, equity, justice and legal principle, and not characterized by patent and gross capriciousness, pure whim and abuse, arbitrariness or despotism as to be correctible by the writ of certiorari. The appellate court had correctly observed that in revoking the appointment the lower court took into account the fiduciary nature of the office of a special administrator, which demands a high degree of trust and confidence in the person appointed; that Alvin's ability and qualification to act as special co-administrator were beclouded by the criminal charges of falsification of commercial documents against him and by the corresponding duty to defend himself in those proceedings; and that the recall of his appointment was proper under the attendant circumstances. Such reasoning was found to have basis in actual logic and probability. Without condemning Alvin as guilty before he was found such by the appropriate tribunal, the court merely declared that it was more consistent with the demands of justice and orderly processes that he, already bidden to defend himself against criminal charges for falsification in other fora, be relieved of his duties and functions as special administrator to avoid conflicts and possible abuse. No grave abuse of discretion attended the ruling, it having been reached based on the court a quo's own fair assessment of the circumstances of the case and the applicable laws.

• Governing Grounds for Removal of a Special Administrator: The settled rule is that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. Courts may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion; and as long as that discretion is exercised without grave abuse, higher courts will not interfere with it. This is no authority, however, for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment, since the exercise of such discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principles. Thus, even if a special administrator had already been appointed, once the court finds the appointee no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect thereto. The special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control and who is expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, especially with respect to its smooth administration and earliest settlement. Applying these standards, the trial court's revocation of Alvin's appointment was sustained as an exercise of sound, reasoned discretion rather than of arbitrary will.

• Discretion in the selection and removal of special administrators — The selection or removal of a special administrator is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of a regular administrator. The probate court may appoint or remove a special administrator on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules of Court, at its discretion, and higher courts will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion absent grave abuse. In this case, the Court applied the doctrine to reject the challenge to the RTC's revocation of Alvin Milton Co's appointment, holding that the trial court was not bound by the enumerated grounds for removing a regular administrator.
• Limits on the probate court's discretion — The discretion to appoint or remove a special administrator is not a license for partiality. It is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment; the exercise of such discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principles. The Court used this limitation to test, and ultimately uphold, the trial court's revocation of Alvin's appointment as grounded on reason, equity, justice and legal principle.
• Loss of confidence as a ground for withdrawal of the appointment — Even if a special administrator has already been appointed, once the court finds the appointee no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect thereto. The Court relied on this principle in sustaining the revocation of Alvin's appointment, which the trial court had found to be warranted because the criminal charges against him beclouded his fitness to hold a fiduciary office.
• Fiduciary nature of the office of special administrator — A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control and who is expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, especially with respect to its smooth administration and earliest settlement. The Court invoked this characterization to explain why the probate court may demand a high degree of trust and confidence in the appointee and may recall the appointment once that confidence is lost.
• Grave abuse of discretion as the standard for certiorari review — Interference with the probate court's exercise of discretion is warranted only where the discretion is exercised with grave abuse, that is, with patent and gross capriciousness, pure whim and abuse, arbitrariness or despotism. Finding no such vice in the trial court's assessment of Alvin's fitness, the Court declined to disturb the revocation.
• Prompt appointment of a regular administrator — Prolonged litigation over the removal of a special co-administrator could have been avoided if the trial court had promptly appointed a regular administrator. The Court accordingly directed the trial court to proceed with the appointment of a regular administrator as soon as practicable.

• "Settled is the rule that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. Courts may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion. As long as the said discretion is exercised without grave abuse, higher courts will not interfere with it." — This passage states the ratio decidendi of the decision: it is the canonical formulation of the rule distinguishing special from regular administrators and of the standard of review applicable to the probate court's exercise of discretion.
• "This, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. The exercise of such discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principles." — This passage defines the outer limit of the discretion recognized in the preceding rule and supplies the test the Court applied in evaluating the trial court's revocation of Alvin's appointment.
• "Thus, even if a special administrator had already been appointed, once the court finds the appointee no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect thereto." — This passage articulates the specific ground on which the revocation was sustained, namely the loss of the court's confidence in the appointee, and is the proposition most directly applied to the facts.
• "The special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control and who is expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, especially with respect to its smooth administration and earliest settlement." — This passage defines the status and fiduciary obligations of a special administrator, explaining why the probate court may demand a high degree of trust and confidence in the person appointed.

• Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo vs. Lacuata-Gabriel, G.R. No. 162934, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 747, 760 — The controlling precedent cited for the rule that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules on regular administrators; also cited at page 757 for the proposition that the special administrator is an officer of the court subject to its supervision and control.
• Roxas vs. Pecson, 82 Phil. 407, 410 (1948) — Cited in Castillo in support of the same rule distinguishing the removal of special administrators from that of regular administrators.
• Rivera vs. Hon. Santos, 124 Phil. 1557, 1561 (1966) — Cited for the rulings that the selection of a special administrator is left to the sound discretion of the court, and that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness, as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, does not obtain.
• Alcasid vs. Samson, 102 Phil. 735, 737 (1957) — Cited for the declaration that the appointment and removal of a special administrator are interlocutory proceedings incidental to the main case and lie in the sound discretion of the court.
• Esler vs. Tad-y, G.R. No. L-20902, October 9, 1923 — Cited for the principle that higher courts will not interfere with the probate court's exercise of discretion in the absence of grave abuse.
• Fule vs. Court of Appeals, 165 Phil. 785, 800 (1976) — Cited for the limitation that the court's discretion must be exercised on reason, equity, justice and legal principles, and not on partiality or personal preference.
• Cobarrubias vs. Dizon, 76 Phil. 209 (1946) — Cited, through Herrera's Remedial Law, for the rule that once the court finds the appointee no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect thereto.
• Machica vs. Roosevelt Services Center, Inc., G.R. No. 168664, May 4, 2006, 489 SCRA 534, 547 — Cited for the standard of grave abuse of discretion as the threshold for correcting a tribunal's exercise of discretion through certiorari.

• Rule 45, Rules of Court — The procedural vehicle by which petitioner elevated the Court of Appeals' October 28, 2003 Decision to the Supreme Court; the petition for review on certiorari was denied for failure to show reversible error in the appellate court's affirmance of the revocation.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — The procedural vehicle by which petitioner earlier challenged the RTC Orders of January 22, 2002 and May 14, 2002 before the Court of Appeals; relief under the rule was held unavailable because the trial court's revocation of Alvin's appointment was not attended by grave abuse of discretion.
• Rules of Court (grounds for removal of a regular administrator) — Referenced generally by the Court as the source of the enumerated grounds that govern the removal of regular administrators but which do not govern the removal of special administrators; the trial court was therefore not confined to those grounds when it revoked Alvin's appointment.
• Section 13, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Cited in the Chief Justice's certification accompanying the Decision, attesting that the conclusions reached had been arrived at in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

• Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Associate Justice (Chairperson)
• Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Associate Justice
• Renato C. Corona, Associate Justice
• Ruben T. Reyes, Associate Justice